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Hakase
2018-09-13 11:56:57 +09:00
parent 648f7916df
commit f12926b943
20 changed files with 290 additions and 140 deletions
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crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+27
View File
@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@ typedef struct {
int taglen;
int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
ctr128_f ctr;
} EVP_AES_GCM_CTX;
@@ -1069,6 +1070,7 @@ typedef struct {
int kreslen;
int tls_aad_len;
uint64_t tls_enc_records; /* Number of TLS records encrypted */
} S390X_AES_GCM_CTX;
typedef struct {
@@ -1692,6 +1694,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
buf = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c);
memcpy(buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
len = buf[arg - 2] << 8 | buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit iv. */
@@ -1791,6 +1794,17 @@ static int s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (out != in || len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
/*
* Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
* Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
* communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
* side only.
*/
if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, enc ? EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN
: EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
@@ -2901,6 +2915,7 @@ static int aes_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
return 0;
memcpy(c->buf, ptr, arg);
gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
gctx->tls_enc_records = 0;
{
unsigned int len = c->buf[arg - 2] << 8 | c->buf[arg - 1];
/* Correct length for explicit IV */
@@ -3035,6 +3050,18 @@ static int aes_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (out != in
|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
return -1;
/*
* Check for too many keys as per FIPS 140-2 IG A.5 "Key/IV Pair Uniqueness
* Requirements from SP 800-38D". The requirements is for one party to the
* communication to fail after 2^64 - 1 keys. We do this on the encrypting
* side only.
*/
if (ctx->encrypt && ++gctx->tls_enc_records == 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS);
goto err;
}
/*
* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
* buffer.
crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+4
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, 0), "aesni_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "aes_gcm_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0), "aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, 0), "aes_ocb_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_t4_init_key"},
@@ -148,6 +149,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC2_MAGIC_TO_METH, 0), "rc2_magic_to_meth"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_RC5_CTRL, 0), "rc5_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "s390x_aes_gcm_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_S390X_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0),
"s390x_aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_UPDATE, 0), "update"},
{0, NULL}
};
@@ -239,6 +242,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PRIVATE_KEY_ENCODE_ERROR),
"private key encode error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_PUBLIC_KEY_NOT_RSA), "public key not rsa"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_TOO_MANY_RECORDS), "too many records"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_CIPHER), "unknown cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION), "unknown option"},