Update pre10

This commit is contained in:
2018-08-23 00:44:44 +09:00
parent ef69dcb649
commit 6ed909873d
55 changed files with 818 additions and 394 deletions
+6 -2
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ int rand_fork_count;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
static int rand_nonce_count;
static int rand_cleaning_up = 0;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
@@ -324,7 +326,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
goto err2;
if (!rand_pool_init())
if (!rand_cleaning_up && !rand_pool_init())
goto err3;
return 1;
@@ -346,10 +348,12 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
rand_cleaning_up = 1;
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
meth->cleanup();
rand_pool_cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
rand_pool_cleanup();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
+68 -38
View File
@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
# endif
#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
!defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
@@ -88,6 +86,8 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
@@ -192,22 +192,29 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
/*
* sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
* Returns the size on success, 0 on failure.
* Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
*/
static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
{
int mib[2];
size_t done = 0;
size_t len;
/*
* Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
* without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
*/
/*
* On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
* variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
* when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
* multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
*/
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0))
return 0;
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
errno = EINVAL;
return -1;
}
/*
* On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
@@ -217,7 +224,8 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
* Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
*/
#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
return 0;
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
#endif
mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
@@ -226,7 +234,7 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
do {
len = buflen;
if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
return done;
return done > 0 ? done : -1;
done += len;
buf += len;
buflen -= len;
@@ -238,10 +246,20 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
/*
* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or <= 0 on error.
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
*/
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
{
/*
* Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
* get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
*
* 2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13
*
* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
*/
/*
* Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
*
@@ -253,10 +271,10 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
* - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
*/
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
extern int getentropy(void *bufer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
if (getentropy != NULL)
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# else
union {
void *p;
@@ -271,19 +289,18 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
ERR_pop_to_mark();
if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# endif
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
return (int)syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# endif
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return (int)sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# endif
return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
# else
errno = ENOSYS;
return -1;
# endif
}
#if !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
@@ -441,17 +458,25 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
unsigned char *buffer;
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
size_t bytes = 0;
{
ssize_t bytes;
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
if (syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed) == (int)bytes_needed)
bytes = bytes_needed;
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
break;
}
}
}
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
if (entropy_available > 0)
return entropy_available;
# endif
@@ -468,22 +493,27 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t i;
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
ssize_t bytes = 0;
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
int attempts = 3;
const int fd = get_random_device(i);
if (fd == -1)
continue;
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
if (buffer != NULL) {
const ssize_t n = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
if (n <= 0) {
close_random_device(i);
continue;
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
if (bytes > 0) {
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
bytes_needed -= bytes;
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
break;
}
rand_pool_add_end(pool, n, 8 * n);
}
if (!keep_random_devices_open)
if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
close_random_device(i);
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);