Latest update.
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+101
-22
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/bn.h>
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#include "dh_local.h"
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#include "crypto/dh.h"
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/*-
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* Check that p and g are suitable enough
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@@ -37,6 +38,28 @@ int DH_check_params_ex(const DH *dh)
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return errflags == 0;
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}
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#ifdef FIPS_MODE
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int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
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{
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int nid;
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*ret = 0;
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/*
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* SP800-56A R3 Section 5.5.2 Assurances of Domain Parameter Validity
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* (1a) The domain parameters correspond to any approved safe prime group.
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*/
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nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
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if (nid != NID_undef)
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return 1;
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/*
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* OR
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* (2b) FFC domain params conform to FIPS-186-4 explicit domain param
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* validity tests.
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*/
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return ffc_params_FIPS186_4_validate(&dh->params, FFC_PARAM_TYPE_DH, NULL,
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FFC_PARAMS_VALIDATE_ALL, ret, NULL);
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}
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#else
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int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
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{
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int ok = 0;
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@@ -73,6 +96,7 @@ int DH_check_params(const DH *dh, int *ret)
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ok;
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}
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#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
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/*-
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* Check that p is a safe prime and
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@@ -107,11 +131,20 @@ int DH_check_ex(const DH *dh)
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return errflags == 0;
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}
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/* Note: according to documentation - this only checks the params */
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int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
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{
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#ifdef FIPS_MODE
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return DH_check_params(dh, ret);
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#else
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int ok = 0, r;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *t1 = NULL, *t2 = NULL;
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int nid = DH_get_nid((DH *)dh);
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*ret = 0;
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if (nid != NID_undef)
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return 1;
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if (!DH_check_params(dh, ret))
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return 0;
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@@ -171,6 +204,7 @@ int DH_check(const DH *dh, int *ret)
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ok;
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#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
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}
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int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
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@@ -190,38 +224,83 @@ int DH_check_pub_key_ex(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key)
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return errflags == 0;
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}
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/*
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* See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Full public key validation.
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*/
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int DH_check_pub_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
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{
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return ffc_validate_public_key(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
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}
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/*
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* See SP800-56Ar3 Section 5.6.2.3.1 : FFC Partial public key validation.
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* To only be used with ephemeral FFC public keys generated using the approved
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* safe-prime groups.
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*/
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int dh_check_pub_key_partial(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *pub_key, int *ret)
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{
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return ffc_validate_public_key_partial(&dh->params, pub_key, ret);
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}
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int dh_check_priv_key(const DH *dh, const BIGNUM *priv_key, int *ret)
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{
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int ok = 0;
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BIGNUM *tmp = NULL;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *two_powN = NULL, *upper;
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*ret = 0;
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ctx = BN_CTX_new();
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if (ctx == NULL)
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two_powN = BN_new();
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if (two_powN == NULL)
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return 0;
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if (dh->params.q == NULL)
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goto err;
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BN_CTX_start(ctx);
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tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
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if (tmp == NULL || !BN_set_word(tmp, 1))
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goto err;
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if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) <= 0)
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*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_SMALL;
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if (BN_copy(tmp, dh->params.p) == NULL || !BN_sub_word(tmp, 1))
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goto err;
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if (BN_cmp(pub_key, tmp) >= 0)
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*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_TOO_LARGE;
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upper = dh->params.q;
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if (dh->params.q != NULL) {
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/* Check pub_key^q == 1 mod p */
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if (!BN_mod_exp(tmp, pub_key, dh->params.q, dh->params.p, ctx))
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/* Is it from an approved Safe prime group ?*/
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if (DH_get_nid((DH *)dh) != NID_undef) {
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if (!BN_lshift(two_powN, BN_value_one(), dh->length))
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goto err;
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if (!BN_is_one(tmp))
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*ret |= DH_CHECK_PUBKEY_INVALID;
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if (BN_cmp(two_powN, dh->params.q) < 0)
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upper = two_powN;
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}
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if (!ffc_validate_private_key(upper, priv_key, ret))
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goto err;
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ok = 1;
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err:
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BN_CTX_end(ctx);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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err:
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BN_free(two_powN);
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return ok;
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}
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/*
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* FFC pairwise check from SP800-56A R3.
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* Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
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*/
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int dh_check_pairwise(DH *dh)
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{
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int ret = 0;
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BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
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BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL;
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if (dh->params.p == NULL
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|| dh->params.g == NULL
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|| dh->priv_key == NULL
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|| dh->pub_key == NULL)
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return 0;
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ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(dh->libctx);
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if (ctx == NULL)
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goto err;
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pub_key = BN_new();
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if (pub_key == NULL)
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goto err;
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/* recalculate the public key = (g ^ priv) mod p */
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if (!dh_generate_public_key(ctx, dh, dh->priv_key, pub_key))
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goto err;
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/* check it matches the existing pubic_key */
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ret = BN_cmp(pub_key, dh->pub_key) == 0;
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err:
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BN_free(pub_key);
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BN_CTX_free(ctx);
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return ret;
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}
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