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Update pre9, Support TLS 1.3 final

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Hakase
2018-08-16 01:04:10 +09:00
parent f78925a4b7
commit ef69dcb649
23 changed files with 168 additions and 61 deletions
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CHANGES
+57 -10
View File
@@ -225,16 +225,7 @@
*) Support for TLSv1.3 added. Note that users upgrading from an earlier
version of OpenSSL should review their configuration settings to ensure
that they are still appropriate for TLSv1.3. For further information see:
https://www.openssl.org/blog/blog/2018/02/08/tlsv1.3/
NOTE: In this pre-release of OpenSSL a draft version of the
TLSv1.3 standard has been implemented. Implementations of different draft
versions of the standard do not inter-operate, and this version will not
inter-operate with an implementation of the final standard when it is
eventually published. Different pre-release versions may implement
different versions of the draft. The final version of OpenSSL 1.1.1 will
implement the final version of the standard.
TODO(TLS1.3): Remove the above note before final release
https://wiki.openssl.org/index.php/TLS1.3
[Matt Caswell]
*) Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator
@@ -465,6 +456,62 @@
Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.0i [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Client DoS due to large DH parameter
During key agreement in a TLS handshake using a DH(E) based ciphersuite a
malicious server can send a very large prime value to the client. This will
cause the client to spend an unreasonably long period of time generating a
key for this prime resulting in a hang until the client has finished. This
could be exploited in a Denial Of Service attack.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 5th June 2018 by Guido Vranken
(CVE-2018-0732)
[Guido Vranken]
*) Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation
The OpenSSL RSA Key generation algorithm has been shown to be vulnerable to
a cache timing side channel attack. An attacker with sufficient access to
mount cache timing attacks during the RSA key generation process could
recover the private key.
This issue was reported to OpenSSL on 4th April 2018 by Alejandro Cabrera
Aldaya, Billy Brumley, Cesar Pereida Garcia and Luis Manuel Alvarez Tapia.
(CVE-2018-0737)
[Billy Brumley]
*) Make EVP_PKEY_asn1_new() a bit stricter about its input. A NULL pem_str
parameter is no longer accepted, as it leads to a corrupt table. NULL
pem_str is reserved for alias entries only.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Revert blinding in ECDSA sign and instead make problematic addition
length-invariant. Switch even to fixed-length Montgomery multiplication.
[Andy Polyakov]
*) Change generating and checking of primes so that the error rate of not
being prime depends on the intended use based on the size of the input.
For larger primes this will result in more rounds of Miller-Rabin.
The maximal error rate for primes with more than 1080 bits is lowered
to 2^-128.
[Kurt Roeckx, Annie Yousar]
*) Increase the number of Miller-Rabin rounds for DSA key generating to 64.
[Kurt Roeckx]
*) Add blinding to ECDSA and DSA signatures to protect against side channel
attacks discovered by Keegan Ryan (NCC Group).
[Matt Caswell]
*) When unlocking a pass phrase protected PEM file or PKCS#8 container, we
now allow empty (zero character) pass phrases.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Certificate time validation (X509_cmp_time) enforces stricter
compliance with RFC 5280. Fractional seconds and timezone offsets
are no longer allowed.
[Emilia Käsper]
*) Fixed a text canonicalisation bug in CMS
Where a CMS detached signature is used with text content the text goes
Configurations/15-android.conf
+3
View File
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
# comments below...
{
use File::Spec::Functions;
my $android_ndk = {};
my %triplet = (
arm => "arm-linux-androideabi",
@@ -23,6 +25,7 @@
my $ndk = $ENV{ANDROID_NDK};
die "\$ANDROID_NDK is not defined" if (!$ndk);
die "\$ANDROID_NDK=$ndk is invalid" if (!-d "$ndk/platforms");
$ndk = canonpath($ndk);
my $ndkver = undef;
Configure
-2
View File
@@ -405,7 +405,6 @@ my @disablables = (
"tests",
"threads",
"tls",
"tls13downgrade",
"ts",
"ubsan",
"ui-console",
@@ -449,7 +448,6 @@ our %disabled = ( # "what" => "comment"
"ssl3" => "default",
"ssl3-method" => "default",
"ubsan" => "default",
"tls13downgrade" => "default",
"unit-test" => "default",
"weak-ssl-ciphers" => "default",
"zlib" => "default",
INSTALL
-10
View File
@@ -476,16 +476,6 @@
require additional system-dependent options! See "Note on
multi-threading" below.
enable-tls13downgrade
TODO(TLS1.3): Make this enabled by default and remove the
option when TLSv1.3 is out of draft
TLSv1.3 offers a downgrade protection mechanism. This is
implemented but disabled by default. It should not typically
be enabled except for testing purposes. Otherwise this could
cause problems if a pre-RFC version of OpenSSL talks to an
RFC implementation (it will erroneously be detected as a
downgrade).
no-ts
Don't build Time Stamping Authority support.
NEWS
+5
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,11 @@
o Add support for SipHash
o Grand redesign of the OpenSSL random generator
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0h and OpenSSL 1.1.0i [under development]
o Client DoS due to large DH parameter (CVE-2018-0732)
o Cache timing vulnerability in RSA Key Generation (CVE-2018-0737)
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0g and OpenSSL 1.1.0h [under development]
o Constructed ASN.1 types with a recursive definition could exceed the
crypto/asn1/a_object.c
+15 -4
View File
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
{
unsigned char *p;
unsigned char *p, *allocated = NULL;
int objsize;
if ((a == NULL) || (a->data == NULL))
@@ -30,12 +30,23 @@ int i2d_ASN1_OBJECT(const ASN1_OBJECT *a, unsigned char **pp)
if (pp == NULL || objsize == -1)
return objsize;
p = *pp;
if (*pp == NULL) {
if ((p = allocated = OPENSSL_malloc(objsize)) == NULL) {
ASN1err(ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else {
p = *pp;
}
ASN1_put_object(&p, 0, a->length, V_ASN1_OBJECT, V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL);
memcpy(p, a->data, a->length);
p += a->length;
*pp = p;
/*
* If a new buffer was allocated, just return it back.
* If not, return the incremented buffer pointer.
*/
*pp = allocated != NULL ? allocated : p + a->length;
return objsize;
}
crypto/asn1/asn1_err.c
+1
View File
@@ -116,6 +116,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA ASN1_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2A_ASN1_OBJECT, 0), "i2a_ASN1_OBJECT"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM, 0),
"i2d_ASN1_bio_stream"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT, 0), "i2d_ASN1_OBJECT"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY, 0), "i2d_DSA_PUBKEY"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY, 0), "i2d_EC_PUBKEY"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_ASN1, ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY, 0), "i2d_PrivateKey"},
crypto/conf/conf_ssl.c
+1
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,7 @@ static int ssl_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
goto err;
}
cnt = sk_CONF_VALUE_num(cmd_lists);
ssl_module_free(md);
ssl_names = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ssl_names) * cnt);
ssl_names_count = cnt;
for (i = 0; i < ssl_names_count; i++) {
crypto/err/openssl.txt
+1
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ ASN1_F_DO_DUMP:125:do_dump
ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE:222:do_tcreate
ASN1_F_I2A_ASN1_OBJECT:126:i2a_ASN1_OBJECT
ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM:211:i2d_ASN1_bio_stream
ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT:143:i2d_ASN1_OBJECT
ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY:161:i2d_DSA_PUBKEY
ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY:181:i2d_EC_PUBKEY
ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY:163:i2d_PrivateKey
crypto/o_fopen.c
+18
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,24 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
# if defined(__linux) || defined(__sun) || defined(__hpux)
/*
* Following definition aliases fopen to fopen64 on above mentioned
* platforms. This makes it possible to open and sequentially access files
* larger than 2GB from 32-bit application. It does not allow to traverse
* them beyond 2GB with fseek/ftell, but on the other hand *no* 32-bit
* platform permits that, not with fseek/ftell. Not to mention that breaking
* 2GB limit for seeking would require surgery to *our* API. But sequential
* access suffices for practical cases when you can run into large files,
* such as fingerprinting, so we can let API alone. For reference, the list
* of 32-bit platforms which allow for sequential access of large files
* without extra "magic" comprise *BSD, Darwin, IRIX...
*/
# ifndef _FILE_OFFSET_BITS
# define _FILE_OFFSET_BITS 64
# endif
# endif
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
doc/man3/SSL_export_keying_material.pod
+1 -2
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ During the creation of a TLS or DTLS connection shared keying material is
established between the two endpoints. The functions
SSL_export_keying_material() and SSL_export_keying_material_early() enable an
application to use some of this keying material for its own purposes in
accordance with RFC5705 (for TLSv1.2 and below) or RFCXXXX (for TLSv1.3).
TODO(TLS1.3): Update the RFC number when the RFC is published.
accordance with RFC5705 (for TLSv1.2 and below) or RFC8446 (for TLSv1.3).
SSL_export_keying_material() derives keying material using
the F<exporter_master_secret> established in the handshake.
include/openssl/asn1err.h
+1
View File
@@ -101,6 +101,7 @@ int ERR_load_ASN1_strings(void);
# define ASN1_F_DO_TCREATE 222
# define ASN1_F_I2A_ASN1_OBJECT 126
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_BIO_STREAM 211
# define ASN1_F_I2D_ASN1_OBJECT 143
# define ASN1_F_I2D_DSA_PUBKEY 161
# define ASN1_F_I2D_EC_PUBKEY 181
# define ASN1_F_I2D_PRIVATEKEY 163
ssl/s3_lib.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -4580,7 +4580,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, size_t len,
} else {
ret = RAND_bytes(result, len);
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
if (ret > 0) {
if (!ossl_assert(sizeof(tls11downgrade) < len)
|| !ossl_assert(sizeof(tls12downgrade) < len))
@@ -4592,7 +4592,7 @@ int ssl_fill_hello_random(SSL *s, int server, unsigned char *result, size_t len,
memcpy(result + len - sizeof(tls11downgrade), tls11downgrade,
sizeof(tls11downgrade));
}
#endif
return ret;
}
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -538,7 +538,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
for (currv = max_version; currv >= min_version; currv--) {
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this first if clause prior to release!! */
if (currv == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_27)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_26)
|| !WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_23)) {
ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+9 -10
View File
@@ -381,9 +381,6 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
} else if (!tls1_set_peer_legacy_sigalg(s, pkey)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_PROCESS_CERT_VERIFY,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
@@ -396,6 +393,11 @@ MSG_PROCESS_RETURN tls_process_cert_verify(SSL *s, PACKET *pkt)
goto err;
}
#ifdef SSL_DEBUG
if (SSL_USE_SIGALGS(s))
fprintf(stderr, "USING TLSv1.2 HASH %s\n", EVP_MD_name(md));
#endif
/* Check for broken implementations of GOST ciphersuites */
/*
* If key is GOST and len is exactly 64 or 128, it is signature without
@@ -1764,17 +1766,16 @@ int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
while (PACKET_get_net_2(&versionslist, &candidate_vers)) {
/* TODO(TLS1.3): Remove this before release */
if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION
|| candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
|| candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_26
|| candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT_23) {
if (best_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& orig_candidate > candidate_vers)
&& (orig_candidate > candidate_vers
|| orig_candidate == TLS1_3_VERSION))
continue;
orig_candidate = candidate_vers;
candidate_vers = TLS1_3_VERSION;
} else if (candidate_vers == TLS1_3_VERSION) {
/* Don't actually accept real TLSv1.3 */
continue;
}
/*
* TODO(TLS1.3): There is some discussion on the TLS list about
@@ -1935,7 +1936,6 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
if (s->version != vent->version)
continue;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS13DOWNGRADE
/* Check for downgrades */
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) {
if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
@@ -1962,7 +1962,6 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
return 0;
}
}
#endif
s->method = method;
return 1;
test/asynciotest.c
+1 -3
View File
@@ -227,11 +227,9 @@ static int async_write(BIO *bio, const char *in, int inl)
/*
* We can't fragment anything after the ServerHello (or CCS <=
* TLS1.2), otherwise we get a bad record MAC
* TODO(TLS1.3): Change TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT to TLS1_3_VERSION
* before release
*/
if (contenttype == SSL3_RT_CHANGE_CIPHER_SPEC
|| (negversion == TLS1_3_VERSION_DRAFT
|| (negversion == TLS1_3_VERSION
&& msgtype == SSL3_MT_SERVER_HELLO)) {
fragment = 0;
break;
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpmac.txt
+45
View File
@@ -148,6 +148,8 @@ Key = AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Input = DDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDDD
Output = 56be34521d144c88dbb8c733f0e8b3f6
Title = SHA1
# HMAC tests from NIST test data
MAC = HMAC
@@ -168,6 +170,8 @@ Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F60616263
Output = 2D51B2F7750E410584662E38F133435F4C4FD42A
Title = SHA2
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA224
Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
@@ -240,6 +244,47 @@ Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F101112131415161718191A1B1C1D1E1F202122232425262728292A2B2C2D2E2F303132333435363738393A3B3C3D3E3F404142434445464748494A4B4C4D4E4F505152535455565758595A5B5C5D5E5F606162636465666768696A6B6C6D6E6F707172737475767778797A7B7C7D7E7F808182838485868788898A8B8C8D8E8F909192939495969798999A9B9C9D9E9FA0A1A2A3A4A5A6A7A8A9AAABACADAEAFB0B1B2B3B4B5B6B7B8B9BABBBCBDBEBFC0C1C2C3C4C5C6C7
Output = D93EC8D2DE1AD2A9957CB9B83F14E76AD6B5E0CCE285079A127D3B14BCCB7AA7286D4AC0D4CE64215F2BC9E6870B33D97438BE4AAA20CDA5C5A912B48B8E27F3
Title = SHA3
# NIST's test vectors
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-384
Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f
Output = d588a3c51f3f2d906e8298c1199aa8ff6296218127f6b38a90b6afe2c5617725bc99987f79b22a557b6520db710b7f42
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-384
Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f6061626364656667
Output = a27d24b592e8c8cbf6d4ce6fc5bf62d8fc98bf2d486640d9eb8099e24047837f5f3bffbe92dcce90b4ed5b1e7e44fa90
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-384
Input = "Sample message for keylen>blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f808182838485868788898a8b8c8d8e8f9091929394959697
Output = e5ae4c739f455279368ebf36d4f5354c95aa184c899d3870e460ebc288ef1f9470053f73f7c6da2a71bcaec38ce7d6ac
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-512
Input = "Sample message for keylen<blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f
Output = 4efd629d6c71bf86162658f29943b1c308ce27cdfa6db0d9c3ce81763f9cbce5f7ebe9868031db1a8f8eb7b6b95e5c5e3f657a8996c86a2f6527e307f0213196
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-512
Input = "Sample message for keylen=blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f4041424344454647
Output = 544e257ea2a3e5ea19a590e6a24b724ce6327757723fe2751b75bf007d80f6b360744bf1b7a88ea585f9765b47911976d3191cf83c039f5ffab0d29cc9d9b6da
MAC = HMAC
Algorithm = SHA3-512
Input = "Sample message for keylen>blocklen"
Key = 000102030405060708090a0b0c0d0e0f101112131415161718191a1b1c1d1e1f202122232425262728292a2b2c2d2e2f303132333435363738393a3b3c3d3e3f404142434445464748494a4b4c4d4e4f505152535455565758595a5b5c5d5e5f606162636465666768696a6b6c6d6e6f707172737475767778797a7b7c7d7e7f8081828384858687
Output = 5f464f5e5b7848e3885e49b2c385f0694985d0e38966242dc4a5fe3fea4b37d46b65ceced5dcf59438dd840bab22269f0ba7febdb9fcf74602a35666b2a32915
Title = CMAC tests (from FIPS module)
MAC = CMAC
test/recipes/70-test_sslcertstatus.t
-2
View File
@@ -40,8 +40,6 @@ my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
#Test 1: Sending a status_request extension in both ClientHello and
#ServerHello but then omitting the CertificateStatus message is valid
#TODO(TLS1.3): Temporarily disabling this test in TLS1.3 until we've completed
#the move the status request extension to the Certificate message.
$proxy->clientflags("-status -no_tls1_3");
$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
plan tests => 1;
test/recipes/70-test_sslversions.t
+3 -4
View File
@@ -145,8 +145,7 @@ sub modify_supported_versions_filter
$ext = pack "C5",
0x04, # Length
0x03, 0x03, #TLSv1.2
#TODO(TLS1.3): Fix before release
0x7f, 0x1c; #TLSv1.3 (draft 28)
0x03, 0x04; #TLSv1.3
} elsif ($testtype == UNRECOGNISED_VERSIONS) {
$ext = pack "C5",
0x04, # Length
@@ -160,8 +159,8 @@ sub modify_supported_versions_filter
} elsif ($testtype == WITH_TLS1_4) {
$ext = pack "C5",
0x04, # Length
#TODO(TLS1.3): Fix before release
0x7f, 0x1c; #TLSv1.3 (draft 28)
0x03, 0x05, #TLSv1.4
0x03, 0x04; #TLSv1.3
}
if ($testtype == REVERSE_ORDER_VERSIONS
|| $testtype == UNRECOGNISED_VERSIONS
test/recipes/70-test_tls13downgrade.t
-4
View File
@@ -26,10 +26,6 @@ plan skip_all => "$test_name needs the sock feature enabled"
plan skip_all => "$test_name needs TLS1.3 and TLS1.2 enabled"
if disabled("tls1_3") || disabled("tls1_2");
# TODO(TLS1.3): Enable this when TLSv1.3 comes out of draft
plan skip_all => "$test_name not run in pre TLSv1.3 RFC implementation"
if disabled("tls13downgrade");
$ENV{OPENSSL_ia32cap} = '~0x200000200000000';
my $proxy = TLSProxy::Proxy->new(
util/perl/TLSProxy/Message.pm
+2 -3
View File
@@ -95,9 +95,8 @@ use constant {
EXT_FORCE_LAST => 0xffff
};
# SignatureScheme of TLS 1.3, from
# https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-tls13-20#appendix-B.3.1.3
# TODO(TLS1.3) update link to IANA registry after publication
# SignatureScheme of TLS 1.3 from:
# https://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/tls-parameters.xhtml#tls-signaturescheme
# We have to manually grab the SHA224 equivalents from the old registry
use constant {
SIG_ALG_RSA_PKCS1_SHA256 => 0x0401,
util/perl/TLSProxy/Record.pm
-1
View File
@@ -36,7 +36,6 @@ my %record_type = (
use constant {
VERS_TLS_1_4 => 0x0305,
VERS_TLS_1_3_DRAFT => 0x7f1c,
VERS_TLS_1_3 => 0x0304,
VERS_TLS_1_2 => 0x0303,
VERS_TLS_1_1 => 0x0302,
util/perl/TLSProxy/ServerHello.pm
+1 -3
View File
@@ -101,9 +101,7 @@ sub parse
if ($random eq $hrrrandom) {
TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13(1);
# TODO(TLS1.3): Replace this reference to draft version before release
} elsif ($neg_version == TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_3_DRAFT) {
$neg_version = TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_3;
} elsif ($neg_version == TLSProxy::Record::VERS_TLS_1_3) {
TLSProxy::Proxy->is_tls13(1);
TLSProxy::Record->server_encrypting(1);