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Update - a0abb6a

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Hakase
2018-05-25 02:40:46 +09:00
parent 8583c0a8a2
commit b6c074e393
15 changed files with 110 additions and 113 deletions
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CHANGES
+4
View File
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
release branch.
Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input
length does not exceed the maximum supported digest length when performing
a sign, verify or verifyrecover operation.
[Matt Caswell]
*) SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is enabled by default. Applications that use blocking
I/O in combination with something like select() or poll() will hang. This
apps/pkeyutl.c
+11 -1
View File
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
if (buf_inlen < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
exit(1);
goto end;
}
if (rev) {
size_t i;
@@ -296,6 +296,16 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
/* Sanity check the input */
if (buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
&& (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN
|| pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
|| pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Error: The input data looks too long to be a hash\n");
goto end;
}
if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+1
View File
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
return 0;
dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
return 1;
}
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -3066,6 +3066,8 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
}
#endif
EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -3131,8 +3133,6 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
return NULL;
}
EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(ret, nid);
return ret;
}
crypto/ec/ec_err.c
-2
View File
@@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
"pkey_ecd_digestsign25519"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448, 0),
"pkey_ecd_digestsign448"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519, 0), "pkey_ecd_sign25519"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448, 0), "pkey_ecd_sign448"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_ecx_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, 0), "pkey_ec_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_ec_ctrl_str"},
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+16
View File
@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ struct ec_key_st {
struct ec_point_st {
const EC_METHOD *meth;
/* NID for the curve if known */
int curve_name;
/*
* All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if
* they appear generic
@@ -288,6 +290,20 @@ struct ec_point_st {
* special case */
};
static ossl_inline int ec_point_is_compat(const EC_POINT *point,
const EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (group->meth != point->meth
|| (group->curve_name != 0
&& point->curve_name != 0
&& group->curve_name != point->curve_name))
return 0;
return 1;
}
NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *);
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+22 -17
View File
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
if (dest == src)
return 1;
dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
/* Copy precomputed */
dest->pre_comp_type = src->pre_comp_type;
switch (src->pre_comp_type) {
@@ -207,7 +209,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
return 0;
}
dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;
@@ -572,6 +573,7 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
}
ret->meth = group->meth;
ret->curve_name = group->curve_name;
if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) {
OPENSSL_free(ret);
@@ -609,7 +611,10 @@ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
if (dest->meth != src->meth
|| (dest->curve_name != src->curve_name
&& dest->curve_name != 0
&& src->curve_name != 0)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -666,7 +671,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -685,7 +690,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -703,7 +708,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -729,7 +734,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -755,7 +760,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -773,7 +778,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -789,8 +794,8 @@ int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)
|| (a->meth != b->meth)) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(a, group)
|| !ec_point_is_compat(b, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -804,7 +809,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(a, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -817,7 +822,7 @@ int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != a->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(a, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -831,7 +836,7 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -852,7 +857,7 @@ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -866,7 +871,7 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return -1;
}
if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(a, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(b, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return -1;
}
@@ -879,7 +884,7 @@ int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -896,7 +901,7 @@ int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
* precomputation is not available */
int ret = 0;
if (group->meth != r->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
}
for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
+4 -4
View File
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M,
EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != point->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
return 0;
}
if (group->meth != r->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
if (group->meth != points[j]->meth) {
if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[j], group)) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+1
View File
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
return 0;
dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
return 1;
}
crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
+12 -51
View File
@@ -675,18 +675,18 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx448_pkey_meth = {
0
};
static int pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = ED25519_SIGSIZE;
return 1;
}
if (*siglen < ED25519_SIGSIZE) {
ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
@@ -696,26 +696,18 @@ static int pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
return pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
tbslen);
}
static int pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
if (sig == NULL) {
*siglen = ED448_SIGSIZE;
return 1;
}
if (*siglen < ED448_SIGSIZE) {
ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
@@ -726,18 +718,11 @@ static int pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
return 1;
}
static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
return pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
}
static int pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
@@ -745,19 +730,11 @@ static int pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
return ED25519_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, edkey->pubkey);
}
static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
return pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
tbslen);
}
static int pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE)
return 0;
@@ -765,14 +742,6 @@ static int pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
return ED448_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, edkey->pubkey, NULL, 0);
}
static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
size_t tbslen)
{
return pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
tbslen);
}
static int pkey_ecd_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
{
switch (type) {
@@ -793,11 +762,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ed25519_pkey_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_ED25519, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pkey_ecx_keygen,
0,
pkey_ecd_sign25519,
0,
pkey_ecd_verify25519,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pkey_ecd_ctrl,
0,
pkey_ecd_digestsign25519,
@@ -808,11 +773,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ed448_pkey_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_ED448, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pkey_ecx_keygen,
0,
pkey_ecd_sign448,
0,
pkey_ecd_verify448,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
pkey_ecd_ctrl,
0,
pkey_ecd_digestsign448,
crypto/err/openssl.txt
-2
View File
@@ -647,8 +647,6 @@ EC_F_PKEY_ECD_CTRL:271:pkey_ecd_ctrl
EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN:272:pkey_ecd_digestsign
EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519:276:pkey_ecd_digestsign25519
EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448:277:pkey_ecd_digestsign448
EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519:284:pkey_ecd_sign25519
EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448:285:pkey_ecd_sign448
EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE:269:pkey_ecx_derive
EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL:197:pkey_ec_ctrl
EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR:198:pkey_ec_ctrl_str
doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+25 -20
View File
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
=head1 DESCRIPTION
The B<pkeyutl> command can be used to perform public key operations using
any supported algorithm.
The B<pkeyutl> command can be used to perform low level public key operations
using any supported algorithm.
=head1 OPTIONS
@@ -99,17 +99,17 @@ Reverse the order of the input buffer. This is useful for some libraries
=item B<-sign>
Sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires
a private key.
Sign the input data (which must be a hash) and output the signed result. This
requires a private key.
=item B<-verify>
Verify the input data against the signature file and indicate if the
verification succeeded or failed.
Verify the input data (which must be a hash) against the signature file and
indicate if the verification succeeded or failed.
=item B<-verifyrecover>
Verify the input data and output the recovered data.
Verify the input data (which must be a hash) and output the recovered data.
=item B<-encrypt>
@@ -184,20 +184,25 @@ and its implementation. The OpenSSL operations and options are indicated below.
Unless otherwise mentioned all algorithms support the B<digest:alg> option
which specifies the digest in use for sign, verify and verifyrecover operations.
The value B<alg> should represent a digest name as used in the
EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>.
This value is used only for sanity-checking the lengths of data passed in to
the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that make up the signature
(e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
In case of RSA, ECDSA and DSA signatures, this utility
will not perform hashing on input data but rather use the data directly as
input of signature algorithm. Depending on key type, signature type and mode
of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input data differ. In general,
with RSA the signed data can't be longer than the key modulus, in case of ECDSA
and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than field size, otherwise it will be
silently truncated to field size.
EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>. This value is not used to
hash the input data. It is used (by some algorithms) for sanity-checking the
lengths of data passed in to the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that
make up the signature (e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be 20 bytes
long binary encoding of SHA-1 hash function output.
This utility does not hash the input data but rather it will use the data
directly as input to the signature algorithm. Depending on the key type,
signature type, and mode of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input
data differ. The signed data can't be longer than the key modulus with RSA. In
case of ECDSA and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than the field
size, otherwise it will be silently truncated to the field size. In any event
the input size must not be larger than the largest supported digest size.
In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be the 20
bytes long binary encoding of the SHA-1 hash function output.
The Ed25519 and Ed448 signature algorithms are not supported by this utility.
They accept non-hashed input, but this utility can only be used to sign hashed
input.
=head1 RSA ALGORITHM
include/openssl/ecerr.h
-2
View File
@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN 272
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519 276
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448 277
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519 284
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448 285
# define EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE 269
# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL 197
# define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR 198