Latest update.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
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# We make separate GOAL variables for each algorithm, to make it easy to
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# switch each to the Legacy provider when needed.
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$TLS1_PRF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$HKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$KBKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$PBKDF2_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$SSKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$SCRYPT_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$SSHKDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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$X942KDF_GOAL=../../libimplementations.a
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SOURCE[$TLS1_PRF_GOAL]=tls1_prf.c
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SOURCE[$HKDF_GOAL]=hkdf.c
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SOURCE[$KBKDF_GOAL]=kbkdf.c
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SOURCE[$PBKDF2_GOAL]=pbkdf2.c
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# Extra code to satisfy the FIPS and non-FIPS separation.
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# When the PBKDF2 moves to legacy, this can be removed.
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SOURCE[../../libfips.a]=pbkdf2_fips.c
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SOURCE[../../libnonfips.a]=pbkdf2_fips.c
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SOURCE[$SSKDF_GOAL]=sskdf.c
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SOURCE[$SCRYPT_GOAL]=scrypt.c
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SOURCE[$SSHKDF_GOAL]=sshkdf.c
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SOURCE[$X942KDF_GOAL]=x942kdf.c
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@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/core_names.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include "internal/numbers.h"
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#include "crypto/evp.h"
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#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/provider_util.h"
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#include "e_os.h"
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#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
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static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
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static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
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const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
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unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
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static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
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const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
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const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
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unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
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typedef struct {
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void *provctx;
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int mode;
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PROV_DIGEST digest;
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unsigned char *salt;
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size_t salt_len;
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unsigned char *key;
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size_t key_len;
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unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
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size_t info_len;
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} KDF_HKDF;
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static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx;
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if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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else
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ctx->provctx = provctx;
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return ctx;
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}
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static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx);
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}
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static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
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memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
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{
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int sz;
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const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
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return SIZE_MAX;
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if (md == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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sz = EVP_MD_size(md);
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if (sz < 0)
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return 0;
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return sz;
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
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if (md == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->key == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
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return 0;
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}
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switch (ctx->mode) {
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
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return HKDF(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
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ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key,
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keylen);
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
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return HKDF_Extract(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
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ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
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case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
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return HKDF_Expand(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
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ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
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default:
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return 0;
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}
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
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OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
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int n;
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if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
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return 0;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
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if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
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if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
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} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
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} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
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ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
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} else {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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} else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
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if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
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&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
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&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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ctx->mode = n;
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} else {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
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return 0;
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}
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}
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
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ctx->key = NULL;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
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&ctx->key_len))
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return 0;
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}
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
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if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
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OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
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ctx->salt = NULL;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
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&ctx->salt_len))
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return 0;
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}
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}
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/* The info fields concatenate, so process them all */
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
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ctx->info_len = 0;
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for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
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OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) {
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const void *q = ctx->info + ctx->info_len;
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size_t sz = 0;
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if (p->data_size != 0
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&& p->data != NULL
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&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
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HKDF_MAXBUF - ctx->info_len,
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&sz))
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return 0;
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ctx->info_len += sz;
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}
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_settable_ctx_params;
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}
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static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
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OSSL_PARAM *p;
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if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
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return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kdf_hkdf_size(ctx));
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return -2;
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}
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||||
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static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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return known_gettable_ctx_params;
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}
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const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
|
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
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(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
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{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
|
||||
* Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
|
||||
* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
|
||||
* Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* From the paper:
|
||||
* The scheme HKDF is specified as:
|
||||
* HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where:
|
||||
* SKM is source key material
|
||||
* XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
|
||||
* CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
|
||||
* L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
|
||||
* k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
|
||||
* t = ceil(L/k)
|
||||
* the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* From RFC 5869:
|
||||
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
|
||||
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
|
||||
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
|
||||
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
int ret, sz;
|
||||
size_t prk_len;
|
||||
|
||||
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
|
||||
if (sz < 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
prk_len = (size_t)sz;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
|
||||
if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
|
||||
ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
|
||||
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
|
||||
* Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Options:
|
||||
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
|
||||
* hash function output in octets
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Inputs:
|
||||
* salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
|
||||
* if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
|
||||
* IKM input keying material
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Output:
|
||||
* PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The output PRK is calculated as follows:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
|
||||
|
||||
if (sz < 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
|
||||
return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
|
||||
* Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
|
||||
*
|
||||
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Options:
|
||||
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
|
||||
* hash function output in octets
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Inputs:
|
||||
* PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
|
||||
* (usually, the output from the extract step)
|
||||
* info optional context and application specific information
|
||||
* (can be a zero-length string)
|
||||
* L length of output keying material in octets
|
||||
* (<= 255*HashLen)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Output:
|
||||
* OKM output keying material (of L octets)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The output OKM is calculated as follows:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* N = ceil(L/HashLen)
|
||||
* T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
|
||||
* OKM = first L octets of T
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where:
|
||||
* T(0) = empty string (zero length)
|
||||
* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
|
||||
* T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
|
||||
* T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
|
||||
* ...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
|
||||
* single octet.)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
|
||||
int ret = 0, sz;
|
||||
unsigned int i;
|
||||
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
|
||||
|
||||
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
|
||||
if (sz <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
dig_len = (size_t)sz;
|
||||
|
||||
/* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
|
||||
n = okm_len / dig_len;
|
||||
if (okm_len % dig_len)
|
||||
n++;
|
||||
|
||||
if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
|
||||
size_t copy_len;
|
||||
const unsigned char ctr = i;
|
||||
|
||||
/* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
|
||||
if (i > 1) {
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
|
||||
okm_len - done_len :
|
||||
dig_len;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
|
||||
|
||||
done_len += copy_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
|
||||
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,346 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 Red Hat, Inc.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This implements https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-108/final
|
||||
* section 5.1 ("counter mode") and section 5.2 ("feedback mode") in both HMAC
|
||||
* and CMAC. That document does not name the KDFs it defines; the name is
|
||||
* derived from
|
||||
* https://csrc.nist.gov/Projects/Cryptographic-Algorithm-Validation-Program/Key-Derivation
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Note that section 5.3 ("double-pipeline mode") is not implemented, though
|
||||
* it would be possible to do so in the future.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* These versions all assume the counter is used. It would be relatively
|
||||
* straightforward to expose a configuration handle should the need arise.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Variable names attempt to match those of SP800-108.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/params.h>
|
||||
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include "e_os.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b)
|
||||
|
||||
typedef enum {
|
||||
COUNTER = 0,
|
||||
FEEDBACK
|
||||
} kbkdf_mode;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Our context structure. */
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
kbkdf_mode mode;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Names are lowercased versions of those found in SP800-108. */
|
||||
unsigned char *ki;
|
||||
size_t ki_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *label;
|
||||
size_t label_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *context;
|
||||
size_t context_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *iv;
|
||||
size_t iv_len;
|
||||
} KBKDF;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Definitions needed for typechecking. */
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kbkdf_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kbkdf_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kbkdf_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kbkdf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kbkdf_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Not all platforms have htobe32(). */
|
||||
static uint32_t be32(uint32_t host)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint32_t big = 0;
|
||||
const union {
|
||||
long one;
|
||||
char little;
|
||||
} is_endian = { 1 };
|
||||
|
||||
if (!is_endian.little)
|
||||
return host;
|
||||
|
||||
big |= (host & 0xff000000) >> 24;
|
||||
big |= (host & 0x00ff0000) >> 8;
|
||||
big |= (host & 0x0000ff00) << 8;
|
||||
big |= (host & 0x000000ff) << 24;
|
||||
return big;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void *kbkdf_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBKDF *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kbkdf_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
kbkdf_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kbkdf_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->ctx_init);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->context, ctx->context_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->label, ctx->label_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* SP800-108 section 5.1 or section 5.2 depending on mode. */
|
||||
static int derive(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init, kbkdf_mode mode, unsigned char *iv,
|
||||
size_t iv_len, unsigned char *label, size_t label_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *context, size_t context_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *k_i, size_t h, uint32_t l, unsigned char *ko,
|
||||
size_t ko_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
size_t written = 0, to_write, k_i_len = iv_len;
|
||||
const unsigned char zero = 0;
|
||||
uint32_t counter, i;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Setup K(0) for feedback mode. */
|
||||
if (iv_len > 0)
|
||||
memcpy(k_i, iv, iv_len);
|
||||
|
||||
for (counter = 1; written < ko_len; counter++) {
|
||||
i = be32(counter);
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Perform feedback, if appropriate. */
|
||||
if (mode == FEEDBACK && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, k_i, k_i_len))
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&i, 4)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, label, label_len)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, &zero, 1)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, context, context_len)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, (unsigned char *)&l, 4)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_final(ctx, k_i, NULL, h))
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
to_write = ko_len - written;
|
||||
memcpy(ko + written, k_i, MIN(to_write, h));
|
||||
written += h;
|
||||
|
||||
k_i_len = h;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
ctx = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
done:
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kbkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *k_i = NULL;
|
||||
uint32_t l = be32(keylen * 8);
|
||||
size_t h = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* label, context, and iv are permitted to be empty. Check everything
|
||||
* else. */
|
||||
if (ctx->ctx_init == NULL) {
|
||||
if (ctx->ki_len == 0 || ctx->ki == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NO_KEY_SET);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Could either be missing MAC or missing message digest or missing
|
||||
* cipher - arbitrarily, I pick this one. */
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MAC);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h = EVP_MAC_size(ctx->ctx_init);
|
||||
if (h == 0)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
if (ctx->iv_len != 0 && ctx->iv_len != h) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SEED_LENGTH);
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
k_i = OPENSSL_zalloc(h);
|
||||
if (k_i == NULL)
|
||||
goto done;
|
||||
|
||||
ret = derive(ctx->ctx_init, ctx->mode, ctx->iv, ctx->iv_len, ctx->label,
|
||||
ctx->label_len, ctx->context, ctx->context_len, k_i, h, l,
|
||||
key, keylen);
|
||||
done:
|
||||
if (ret != 1)
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(key, keylen);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(k_i, h);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kbkdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(*out, *out_len);
|
||||
*out = NULL;
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kbkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
KBKDF *ctx = (KBKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM mparams[2];
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->ctx_init, params, NULL,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, libctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
else if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL
|
||||
&& !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
|
||||
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)
|
||||
&& !EVP_MAC_is_a(EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->ctx_init),
|
||||
OSSL_MAC_NAME_CMAC)) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MAC);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE);
|
||||
if (p != NULL && strncasecmp("counter", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
|
||||
ctx->mode = COUNTER;
|
||||
} else if (p != NULL
|
||||
&& strncasecmp("feedback", p->data, p->data_size) == 0) {
|
||||
ctx->mode = FEEDBACK;
|
||||
} else if (p != NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY);
|
||||
if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ki, &ctx->ki_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT);
|
||||
if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->label, &ctx->label_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO);
|
||||
if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->context, &ctx->context_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED);
|
||||
if (p != NULL && !kbkdf_set_buffer(&ctx->iv, &ctx->iv_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set up digest context, if we can. */
|
||||
if (ctx->ctx_init != NULL && ctx->ki_len != 0) {
|
||||
mparams[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
|
||||
ctx->ki, ctx->ki_len);
|
||||
mparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx->ctx_init, mparams)
|
||||
|| !EVP_MAC_init(ctx->ctx_init))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CIPHER, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
|
||||
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END,
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kbkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE);
|
||||
if (p == NULL)
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
|
||||
/* KBKDF can produce results as large as you like. */
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] =
|
||||
{ OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL), OSSL_PARAM_END };
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_kbkdf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kbkdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kbkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kbkdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL },
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
#include "pbkdf2.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
|
||||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
|
||||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
|
||||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
|
||||
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_pbkdf2_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_pbkdf2_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
unsigned char *pass;
|
||||
size_t pass_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *salt;
|
||||
size_t salt_len;
|
||||
uint64_t iter;
|
||||
PROV_DIGEST digest;
|
||||
int lower_bound_checks;
|
||||
} KDF_PBKDF2;
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(ctx);
|
||||
kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
|
||||
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
|
||||
SN_sha1, 0);
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
|
||||
/* This is an error, but there is no way to indicate such directly */
|
||||
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
ctx->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
|
||||
ctx->lower_bound_checks = kdf_pbkdf2_default_checks;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
|
||||
if (p->data_size == 0) {
|
||||
if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (p->data != NULL) {
|
||||
*buffer = NULL;
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return pbkdf2_derive((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len,
|
||||
ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->iter,
|
||||
md, key, keylen, ctx->lower_bound_checks);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
int pkcs5;
|
||||
uint64_t iter, min_iter;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5)) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pkcs5))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
|
||||
&& p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len,p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER)) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &iter))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
min_iter = ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
|
||||
if (iter < min_iter) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx->iter = iter;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
|
||||
* derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
|
||||
* posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
|
||||
* - Check the range of the key length.
|
||||
* - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
|
||||
* - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
|
||||
int cplen, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
|
||||
uint64_t j;
|
||||
unsigned long i = 1;
|
||||
HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
|
||||
if (mdlen <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
|
||||
* results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (lower_bound_checks) {
|
||||
if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
||||
if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
p = key;
|
||||
tkeylen = keylen;
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
|
||||
if (hctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
while (tkeylen) {
|
||||
if (tkeylen > mdlen)
|
||||
cplen = mdlen;
|
||||
else
|
||||
cplen = tkeylen;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
|
||||
* just in case...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
|
||||
itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
|
||||
itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
|
||||
itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
|
||||
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
|
||||
|| !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
|
||||
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
|
||||
for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
|
||||
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
|
||||
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
|
||||
p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
|
||||
}
|
||||
tkeylen -= cplen;
|
||||
i++;
|
||||
p += cplen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
|
||||
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Available in pbkdfe_fips.c, and compiled with different values depending
|
||||
* on we're in the FIPS module or not.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
extern const int kdf_pbkdf2_default_checks;
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include "pbkdf2.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For backwards compatibility reasons,
|
||||
* Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
|
||||
const int kdf_pbkdf2_default_checks = 1;
|
||||
#else
|
||||
const int kdf_pbkdf2_default_checks = 0;
|
||||
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,463 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_scrypt_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_scrypt_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_scrypt_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_scrypt_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
|
||||
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
|
||||
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256);
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
unsigned char *pass;
|
||||
size_t pass_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *salt;
|
||||
size_t salt_len;
|
||||
uint64_t N;
|
||||
uint64_t r, p;
|
||||
uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
|
||||
EVP_MD *sha256;
|
||||
} KDF_SCRYPT;
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
static void *kdf_scrypt_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SCRYPT *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
ctx->sha256 = EVP_MD_fetch(PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(provctx),
|
||||
"sha256", NULL);
|
||||
if (ctx->sha256 == NULL) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNABLE_TO_LOAD_SHA256);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_scrypt_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->sha256);
|
||||
kdf_scrypt_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_scrypt_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
|
||||
kdf_scrypt_init(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_scrypt_init(KDF_SCRYPT *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
|
||||
* original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
|
||||
* for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ctx->N = 1 << 20;
|
||||
ctx->r = 8;
|
||||
ctx->p = 1;
|
||||
ctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
|
||||
if (p->data_size == 0) {
|
||||
if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (p->data != NULL) {
|
||||
*buffer = NULL;
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_scrypt_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = (KDF_SCRYPT *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return scrypt_alg((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len, ctx->salt,
|
||||
ctx->salt_len, ctx->N, ctx->r, ctx->p,
|
||||
ctx->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen, ctx->sha256);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
KDF_SCRYPT *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
uint64_t u64_value;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!scrypt_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value)
|
||||
|| u64_value <= 1
|
||||
|| !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->N = u64_value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->r = u64_value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->p = u64_value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &u64_value) || u64_value < 1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_N, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_R, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_uint32(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_P, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SCRYPT_MAXMEM, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_scrypt_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_scrypt_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
|
||||
static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
uint32_t x[16];
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
|
||||
for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
|
||||
x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
|
||||
x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
|
||||
x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
|
||||
x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
|
||||
x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
|
||||
x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
|
||||
x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
|
||||
x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
|
||||
x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
|
||||
x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
|
||||
x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
|
||||
x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
|
||||
x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
|
||||
x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
|
||||
x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
|
||||
x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
|
||||
x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
|
||||
x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
|
||||
x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
|
||||
x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
|
||||
x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
|
||||
x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
|
||||
x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
|
||||
x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
|
||||
x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
|
||||
x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
|
||||
x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
|
||||
x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
|
||||
x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
|
||||
x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
|
||||
x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
|
||||
x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
|
||||
inout[i] += x[i];
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
uint64_t i, j;
|
||||
uint32_t X[16], *pB;
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
|
||||
pB = B;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
|
||||
X[j] ^= *pB++;
|
||||
salsa208_word_specification(X);
|
||||
memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
|
||||
}
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
|
||||
uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *pB;
|
||||
uint32_t *pV;
|
||||
uint64_t i, k;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert from little endian input */
|
||||
for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
|
||||
*pV = *pB++;
|
||||
*pV |= *pB++ << 8;
|
||||
*pV |= *pB++ << 16;
|
||||
*pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
|
||||
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t j;
|
||||
j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
|
||||
pV = V + 32 * r * j;
|
||||
for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
|
||||
T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Convert output to little endian */
|
||||
for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
|
||||
*pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
|
||||
# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
|
||||
* most (all?) platforms.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Maximum value of p * r:
|
||||
* p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
|
||||
* p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
|
||||
* p * r <= (2^30-1)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
|
||||
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
|
||||
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen, EVP_MD *sha256)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *B;
|
||||
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
|
||||
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sanity check parameters */
|
||||
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
|
||||
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
|
||||
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
|
||||
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
|
||||
if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
|
||||
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
|
||||
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
|
||||
*/
|
||||
Blen = p * 128 * r;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
|
||||
* have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
|
||||
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
|
||||
if (N + 2 > i / r) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
|
||||
|
||||
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
|
||||
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
|
||||
if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
|
||||
maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
|
||||
|
||||
if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
|
||||
if (key == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
||||
if (B == NULL) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
|
||||
T = X + 32 * r;
|
||||
V = T + 32 * r;
|
||||
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, sha256,
|
||||
(int)Blen, B) == 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
|
||||
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
|
||||
|
||||
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, sha256,
|
||||
keylen, key) == 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (rv == 0)
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,280 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
# include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_sshkdf_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_sshkdf_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_sshkdf_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_sshkdf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
|
||||
char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
PROV_DIGEST digest;
|
||||
unsigned char *key; /* K */
|
||||
size_t key_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
|
||||
size_t xcghash_len;
|
||||
char type; /* X */
|
||||
unsigned char *session_id;
|
||||
size_t session_id_len;
|
||||
} KDF_SSHKDF;
|
||||
|
||||
static void *kdf_sshkdf_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSHKDF *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_sshkdf_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
kdf_sshkdf_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sshkdf_set_membuf(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
|
||||
*dst = NULL;
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)dst, 0, dst_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSHKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->key == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->xcghash == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->session_id == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->type == 0) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_TYPE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return SSHKDF(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len,
|
||||
ctx->xcghash, ctx->xcghash_len,
|
||||
ctx->session_id, ctx->session_id_len,
|
||||
ctx->type, key, keylen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
KDF_SSHKDF *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
int t;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->key, &ctx->key_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH))
|
||||
!= NULL)
|
||||
if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->xcghash, &ctx->xcghash_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID))
|
||||
!= NULL)
|
||||
if (!sshkdf_set_membuf(&ctx->session_id, &ctx->session_id_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
t = *(unsigned char *)p->data;
|
||||
if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_VALUE_ERROR);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx->type = (char)t;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SSHKDF_TYPE, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sshkdf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_sshkdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
|
||||
char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
unsigned int dsize = 0;
|
||||
size_t cursize = 0;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
||||
if (md == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (okey_len < dsize) {
|
||||
memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
|
||||
|
||||
for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
|
||||
if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
|
||||
memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
goto out;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
out:
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
|
||||
* Section 4.1.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
|
||||
* For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
|
||||
* Increment counter by 1.
|
||||
* Result(i) = Result(i - 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
|
||||
* DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
|
||||
*
|
||||
* NOTES:
|
||||
* Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material.
|
||||
* counter is a 4 byte buffer.
|
||||
* FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data.
|
||||
* DKM is the output derived key material.
|
||||
* L is the required size of the DKM.
|
||||
* reps = [L / H_outputBits]
|
||||
* H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC.
|
||||
* H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this
|
||||
* algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC.
|
||||
* Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/params.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *macctx; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
|
||||
PROV_DIGEST digest; /* H(x) = hash(x) */
|
||||
unsigned char *secret;
|
||||
size_t secret_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *info;
|
||||
size_t info_len;
|
||||
unsigned char *salt;
|
||||
size_t salt_len;
|
||||
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
|
||||
} KDF_SSKDF;
|
||||
|
||||
#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
|
||||
#define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
|
||||
#define SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (136 - 4)
|
||||
|
||||
/* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
|
||||
static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x963kdf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn sskdf_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn sskdf_get_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
|
||||
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
|
||||
* Note: X9.63 also uses this code with the only difference being that the
|
||||
* counter is appended to the secret 'z'.
|
||||
* i.e.
|
||||
* result[i] = Hash(counter || z || info) for One Step OR
|
||||
* result[i] = Hash(z || counter || info) for X9.63.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
|
||||
unsigned int append_ctr,
|
||||
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0, hlen;
|
||||
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
|
||||
unsigned char c[4];
|
||||
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
|
||||
if (hlen <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
|
||||
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
|
||||
&& (append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
|
||||
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
|
||||
&& (!append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
|
||||
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len)))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
if (len >= out_len) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
out += out_len;
|
||||
len -= out_len;
|
||||
if (len == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
memcpy(out, mac, len);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
end:
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom,
|
||||
size_t custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
|
||||
size_t derived_key_len, unsigned char **out)
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
|
||||
|
||||
/* Only KMAC has custom data - so return if not KMAC */
|
||||
if (custom == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM,
|
||||
(void *)custom, custom_len);
|
||||
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
|
||||
if (kmac_out_len == 0)
|
||||
kmac_out_len = derived_key_len;
|
||||
/* otherwise check the size is valid */
|
||||
else if (!(kmac_out_len == derived_key_len
|
||||
|| kmac_out_len == 20
|
||||
|| kmac_out_len == 28
|
||||
|| kmac_out_len == 32
|
||||
|| kmac_out_len == 48
|
||||
|| kmac_out_len == 64))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE,
|
||||
&kmac_out_len);
|
||||
|
||||
if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For kmac the output buffer can be larger than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE: so
|
||||
* alloc a buffer for this case.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (kmac_out_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
|
||||
*out = OPENSSL_zalloc(kmac_out_len);
|
||||
if (*out == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
|
||||
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using MAC: i.e either
|
||||
* H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR
|
||||
* H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF')
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
|
||||
const unsigned char *kmac_custom,
|
||||
size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
size_t counter, out_len, len;
|
||||
unsigned char c[4];
|
||||
unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
|
||||
|
||||
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
|
||||
(void *)salt, salt_len);
|
||||
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
|
||||
derived_key_len, &kmac_buffer))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
|
||||
mac = kmac_buffer;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
out_len = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); /* output size */
|
||||
if (out_len <= 0)
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
len = derived_key_len;
|
||||
|
||||
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
|
||||
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
|
||||
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
|
||||
if (!(ctx != NULL
|
||||
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
|
||||
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
|
||||
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
if (len >= out_len) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, len))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
out += out_len;
|
||||
len -= out_len;
|
||||
if (len == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, mac, NULL, len))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
memcpy(out, mac, len);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
ctx = NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
end:
|
||||
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(kmac_buffer, kmac_out_len);
|
||||
else
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx);
|
||||
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void sskdf_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
sskdf_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sskdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(*out);
|
||||
*out = NULL;
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static size_t sskdf_size(KDF_SSKDF *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
len = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
||||
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
|
||||
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
|
||||
size_t custom_len = 0;
|
||||
int default_salt_len;
|
||||
EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->macctx);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* TODO(3.0) investigate the necessity to have all these controls.
|
||||
* Why does KMAC require a salt length that's shorter than the MD
|
||||
* block size?
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
|
||||
/* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
default_salt_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
||||
if (default_salt_len <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128)
|
||||
|| EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) {
|
||||
/* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */
|
||||
custom = kmac_custom_str;
|
||||
custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str);
|
||||
if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128))
|
||||
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
|
||||
else
|
||||
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
|
||||
if (ctx->salt == NULL || ctx->salt_len <= 0) {
|
||||
ctx->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
|
||||
if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->macctx,
|
||||
custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len,
|
||||
ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
|
||||
ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
||||
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/* H(x) = hash */
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
||||
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* H(x) = hash */
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
||||
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
size_t sz;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->macctx, params,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
|
||||
|| (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE))
|
||||
!= NULL) {
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz) || sz == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->out_len = sz;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))sskdf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
|
||||
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
|
||||
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where P_MD5 and P_SHA-1 are defined by P_<hash>, below, and S1 and S2 are
|
||||
* two halves of the secret (with the possibility of one shared byte, in the
|
||||
* case where the length of the original secret is odd). S1 is taken from the
|
||||
* first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For TLS v1.2 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where hash is SHA-256 for all cipher suites defined in RFC 5246 as well as
|
||||
* those published prior to TLS v1.2 while the TLS v1.2 protocol is in effect,
|
||||
* unless defined otherwise by the cipher suite.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
|
||||
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
|
||||
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A(i) is defined as:
|
||||
* A(0) = seed
|
||||
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
|
||||
*/
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/params.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
#include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
#include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
#include "e_os.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
|
||||
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
|
||||
|
||||
#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
|
||||
|
||||
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
|
||||
/* MAC context for the main digest */
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *P_hash;
|
||||
/* MAC context for SHA1 for the MD5/SHA-1 combined PRF */
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *P_sha1;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Secret value to use for PRF */
|
||||
unsigned char *sec;
|
||||
size_t seclen;
|
||||
/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
|
||||
unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
|
||||
size_t seedlen;
|
||||
} TLS1_PRF;
|
||||
|
||||
static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TLS1_PRF *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_hash);
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
|
||||
size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->P_hash == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->sec == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->seedlen == 0) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SEED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
|
||||
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
|
||||
ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
|
||||
key, keylen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (strcasecmp(p->data, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
|
||||
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
|
||||
NULL, SN_md5, libctx)
|
||||
|| !ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_sha1, params,
|
||||
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
|
||||
NULL, SN_sha1, libctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
|
||||
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
|
||||
NULL, NULL, libctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
|
||||
ctx->sec = NULL;
|
||||
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->sec, 0, &ctx->seclen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* The seed fields concatenate, so process them all */
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) != NULL) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
|
||||
ctx->seedlen = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
|
||||
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) {
|
||||
const void *q = ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen;
|
||||
size_t sz = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (p->data_size != 0
|
||||
&& p->data != NULL
|
||||
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
|
||||
TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - ctx->seedlen,
|
||||
&sz))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->seedlen += sz;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
|
||||
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
|
||||
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
|
||||
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
|
||||
*
|
||||
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
|
||||
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* A(i) is defined as:
|
||||
* A(0) = seed
|
||||
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
|
||||
const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
size_t chunk;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_Ai = NULL;
|
||||
unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
size_t Ai_len;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
|
||||
|
||||
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
|
||||
(void *)sec, sec_len);
|
||||
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init);
|
||||
if (chunk == 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* A(0) = seed */
|
||||
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
|
||||
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
|
||||
ctx_Ai = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
|
||||
if (olen > chunk) {
|
||||
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
|
||||
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (olen <= chunk) {
|
||||
/* last chunk - use Ai as temp bounce buffer */
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
memcpy(out, Ai, olen);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, olen))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
ctx = NULL;
|
||||
out += chunk;
|
||||
olen -= chunk;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
|
||||
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
|
||||
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
|
||||
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
|
||||
*
|
||||
* S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* L_S = length in bytes of secret;
|
||||
* L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2);
|
||||
*
|
||||
* For TLS v1.2:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
|
||||
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (sha1ctx != NULL) {
|
||||
/* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
unsigned char *tmp;
|
||||
/* calc: L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2) */
|
||||
size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2;
|
||||
size_t L_S2 = L_S1;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(mdctx, sec, L_S1,
|
||||
seed, seed_len, out, olen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(sha1ctx, sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
|
||||
seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
|
||||
out[i] ^= tmp[i];
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* TLS v1.2 */
|
||||
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(mdctx, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,424 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include "e_os.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
|
||||
# include <stdlib.h>
|
||||
# include <stdarg.h>
|
||||
# include <string.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/hmac.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/cms.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/kdf.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/x509.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
|
||||
# include <openssl/core_names.h>
|
||||
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
# include "internal/numbers.h"
|
||||
# include "crypto/evp.h"
|
||||
# include "prov/provider_ctx.h"
|
||||
# include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
|
||||
# include "prov/implementations.h"
|
||||
# include "prov/provider_util.h"
|
||||
|
||||
# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
|
||||
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn x942kdf_new;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn x942kdf_free;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn x942kdf_reset;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x942kdf_derive;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_set_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn x942kdf_get_ctx_params;
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct {
|
||||
void *provctx;
|
||||
PROV_DIGEST digest;
|
||||
unsigned char *secret;
|
||||
size_t secret_len;
|
||||
int cek_nid;
|
||||
unsigned char *ukm;
|
||||
size_t ukm_len;
|
||||
size_t dkm_len;
|
||||
} KDF_X942;
|
||||
|
||||
/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
|
||||
static const struct {
|
||||
int nid;
|
||||
size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
|
||||
} kek_algs[] = {
|
||||
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
|
||||
{ NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
|
||||
static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i, tag, xclass;
|
||||
long tmplen;
|
||||
const unsigned char *q = *pp;
|
||||
|
||||
i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
|
||||
if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
|
||||
q += tmplen;
|
||||
*pp = (unsigned char *)q;
|
||||
*plen -= q - *pp;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Encode the other info structure.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
|
||||
*
|
||||
* OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
||||
* keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
|
||||
* partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
|
||||
* suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
|
||||
* }
|
||||
*
|
||||
* KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
|
||||
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
|
||||
* counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
|
||||
* }
|
||||
*
|
||||
* |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
|
||||
* |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
|
||||
* suppPubInfo (in bits).
|
||||
* |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
|
||||
* can be NULL.
|
||||
* |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
|
||||
* |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
|
||||
* |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
|
||||
* |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
|
||||
* encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
|
||||
* Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
|
||||
unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
|
||||
unsigned char **out_ctr)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
|
||||
int ret = 0, encoded_len;
|
||||
long tlen;
|
||||
/* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
|
||||
static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
|
||||
ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
|
||||
ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
||||
alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
|
||||
ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
|
||||
if (ksi == NULL
|
||||
|| alg_oid == NULL
|
||||
|| ctr_oct == NULL
|
||||
|| !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
|
||||
|| !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
|
||||
alg_oid = NULL;
|
||||
ctr_oct = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set the optional partyAInfo */
|
||||
if (ukm != NULL) {
|
||||
ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
|
||||
if (ukm_oct == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
|
||||
encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
|
||||
if (encoded_len <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
|
||||
p = encoded;
|
||||
tlen = (long)encoded_len;
|
||||
if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
|
||||
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
|
||||
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
|
||||
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
|
||||
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
|
||||
*out_ctr = p;
|
||||
*der = encoded;
|
||||
*der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (ret != 1)
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(encoded);
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
|
||||
ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
|
||||
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
|
||||
const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
|
||||
unsigned char *ctr,
|
||||
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret = 0, hlen;
|
||||
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
|
||||
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|
||||
|| derived_key_len == 0) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
|
||||
if (hlen <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
|
||||
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
|
||||
/* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
|
||||
ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
|
||||
ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
|
||||
ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
|
||||
ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
|
||||
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
if (len >= out_len) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
out += out_len;
|
||||
len -= out_len;
|
||||
if (len == 0)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
|
||||
goto end;
|
||||
memcpy(out, mac, len);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
end:
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void *x942kdf_new(void *provctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
ctx->provctx = provctx;
|
||||
return ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void x942kdf_reset(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len);
|
||||
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void x942kdf_free(void *vctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
|
||||
|
||||
x942kdf_reset(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x942kdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (p->data_size == 0 || p->data == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(*out);
|
||||
*out = NULL;
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static size_t x942kdf_size(KDF_X942 *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int len;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
len = EVP_MD_size(md);
|
||||
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x942kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *ctr;
|
||||
unsigned char *der = NULL;
|
||||
size_t der_len = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ctx->ukm != NULL && ctx->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
|
||||
* For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INAVLID_UKM_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (keylen != ctx->dkm_len) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* generate the otherinfo der */
|
||||
if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(ctx->cek_nid, ctx->dkm_len,
|
||||
ctx->ukm, ctx->ukm_len,
|
||||
&der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_BAD_ENCODING);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
|
||||
der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(der);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x942kdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx = vctx;
|
||||
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
|
||||
size_t i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
|
||||
|| (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM)) != NULL)
|
||||
if (!x942kdf_set_buffer(&ctx->ukm, &ctx->ukm_len, p))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG)) != NULL) {
|
||||
if (p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ctx->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(p->data);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); i++)
|
||||
if (kek_algs[i].nid == ctx->cek_nid)
|
||||
goto cek_found;
|
||||
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
cek_found:
|
||||
ctx->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_UKM, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_CEK_ALG, NULL, 0),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_settable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int x942kdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
KDF_X942 *ctx = (KDF_X942 *)vctx;
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM *p;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
|
||||
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, x942kdf_size(ctx));
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM *x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
|
||||
OSSL_PARAM_END
|
||||
};
|
||||
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x942_kdf_functions[] = {
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_new },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_free },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_reset },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_derive },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))x942kdf_settable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_set_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
|
||||
(void(*)(void))x942kdf_gettable_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))x942kdf_get_ctx_params },
|
||||
{ 0, NULL }
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user