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@@ -2,7 +2,23 @@
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# switch each to the Legacy provider when needed.
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$DH_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$ECX_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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IF[{- !$disabled{dh} -}]
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SOURCE[$DH_GOAL]=dh_exch.c
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ENDIF
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IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
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$ECDEF_s390x=S390X_EC_ASM
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# Now that we have defined all the arch specific variables, use the
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# appropriate one, and define the appropriate macros
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IF[$ECASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}]
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$ECDEF=$ECDEF_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
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ENDIF
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ENDIF
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IF[{- !$disabled{ec} -}]
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SOURCE[$ECX_GOAL]=ecx_exch.c
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DEFINE[$ECX_GOAL]=$ECDEF
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ENDIF
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@@ -92,9 +92,9 @@ static int dh_derive(void *vpdhctx, unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen,
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DH_get0_key(pdhctx->dhpeer, &pub_key, NULL);
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if (pdhctx->pad)
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ret = dh_compute_key_padded(pdhctx->libctx, secret, pub_key, pdhctx->dh);
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ret = DH_compute_key_padded(secret, pub_key, pdhctx->dh);
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else
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ret = dh_compute_key(pdhctx->libctx, secret, pub_key, pdhctx->dh);
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ret = DH_compute_key(secret, pub_key, pdhctx->dh);
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if (ret <= 0)
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return 0;
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@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include <openssl/params.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "crypto/ecx.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
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# include "s390x_arch.h"
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#endif
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_newctx_fn x25519_newctx;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_newctx_fn x448_newctx;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_init_fn ecx_init;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_set_peer_fn ecx_set_peer;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_derive_fn ecx_derive;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_freectx_fn ecx_freectx;
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static OSSL_OP_keyexch_dupctx_fn ecx_dupctx;
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/*
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* What's passed as an actual key is defined by the KEYMGMT interface.
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* We happen to know that our KEYMGMT simply passes ECX_KEY structures, so
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* we use that here too.
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*/
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typedef struct {
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size_t keylen;
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ECX_KEY *key;
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ECX_KEY *peerkey;
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} PROV_ECX_CTX;
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static void *ecx_newctx(void *provctx, size_t keylen)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(PROV_ECX_CTX));
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if (ctx == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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ctx->keylen = keylen;
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return ctx;
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}
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static void *x25519_newctx(void *provctx)
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{
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return ecx_newctx(provctx, X25519_KEYLEN);
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}
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static void *x448_newctx(void *provctx)
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{
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return ecx_newctx(provctx, X448_KEYLEN);
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}
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static int ecx_init(void *vecxctx, void *vkey)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *ecxctx = (PROV_ECX_CTX *)vecxctx;
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ECX_KEY *key = vkey;
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if (ecxctx == NULL
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|| key == NULL
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|| key->keylen != ecxctx->keylen
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|| !ecx_key_up_ref(key)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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ecx_key_free(ecxctx->key);
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ecxctx->key = key;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ecx_set_peer(void *vecxctx, void *vkey)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *ecxctx = (PROV_ECX_CTX *)vecxctx;
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ECX_KEY *key = vkey;
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if (ecxctx == NULL
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|| key == NULL
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|| key->keylen != ecxctx->keylen
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|| !ecx_key_up_ref(key)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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ecx_key_free(ecxctx->peerkey);
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ecxctx->peerkey = key;
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return 1;
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}
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static int ecx_derive(void *vecxctx, unsigned char *secret, size_t *secretlen,
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size_t outlen)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *ecxctx = (PROV_ECX_CTX *)vecxctx;
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if (ecxctx->key == NULL
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|| ecxctx->key->privkey == NULL
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|| ecxctx->peerkey == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!ossl_assert(ecxctx->keylen == X25519_KEYLEN
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|| ecxctx->keylen == X448_KEYLEN)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (secret == NULL) {
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*secretlen = ecxctx->keylen;
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return 1;
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}
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if (outlen < ecxctx->keylen) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ecxctx->keylen == X25519_KEYLEN) {
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#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
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if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1]
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& S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X25519)) {
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if (s390x_x25519_mul(secret, ecxctx->peerkey->pubkey,
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ecxctx->key->privkey) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION);
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return 0;
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}
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} else
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#endif
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if (X25519(secret, ecxctx->key->privkey, ecxctx->peerkey->pubkey) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION);
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return 0;
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}
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} else {
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#ifdef S390X_EC_ASM
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if (OPENSSL_s390xcap_P.pcc[1]
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& S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SCALAR_MULTIPLY_X448)) {
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if (s390x_x448_mul(secret, ecxctx->peerkey->pubkey,
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ecxctx->key->privkey) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION);
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return 0;
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}
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} else
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#endif
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if (X448(secret, ecxctx->key->privkey, ecxctx->peerkey->pubkey) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_DURING_DERIVATION);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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*secretlen = ecxctx->keylen;
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return 1;
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}
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static void ecx_freectx(void *vecxctx)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *ecxctx = (PROV_ECX_CTX *)vecxctx;
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ecx_key_free(ecxctx->key);
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ecx_key_free(ecxctx->peerkey);
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OPENSSL_free(ecxctx);
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}
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static void *ecx_dupctx(void *vecxctx)
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{
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PROV_ECX_CTX *srcctx = (PROV_ECX_CTX *)vecxctx;
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PROV_ECX_CTX *dstctx;
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dstctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*srcctx));
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if (dstctx == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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*dstctx = *srcctx;
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if (dstctx->key != NULL && !ecx_key_up_ref(dstctx->key)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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OPENSSL_free(dstctx);
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return NULL;
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}
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if (dstctx->peerkey != NULL && !ecx_key_up_ref(dstctx->peerkey)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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ecx_key_free(dstctx->key);
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OPENSSL_free(dstctx);
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return NULL;
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}
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return dstctx;
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}
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const OSSL_DISPATCH x25519_keyexch_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))x25519_newctx },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecx_init },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DERIVE, (void (*)(void))ecx_derive },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_PEER, (void (*)(void))ecx_set_peer },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecx_freectx },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecx_dupctx },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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const OSSL_DISPATCH x448_keyexch_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))x448_newctx },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_INIT, (void (*)(void))ecx_init },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DERIVE, (void (*)(void))ecx_derive },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_SET_PEER, (void (*)(void))ecx_set_peer },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))ecx_freectx },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KEYEXCH_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))ecx_dupctx },
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{ 0, NULL }
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};
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