diff --git a/CHANGES b/CHANGES
index 612da599..7a478521 100644
--- a/CHANGES
+++ b/CHANGES
@@ -8,6 +8,10 @@
  release branch.
 
  Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
+  *) Enforce checking in the pkeyutl command line app to ensure that the input
+     length does not exceed the maximum supported digest length when performing
+     a sign, verify or verifyrecover operation.
+     [Matt Caswell]
 
   *) SSL_MODE_AUTO_RETRY is enabled by default. Applications that use blocking
      I/O in combination with something like select() or poll() will hang. This
diff --git a/apps/pkeyutl.c b/apps/pkeyutl.c
index 911cc576..2c4e524b 100644
--- a/apps/pkeyutl.c
+++ b/apps/pkeyutl.c
@@ -282,7 +282,7 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
         buf_inlen = bio_to_mem(&buf_in, keysize * 10, in);
         if (buf_inlen < 0) {
             BIO_printf(bio_err, "Error reading input Data\n");
-            exit(1);
+            goto end;
         }
         if (rev) {
             size_t i;
@@ -296,6 +296,16 @@ int pkeyutl_main(int argc, char **argv)
         }
     }
 
+    /* Sanity check the input */
+    if (buf_inlen > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE
+            && (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_SIGN
+                || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY
+                || pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFYRECOVER)) {
+        BIO_printf(bio_err,
+                   "Error: The input data looks too long to be a hash\n");
+        goto end;
+    }
+
     if (pkey_op == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
         rv = EVP_PKEY_verify(ctx, sig, (size_t)siglen,
                              buf_in, (size_t)buf_inlen);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
index b73805a2..5a83b056 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
@@ -311,6 +311,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
     if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
         return 0;
     dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
+    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
 
     return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
index 7d56d26b..618ec04c 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
@@ -3066,6 +3066,8 @@ static EC_GROUP *ec_group_new_from_data(const ec_list_element curve)
     }
 #endif
 
+    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(group, curve.nid);
+
     if ((P = EC_POINT_new(group)) == NULL) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_NEW_FROM_DATA, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
         goto err;
@@ -3131,8 +3133,6 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
         return NULL;
     }
 
-    EC_GROUP_set_curve_name(ret, nid);
-
     return ret;
 }
 
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
index 807427f9..94a72072 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_err.c
@@ -250,8 +250,6 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EC_str_functs[] = {
      "pkey_ecd_digestsign25519"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448, 0),
      "pkey_ecd_digestsign448"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519, 0), "pkey_ecd_sign25519"},
-    {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448, 0), "pkey_ecd_sign448"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_ecx_derive"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, 0), "pkey_ec_ctrl"},
     {ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EC, EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_ec_ctrl_str"},
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
index 36c65c5f..5e14071a 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
@@ -276,6 +276,8 @@ struct ec_key_st {
 
 struct ec_point_st {
     const EC_METHOD *meth;
+    /* NID for the curve if known */
+    int curve_name;
     /*
      * All members except 'meth' are handled by the method functions, even if
      * they appear generic
@@ -288,6 +290,20 @@ struct ec_point_st {
                                  * special case */
 };
 
+
+static ossl_inline int ec_point_is_compat(const EC_POINT *point,
+                                          const EC_GROUP *group)
+{
+    if (group->meth != point->meth
+        || (group->curve_name != 0
+            && point->curve_name != 0
+            && group->curve_name != point->curve_name))
+        return 0;
+
+    return 1;
+}
+
+
 NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
 NISTP256_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp256_pre_comp_dup(NISTP256_PRE_COMP *);
 NISTP521_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp521_pre_comp_dup(NISTP521_PRE_COMP *);
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
index 10b0cb77..30b11f75 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
@@ -140,6 +140,8 @@ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
     if (dest == src)
         return 1;
 
+    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
+
     /* Copy precomputed */
     dest->pre_comp_type = src->pre_comp_type;
     switch (src->pre_comp_type) {
@@ -207,7 +209,6 @@ int EC_GROUP_copy(EC_GROUP *dest, const EC_GROUP *src)
             return 0;
     }
 
-    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
     dest->asn1_flag = src->asn1_flag;
     dest->asn1_form = src->asn1_form;
 
@@ -572,6 +573,7 @@ EC_POINT *EC_POINT_new(const EC_GROUP *group)
     }
 
     ret->meth = group->meth;
+    ret->curve_name = group->curve_name;
 
     if (!ret->meth->point_init(ret)) {
         OPENSSL_free(ret);
@@ -609,7 +611,10 @@ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (dest->meth != src->meth) {
+    if (dest->meth != src->meth
+            || (dest->curve_name != src->curve_name
+                && dest->curve_name != 0
+                && src->curve_name != 0)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -666,7 +671,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -685,7 +690,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_Jprojective_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_JPROJECTIVE_COORDINATES_GFP,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -703,7 +708,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -729,7 +734,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -755,7 +760,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GFP,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -773,7 +778,7 @@ int EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_GET_AFFINE_COORDINATES_GF2M,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -789,8 +794,8 @@ int EC_POINT_add(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)
-        || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(a, group)
+        || !ec_point_is_compat(b, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_ADD, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -804,7 +809,7 @@ int EC_POINT_dbl(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const EC_POINT *a,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if ((group->meth != r->meth) || (r->meth != a->meth)) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(a, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_DBL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -817,7 +822,7 @@ int EC_POINT_invert(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != a->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(a, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_INVERT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -831,7 +836,7 @@ int EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point)
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_AT_INFINITY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -852,7 +857,7 @@ int EC_POINT_is_on_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_IS_ON_CURVE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -866,7 +871,7 @@ int EC_POINT_cmp(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *a, const EC_POINT *b,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return -1;
     }
-    if ((group->meth != a->meth) || (a->meth != b->meth)) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(a, group) || !ec_point_is_compat(b, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_CMP, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return -1;
     }
@@ -879,7 +884,7 @@ int EC_POINT_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point, BN_CTX *ctx)
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -896,7 +901,7 @@ int EC_POINTs_make_affine(const EC_GROUP *group, size_t num,
         return 0;
     }
     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-        if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
+        if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINTS_MAKE_AFFINE, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
             return 0;
         }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
index 1f343291..05a3aca0 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_mult.c
@@ -368,7 +368,7 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
                                  * precomputation is not available */
     int ret = 0;
 
-    if (group->meth != r->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -404,7 +404,7 @@ int ec_wNAF_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r, const BIGNUM *scalar,
     }
 
     for (i = 0; i < num; i++) {
-        if (group->meth != points[i]->meth) {
+        if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[i], group)) {
             ECerr(EC_F_EC_WNAF_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
             return 0;
         }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c b/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
index a21906e7..c87d495a 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ec_oct.c
@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GFp(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GFP,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ int EC_POINT_set_compressed_coordinates_GF2m(const EC_GROUP *group,
               ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_SET_COMPRESSED_COORDINATES_GF2M,
               EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
@@ -88,7 +88,7 @@ size_t EC_POINT_point2oct(const EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *point,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_POINT2OCT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ int EC_POINT_oct2point(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *point,
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
         return 0;
     }
-    if (group->meth != point->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(point, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_OCT2POINT, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
index 4580f70b..d3603fbb 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_nistz256.c
@@ -1162,7 +1162,7 @@ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
         return 0;
     }
 
-    if (group->meth != r->meth) {
+    if (!ec_point_is_compat(r, group)) {
         ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
         return 0;
     }
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@ __owur static int ecp_nistz256_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group,
         return EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, r);
 
     for (j = 0; j < num; j++) {
-        if (group->meth != points[j]->meth) {
+        if (!ec_point_is_compat(points[j], group)) {
             ECerr(EC_F_ECP_NISTZ256_POINTS_MUL, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
             return 0;
         }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
index 7ff5489c..8543b416 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
@@ -347,6 +347,7 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_point_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
     if (!BN_copy(dest->Z, src->Z))
         return 0;
     dest->Z_is_one = src->Z_is_one;
+    dest->curve_name = src->curve_name;
 
     return 1;
 }
diff --git a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
index ea56df0d..d2aa6dd8 100644
--- a/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
+++ b/crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
@@ -675,18 +675,18 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ecx448_pkey_meth = {
     0
 };
 
-static int pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
-                              size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                              size_t tbslen)
+static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                                    size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                    size_t tbslen)
 {
-    const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+    const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
 
     if (sig == NULL) {
         *siglen = ED25519_SIGSIZE;
         return 1;
     }
     if (*siglen < ED25519_SIGSIZE) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -696,26 +696,18 @@ static int pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int pkey_ecd_digestsign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
-                                    size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                                    size_t tbslen)
+static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
+                                  size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                  size_t tbslen)
 {
-    return pkey_ecd_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
-                              tbslen);
-}
-
-static int pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
-                            size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                            size_t tbslen)
-{
-    const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+    const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
 
     if (sig == NULL) {
         *siglen = ED448_SIGSIZE;
         return 1;
     }
     if (*siglen < ED448_SIGSIZE) {
-        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
+        ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448, EC_R_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
         return 0;
     }
 
@@ -726,18 +718,11 @@ static int pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
     return 1;
 }
 
-static int pkey_ecd_digestsign448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
-                                  size_t *siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                                  size_t tbslen)
+static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                                      size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                      size_t tbslen)
 {
-    return pkey_ecd_sign448(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs, tbslen);
-}
-
-static int pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
-                                size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                                size_t tbslen)
-{
-    const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+    const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
 
     if (siglen != ED25519_SIGSIZE)
         return 0;
@@ -745,19 +730,11 @@ static int pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     return ED25519_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, edkey->pubkey);
 }
 
-static int pkey_ecd_digestverify25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
-                                      size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                                      size_t tbslen)
+static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
+                                    size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
+                                    size_t tbslen)
 {
-    return pkey_ecd_verify25519(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
-                                tbslen);
-}
-
-static int pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
-                              size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                              size_t tbslen)
-{
-    const ECX_KEY *edkey = ctx->pkey->pkey.ecx;
+    const ECX_KEY *edkey = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx)->pkey->pkey.ecx;
 
     if (siglen != ED448_SIGSIZE)
         return 0;
@@ -765,14 +742,6 @@ static int pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
     return ED448_verify(tbs, tbslen, sig, edkey->pubkey, NULL, 0);
 }
 
-static int pkey_ecd_digestverify448(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sig,
-                                    size_t siglen, const unsigned char *tbs,
-                                    size_t tbslen)
-{
-    return pkey_ecd_verify448(EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx), sig, siglen, tbs,
-                              tbslen);
-}
-
 static int pkey_ecd_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
 {
     switch (type) {
@@ -793,11 +762,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ed25519_pkey_meth = {
     EVP_PKEY_ED25519, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
     0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
     pkey_ecx_keygen,
-    0,
-    pkey_ecd_sign25519,
-    0,
-    pkey_ecd_verify25519,
-    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
     pkey_ecd_ctrl,
     0,
     pkey_ecd_digestsign25519,
@@ -808,11 +773,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD ed448_pkey_meth = {
     EVP_PKEY_ED448, EVP_PKEY_FLAG_SIGCTX_CUSTOM,
     0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
     pkey_ecx_keygen,
-    0,
-    pkey_ecd_sign448,
-    0,
-    pkey_ecd_verify448,
-    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
+    0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
     pkey_ecd_ctrl,
     0,
     pkey_ecd_digestsign448,
diff --git a/crypto/err/openssl.txt b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
index 209bd0d3..89e5ceb1 100644
--- a/crypto/err/openssl.txt
+++ b/crypto/err/openssl.txt
@@ -647,8 +647,6 @@ EC_F_PKEY_ECD_CTRL:271:pkey_ecd_ctrl
 EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN:272:pkey_ecd_digestsign
 EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519:276:pkey_ecd_digestsign25519
 EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448:277:pkey_ecd_digestsign448
-EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519:284:pkey_ecd_sign25519
-EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448:285:pkey_ecd_sign448
 EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE:269:pkey_ecx_derive
 EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL:197:pkey_ec_ctrl
 EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR:198:pkey_ec_ctrl_str
diff --git a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
index d485f612..664dbef3 100644
--- a/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
+++ b/doc/man1/pkeyutl.pod
@@ -38,8 +38,8 @@ B<openssl> B<pkeyutl>
 
 =head1 DESCRIPTION
 
-The B<pkeyutl> command can be used to perform public key operations using
-any supported algorithm.
+The B<pkeyutl> command can be used to perform low level public key operations
+using any supported algorithm.
 
 =head1 OPTIONS
 
@@ -99,17 +99,17 @@ Reverse the order of the input buffer. This is useful for some libraries
 
 =item B<-sign>
 
-Sign the input data and output the signed result. This requires
-a private key.
+Sign the input data (which must be a hash) and output the signed result. This
+requires a private key.
 
 =item B<-verify>
 
-Verify the input data against the signature file and indicate if the
-verification succeeded or failed.
+Verify the input data (which must be a hash) against the signature file and
+indicate if the verification succeeded or failed.
 
 =item B<-verifyrecover>
 
-Verify the input data and output the recovered data.
+Verify the input data (which must be a hash) and output the recovered data.
 
 =item B<-encrypt>
 
@@ -184,20 +184,25 @@ and its implementation. The OpenSSL operations and options are indicated below.
 Unless otherwise mentioned all algorithms support the B<digest:alg> option
 which specifies the digest in use for sign, verify and verifyrecover operations.
 The value B<alg> should represent a digest name as used in the
-EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>.
-This value is used only for sanity-checking the lengths of data passed in to
-the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that make up the signature
-(e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
-In case of RSA, ECDSA and DSA signatures, this utility
-will not perform hashing on input data but rather use the data directly as
-input of signature algorithm. Depending on key type, signature type and mode
-of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input data differ. In general,
-with RSA the signed data can't be longer than the key modulus, in case of ECDSA
-and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than field size, otherwise it will be
-silently truncated to field size.
+EVP_get_digestbyname() function for example B<sha1>. This value is not used to
+hash the input data. It is used (by some algorithms) for sanity-checking the
+lengths of data passed in to the B<pkeyutl> and for creating the structures that
+make up the signature (e.g. B<DigestInfo> in RSASSA PKCS#1 v1.5 signatures).
 
-In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be 20 bytes
-long binary encoding of SHA-1 hash function output.
+This utility does not hash the input data but rather it will use the data
+directly as input to the signature algorithm. Depending on the key type,
+signature type, and mode of padding, the maximum acceptable lengths of input
+data differ. The signed data can't be longer than the key modulus with RSA. In
+case of ECDSA and DSA the data shouldn't be longer than the field
+size, otherwise it will be silently truncated to the field size. In any event
+the input size must not be larger than the largest supported digest size.
+
+In other words, if the value of digest is B<sha1> the input should be the 20
+bytes long binary encoding of the SHA-1 hash function output.
+
+The Ed25519 and Ed448 signature algorithms are not supported by this utility.
+They accept non-hashed input, but this utility can only be used to sign hashed
+input.
 
 =head1 RSA ALGORITHM
 
diff --git a/include/openssl/ecerr.h b/include/openssl/ecerr.h
index 320c6518..fd5ce84c 100644
--- a/include/openssl/ecerr.h
+++ b/include/openssl/ecerr.h
@@ -173,8 +173,6 @@ int ERR_load_EC_strings(void);
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN                         272
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN25519                    276
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_DIGESTSIGN448                      277
-#  define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN25519                          284
-#  define EC_F_PKEY_ECD_SIGN448                            285
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_ECX_DERIVE                             269
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL                                197
 #  define EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL_STR                            198