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Latest update (add quic)

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Hakase
2020-07-12 19:52:18 +09:00
parent 3a6d64bb68
commit e85ee33eee
501 changed files with 19166 additions and 10232 deletions
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crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
+158 -141
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
/*
/*-
* Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
* (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
*
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
/* verify signature of protected part */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header),
&digest_nid, &pk_nid)
|| digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
|| (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
sig_err:
res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
if (res)
ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
res = 0;
@@ -132,15 +132,15 @@ static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
return valid;
}
/*
/*-
* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
*
* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
X509 *cert)
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
}
/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
{
@@ -190,10 +190,16 @@ static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
return 0;
}
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0)
str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
if (log_success && str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
@@ -203,11 +209,11 @@ static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
}
/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
{
char *actual, *expect;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
char *str;
if (skid == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
@@ -217,19 +223,25 @@ static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
return 0;
}
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0)
str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if ((actual = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual);
if ((expect = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect);
OPENSSL_free(expect);
OPENSSL_free(actual);
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
{
int i;
@@ -239,7 +251,7 @@ static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
return 0;
}
/*
/*-
* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
@@ -247,7 +259,7 @@ static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
*
* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
*/
static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
@@ -285,19 +297,19 @@ static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return 0;
}
if (!check_name(ctx,
if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
return 0;
if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
static int check_msg_valid_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
@@ -319,7 +331,7 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
int valid = 0;
@@ -361,11 +373,21 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
return valid;
}
/*
static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg));
}
/*-
* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const char *desc,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
@@ -406,9 +428,10 @@ static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return 0;
}
/*
/*-
* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
int mode_3gpp)
@@ -451,7 +474,10 @@ static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
return 1;
}
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
/*-
* Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
@@ -472,29 +498,28 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
if (scrt != NULL) {
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
/* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
(void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
}
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
@@ -518,8 +543,8 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
}
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
@@ -538,12 +563,13 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
return res;
}
/*
/*-
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
@@ -555,9 +581,6 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_ALGOR *alg;
int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
X509 *scrt;
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
@@ -566,17 +589,13 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
return 0;
}
if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
}
/* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
switch (nid) {
switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
@@ -584,34 +603,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case -1:
return 0;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue))
return 1;
}
break;
/*
@@ -626,28 +619,6 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
*/
default:
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
|| pk_nid == NID_undef) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
break;
}
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
* entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
if (!check_name(ctx, "sender DN field",
msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", ctx->expected_sender))
break;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
if (scrt == NULL) {
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
@@ -656,9 +627,6 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
return 1;
/* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
(void)cert_acceptable(ctx, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg);
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
}
@@ -670,9 +638,11 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/*-
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs.
*
* Ensures that:
* its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and
* matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
* it has a valid body type
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
@@ -681,30 +651,63 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
*
* If everything is fine:
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
* and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
*
* returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
{
int rcvd_type;
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return -1;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
return 0;
hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
* or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", expected_sender))
return 0;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
* and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return 0;
/* validate message protection */
if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
} else {
@@ -712,34 +715,34 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
}
/* check CMP version number in header */
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
if (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
&& (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
&& (hdr->transactionID == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
hdr->transactionID) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -747,10 +750,10 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
&& (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -759,26 +762,40 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
* --> Store for setting in next message
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
return -1;
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
return 0;
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
return -1;
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
return 0;
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return -1;
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
return rcvd_type;
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)