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/*
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* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include "cipher_aes_xts.h"
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#include "prov/implementations.h"
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#include "prov/providercommonerr.h"
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/* TODO (3.0) Figure out what flags need to be set */
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#define AES_XTS_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV \
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| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT \
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| EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY)
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#define AES_XTS_IV_BITS 128
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#define AES_XTS_BLOCK_BITS 8
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/* forward declarations */
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_encrypt_init_fn aes_xts_einit;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_decrypt_init_fn aes_xts_dinit;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_update_fn aes_xts_stream_update;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_final_fn aes_xts_stream_final;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_cipher_fn aes_xts_cipher;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_freectx_fn aes_xts_freectx;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_dupctx_fn aes_xts_dupctx;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_set_ctx_params_fn aes_xts_set_ctx_params;
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_settable_ctx_params_fn aes_xts_settable_ctx_params;
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/*
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* Verify that the two keys are different.
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*
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* This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
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* September 2004 paper:
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*
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* "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
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* Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
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* (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
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*
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* FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
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* that:
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* "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
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* BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
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* data with them."
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*/
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static int aes_xts_check_keys_differ(const unsigned char *key, size_t bytes,
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int enc)
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{
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if ((!allow_insecure_decrypt || enc)
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&& CRYPTO_memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*-
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* Provider dispatch functions
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*/
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static int aes_xts_init(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
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const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen, int enc)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *xctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
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PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = &xctx->base;
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ctx->enc = enc;
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if (iv != NULL) {
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if (!cipher_generic_initiv(vctx, iv, ivlen))
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return 0;
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}
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if (key != NULL) {
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if (keylen != ctx->keylen) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!aes_xts_check_keys_differ(key, keylen / 2, enc))
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return 0;
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return ctx->hw->init(ctx, key, keylen);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_xts_einit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
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const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
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{
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return aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 1);
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}
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static int aes_xts_dinit(void *vctx, const unsigned char *key, size_t keylen,
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const unsigned char *iv, size_t ivlen)
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{
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return aes_xts_init(vctx, key, keylen, iv, ivlen, 0);
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}
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static void *aes_xts_newctx(void *provctx, unsigned int mode, uint64_t flags,
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size_t kbits, size_t blkbits, size_t ivbits)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
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if (ctx != NULL) {
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cipher_generic_initkey(&ctx->base, kbits, blkbits, ivbits, mode, flags,
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PROV_CIPHER_HW_aes_xts(kbits), NULL);
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}
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return ctx;
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}
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static void aes_xts_freectx(void *vctx)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
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OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx, sizeof(*ctx));
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}
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static void *aes_xts_dupctx(void *vctx)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *in = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ret = NULL;
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if (in->xts.key1 != NULL) {
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if (in->xts.key1 != &in->ks1)
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return NULL;
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}
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if (in->xts.key2 != NULL) {
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if (in->xts.key2 != &in->ks2)
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return NULL;
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}
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ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
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if (ret == NULL) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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*ret = *in;
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return ret;
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}
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static int aes_xts_cipher(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
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size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in, size_t inl)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
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if (ctx->xts.key1 == NULL
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|| ctx->xts.key2 == NULL
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|| !ctx->base.iv_set
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|| out == NULL
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|| in == NULL
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|| inl < AES_BLOCK_SIZE)
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return 0;
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/*
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* Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specifed by
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* IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
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* indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
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* NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
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*/
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if (inl > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctx->stream != NULL)
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(*ctx->stream)(in, out, inl, ctx->xts.key1, ctx->xts.key2, ctx->base.iv);
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else if (CRYPTO_xts128_encrypt(&ctx->xts, ctx->base.iv, in, out, inl,
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ctx->base.enc))
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return 0;
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*outl = inl;
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_xts_stream_update(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
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size_t outsize, const unsigned char *in,
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size_t inl)
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{
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PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *ctx = (PROV_AES_XTS_CTX *)vctx;
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if (outsize < inl) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_OUTPUT_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!aes_xts_cipher(ctx, out, outl, outsize, in, inl)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_CIPHER_OPERATION_FAILED);
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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static int aes_xts_stream_final(void *vctx, unsigned char *out, size_t *outl,
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size_t outsize)
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{
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*outl = 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static const OSSL_PARAM aes_xts_known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
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OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN, NULL),
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OSSL_PARAM_END
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};
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static const OSSL_PARAM *aes_xts_settable_ctx_params(void)
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{
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return aes_xts_known_settable_ctx_params;
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}
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static int aes_xts_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
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{
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PROV_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = (PROV_CIPHER_CTX *)vctx;
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const OSSL_PARAM *p;
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/*
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* TODO(3.0) We need a general solution for handling missing parameters
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* inside set_params and get_params methods.
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*/
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p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_CIPHER_PARAM_KEYLEN);
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if (p != NULL) {
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size_t keylen;
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if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &keylen)) {
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ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_FAILED_TO_GET_PARAMETER);
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return 0;
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}
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/* The key length can not be modified for xts mode */
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if (keylen != ctx->keylen)
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return 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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#define IMPLEMENT_cipher(lcmode, UCMODE, kbits, flags) \
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_get_params_fn aes_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params; \
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static int aes_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params(OSSL_PARAM params[]) \
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{ \
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return cipher_generic_get_params(params, EVP_CIPH_##UCMODE##_MODE, \
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flags, 2 * kbits, AES_XTS_BLOCK_BITS, \
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AES_XTS_IV_BITS); \
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} \
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static OSSL_OP_cipher_newctx_fn aes_##kbits##_xts_newctx; \
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static void *aes_##kbits##_xts_newctx(void *provctx) \
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{ \
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return aes_xts_newctx(provctx, EVP_CIPH_##UCMODE##_MODE, flags, 2 * kbits, \
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AES_XTS_BLOCK_BITS, AES_XTS_IV_BITS); \
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} \
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const OSSL_DISPATCH aes##kbits##xts_functions[] = { \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_NEWCTX, (void (*)(void))aes_##kbits##_xts_newctx }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_ENCRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_einit }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DECRYPT_INIT, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_dinit }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_UPDATE, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_stream_update }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FINAL, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_stream_final }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_CIPHER, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_cipher }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_FREECTX, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_freectx }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_DUPCTX, (void (*)(void))aes_xts_dupctx }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))aes_##kbits##_##lcmode##_get_params }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))cipher_generic_gettable_params }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GET_CTX_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))cipher_generic_get_ctx_params }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))cipher_generic_gettable_ctx_params }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SET_CTX_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))aes_xts_set_ctx_params }, \
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{ OSSL_FUNC_CIPHER_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS, \
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(void (*)(void))aes_xts_settable_ctx_params }, \
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{ 0, NULL } \
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}
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IMPLEMENT_cipher(xts, XTS, 256, AES_XTS_FLAGS);
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IMPLEMENT_cipher(xts, XTS, 128, AES_XTS_FLAGS);
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