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Update - OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre7-dev

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Hakase
2018-05-23 23:52:41 +09:00
parent e8a0afd4a0
commit ef253190c7
624 changed files with 189420 additions and 8064 deletions
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crypto/bn/bn_gf2m.c
+59 -105
View File
@@ -22,30 +22,32 @@
*/
# define MAX_ITERATIONS 50
static const BN_ULONG SQR_tb[16] = { 0, 1, 4, 5, 16, 17, 20, 21,
64, 65, 68, 69, 80, 81, 84, 85
};
# define SQR_nibble(w) ((((w) & 8) << 3) \
| (((w) & 4) << 2) \
| (((w) & 2) << 1) \
| ((w) & 1))
/* Platform-specific macros to accelerate squaring. */
# if defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT) || defined(SIXTY_FOUR_BIT_LONG)
# define SQR1(w) \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 60 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 56 & 0xF] << 48 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 52 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 48 & 0xF] << 32 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 44 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 40 & 0xF] << 16 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 36 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 32 & 0xF]
SQR_nibble((w) >> 60) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 56) << 48 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 52) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 48) << 32 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 44) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 40) << 16 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 36) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 32)
# define SQR0(w) \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 56 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 48 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 40 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF] << 32 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 56 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 48 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 40 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16) << 32 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) )
# endif
# ifdef THIRTY_TWO_BIT
# define SQR1(w) \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 28 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 24 & 0xF] << 16 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 20 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 16 & 0xF]
SQR_nibble((w) >> 28) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 24) << 16 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 20) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 16)
# define SQR0(w) \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 12 & 0xF] << 24 | SQR_tb[(w) >> 8 & 0xF] << 16 | \
SQR_tb[(w) >> 4 & 0xF] << 8 | SQR_tb[(w) & 0xF]
SQR_nibble((w) >> 12) << 24 | SQR_nibble((w) >> 8) << 16 | \
SQR_nibble((w) >> 4) << 8 | SQR_nibble((w) )
# endif
# if !defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_GF2m)
@@ -547,7 +549,8 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_sqr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
* Hernandez, J.L., and Menezes, A. "Software Implementation of Elliptic
* Curve Cryptography Over Binary Fields".
*/
int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
static int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_vartime(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *b, *c = NULL, *u = NULL, *v = NULL, *tmp;
int ret = 0;
@@ -713,6 +716,46 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
return ret;
}
/*-
* Wrapper for BN_GF2m_mod_inv_vartime that blinds the input before calling.
* This is not constant time.
* But it does eliminate first order deduction on the input.
*/
int BN_GF2m_mod_inv(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *b = NULL;
int ret = 0;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
if ((b = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* generate blinding value */
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand(b, BN_num_bits(p) - 1,
BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(b));
/* r := a * b */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, a, b, p, ctx))
goto err;
/* r := 1/(a * b) */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_inv_vartime(r, r, p, ctx))
goto err;
/* r := b/(a * b) = 1/a */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod_mul(r, r, b, p, ctx))
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* Invert xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx.
* This function calls down to the BN_GF2m_mod_inv implementation; this
@@ -740,7 +783,6 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_inv_arr(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *xx, const int p[],
return ret;
}
# ifndef OPENSSL_SUN_GF2M_DIV
/*
* Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
* or y, x could equal y.
@@ -771,94 +813,6 @@ int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
# else
/*
* Divide y by x, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be x
* or y, x could equal y. Uses algorithm Modular_Division_GF(2^m) from
* Chang-Shantz, S. "From Euclid's GCD to Montgomery Multiplication to the
* Great Divide".
*/
int BN_GF2m_mod_div(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *y, const BIGNUM *x,
const BIGNUM *p, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
BIGNUM *a, *b, *u, *v;
int ret = 0;
bn_check_top(y);
bn_check_top(x);
bn_check_top(p);
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
a = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
b = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
u = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
v = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (v == NULL)
goto err;
/* reduce x and y mod p */
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(u, y, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_mod(a, x, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_copy(b, p))
goto err;
while (!BN_is_odd(a)) {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
}
do {
if (BN_GF2m_cmp(b, a) > 0) {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(b, b, a))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, u))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(b, b))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(v))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(v, v, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(v, v))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(b));
} else if (BN_abs_is_word(a, 1))
break;
else {
if (!BN_GF2m_add(a, a, b))
goto err;
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, v))
goto err;
do {
if (!BN_rshift1(a, a))
goto err;
if (BN_is_odd(u))
if (!BN_GF2m_add(u, u, p))
goto err;
if (!BN_rshift1(u, u))
goto err;
} while (!BN_is_odd(a));
}
} while (1);
if (!BN_copy(r, u))
goto err;
bn_check_top(r);
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
# endif
/*
* Divide yy by xx, reduce modulo p, and store the result in r. r could be xx