Update pre10
This commit is contained in:
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ int rand_fork_count;
|
||||
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
|
||||
static int rand_nonce_count;
|
||||
|
||||
static int rand_cleaning_up = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
|
||||
@@ -324,7 +326,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
|
||||
if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
|
||||
goto err2;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!rand_pool_init())
|
||||
if (!rand_cleaning_up && !rand_pool_init())
|
||||
goto err3;
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
@@ -346,10 +348,12 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RAND_METHOD *meth = default_RAND_meth;
|
||||
|
||||
rand_cleaning_up = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (meth != NULL && meth->cleanup != NULL)
|
||||
meth->cleanup();
|
||||
rand_pool_cleanup();
|
||||
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
|
||||
rand_pool_cleanup();
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
|
||||
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
|
||||
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
+68
-38
@@ -77,8 +77,6 @@ static uint64_t get_timer_bits(void);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
#endif /* defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UNIX) || defined(__DJGPP__) */
|
||||
|
||||
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
|
||||
|
||||
#if (defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)) && \
|
||||
!defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE)
|
||||
# error "UEFI and VXWorks only support seeding NONE"
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +86,8 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
|
||||
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VMS) || defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VXWORKS) \
|
||||
|| defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI))
|
||||
|
||||
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen);
|
||||
|
||||
# if defined(OPENSSL_SYS_VOS)
|
||||
|
||||
# ifndef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_OS
|
||||
@@ -192,22 +192,29 @@ void rand_pool_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
|
||||
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* sysctl_random(): Use sysctl() to read a random number from the kernel
|
||||
* Returns the size on success, 0 on failure.
|
||||
* Returns the number of bytes returned in buf on success, -1 on failure.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
static ssize_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int mib[2];
|
||||
size_t done = 0;
|
||||
size_t len;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Note: sign conversion between size_t and ssize_t is safe even
|
||||
* without a range check, see comment in syscall_random()
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* On FreeBSD old implementations returned longs, newer versions support
|
||||
* variable sizes up to 256 byte. The code below would not work properly
|
||||
* when the sysctl returns long and we want to request something not a
|
||||
* multiple of longs, which should never be the case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!ossl_assert(buflen % sizeof(long) == 0)) {
|
||||
errno = EINVAL;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* On NetBSD before 4.0 KERN_ARND was an alias for KERN_URND, and only
|
||||
@@ -217,7 +224,8 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
* Just return an error on older NetBSD versions.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#if defined(__NetBSD__) && __NetBSD_Version__ < 400000000
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
mib[0] = CTL_KERN;
|
||||
@@ -226,7 +234,7 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
do {
|
||||
len = buflen;
|
||||
if (sysctl(mib, 2, buf, &len, NULL, 0) == -1)
|
||||
return done;
|
||||
return done > 0 ? done : -1;
|
||||
done += len;
|
||||
buf += len;
|
||||
buflen -= len;
|
||||
@@ -238,10 +246,20 @@ static size_t sysctl_random(char *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* syscall_random(): Try to get random data using a system call
|
||||
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or <= 0 on error.
|
||||
* returns the number of bytes returned in buf, or < 0 on error.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Note: 'buflen' equals the size of the buffer which is used by the
|
||||
* get_entropy() callback of the RAND_DRBG. It is roughly bounded by
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2 * DRBG_MINMAX_FACTOR * (RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH / 8) = 2^13
|
||||
*
|
||||
* which is way below the OSSL_SSIZE_MAX limit. Therefore sign conversion
|
||||
* between size_t and ssize_t is safe even without a range check.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Do runtime detection to find getentropy().
|
||||
*
|
||||
@@ -253,10 +271,10 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
* - FreeBSD since 12.0 (1200061)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
# if defined(__GNUC__) && __GNUC__>=2 && defined(__ELF__) && !defined(__hpux)
|
||||
extern int getentropy(void *bufer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
|
||||
extern int getentropy(void *buffer, size_t length) __attribute__((weak));
|
||||
|
||||
if (getentropy != NULL)
|
||||
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
|
||||
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
|
||||
# else
|
||||
union {
|
||||
void *p;
|
||||
@@ -271,19 +289,18 @@ int syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
|
||||
p_getentropy.p = DSO_global_lookup("getentropy");
|
||||
ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
if (p_getentropy.p != NULL)
|
||||
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? buflen : 0;
|
||||
return p_getentropy.f(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
/* Linux supports this since version 3.17 */
|
||||
# if defined(__linux) && defined(SYS_getrandom)
|
||||
return (int)syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
# if (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
|
||||
return (int)sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
|
||||
return syscall(SYS_getrandom, buf, buflen, 0);
|
||||
# elif (defined(__FreeBSD__) || defined(__NetBSD__)) && defined(KERN_ARND)
|
||||
return sysctl_random(buf, buflen);
|
||||
# else
|
||||
errno = ENOSYS;
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#if !defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_NONE) && defined(OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_DEVRANDOM)
|
||||
@@ -441,17 +458,25 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
|
||||
unsigned char *buffer;
|
||||
|
||||
# ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_GETRANDOM
|
||||
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
|
||||
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
|
||||
if (buffer != NULL) {
|
||||
size_t bytes = 0;
|
||||
{
|
||||
ssize_t bytes;
|
||||
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
|
||||
int attempts = 3;
|
||||
|
||||
if (syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed) == (int)bytes_needed)
|
||||
bytes = bytes_needed;
|
||||
|
||||
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
|
||||
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
|
||||
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
|
||||
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
|
||||
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
|
||||
bytes = syscall_random(buffer, bytes_needed);
|
||||
if (bytes > 0) {
|
||||
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
|
||||
bytes_needed -= bytes;
|
||||
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
|
||||
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
entropy_available = rand_pool_entropy_available(pool);
|
||||
if (entropy_available > 0)
|
||||
return entropy_available;
|
||||
# endif
|
||||
@@ -468,22 +493,27 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
|
||||
ssize_t bytes = 0;
|
||||
/* Maximum allowed number of consecutive unsuccessful attempts */
|
||||
int attempts = 3;
|
||||
const int fd = get_random_device(i);
|
||||
|
||||
if (fd == -1)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
|
||||
if (buffer != NULL) {
|
||||
const ssize_t n = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
|
||||
|
||||
if (n <= 0) {
|
||||
close_random_device(i);
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
while (bytes_needed != 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
|
||||
buffer = rand_pool_add_begin(pool, bytes_needed);
|
||||
bytes = read(fd, buffer, bytes_needed);
|
||||
|
||||
if (bytes > 0) {
|
||||
rand_pool_add_end(pool, bytes, 8 * bytes);
|
||||
bytes_needed -= bytes;
|
||||
attempts = 3; /* reset counter after successful attempt */
|
||||
} else if (bytes < 0 && errno != EINTR) {
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rand_pool_add_end(pool, n, 8 * n);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!keep_random_devices_open)
|
||||
if (bytes < 0 || !keep_random_devices_open)
|
||||
close_random_device(i);
|
||||
|
||||
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user