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Hakase
2019-10-17 23:54:38 +09:00
parent 41a23ae6f6
commit ee84d0dd84
1357 changed files with 41111 additions and 9603 deletions
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crypto/rsa/rsa_ssl.c
+11 -11
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@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int i, j;
unsigned char *p;
if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
return 0;
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
if (tlen <= 0 || flen <= 0)
return -1;
if (flen > num || num < 11) {
if (flen > num || num < RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
@@ -141,8 +141,8 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
/*
* Move the result in-place by |num|-11-|mlen| bytes to the left.
* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+11 to |to|.
* Move the result in-place by |num|-RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE-|mlen| bytes to the left.
* Then if |good| move |mlen| bytes from |em|+RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE to |to|.
* Otherwise leave |to| unchanged.
* Copy the memory back in a way that does not reveal the size of
* the data being copied via a timing side channel. This requires copying
@@ -150,16 +150,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* length. Clear bits do a non-copy with identical access pattern.
* The loop below has overall complexity of O(N*log(N)).
*/
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - 11, tlen),
num - 11, tlen);
for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - 11; msg_index <<= 1) {
mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - 11 - mlen), 0);
for (i = 11; i < num - msg_index; i++)
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen),
num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE, tlen);
for (msg_index = 1; msg_index < num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; msg_index <<= 1) {
mask = ~constant_time_eq(msg_index & (num - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE - mlen), 0);
for (i = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE; i < num - msg_index; i++)
em[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + msg_index], em[i]);
}
for (i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
mask = good & constant_time_lt(i, mlen);
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + 11], to[i]);
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, em[i + RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);