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Hakase
2018-08-23 00:44:44 +09:00
parent ef69dcb649
commit 6ed909873d
55 changed files with 818 additions and 394 deletions
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CHANGES
+1 -1
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,7 @@
https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commits/ and pick the appropriate
release branch.
Changes between 1.1.0h and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
Changes between 1.1.0i and 1.1.1 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) s390x assembly pack: add (improved) hardware-support for the following
cryptographic primitives: sha3, shake, aes-gcm, aes-ccm, aes-ctr, aes-ofb,
Configure
+14 -5
View File
@@ -1010,9 +1010,18 @@ if (scalar(@seed_sources) == 0) {
print "Using os-specific seed configuration\n";
push @seed_sources, 'os';
}
die "Cannot seed with none and anything else"
if scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0
&& scalar(@seed_sources) > 1;
if (scalar(grep { $_ eq 'none' } @seed_sources) > 0) {
die "Cannot seed with none and anything else" if scalar(@seed_sources) > 1;
warn <<_____ if scalar(@seed_sources) == 1;
You have selected the --with-rand-seed=none option, which effectively disables
automatic reseeding of the OpenSSL random generator. All operations depending
on the random generator such as creating keys will not work unless the random
generator is seeded manually by the application.
Please read the 'Note on random number generation' section in the INSTALL
instructions and the RAND_DRBG(7) manual page for more details.
_____
}
push @{$config{openssl_other_defines}},
map { (my $x = $_) =~ tr|[\-a-z]|[_A-Z]|; "OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_$x" }
@seed_sources;
@@ -1432,7 +1441,7 @@ if (!$disabled{makedepend}) {
}
}
if (!$disabled{asm}) {
if (!$disabled{asm} && !$predefined{__MACH__} && $^O ne 'VMS') {
# probe for -Wa,--noexecstack option...
if ($predefined{__clang__}) {
# clang has builtin assembler, which doesn't recognize --help,
@@ -1440,7 +1449,7 @@ if (!$disabled{asm}) {
# supported platforms even when it's meaningless. In other words
# probe would fail, but probed option always accepted...
push @{$config{cflags}}, "-Wa,--noexecstack", "-Qunused-arguments";
} elsif ($^O ne 'VMS') {
} else {
my $cc = $config{CROSS_COMPILE}.$config{CC};
open(PIPE, "$cc -Wa,--help -c -o null.$$.o -x assembler /dev/null 2>&1 |");
while(<PIPE>) {
NEWS
+1 -1
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
This file gives a brief overview of the major changes between each OpenSSL
release. For more details please read the CHANGES file.
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0h and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [in pre-release]
Major changes between OpenSSL 1.1.0i and OpenSSL 1.1.1 [in pre-release]
o Support for TLSv1.3 added
o Move the display of configuration data to configdata.pm.
README
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre9-dev
OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre10-dev
Copyright (c) 1998-2018 The OpenSSL Project
Copyright (c) 1995-1998 Eric A. Young, Tim J. Hudson
apps/ca.c
+13 -9
View File
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ int ca_main(int argc, char **argv)
int batch = 0, default_op = 1, doupdatedb = 0, ext_copy = EXT_COPY_NONE;
int keyformat = FORMAT_PEM, multirdn = 0, notext = 0, output_der = 0;
int ret = 1, email_dn = 1, req = 0, verbose = 0, gencrl = 0, dorevoke = 0;
int rand_ser = 0, i, j, selfsign = 0;
int rand_ser = 0, i, j, selfsign = 0, def_nid, def_ret;
long crldays = 0, crlhours = 0, crlsec = 0, days = 0;
unsigned long chtype = MBSTRING_ASC, certopt = 0;
X509 *x509 = NULL, *x509p = NULL, *x = NULL;
@@ -728,24 +728,28 @@ end_of_options:
}
}
if (md == NULL && (md = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL)
goto end;
if (strcmp(md, "null") == 0) {
def_ret = EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid);
/*
* EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() returns 2 if the digest is
* mandatory for this algorithm.
*/
if (def_ret == 2 && def_nid == NID_undef) {
/* The signing algorithm requires there to be no digest */
dgst = EVP_md_null();
} else if (md == NULL
&& (md = lookup_conf(conf, section, ENV_DEFAULT_MD)) == NULL) {
goto end;
} else {
if (strcmp(md, "default") == 0) {
int def_nid;
if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) <= 0) {
if (def_ret <= 0) {
BIO_puts(bio_err, "no default digest\n");
goto end;
}
md = (char *)OBJ_nid2sn(def_nid);
}
if (!opt_md(md, &dgst)) {
if (!opt_md(md, &dgst))
goto end;
}
}
if (req) {
apps/req.c
+10 -1
View File
@@ -1601,10 +1601,19 @@ static int do_sign_init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
const EVP_MD *md, STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL;
int i;
int i, def_nid;
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() returns 2 if the digest is mandatory
* for this algorithm.
*/
if (EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid(pkey, &def_nid) == 2
&& def_nid == NID_undef) {
/* The signing algorithm requires there to be no digest */
md = NULL;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OPENSSL_STRING_num(sigopts); i++) {
apps/s_client.c
+7 -7
View File
@@ -595,7 +595,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_CT, OPT_NOCT, OPT_CTLOG_FILE,
#endif
OPT_DANE_TLSA_RRDATA, OPT_DANE_EE_NO_NAME,
OPT_FORCE_PHA,
OPT_ENABLE_PHA,
OPT_R_ENUM
} OPTION_CHOICE;
@@ -786,7 +786,7 @@ const OPTIONS s_client_options[] = {
#endif
{"keylogfile", OPT_KEYLOG_FILE, '>', "Write TLS secrets to file"},
{"early_data", OPT_EARLY_DATA, '<', "File to send as early data"},
{"force_pha", OPT_FORCE_PHA, '-', "Force-enable post-handshake-authentication"},
{"enable_pha", OPT_ENABLE_PHA, '-', "Enable post-handshake-authentication"},
{NULL, OPT_EOF, 0x00, NULL}
};
@@ -975,7 +975,7 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
int isdtls = 0;
#endif
char *psksessf = NULL;
int force_pha = 0;
int enable_pha = 0;
FD_ZERO(&readfds);
FD_ZERO(&writefds);
@@ -1492,8 +1492,8 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
case OPT_EARLY_DATA:
early_data_file = opt_arg();
break;
case OPT_FORCE_PHA:
force_pha = 1;
case OPT_ENABLE_PHA:
enable_pha = 1;
break;
}
}
@@ -1944,8 +1944,8 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (con == NULL)
goto end;
if (force_pha)
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(con);
if (enable_pha)
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(con, 1);
if (sess_in != NULL) {
SSL_SESSION *sess;
crypto/ec/ecp_smpl.c
+33 -30
View File
@@ -1483,10 +1483,10 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_pre(const EC_GROUP *group,
}
/*-
* Differential addition-and-doubling using Eq. (8) and (10) from Izu-Takagi
* Differential addition-and-doubling using Eq. (9) and (10) from Izu-Takagi
* "A fast parallel elliptic curve multiplication resistant against side channel
* attacks", as described at
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-3
* https://hyperelliptic.org/EFD/g1p/auto-shortw-xz.html#ladder-ladd-2002-it-4
*/
int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
EC_POINT *r, EC_POINT *s,
@@ -1511,39 +1511,42 @@ int ec_GFp_simple_ladder_step(const EC_GROUP *group,
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, r->X, s->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, r->Z, s->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, group->a, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t4, t0, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, t3, t2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, t4, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t1, t5, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t0, group->b, 2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t0, t5, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t4, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t0, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t4, t3, t2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t4, t0, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift_quick(t7, group->b, 2, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t7, t1, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t0, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t0, t1, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t1, t2, t3, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t1, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t3, t1, p->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, p->Z, t0, ctx)
/* s->X coord output */
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->X, t5, p->Z, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t3, t2, t3, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t3, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(s->X, t0, t3, group->field)
/* s->Z coord output */
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->Z, t3, p->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, r->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t4, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t4, group->a, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, r->X, r->Z, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, s->Z, p->Z, t1, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, r->X, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t2, r->Z, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t4, t2, group->a, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t5, r->X, r->Z, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t5, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t3, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t5, t5, t2, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t6, t6, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t6, t2, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t6, t6, t4, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(t7, t2, t1, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t7, t7, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t4, t6, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t0, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t2, t5, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t0, t7, t0, ctx)
/* r->X coord output */
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t7, t5, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t2, t2, t1, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t5, t4, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t0, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t6, t6, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t6, t6, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_sub_quick(r->X, t6, t0, group->field)
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(t6, t3, t4, group->field)
|| !group->meth->field_sqr(group, t3, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t7, t3, t7, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t5, t5, t6, ctx)
|| !BN_mod_lshift1_quick(t5, t5, group->field)
/* r->Z coord output */
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t5, t6, group->field))
|| !BN_mod_add_quick(r->Z, t7, t5, group->field))
goto err;
ret = 1;
crypto/ec/ecx_meth.c
+13 -3
View File
@@ -331,8 +331,18 @@ static int ecx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
}
return 0;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int ecd_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
{
switch (op) {
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_DEFAULT_MD_NID:
*(int *)arg2 = NID_sha256;
/* We currently only support Pure EdDSA which takes no digest */
*(int *)arg2 = NID_undef;
return 2;
default:
@@ -579,7 +589,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ed25519_asn1_meth = {
0, 0,
ecx_free,
0,
ecd_ctrl,
NULL,
NULL,
ecd_item_verify,
@@ -621,7 +631,7 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD ed448_asn1_meth = {
0, 0,
ecx_free,
0,
ecd_ctrl,
NULL,
NULL,
ecd_item_verify,
crypto/mem_sec.c
+11 -5
View File
@@ -137,11 +137,12 @@ void *CRYPTO_secure_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
void *CRYPTO_secure_zalloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
{
void *ret = CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, file, line);
if (ret != NULL)
memset(ret, 0, num);
return ret;
#ifdef IMPLEMENTED
if (secure_mem_initialized)
/* CRYPTO_secure_malloc() zeroes allocations when it is implemented */
return CRYPTO_secure_malloc(num, file, line);
#endif
return CRYPTO_zalloc(num, file, line);
}
void CRYPTO_secure_free(void *ptr, const char *file, int line)
@@ -588,6 +589,9 @@ static void *sh_malloc(size_t size)
OPENSSL_assert(WITHIN_ARENA(chunk));
/* zero the free list header as a precaution against information leakage */
memset(chunk, 0, sizeof(SH_LIST));
return chunk;
}
@@ -620,6 +624,8 @@ static void sh_free(void *ptr)
list--;
/* Zero the higher addressed block's free list pointers */
memset(ptr > buddy ? ptr : buddy, 0, sizeof(SH_LIST));
if (ptr > buddy)
ptr = buddy;
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+6 -2
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ int rand_fork_count;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
static int rand_nonce_count;
static int rand_cleaning_up = 0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
@@ -324,7 +326,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
goto err2;
if (!rand_pool_init())
if (!rand_cleaning_up && !rand_pool_init())
goto err3;
return 1;
@@ -346,10 +348,12 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
rand_cleaning_up = 1;
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
meth->cleanup();
rand_pool_cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
rand_pool_cleanup();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
crypto/rand/rand_unix.c
+68 -38
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
# endif
#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
@@ -88,6 +86,8 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
@@ -192,22 +192,29 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
/*
* sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
* Returns the size on success, 0 on failure.
* Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int mib[2];
size_t done = 0;
size_t len;
/*
* Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
* without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
*/
/*
* On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
* variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
* when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
* multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0))
return 0;
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
/*
* On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -217,7 +224,8 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
* Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
*/
#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
return 0;
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#endif
mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
@@ -226,7 +234,7 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
do {
len = buflen;
if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
return done;
return done > 0 ? done : -1;
done += len;
buf += len;
buflen -= len;
@@ -238,10 +246,20 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
/*
* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or <= 0 on error.
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
*/
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
/*
* Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
* get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
*
* 2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13
*
* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
*/
/*
* Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
*
@@ -253,10 +271,10 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
* - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
*/
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
extern int getentropy(void *bufer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
if (getentropy != NULL)
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# else
union {
void *p;
@@ -271,19 +289,18 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# endif
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
return (int)syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# endif
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return (int)sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# endif
return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
@@ -441,17 +458,25 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
unsigned char *buffer;
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
{
ssize_t bytes;
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
if (syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed) == (int)bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
break;
}
}
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
@@ -468,22 +493,27 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t i;
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
ssize_t bytes = 0;
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
const int fd = get_random_device(i);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
const ssize_t n = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
if (n <= 0) {
close_random_device(i);
continue;
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
break;
}
rand_pool_add_end(pool, n, 8 * n);
}
if (!keep_random_devices_open)
if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
close_random_device(i);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
crypto/threads_none.c
-12
View File
@@ -128,18 +128,6 @@ int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_read(int *val, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
*ret = *val;
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_write(int *val, int n, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
*val = n;
return 1;
}
int openssl_init_fork_handlers(void)
{
return 0;
crypto/threads_pthread.c
-38
View File
@@ -175,44 +175,6 @@ int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_read(int *val, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
# if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ATOMIC_ACQUIRE)
if (__atomic_is_lock_free(sizeof(*val), val)) {
__atomic_load(val, ret, __ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
return 1;
}
# endif
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(lock))
return 0;
*ret = *val;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock))
return 0;
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_write(int *val, int n, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
# if defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ATOMIC_RELEASE)
if (__atomic_is_lock_free(sizeof(*val), val)) {
__atomic_store(val, &n, __ATOMIC_RELEASE);
return 1;
}
# endif
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(lock))
return 0;
*val = n;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(lock))
return 0;
return 1;
}
# ifdef OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX
static pthread_once_t fork_once_control = PTHREAD_ONCE_INIT;
crypto/threads_win.c
-12
View File
@@ -155,18 +155,6 @@ int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_read(int *val, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
*ret = InterlockedCompareExchange(val, 0, 0);
return 1;
}
int CRYPTO_atomic_write(int *val, int n, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock)
{
InterlockedExchange(val, n);
return 1;
}
int openssl_init_fork_handlers(void)
{
return 0;
crypto/uid.c
+11 -5
View File
@@ -31,12 +31,18 @@ int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
# include <sys/types.h>
# if defined(__GLIBC__) && defined(__GLIBC_PREREQ)
# if __GLIBC_PREREQ(2, 16)
# include <sys/auxv.h>
# endif
# endif
int OPENSSL_issetugid(void)
{
if (getuid() != geteuid())
return 1;
if (getgid() != getegid())
return 1;
return 0;
# ifdef AT_SECURE
return getauxval(AT_SECURE) != 0;
# else
return getuid() != geteuid() || getgid() != getegid();
# endif
}
#endif
crypto/x509/x509_meth.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -58,9 +58,9 @@ int (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_new_item(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_free(
X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
void (*free_fn) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx))
{
method->free = free;
method->free = free_fn;
return 1;
}
doc/man1/ca.pod
+5 -4
View File
@@ -184,9 +184,9 @@ The number of days to certify the certificate for.
=item B<-md alg>
The message digest to use.
Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used. If the signing
key is using Ed25519 or Ed448 then you should specify "null" for the digest.
This option also applies to CRLs.
Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used. For signing
algorithms that do not support a digest (i.e. Ed25519 and Ed448) any message
digest that is set is ignored. This option also applies to CRLs.
=item B<-policy arg>
@@ -453,7 +453,8 @@ least one of these must be present to generate a CRL.
=item B<default_md>
The same as the B<-md> option. Mandatory.
The same as the B<-md> option. Mandatory except where the signing algorithm does
not require a digest (i.e. Ed25519 and Ed448).
=item B<database>
doc/man1/req.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ the configuration file.
Some public key algorithms may override this choice. For instance, DSA
signatures always use SHA1, GOST R 34.10 signatures always use
GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>).
GOST R 34.11-94 (B<-md_gost94>), Ed25519 and Ed448 never use any digest.
=item B<-config filename>
@@ -394,10 +394,10 @@ option. For compatibility B<encrypt_rsa_key> is an equivalent option.
=item B<default_md>
This option specifies the digest algorithm to use.
Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used.
If not present then MD5 is used.
This option can be overridden on the command line.
This option specifies the digest algorithm to use. Any digest supported by the
OpenSSL B<dgst> command can be used. This option can be overridden on the
command line. Certain signing algorithms (i.e. Ed25519 and Ed448) will ignore
any digest that has been set.
=item B<string_mask>
doc/man1/s_client.pod
+4 -4
View File
@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ B<openssl> B<s_client>
[B<-ctlogfile>]
[B<-keylogfile file>]
[B<-early_data file>]
[B<-force_pha>]
[B<-enable_pha>]
[B<target>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -700,10 +700,10 @@ Reads the contents of the specified file and attempts to send it as early data
to the server. This will only work with resumed sessions that support early
data and when the server accepts the early data.
=item B<-force_pha>
=item B<-enable_pha>
For TLSv1.3 only, always send the Post-Handshake Authentication extension,
whether or not a certificate has been provided via B<-cert>.
For TLSv1.3 only, send the Post-Handshake Authentication extension. This will
happen whether or not a certificate has been provided via B<-cert>.
=item B<[target]>
doc/man3/BIO_s_file.pod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ BIO_CLOSE, BIO_NOCLOSE (the close flag) BIO_FP_TEXT (sets the underlying
stream to text mode, default is binary: this only has any effect under
Win32).
BIO_set_fp() set the fp of a file BIO to B<fp>. B<flags> has the same
BIO_set_fp() sets the fp of a file BIO to B<fp>. B<flags> has the same
meaning as in BIO_new_fp(), it is a macro.
BIO_get_fp() retrieves the fp of a file BIO, it is a macro.
doc/man3/BN_generate_prime.pod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -143,7 +143,7 @@ A callback is invoked through a call to B<BN_GENCB_call>. This will check
the type of the callback and will invoke B<callback(a, b, gencb)> for new
style callbacks or B<callback(a, b, cb_arg)> for old style.
It is possible to obtained the argument associated with a BN_GENCB structure
It is possible to obtain the argument associated with a BN_GENCB structure
(set via a call to BN_GENCB_set or BN_GENCB_set_old) using BN_GENCB_get_arg.
BN_generate_prime() (deprecated) works in the same way as
doc/man3/CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once.pod
+2 -15
View File
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
CRYPTO_THREAD_run_once,
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new, CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock, CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock,
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock, CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free, CRYPTO_atomic_add,
CRYPTO_atomic_read, CRYPTO_atomic_write - OpenSSL thread support
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock, CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free,
CRYPTO_atomic_add - OpenSSL thread support
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -21,8 +21,6 @@ CRYPTO_atomic_read, CRYPTO_atomic_write - OpenSSL thread support
void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_read(int *val, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_write(int *val, int n, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -77,17 +75,6 @@ operations are supported on the specific platform. Because of this, if a
variable is modified by CRYPTO_atomic_add() then CRYPTO_atomic_add() must
be the only way that the variable is modified.
=item *
CRYPTO_atomic_read() atomically reads B<val> and returns the result of
the operation in B<ret>. B<lock> will be locked, unless atomic operations
are supported on the specific platform.
=item *
CRYPTO_atomic_write() atomically writes B<n> to B<val>. B<lock> will be
locked, unless atomic operations are supported on the specific platform.
=back
=head1 RETURN VALUES
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid.pod
+2 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid - get default signature digest
The EVP_PKEY_get_default_digest_nid() function sets B<pnid> to the default
message digest NID for the public key signature operations associated with key
B<pkey>.
B<pkey>. Note that some signature algorithms (i.e. Ed25519 and Ed448) do not use
a digest during signing. In this case B<pnid> will be set to NID_undef.
=head1 NOTES
doc/man3/RSA_generate_key.pod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ L<ERR_get_error(3)>, L<RAND_bytes(3)>, L<BN_generate_prime(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
RSA_generate_key() was deprecated in OpenSSL 0.9.8; use
RSA_generate_key_ex() intsead.
RSA_generate_key_ex() instead.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_verify.pod
+10 -7
View File
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ SSL_CTX_set_verify, SSL_set_verify,
SSL_CTX_set_verify_depth, SSL_set_verify_depth,
SSL_verify_cb,
SSL_verify_client_post_handshake,
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth,
SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth
- set peer certificate verification parameters
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -24,7 +25,8 @@ SSL_force_post_handshake_auth
void SSL_set_verify_depth(SSL *ssl, int depth);
int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl);
void SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl);
void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -48,10 +50,11 @@ verification that shall be allowed for B<ctx>.
SSL_set_verify_depth() sets the maximum B<depth> for the certificate chain
verification that shall be allowed for B<ssl>.
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() forces the Post-Handshake Authentication
extension to be added to the ClientHello regardless of certificate configuration
at the time of the initial handshake, such that post-handshake authentication
can be requested by the server. A certificate callback will need to be set via
SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth() and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() enable the
Post-Handshake Authentication extension to be added to the ClientHello such that
post-handshake authentication can be requested by the server. If B<val> is 0
then the extension is not sent, otherwise it is. By default the extension is not
sent. A certificate callback will need to be set via
SSL_CTX_set_client_cert_cb() if no certificate is provided at initialization.
SSL_verify_client_post_handshake() causes a CertificateRequest message to be
@@ -341,7 +344,7 @@ L<CRYPTO_get_ex_new_index(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The SSL_VERIFY_POST_HANDSHAKE option, and the SSL_verify_client_post_handshake()
and SSL_force_post_handshake_auth() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
and SSL_set_post_handshake_auth() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
doc/man7/Ed25519.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -13,18 +13,18 @@ one-shot digest sign and digest verify using PureEdDSA and B<Ed25519> or B<Ed448
(see RFC8032). It has associated private and public key formats compatible with
draft-ietf-curdle-pkix-04.
No additional parameters can be set during key generation one-shot signing or
verification. In particular, because PureEdDSA is used, when signing or
verifying a digest must B<NOT> be specified.
No additional parameters can be set during key generation, one-shot signing or
verification. In particular, because PureEdDSA is used, a digest must B<NOT> be
specified when signing or verifying.
=head1 NOTES
The PureEdDSA algorithm does not support the streaming mechanism
of other signature algorithms using, for example, EVP_DigestUpdate().
The message to sign or verify must be passed using the one-shot
EVP_DigestSign() asn EVP_DigestVerify() functions.
EVP_DigestSign() and EVP_DigestVerify() functions.
When calling EVP_DigestSignInit() or EVP_DigestSignUpdate() the
When calling EVP_DigestSignInit() or EVP_DigestVerifyInit(), the
digest parameter B<MUST> be set to B<NULL>.
Applications wishing to sign certificates (or other structures such as
include/internal/refcount.h
+62 -11
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -18,26 +18,36 @@
# if defined(__STDC_VERSION__) && __STDC_VERSION__ >= 201112L \
&& !defined(__STDC_NO_ATOMICS__)
# include <stdatomic.h>
# define HAVE_C11_ATOMICS
# include <stdatomic.h>
# define HAVE_C11_ATOMICS
# endif
# if defined(HAVE_C11_ATOMICS) && defined(ATOMIC_INT_LOCK_FREE) \
&& ATOMIC_INT_LOCK_FREE > 0
# define HAVE_ATOMICS 1
# define HAVE_ATOMICS 1
typedef _Atomic int CRYPTO_REF_COUNT;
static ossl_inline int CRYPTO_UP_REF(_Atomic int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
static inline int CRYPTO_UP_REF(_Atomic int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = atomic_fetch_add_explicit(val, 1, memory_order_relaxed) + 1;
return 1;
}
static ossl_inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(_Atomic int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
/*
* Changes to shared structure other than reference counter have to be
* serialized. And any kind of serialization implies a release fence. This
* means that by the time reference counter is decremented all other
* changes are visible on all processors. Hence decrement itself can be
* relaxed. In case it hits zero, object will be destructed. Since it's
* last use of the object, destructor programmer might reason that access
* to mutable members doesn't have to be serialized anymore, which would
* otherwise imply an acquire fence. Hence conditional acquire fence...
*/
static inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(_Atomic int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = atomic_fetch_sub_explicit(val, 1, memory_order_release) - 1;
*ret = atomic_fetch_sub_explicit(val, 1, memory_order_relaxed) - 1;
if (*ret == 0)
atomic_thread_fence(memory_order_acquire);
return 1;
@@ -45,24 +55,65 @@ static ossl_inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(_Atomic int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
# elif defined(__GNUC__) && defined(__ATOMIC_RELAXED) && __GCC_ATOMIC_INT_LOCK_FREE > 0
# define HAVE_ATOMICS 1
# define HAVE_ATOMICS 1
typedef int CRYPTO_REF_COUNT;
static ossl_inline int CRYPTO_UP_REF(int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
static __inline__ int CRYPTO_UP_REF(int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = __atomic_fetch_add(val, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED) + 1;
return 1;
}
static ossl_inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
static __inline__ int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = __atomic_fetch_sub(val, 1, __ATOMIC_RELEASE) - 1;
*ret = __atomic_fetch_sub(val, 1, __ATOMIC_RELAXED) - 1;
if (*ret == 0)
__atomic_thread_fence(__ATOMIC_ACQUIRE);
return 1;
}
# elif defined(_MSC_VER) && _MSC_VER>=1200
# define HAVE_ATOMICS 1
typedef volatile int CRYPTO_REF_COUNT;
# if (defined(_M_ARM) && _M_ARM>=7) || defined(_M_ARM64)
# include <intrin.h>
# if defined(_M_ARM64) && !defined(_ARM_BARRIER_ISH)
# define _ARM_BARRIER_ISH _ARM64_BARRIER_ISH
# endif
static __inline int CRYPTO_UP_REF(volatile int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = _InterlockedExchangeAdd_nf(val, 1) + 1;
return 1;
}
static __inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(volatile int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = _InterlockedExchangeAdd_nf(val, -1) - 1;
if (*ret == 0)
__dmb(_ARM_BARRIER_ISH);
return 1;
}
# else
# pragma intrinsic(_InterlockedExchangeAdd)
static __inline int CRYPTO_UP_REF(volatile int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = _InterlockedExchangeAdd(val, 1) + 1;
return 1;
}
static __inline int CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(volatile int *val, int *ret, void *lock)
{
*ret = _InterlockedExchangeAdd(val, -1) - 1;
return 1;
}
# endif
# else
typedef int CRYPTO_REF_COUNT;
include/openssl/crypto.h
-2
View File
@@ -73,8 +73,6 @@ int CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
void CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_add(int *val, int amount, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_read(int *val, int *ret, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
int CRYPTO_atomic_write(int *val, int n, CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock);
/*
* The following can be used to detect memory leaks in the library. If
include/openssl/opensslv.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -39,8 +39,8 @@ extern "C" {
* (Prior to 0.9.5a beta1, a different scheme was used: MMNNFFRBB for
* major minor fix final patch/beta)
*/
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x10101009L
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre9-dev xx XXX xxxx"
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER 0x1010100aL
# define OPENSSL_VERSION_TEXT "OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre10-dev xx XXX xxxx"
/*-
* The macros below are to be used for shared library (.so, .dll, ...)
include/openssl/ssl.h
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1898,7 +1898,8 @@ int SSL_renegotiate_abbreviated(SSL *s);
__owur int SSL_renegotiate_pending(SSL *s);
int SSL_shutdown(SSL *s);
__owur int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *s);
void SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s);
void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val);
void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, int val);
__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_CTX_get_ssl_method(SSL_CTX *ctx);
__owur const SSL_METHOD *SSL_get_ssl_method(SSL *s);
include/openssl/x509_vfy.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ int (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_new_item(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
(X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
int X509_LOOKUP_meth_set_free(X509_LOOKUP_METHOD *method,
void (*free) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx));
void (*free_fn) (X509_LOOKUP *ctx));
void (*X509_LOOKUP_meth_get_free(const X509_LOOKUP_METHOD* method))
(X509_LOOKUP *ctx);
ssl/ssl_cert.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -947,7 +947,8 @@ static int ssl_security_default_callback(const SSL *s, const SSL_CTX *ctx,
if (level >= 2 && c->algorithm_enc == SSL_RC4)
return 0;
/* Level 3: forward secure ciphersuites only */
if (level >= 3 && !(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH)))
if (level >= 3 && (c->min_tls != TLS1_3_VERSION ||
!(c->algorithm_mkey & (SSL_kEDH | SSL_kEECDH))))
return 0;
break;
}
ssl/ssl_lib.c
+8 -2
View File
@@ -702,6 +702,7 @@ SSL *SSL_new(SSL_CTX *ctx)
s->max_early_data = ctx->max_early_data;
s->recv_max_early_data = ctx->recv_max_early_data;
s->num_tickets = ctx->num_tickets;
s->pha_enabled = ctx->pha_enabled;
/* Shallow copy of the ciphersuites stack */
s->tls13_ciphersuites = sk_SSL_CIPHER_dup(ctx->tls13_ciphersuites);
@@ -5523,9 +5524,14 @@ int SSL_stateless(SSL *s)
return -1;
}
void SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl)
void SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL_CTX *ctx, int val)
{
ssl->pha_forced = 1;
ctx->pha_enabled = val;
}
void SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(SSL *ssl, int val)
{
ssl->pha_enabled = val;
}
int SSL_verify_client_post_handshake(SSL *ssl)
ssl/ssl_locl.h
+5 -2
View File
@@ -1100,6 +1100,9 @@ struct ssl_ctx_st {
/* Callback to determine if early_data is acceptable or not */
SSL_allow_early_data_cb_fn allow_early_data_cb;
void *allow_early_data_cb_data;
/* Do we advertise Post-handshake auth support? */
int pha_enabled;
};
struct ssl_st {
@@ -1430,7 +1433,7 @@ struct ssl_st {
int key_update;
/* Post-handshake authentication state */
SSL_PHA_STATE post_handshake_auth;
int pha_forced;
int pha_enabled;
uint8_t* pha_context;
size_t pha_context_len;
int certreqs_sent;
@@ -2427,7 +2430,7 @@ __owur int ssl_choose_server_version(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
__owur int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version,
RAW_EXTENSION *extensions);
__owur int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version,
int *max_version);
int *max_version, int *real_max);
__owur long tls1_default_timeout(void);
__owur int dtls1_do_write(SSL *s, int type);
ssl/statem/extensions.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ int tls_construct_extensions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt, unsigned int context,
}
if ((context & SSL_EXT_CLIENT_HELLO) != 0) {
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_EXTENSIONS,
reason);
ssl/statem/extensions_clnt.c
+3 -18
View File
@@ -507,7 +507,7 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_supported_versions(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
{
int currv, min_version, max_version, reason;
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version);
reason = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &min_version, &max_version, NULL);
if (reason != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_CONSTRUCT_CTOS_SUPPORTED_VERSIONS, reason);
@@ -1210,23 +1210,8 @@ EXT_RETURN tls_construct_ctos_post_handshake_auth(SSL *s, WPACKET *pkt,
X509 *x, size_t chainidx)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
if (!s->pha_forced) {
int i, n = 0;
/* check for cert, if present, we can do post-handshake auth */
if (s->cert == NULL)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
for (i = 0; i < SSL_PKEY_NUM; i++) {
if (s->cert->pkeys[i].x509 != NULL
&& s->cert->pkeys[i].privatekey != NULL)
n++;
}
/* no identity certificates, so no extension */
if (n == 0)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
}
if (!s->pha_enabled)
return EXT_RETURN_NOT_SENT;
/* construct extension - 0 length, no contents */
if (!WPACKET_put_bytes_u16(pkt, TLSEXT_TYPE_post_handshake_auth)
ssl/statem/statem_lib.c
+88 -65
View File
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ int tls_setup_handshake(SSL *s)
* enabled. For clients we do this check during construction of the
* ClientHello.
*/
if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max) != 0) {
if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL) != 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_SETUP_HANDSHAKE,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
@@ -1665,9 +1665,16 @@ static void check_for_downgrade(SSL *s, int vers, DOWNGRADE *dgrd)
if (vers == TLS1_2_VERSION
&& ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL)) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_2;
} else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s) && vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
&& (ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)
|| ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_3_VERSION, NULL))) {
} else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& vers < TLS1_2_VERSION
/*
* We need to ensure that a server that disables TLSv1.2
* (creating a hole between TLSv1.3 and TLSv1.1) can still
* complete handshakes with clients that support TLSv1.2 and
* below. Therefore we do not enable the sentinel if TLSv1.3 is
* enabled and TLSv1.2 is not.
*/
&& ssl_version_supported(s, TLS1_2_VERSION, NULL)) {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_TO_1_1;
} else {
*dgrd = DOWNGRADE_NONE;
@@ -1857,8 +1864,7 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
{
const version_info *vent;
const version_info *table;
int highver = 0;
int origv;
int ret, ver_min, ver_max, real_max, origv;
origv = s->version;
s->version = version;
@@ -1905,65 +1911,62 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
break;
}
ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, &real_max);
if (ret != 0) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, ret);
return 0;
}
if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_LT(s->version, ver_min)
: s->version < ver_min) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
} else if (SSL_IS_DTLS(s) ? DTLS_VERSION_GT(s->version, ver_max)
: s->version > ver_max) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, SSL_R_UNSUPPORTED_PROTOCOL);
return 0;
}
if ((s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) == 0)
real_max = ver_max;
/* Check for downgrades */
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && real_max > s->version) {
if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- sizeof(tls12downgrade),
sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
return 0;
}
} else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
&& real_max > s->version) {
if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- sizeof(tls11downgrade),
sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
return 0;
}
}
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
const SSL_METHOD *method;
int err;
if (vent->cmeth == NULL)
if (vent->cmeth == NULL || s->version != vent->version)
continue;
if (highver != 0 && s->version != vent->version)
continue;
if (highver == 0 && (s->mode & SSL_MODE_SEND_FALLBACK_SCSV) != 0)
highver = vent->version;
method = vent->cmeth();
err = ssl_method_error(s, method);
if (err != 0) {
if (s->version == vent->version) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION, err);
return 0;
}
continue;
}
if (highver == 0)
highver = vent->version;
if (s->version != vent->version)
continue;
/* Check for downgrades */
if (s->version == TLS1_2_VERSION && highver > s->version) {
if (memcmp(tls12downgrade,
s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- sizeof(tls12downgrade),
sizeof(tls12downgrade)) == 0) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
return 0;
}
} else if (!SSL_IS_DTLS(s)
&& s->version < TLS1_2_VERSION
&& highver > s->version) {
if (memcmp(tls11downgrade,
s->s3->server_random + SSL3_RANDOM_SIZE
- sizeof(tls11downgrade),
sizeof(tls11downgrade)) == 0) {
s->version = origv;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
SSL_F_SSL_CHOOSE_CLIENT_VERSION,
SSL_R_INAPPROPRIATE_FALLBACK);
return 0;
}
}
s->method = method;
s->method = vent->cmeth();
return 1;
}
@@ -1978,6 +1981,9 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
* @s: The SSL connection
* @min_version: The minimum supported version
* @max_version: The maximum supported version
* @real_max: The highest version below the lowest compile time version hole
* where that hole lies above at least one run-time enabled
* protocol.
*
* Work out what version we should be using for the initial ClientHello if the
* version is initially (D)TLS_ANY_VERSION. We apply any explicit SSL_OP_NO_xxx
@@ -1992,9 +1998,10 @@ int ssl_choose_client_version(SSL *s, int version, RAW_EXTENSION *extensions)
* Returns 0 on success or an SSL error reason number on failure. On failure
* min_version and max_version will also be set to 0.
*/
int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version,
int *real_max)
{
int version;
int version, tmp_real_max;
int hole;
const SSL_METHOD *single = NULL;
const SSL_METHOD *method;
@@ -2011,6 +2018,12 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
* ssl_method_error(s, s->method)
*/
*min_version = *max_version = s->version;
/*
* Providing a real_max only makes sense where we're using a version
* flexible method.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(real_max == NULL))
return ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR;
return 0;
case TLS_ANY_VERSION:
table = tls_version_table;
@@ -2043,6 +2056,9 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
*/
*min_version = version = 0;
hole = 1;
if (real_max != NULL)
*real_max = 0;
tmp_real_max = 0;
for (vent = table; vent->version != 0; ++vent) {
/*
* A table entry with a NULL client method is still a hole in the
@@ -2050,15 +2066,22 @@ int ssl_get_min_max_version(const SSL *s, int *min_version, int *max_version)
*/
if (vent->cmeth == NULL) {
hole = 1;
tmp_real_max = 0;
continue;
}
method = vent->cmeth();
if (hole == 1 && tmp_real_max == 0)
tmp_real_max = vent->version;
if (ssl_method_error(s, method) != 0) {
hole = 1;
} else if (!hole) {
single = NULL;
*min_version = method->version;
} else {
if (real_max != NULL && tmp_real_max != 0)
*real_max = tmp_real_max;
version = (single = method)->version;
*min_version = version;
hole = 0;
@@ -2093,7 +2116,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_hello_version(SSL *s)
if (!SSL_IS_FIRST_HANDSHAKE(s))
return 0;
ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max);
ret = ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &ver_min, &ver_max, NULL);
if (ret != 0)
return ret;
ssl/t1_lib.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ int ssl_set_client_disabled(SSL *s)
s->s3->tmp.mask_k = 0;
ssl_set_sig_mask(&s->s3->tmp.mask_a, s, SSL_SECOP_SIGALG_MASK);
if (ssl_get_min_max_version(s, &s->s3->tmp.min_ver,
&s->s3->tmp.max_ver) != 0)
&s->s3->tmp.max_ver, NULL) != 0)
return 0;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_PSK
/* with PSK there must be client callback set */
test/evp_test.c
+61 -38
View File
@@ -74,6 +74,27 @@ static int find_key(EVP_PKEY **ppk, const char *name, KEY_LIST *lst);
static int parse_bin(const char *value, unsigned char **buf, size_t *buflen);
/*
* Compare two memory regions for equality, returning zero if they differ.
* However, if there is expected to be an error and the actual error
* matches then the memory is expected to be different so handle this
* case without producing unnecessary test framework output.
*/
static int memory_err_compare(EVP_TEST *t, const char *err,
const void *expected, size_t expected_len,
const void *got, size_t got_len)
{
int r;
if (t->expected_err != NULL && strcmp(t->expected_err, err) == 0)
r = !TEST_mem_ne(expected, expected_len, got, got_len);
else
r = TEST_mem_eq(expected, expected_len, got, got_len);
if (!r)
t->err = err;
return r;
}
/*
* Structure used to hold a list of blocks of memory to test
* calls to "update" like functions.
@@ -397,10 +418,11 @@ static int digest_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "DIGEST_LENGTH_MISMATCH";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "DIGEST_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "DIGEST_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
@@ -688,11 +710,9 @@ static int cipher_test_enc(EVP_TEST *t, int enc,
t->err = "CIPHERFINAL_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected_out, out_len,
tmp + out_misalign, tmplen + tmpflen)) {
t->err = "VALUE_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "VALUE_MISMATCH", expected_out, out_len,
tmp + out_misalign, tmplen + tmpflen))
goto err;
}
if (enc && expected->aead) {
unsigned char rtag[16];
@@ -705,11 +725,10 @@ static int cipher_test_enc(EVP_TEST *t, int enc,
t->err = "TAG_RETRIEVE_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->tag, expected->tag_len,
rtag, expected->tag_len)) {
t->err = "TAG_VALUE_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "TAG_VALUE_MISMATCH",
expected->tag, expected->tag_len,
rtag, expected->tag_len))
goto err;
}
}
t->err = NULL;
ok = 1;
@@ -950,8 +969,9 @@ static int mac_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
goto err;
}
if (!EVP_DigestSignFinal(mctx, got, &got_len)
|| !TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len)) {
|| !memory_err_compare(t, "TEST_MAC_ERR",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len)) {
t->err = "TEST_MAC_ERR";
goto err;
}
@@ -1108,10 +1128,11 @@ static int pkey_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "KEYOP_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "KEYOP_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "KEYOP_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
OPENSSL_free(got);
@@ -1226,10 +1247,10 @@ static int pderive_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "DERIVE_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "SHARED_SECRET_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "SHARED_SECRET_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
@@ -1444,11 +1465,10 @@ static int pbe_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
goto err;
}
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->key, expected->key_len,
key, expected->key_len)) {
t->err = "KEY_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "KEY_MISMATCH", expected->key, expected->key_len,
key, expected->key_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
OPENSSL_free(key);
@@ -1559,11 +1579,10 @@ static int encode_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
EVP_ENCODE_CTX_free(encode_ctx);
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len,
encode_out, output_len)) {
t->err = "BAD_ENCODING";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "BAD_ENCODING",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
encode_out, output_len))
goto err;
}
}
if (!TEST_ptr(decode_out =
@@ -1585,8 +1604,9 @@ static int encode_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
output_len += chunk_len;
if (expected->encoding != BASE64_INVALID_ENCODING
&& !TEST_mem_eq(expected->input, expected->input_len,
decode_out, output_len)) {
&& !memory_err_compare(t, "BAD_DECODING",
expected->input, expected->input_len,
decode_out, output_len)) {
t->err = "BAD_DECODING";
goto err;
}
@@ -1687,10 +1707,11 @@ static int kdf_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "KDF_DERIVE_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "KDF_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "KDF_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
@@ -2079,11 +2100,12 @@ static int digestsign_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "DIGESTSIGNFINAL_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "SIGNATURE_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "SIGNATURE_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
OPENSSL_free(got);
return 1;
@@ -2156,11 +2178,12 @@ static int oneshot_digestsign_test_run(EVP_TEST *t)
t->err = "DIGESTSIGN_ERROR";
goto err;
}
if (!TEST_mem_eq(expected->output, expected->output_len, got, got_len)) {
t->err = "SIGNATURE_MISMATCH";
if (!memory_err_compare(t, "SIGNATURE_MISMATCH",
expected->output, expected->output_len,
got, got_len))
goto err;
}
t->err = NULL;
err:
OPENSSL_free(got);
return 1;
test/handshake_helper.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -726,8 +726,8 @@ static void configure_handshake_ssl(SSL *server, SSL *client,
if (extra->client.servername != SSL_TEST_SERVERNAME_NONE)
SSL_set_tlsext_host_name(client,
ssl_servername_name(extra->client.servername));
if (extra->client.force_pha)
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(client);
if (extra->client.enable_pha)
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(client, 1);
}
/* The status for each connection phase. */
test/ossl_shim/ossl_config.json
+6 -1
View File
@@ -248,7 +248,12 @@
"DTLS-Retransmit-Server-12":"Test failure - reason unknown",
"DTLS-Retransmit-Fudge":"Test failure - reason unknown",
"DTLS-Retransmit-Fragmented":"Test failure - reason unknown",
"TrailingMessageData-ClientHello-DTLS":"Test failure - reason unknown"
"TrailingMessageData-ClientHello-DTLS":"Test failure - reason unknown",
"SendFallbackSCSV":"Current runner version uses old draft TLSv1.3",
"VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS11":"Current runner version uses old draft TLSv1.3",
"VersionNegotiationExtension-TLS1":"Current runner version uses old draft TLSv1.3",
"VersionNegotiationExtension-SSL3":"Current runner version uses old draft TLSv1.3",
"ConflictingVersionNegotiation":"Current runner version uses old draft TLSv1.3"
},
"ErrorMap" : {
":UNEXPECTED_MESSAGE:":"unexpected message",
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evpciph.txt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
# -K 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617 -iv 0001020304050607 |
# xxd -ps -u
Title = DES Tests (varous sources)
Title = DES Tests (various sources)
Cipher = DES-EDE3-CFB1
Key = 000102030405060708090A0B0C0D0E0F1011121314151617
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey.txt
+1 -1
View File
@@ -17287,7 +17287,7 @@ PeerKey=BOB_cf_sect283k1_PUB
Ctrl=ecdh_cofactor_mode:1
Result = DERIVE_ERROR
Title = Test keypair mistmatches
Title = Test keypair mismatches
PrivPubKeyPair = Alice-25519:Bob-25519-PUBLIC
Result = KEYPAIR_MISMATCH
test/recipes/30-test_evp_data/evppkey_ecc.txt
+237
View File
@@ -4364,3 +4364,240 @@ PeerKey=ALICE_cf_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls9_PUB
SharedSecret=948d3030e95cead39a1bb3d8a01c2be178517ba7
# tests: 484
Title=zero x-coord regression tests
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime192v1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDkCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEEHzAdAgEBBBhaPNk8jG5hSG6y8tUqUoOaNNsZ3APU
pps=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime192v1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQEDMgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAe2hWBe5g
DLNj216pEvK7XjoKLg5gNg8S
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime192v1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime192v1_PUB
SharedSecret=baaffd49a8399d2ad52cbbe24d47b67afb4b3cf436f1cd65
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime192v2
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDkCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIEHzAdAgEBBBj1AIQMJ7jqYIKCvxYAS+qKMmKmH0to
41k=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime192v2_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQIDMgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAB4Gj7Qqt
2wx/jwFlKgvE4rnd50LspdMk
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime192v2
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime192v2_PUB
SharedSecret=b8f200a4b87064f2e8600685ca3e69b8e661a117aabc770b
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime192v3
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDkCAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMEHzAdAgEBBBh/maLQMSlea9BfLqGy5NPuK0YAH/cz
GqI=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime192v3_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MEkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQMDMgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZEzb63e2
3MKatRLR9Y1M5JEdI9jwMocI
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime192v3
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime192v3_PUB
SharedSecret=b5de857d355bc5b9e270a4c290ea9728d764d8b243ff5d8d
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime239v1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MD8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQQEJTAjAgEBBB5pYWzRYI+c6O7NXCt0H2kw8XRL3rhe
4MrJT8j++CI=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime239v1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQQDPgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
Ox02uwNNLFuvDRn5ip8TxvW0W22R7UzJa9Av6/nh
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime239v1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime239v1_PUB
SharedSecret=6b6206408bd05d42daa2cd224c401a1230b44e184f17b82f385f22dac215
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime239v2
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MD8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQUEJTAjAgEBBB5l8bB7Cpmr7vyx9FiOT2wEF3YOFbDG
bmRr3Vi/xr4=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime239v2_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQUDPgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
IOg3VJGQ89d1GWg4Igxcj5xpDmJiP8tv+e4mxt5U
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime239v2
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime239v2_PUB
SharedSecret=772c2819c960c78f28f21f6542b7409294fad1f84567c44c4b7678dc0e42
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime239v3
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MD8CAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQYEJTAjAgEBBB5HF5FABzUOTYMZg9UdZTx/oRERm/fU
M/+otKzpLjA=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime239v3_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFUwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQYDPgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AsZ4u6r3qQI78EYBpiSgWjqNpoeShjr5piecMBWj
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime239v3
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime239v3_PUB
SharedSecret=56a71f5dd1611e8032c3e2d8224d86e5e8c2fc6480d74c0e282282decd43
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_prime256v1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MEECAQAwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcEJzAlAgEBBCDXhMb6aR4JR2+l2tmgYqP0r8S4jtym
yH++awvF2nGhhg==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_prime256v1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AABmSFx4Di+D1yQzvV2EoGu2VBwq8x2uhxcov4VqF0+T9A==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_prime256v1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_prime256v1_PUB
SharedSecret=c4f5607deb8501f1a4ba23fce4122a4343a17ada2c86a9c8e0d03d92d4a4c84c
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp112r2
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MCwCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcEFTATAgEBBA4hh3tRkG3tnA0496ffMw==
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp112r2_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MDIwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAcDHgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAS5eEOWDV/Wk7w4djyDQ==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp112r2
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp112r2_PUB
SharedSecret=958cc1cb425713678830a4d7d95e
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp128r1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MC4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwEFzAVAgEBBBCykSzic/h3T2K6SkSP1SGt
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp128r1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MDYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEABwDIgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABya8M5aeOpNG3z799IdHc=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp128r1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp128r1_PUB
SharedSecret=5235d452066f126cd7e99eea00fd3068
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp160r1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgEHDAaAgEBBBUACoRnbig69XLlh5VcRexpbbn5zwA=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp160r1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAAgDKgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAG/w1po29wYlxlygXs
MGfbiGg5ng==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp160r1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp160r1_PUB
SharedSecret=9ccd0ab8d093b6acdb3fe14c3736a0dfe61a4666
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp160r2
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4EHDAaAgEBBBUAQFGxInSw1eAvd45E9TUdbXtJGnA=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp160r2_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEAB4DKgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZtSBSZqfmXp47v5z2
ZZZl2JFxDg==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp160r2
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp160r2_PUB
SharedSecret=303e0a282ac86f463fe834cb51b0057be42ed5ab
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp384r1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
ME4CAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIENzA1AgEBBDD6kgzKbg28zbQyVTdC0IdHbm0UCQt2Rdbi
VVHJeYRSnNpFOiFLaOsGOmwoeZzj6jc=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp384r1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MHYwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACIDYgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAPPme8E9RpepjC6P5+WDdWToUyb45/SvSFdO0sIqq+Gu/kn8sRuUqsG+3
QriFDlIe
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp384r1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp384r1_PUB
SharedSecret=b1cfeaeef51dfd487d3a8b2849f1592e04d63f2d2c88b310a6290ebfe5399f5ffe954eabd0619231393e56c35b242986
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_secp521r1
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MGACAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFK4EEACMESTBHAgEBBEIAbddDLMUWbAsY7l3vbNDmntXuAUcDYPg5
w/cgUwSCIvrV9MBeSG8AWqT16riHmHlsn+XI5PAJM6eij3JDahnu9Mo=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_secp521r1_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MIGbMBAGByqGSM49AgEGBSuBBAAjA4GGAAQAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA0g7J/qa1d8ENJsobtEb0CymeZIsa
1Qiq0GiJb+4/jmFLxjBU1Xcr8Bpl1BLgvKqOll0vXTMtfzn4RtRArgAfT4c=
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_secp521r1
PeerKey=BOB_zero_secp521r1_PUB
SharedSecret=003fc3028f61db94b20c7cd177923b6e73f12f0ab067c9ce8866755e3c82abb39c9863cde74fa80b32520bd7dd0eb156c30c08911503b67b2661f1264d09bb231423
PrivateKey=ALICE_zero_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----
MDMCAQAwEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcEHDAaAgEBBBUAoGng7WzYr4P9vtdc3BS/UiNWmc0=
-----END PRIVATE KEY-----
PublicKey=BOB_zero_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----
MD4wEAYHKoZIzj0CAQYFZysBBAcDKgAEAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAZtSBSZqfmXp47v5z2
ZZZl2JFxDg==
-----END PUBLIC KEY-----
# ECDH Alice with Bob peer
Derive=ALICE_zero_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7
PeerKey=BOB_zero_wap-wsg-idm-ecid-wtls7_PUB
SharedSecret=6582fc03bbb340fcf24a5fe8fcdf722655efa8b9
# tests: 14
test/recipes/70-test_tls13downgrade.t
+18 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ use constant {
$proxy->filter(\&downgrade_filter);
my $testtype = DOWNGRADE_TO_TLS_1_2;
$proxy->start() or plan skip_all => "Unable to start up Proxy for tests";
plan tests => 4;
plan tests => 6;
ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail(), "Downgrade TLSv1.3 to TLSv1.2");
#Test 2: Downgrade from TLSv1.3 to TLSv1.1
@@ -73,6 +73,23 @@ ok(TLSProxy::Message->fail()
&& $alert->description() == TLSProxy::Message::AL_DESC_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
"Fallback from TLSv1.3");
SKIP: {
skip "TLSv1.1 disabled", 2 if disabled("tls1_1");
#Test 5: A client side protocol "hole" should not be detected as a downgrade
$proxy->clear();
$proxy->filter(undef);
$proxy->clientflags("-no_tls1_2");
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "TLSv1.2 client-side protocol hole");
#Test 6: A server side protocol "hole" should not be detected as a downgrade
$proxy->clear();
$proxy->filter(undef);
$proxy->serverflags("-no_tls1_2");
$proxy->start();
ok(TLSProxy::Message->success(), "TLSv1.2 server-side protocol hole");
}
sub downgrade_filter
{
my $proxy = shift;
test/recipes/70-test_tls13messages.t
+1 -1
View File
@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ SKIP: {
#Test 6: A client auth handshake
$proxy->clear();
$proxy->clientflags("-cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
$proxy->clientflags("-enable_pha -cert ".srctop_file("apps", "server.pem"));
$proxy->serverflags("-Verify 5");
$proxy->start();
checkhandshake($proxy, checkhandshake::CLIENT_AUTH_HANDSHAKE,
test/secmemtest.c
+44
View File
@@ -129,8 +129,52 @@ static int test_sec_mem(void)
#endif
}
static int test_sec_mem_clear(void)
{
#if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_LINUX) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX)
const int size = 64;
unsigned char *p = NULL;
int i, res = 0;
if (!TEST_true(CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(4096, 32))
|| !TEST_ptr(p = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(size)))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
if (!TEST_uchar_eq(p[i], 0))
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < size; i++)
p[i] = (unsigned char)(i + ' ' + 1);
OPENSSL_secure_free(p);
/*
* A deliberate use after free here to verify that the memory has been
* cleared properly. Since secure free doesn't return the memory to
* libc's memory pool, it technically isn't freed. However, the header
* bytes have to be skipped and these consist of two pointers in the
* current implementation.
*/
for (i = sizeof(void *) * 2; i < size; i++)
if (!TEST_uchar_eq(p[i], 0))
return 0;
res = 1;
p = NULL;
err:
OPENSSL_secure_free(p);
CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done();
return res;
#else
return 1;
#endif
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
ADD_TEST(test_sec_mem);
ADD_TEST(test_sec_mem_clear);
return 1;
}
test/ssl-tests/26-tls13_client_auth.conf
+14 -2
View File
@@ -299,6 +299,10 @@ ExpectedClientSignHash = SHA256
ExpectedClientSignType = RSA-PSS
ExpectedResult = Success
HandshakeMode = PostHandshakeAuth
client = 8-client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-post-handshake-client-extra
[8-client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-post-handshake-client-extra]
EnablePHA = Yes
# ===========================================================
@@ -337,6 +341,10 @@ ExpectedClientSignHash = SHA256
ExpectedClientSignType = RSA-PSS
ExpectedResult = Success
HandshakeMode = PostHandshakeAuth
client = 9-client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-non-empty-names-post-handshake-client-extra
[9-client-auth-TLSv1.3-require-non-empty-names-post-handshake-client-extra]
EnablePHA = Yes
# ===========================================================
@@ -369,6 +377,10 @@ VerifyMode = Peer
ExpectedResult = ServerFail
ExpectedServerAlert = UnknownCA
HandshakeMode = PostHandshakeAuth
client = 10-client-auth-TLSv1.3-noroot-post-handshake-client-extra
[10-client-auth-TLSv1.3-noroot-post-handshake-client-extra]
EnablePHA = Yes
# ===========================================================
@@ -401,7 +413,7 @@ HandshakeMode = PostHandshakeAuth
client = 11-client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-client-post-handshake-client-extra
[11-client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-client-post-handshake-client-extra]
ForcePHA = Yes
EnablePHA = Yes
# ===========================================================
@@ -471,6 +483,6 @@ client = 13-client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-both-post-handshake-client-extra
ForcePHA = Yes
[13-client-auth-TLSv1.3-request-force-both-post-handshake-client-extra]
ForcePHA = Yes
EnablePHA = Yes
test/ssl-tests/26-tls13_client_auth.conf.in
+21 -12
View File
@@ -176,6 +176,9 @@ our @tests = (
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
@@ -201,6 +204,9 @@ our @tests = (
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
@@ -223,6 +229,9 @@ our @tests = (
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"Certificate" => test_pem("ee-client-chain.pem"),
"PrivateKey" => test_pem("ee-key.pem"),
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "ServerFail",
@@ -240,9 +249,9 @@ our @tests = (
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
@@ -255,9 +264,9 @@ our @tests = (
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
@@ -274,16 +283,16 @@ our @tests = (
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"VerifyMode" => "RequestPostHandshake",
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
client => {
"MinProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
"MaxProtocol" => "TLSv1.3",
extra => {
"ForcePHA" => "Yes",
},
extra => {
"EnablePHA" => "Yes",
},
},
test => {
"ExpectedResult" => "Success",
test/ssl_test_ctx.c
+3 -3
View File
@@ -629,9 +629,9 @@ __owur static int parse_expected_client_ca_names(SSL_TEST_CTX *test_ctx,
IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_STRING_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CTX, test, expected_cipher)
/* Client and Server ForcePHA */
/* Client and Server PHA */
IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, force_pha)
IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF, client, enable_pha)
IMPLEMENT_SSL_TEST_BOOL_OPTION(SSL_TEST_SERVER_CONF, server, force_pha)
/* Known test options and their corresponding parse methods. */
@@ -689,7 +689,7 @@ static const ssl_test_client_option ssl_test_client_options[] = {
{ "SRPUser", &parse_client_srp_user },
{ "SRPPassword", &parse_client_srp_password },
{ "MaxFragmentLenExt", &parse_max_fragment_len_mode },
{ "ForcePHA", &parse_client_force_pha },
{ "EnablePHA", &parse_client_enable_pha },
};
/* Nested server options. */
test/ssl_test_ctx.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -108,8 +108,8 @@ typedef struct {
char *reneg_ciphers;
char *srp_user;
char *srp_password;
/* Forced PHA */
int force_pha;
/* PHA enabled */
int enable_pha;
} SSL_TEST_CLIENT_CONF;
typedef struct {
test/sslapitest.c
+3 -4
View File
@@ -1270,7 +1270,7 @@ static int check_resumption(int idx, SSL_CTX *sctx, SSL_CTX *cctx, int succ)
|| !TEST_true(SSL_set_session(clientssl, sesscache[i])))
goto end;
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(clientssl);
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(clientssl, 1);
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
@@ -1377,7 +1377,7 @@ static int test_tickets(int stateful, int idx)
&clientssl, NULL, NULL)))
goto end;
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(clientssl);
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth(clientssl, 1);
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
SSL_ERROR_NONE))
@@ -4331,13 +4331,12 @@ static int test_pha_key_update(void)
|| !TEST_true(SSL_CTX_set_max_proto_version(cctx, TLS1_3_VERSION)))
goto end;
SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth(cctx, 1);
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
NULL, NULL)))
goto end;
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth(clientssl);
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl,
SSL_ERROR_NONE)))
goto end;
util/libcrypto.num
-2
View File
@@ -4396,8 +4396,6 @@ EVP_PKEY_meth_set_check 4341 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_get_check 4342 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_meth_remove 4343 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
OPENSSL_sk_reserve 4344 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CRYPTO_atomic_read 4345 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
CRYPTO_atomic_write 4346 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
EVP_PKEY_set1_engine 4347 1_1_0g EXIST::FUNCTION:ENGINE
DH_new_by_nid 4348 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
DH_get_nid 4349 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:DH
util/libssl.num
+2 -1
View File
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length 475 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length 476 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_stateless 477 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_verify_client_post_handshake 478 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_force_post_handshake_auth 479 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_set_post_handshake_auth 479 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_export_keying_material_early 480 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_use_cert_and_key 481 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_use_cert_and_key 482 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
@@ -496,3 +496,4 @@ SSL_set_recv_max_early_data 496 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_get_recv_max_early_data 497 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_get_recv_max_early_data 498 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_set_recv_max_early_data 499 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION:
SSL_CTX_set_post_handshake_auth 500 1_1_1 EXIST::FUNCTION: