Update pre9, Support TLS 1.3 final
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@@ -225,16 +225,7 @@
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*) Support for TLSv1.3 added. Note that users upgrading from an earlier
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version of OpenSSL should review their configuration settings to ensure
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that they are still appropriate for TLSv1.3. For further information see:
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https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
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NOTE: In this pre-release of OpenSSL a draft version of the
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TLSv1.3 standard has been implemented. Implementations of different draft
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versions of the standard do not inter-operate, and this version will not
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inter-operate with an implementation of the final standard when it is
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eventually published. Different pre-release versions may implement
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different versions of the draft. The final version of OpenSSL 1.1.1 will
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implement the final version of the standard.
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TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the above note before final release
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https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3
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[Matt Caswell]
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*) Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator
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@@ -465,6 +456,62 @@
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Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
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During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
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malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
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cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
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key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
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could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
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(CVE-2018-0732)
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[Guido Vranken]
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*) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
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The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
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a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
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mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
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recover the private key.
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This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
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Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
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(CVE-2018-0737)
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[Billy Brumley]
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*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
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parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
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pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
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[Richard Levitte]
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*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
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length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
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[Andy Polyakov]
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*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
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being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
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For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
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The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
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to 2^-128.
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[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
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*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
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[Kurt Roeckx]
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*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
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attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
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[Matt Caswell]
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*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
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now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
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[Richard Levitte]
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*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
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compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
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are no longer allowed.
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[Emilia Käsper]
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*) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS
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Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
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