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Latest update (add quic)

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Hakase
2020-07-12 19:52:18 +09:00
parent 3a6d64bb68
commit e85ee33eee
501 changed files with 19166 additions and 10232 deletions
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crypto/cmp/build.info
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= cmp_asn.c cmp_ctx.c cmp_err.c cmp_util.c \
cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c cmp_protect.c cmp_msg.c cmp_vfy.c \
cmp_server.c cmp_client.c cmp_http.c
cmp_server.c cmp_client.c
crypto/cmp/cmp_client.c
+3 -3
View File
@@ -146,7 +146,7 @@ static int send_receive_check(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req,
OSSL_CMP_transfer_cb_t transfer_cb = ctx->transfer_cb;
if (transfer_cb == NULL)
transfer_cb = OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform;
transfer_cb = NULL; /* TODO: will be OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform of chunk 10 */
*rep = NULL;
msg_timeout = ctx->msg_timeout; /* backup original value */
@@ -189,8 +189,8 @@ static int send_receive_check(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req,
*/
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "received %s", ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(bt));
if ((bt = ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(ctx, *rep, unprotected_exception,
expected_type)) < 0)
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(ctx, *rep, unprotected_exception,
expected_type))
return 0;
if (bt == expected_type
crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
+148 -39
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@ X509_STORE *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_trustedStore(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
* Set certificate store containing trusted (root) CA certs and possibly CRLs
* and a cert verification callback function used for CMP server authentication.
* Any already existing store entry is freed. Given NULL, the entry is reset.
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trustedStore(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
{
@@ -55,7 +56,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_trustedStore(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store)
return 1;
}
/* Get current list of non-trusted intermediate certs */
/*
* Get current list of non-trusted intermediate certs
*/
STACK_OF(X509) *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted_certs(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -68,6 +71,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted_certs(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Set untrusted certificates for path construction in authentication of
* the CMP server and potentially others (TLS server, newly enrolled cert).
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
{
@@ -104,6 +108,8 @@ OSSL_CMP_CTX *OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(void)
ctx->status = -1;
ctx->failInfoCode = -1;
ctx->serverPort = OSSL_CMP_DEFAULT_PORT;
ctx->proxyPort = OSSL_CMP_DEFAULT_PORT;
ctx->msg_timeout = 2 * 60;
if ((ctx->untrusted_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
@@ -126,7 +132,9 @@ OSSL_CMP_CTX *OSSL_CMP_CTX_new(void)
return NULL;
}
/* Prepare the OSSL_CMP_CTX for next use, partly re-initializing OSSL_CMP_CTX */
/*
* Prepare the OSSL_CMP_CTX for next use, partly re-initializing OSSL_CMP_CTX
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_reinit(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -147,16 +155,17 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_reinit(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
&& ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, NULL);
}
/* Frees OSSL_CMP_CTX variables allocated in OSSL_CMP_CTX_new() */
/*
* Frees OSSL_CMP_CTX variables allocated in OSSL_CMP_CTX_new()
*/
void OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL)
return;
OPENSSL_free(ctx->serverPath);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->server);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->proxy);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->no_proxy);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->serverName);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->proxyName);
X509_free(ctx->srvCert);
X509_free(ctx->validatedSrvCert);
@@ -250,7 +259,11 @@ int ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
return 1;
}
/* Set callback function for checking if the cert is ok or should be rejected */
/*
* Set callback function for checking if the cert is ok or should
* it be rejected.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_certConf_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb_t cb)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -264,6 +277,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_certConf_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_certConf_cb_t cb)
/*
* Set argument, respectively a pointer to a structure containing arguments,
* optionally to be used by the certConf callback.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_certConf_cb_arg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
{
@@ -373,7 +387,10 @@ int ossl_cmp_print_log(OSSL_CMP_severity level, const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return res;
}
/* Set a callback function for error reporting and logging messages */
/*
* Set a callback function for error reporting and logging messages.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_log_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t cb)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -393,7 +410,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_log_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t cb)
}
/* Print OpenSSL and CMP errors via the log cb of the ctx or ERR_print_errors */
void OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
void OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_CMP_print_errors_cb(ctx == NULL ? NULL : ctx->log_cb);
}
@@ -401,6 +418,7 @@ void OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Set or clear the reference value to be used for identification
* (i.e., the user name) when using PBMAC.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const unsigned char *ref, int len)
@@ -413,7 +431,10 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
len);
}
/* Set or clear the password to be used for protecting messages with PBMAC */
/*
* Set or clear the password to be used for protecting messages with PBMAC.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sec,
const int len)
{
@@ -451,6 +472,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get1_extraCertsIn(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Copies any given stack of inbound X509 certificates to extraCertsIn
* of the OSSL_CMP_CTX structure so that they may be retrieved later.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_extraCertsIn(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *extraCertsIn)
@@ -468,6 +490,7 @@ int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_extraCertsIn(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
/*
* Duplicate and set the given stack as the new stack of X509
* certificates to send out in the extraCerts field.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_extraCertsOut(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
STACK_OF(X509) *extraCertsOut)
@@ -487,6 +510,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_extraCertsOut(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
/*
* Add the given policy info object
* to the X509_EXTENSIONS of the requested certificate template.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_policy(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, POLICYINFO *pinfo)
{
@@ -502,7 +526,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_policy(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, POLICYINFO *pinfo)
return sk_POLICYINFO_push(ctx->policies, pinfo);
}
/* Add an ITAV for geninfo of the PKI message header */
/*
* Add an ITAV for geninfo of the PKI message header
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_geninfo_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -512,7 +538,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_geninfo_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
return OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(&ctx->geninfo_ITAVs, itav);
}
/* Add an itav for the body of outgoing general messages */
/*
* Add an itav for the body of outgoing general messages
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push0_genm_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -541,6 +569,7 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get1_caPubs(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Duplicate and copy the given stack of certificates to the given
* OSSL_CMP_CTX structure so that they may be retrieved later.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_caPubs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs)
{
@@ -592,25 +621,39 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_##FIELD(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, TYPE *val) \
* Pins the server certificate to be directly trusted (even if it is expired)
* for verifying response messages.
* Cert pointer is not consumed. It may be NULL to clear the entry.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(srvCert, X509)
/* Set the X509 name of the recipient. Set in the PKIHeader */
/*
* Set the X509 name of the recipient. Set in the PKIHeader.
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(recipient, X509_NAME)
/* Store the X509 name of the expected sender in the PKIHeader of responses */
/*
* Store the X509 name of the expected sender in the PKIHeader of responses.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(expected_sender, X509_NAME)
/* Set the X509 name of the issuer. Set in the PKIHeader */
/*
* Set the X509 name of the issuer. Set in the PKIHeader.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(issuer, X509_NAME)
/*
* Set the subject name that will be placed in the certificate
* request. This will be the subject name on the received certificate.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(subjectName, X509_NAME)
/* Set the X.509v3 certificate request extensions to be used in IR/CR/KUR */
/*
* Set the X.509v3 certificate request extensions to be used in IR/CR/KUR.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_reqExtensions(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_EXTENSIONS *exts)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -644,6 +687,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_reqExtensions_have_SAN(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
/*
* Add a GENERAL_NAME structure that will be added to the CRMF
* request's extensions field to request subject alternative names.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push1_subjectAltName(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const GENERAL_NAME *name)
@@ -675,6 +719,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_push1_subjectAltName(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
/*
* Set our own client certificate, used for example in KUR and when
* doing the IR with existing certificate.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(cert, X509)
@@ -683,14 +728,19 @@ DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(cert, X509)
* or the certificate to be revoked in RR, respectively.
* Also used as reference cert (defaulting to cert) for deriving subject DN
* and SANs. Its issuer is used as default recipient in the CMP message header.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(oldCert, X509)
/* Set the PKCS#10 CSR to be sent in P10CR */
/*
* Set the PKCS#10 CSR to be sent in P10CR.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(p10CSR, X509_REQ)
/*
* Set the (newly received in IP/KUP/CP) certificate in the context.
* Sets the (newly received in IP/KUP/CP) certificate in the context.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
* TODO: this only permits for one cert to be enrolled at a time.
*/
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_newCert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
@@ -716,10 +766,16 @@ X509 *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newCert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->newCert;
}
/* Set the client's current private key */
/*
* Set the client's current private key.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_up_ref(pkey, EVP_PKEY)
/* Set new key pair. Used e.g. when doing Key Update */
/*
* Set new key pair. Used e.g. when doing Key Update.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_newPkey(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int priv, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -733,7 +789,9 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set0_newPkey(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int priv, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
return 1;
}
/* Get the private/public key to use for cert enrollment, or NULL on error */
/*
* gets the private/public key to use for certificate enrollment, NULL on error
*/
EVP_PKEY *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int priv)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -748,7 +806,10 @@ EVP_PKEY *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int priv)
return ctx->pkey; /* may be NULL */
}
/* Set the given transactionID to the context */
/*
* Sets the given transactionID to the context.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *id)
{
@@ -759,7 +820,11 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&ctx->transactionID, id);
}
/* Set the nonce to be used for the recipNonce in the message created next */
/*
* sets the given nonce to be used for the recipNonce in the next message to be
* created.
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *nonce)
{
@@ -768,7 +833,10 @@ int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&ctx->recipNonce, nonce);
}
/* Stores the given nonce as the last senderNonce sent out */
/*
* Stores the given nonce as the last senderNonce sent out.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_senderNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *nonce)
{
@@ -779,17 +847,37 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_senderNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&ctx->senderNonce, nonce);
}
/* Set the proxy server to use for HTTP(S) connections */
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(proxy, char)
/*
* Set the host name of the (HTTP) proxy server to use for all connections
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(proxyName, char)
/* Set the (HTTP) host name of the CMP server */
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(server, char)
/*
* Set the (HTTP) host name of the CA server.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(serverName, char)
/* Set the server exclusion list of the HTTP proxy server */
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(no_proxy, char)
/*
* Sets the (HTTP) proxy port to be used.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_proxyPort(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int port)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
ctx->proxyPort = port;
return 1;
}
/* Set the http connect/disconnect callback function to be used for HTTP(S) */
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_HTTP_bio_cb_t cb)
/*
* sets the http connect/disconnect callback function to be used for HTTP(S)
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_http_cb_t cb)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
@@ -799,7 +887,10 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_HTTP_bio_cb_t cb)
return 1;
}
/* Set argument optionally to be used by the http connect/disconnect callback */
/*
* Set argument optionally to be used by the http connect/disconnect callback.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_http_cb_arg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -823,7 +914,10 @@ void *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_http_cb_arg(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->http_cb_arg;
}
/* Set callback function for sending CMP request and receiving response */
/*
* Set callback function for sending CMP request and receiving response.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_transfer_cb_t cb)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -834,7 +928,10 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_transfer_cb_t cb)
return 1;
}
/* Set argument optionally to be used by the transfer callback */
/*
* Set argument optionally to be used by the transfer callback.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_transfer_cb_arg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, void *arg)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -858,7 +955,10 @@ void *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_transfer_cb_arg(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->transfer_cb_arg;
}
/** Set the HTTP server port to be used */
/*
* Sets the (HTTP) server port to be used.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_serverPort(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int port)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -869,10 +969,16 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_serverPort(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int port)
return 1;
}
/* Set the HTTP path to be used on the server (e.g "pkix/") */
/*
* Sets the HTTP path to be used on the server (e.g "pkix/").
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
DEFINE_OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1(serverPath, char)
/* Set the failInfo error code as bit encoding in OSSL_CMP_CTX */
/*
* Set the failInfo error code as bit encoding in OSSL_CMP_CTX.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set_failInfoCode(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
@@ -894,7 +1000,10 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_failInfoCode(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
return ctx->failInfoCode;
}
/* Set a Boolean or integer option of the context to the "val" arg */
/*
* Sets a Boolean or integer option of the context to the "val" arg.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val)
{
int min_val;
crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
+2
View File
@@ -76,6 +76,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMP_str_reasons[] = {
"error unexpected certconf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION),
"error validating protection"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE),
"error validating signature"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAILED_EXTRACTING_PUBKEY),
"failed extracting pubkey"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM),
crypto/cmp/cmp_hdr.c
+19 -15
View File
@@ -41,6 +41,14 @@ int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
return (int)pvno;
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL)
|| hdr->protectionAlg == NULL)
return NID_undef;
return OBJ_obj2nid(hdr->protectionAlg->algorithm);
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OSSL_CMP_HDR_get0_transactionID(const
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
@@ -300,30 +308,26 @@ int ossl_cmp_hdr_init(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
return 0;
/*
* The sender name is copied from the subject of the client cert, if any,
* or else from the subject name provided for certification requests.
* If neither protection cert nor oldCert nor subject are given,
* sender name is not known to the client and thus set to NULL-DN
*/
sender = ctx->cert != NULL ?
X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert) : ctx->subjectName;
sender = ctx->cert != NULL ? X509_get_subject_name(ctx->cert) :
ctx->oldCert != NULL ? X509_get_subject_name(ctx->oldCert) :
ctx->subjectName;
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_sender(hdr, sender))
return 0;
/* determine recipient entry in PKIHeader */
if (ctx->srvCert != NULL) {
rcp = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
/* set also as expected_sender of responses unless set explicitly */
if (ctx->expected_sender == NULL && rcp != NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_expected_sender(ctx, rcp))
return 0;
} else if (ctx->recipient != NULL) {
if (ctx->recipient != NULL)
rcp = ctx->recipient;
} else if (ctx->issuer != NULL) {
else if (ctx->srvCert != NULL)
rcp = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
else if (ctx->issuer != NULL)
rcp = ctx->issuer;
} else if (ctx->oldCert != NULL) {
else if (ctx->oldCert != NULL)
rcp = X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert);
} else if (ctx->cert != NULL) {
else if (ctx->cert != NULL)
rcp = X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->cert);
}
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_recipient(hdr, rcp))
return 0;
crypto/cmp/cmp_http.c
-68
View File
@@ -1,68 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/http.h>
#include "internal/sockets.h"
#include "openssl/cmp.h"
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <ctype.h>
#include <fcntl.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/buffer.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
DEFINE_STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE)
/*
* Send the PKIMessage req and on success return the response, else NULL.
* Any previous error queue entries will likely be removed by ERR_clear_error().
*/
OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_MSG_http_perform(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req)
{
char server_port[32] = { '\0' };
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *headers = NULL;
const char *const content_type_pkix = "application/pkixcmp";
OSSL_CMP_MSG *res;
if (ctx == NULL || req == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
if (!X509V3_add_value("Pragma", "no-cache", &headers))
return NULL;
if (ctx->serverPort != 0)
BIO_snprintf(server_port, sizeof(server_port), "%d", ctx->serverPort);
res = (OSSL_CMP_MSG *)
OSSL_HTTP_post_asn1(ctx->server, server_port, ctx->serverPath,
OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_http_cb_arg(ctx) != NULL,
ctx->proxy, ctx->no_proxy, NULL, NULL,
ctx->http_cb, OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_http_cb_arg(ctx),
headers, content_type_pkix, (const ASN1_VALUE *)req,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG),
0, 0, ctx->msg_timeout, content_type_pkix,
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CMP_MSG));
sk_CONF_VALUE_pop_free(headers, X509V3_conf_free);
return res;
}
crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h
+7 -7
View File
@@ -36,15 +36,15 @@ struct ossl_cmp_ctx_st {
void *transfer_cb_arg; /* allows to store optional argument to cb */
/* HTTP-based transfer */
char *serverPath;
char *server;
char *serverName;
int serverPort;
char *proxy;
char *no_proxy;
char *proxyName;
int proxyPort;
int msg_timeout; /* max seconds to wait for each CMP message round trip */
int total_timeout; /* max number of seconds an enrollment may take, incl. */
/* attempts polling for a response if a 'waiting' PKIStatus is received */
time_t end_time; /* session start time + totaltimeout */
OSSL_HTTP_bio_cb_t http_cb;
OSSL_CMP_http_cb_t http_cb;
void *http_cb_arg; /* allows to store optional argument to cb */
/* server authentication */
@@ -283,7 +283,6 @@ struct ossl_cmp_pkisi_st {
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *statusString;
OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO *failInfo;
} /* OSSL_CMP_PKISI */;
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
/*-
* RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
@@ -797,6 +796,7 @@ int ossl_cmp_pkisi_check_pkifailureinfo(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si, int index);
/* from cmp_hdr.c */
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set_pvno(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, int pvno);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ossl_cmp_hdr_get0_senderNonce(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
int ossl_cmp_general_name_is_NULL_DN(GENERAL_NAME *name);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_sender(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, const X509_NAME *nm);
@@ -909,8 +909,8 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
typedef int (*ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t)(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
int invalid_protection, int arg);
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg);
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg);
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified);
/* from cmp_client.c */
crypto/cmp/cmp_msg.c
+7 -3
View File
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_PKISI)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
@@ -228,7 +229,7 @@ static OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype, int rid)
X509_EXTENSIONS *exts = NULL;
if (rkey == NULL)
rkey = ctx->pkey; /* default is independent of ctx->oldClCert */
rkey = ctx->pkey; /* default is independent of ctx->oldCert */
if (rkey == NULL) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
@@ -426,9 +427,12 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP && caPubs != NULL
&& (repMsg->caPubs = X509_chain_up_ref(caPubs)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (chain != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain, 0, 1, 0))
if (sk_X509_num(chain) > 0) {
msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_reserve(NULL, sk_X509_num(chain));
if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
|| !ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain, 0, 1, 0))
goto err;
}
if (!unprotectedErrors
|| ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_status(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
+6 -8
View File
@@ -26,8 +26,8 @@ DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
* Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
* and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
*
* Either secret or pkey must be set, the other must be NULL. Attempts doing
* PBMAC in case 'secret' is set and signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
* secret or pkey must be set. Attempts doing PBMAC in case 'secret' is set
* and else signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
* do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
*
* returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
if (secret != NULL && pkey == NULL) {
if (secret != NULL) {
if (ppval == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
secret->data, secret->length,
&protection, &sig_len))
goto end;
} else if (secret == NULL && pkey != NULL) {
} else if (pkey != NULL) {
/* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
/* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
@@ -259,10 +259,8 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
goto err;
}
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
crypto/cmp/cmp_server.c
+32 -16
View File
@@ -452,8 +452,10 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *req)
{
OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *backup_secret;
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
int req_type, rsp_type;
int res;
OSSL_CMP_MSG *rsp = NULL;
if (srv_ctx == NULL || srv_ctx->ctx == NULL
@@ -463,7 +465,12 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx,
return 0;
}
ctx = srv_ctx->ctx;
backup_secret = ctx->secretValue;
/*
* Some things need to be done already before validating the message in
* order to be able to send an error message as far as needed and possible.
*/
if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
@@ -485,9 +492,10 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx,
tid = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ctx->transactionID->data,
ctx->transactionID->length);
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx,
"Assuming that last transaction with ID=%s got aborted",
tid);
if (tid != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx,
"Assuming that last transaction with ID=%s got aborted",
tid);
OPENSSL_free(tid);
}
/* start of a new transaction, reset transactionID and senderNonce */
@@ -500,16 +508,17 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx,
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY);
/* ignore any (extra) error in next two function calls: */
(void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID);
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce);
goto err;
#endif
}
}
if (ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(ctx, req, unprotected_exception,
srv_ctx->acceptUnprotected) < 0)
res = ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(ctx, req, unprotected_exception,
srv_ctx->acceptUnprotected);
if (ctx->secretValue != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL
&& ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) != NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC)
ctx->secretValue = NULL; /* use MSG_SIG_ALG when protecting rsp */
if (!res)
goto err;
switch (req_type) {
@@ -568,16 +577,23 @@ OSSL_CMP_MSG *OSSL_CMP_SRV_process_request(OSSL_CMP_SRV_CTX *srv_ctx,
/* TODO fail_info could be more specific */
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = NULL;
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL) {
/* ignore any (extra) error in next two function calls: */
(void)OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID);
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce);
}
if ((si = OSSL_CMP_STATUSINFO_new(OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection,
fail_info, NULL)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (err != 0 && (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) != 0)
data = ERR_reason_error_string(err);
rsp = ossl_cmp_error_new(srv_ctx->ctx, si,
err != 0 ? ERR_GET_REASON(err) : -1,
data, srv_ctx->sendUnprotectedErrors);
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si);
fail_info, NULL)) != NULL) {
if (err != 0 && (flags & ERR_TXT_STRING) != 0)
data = ERR_reason_error_string(err);
rsp = ossl_cmp_error_new(srv_ctx->ctx, si,
err != 0 ? ERR_GET_REASON(err) : -1,
data, srv_ctx->sendUnprotectedErrors);
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si);
}
}
ctx->secretValue = backup_secret;
/* possibly close the transaction */
rsp_type =
crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
+158 -141
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
DEFINE_STACK_OF(X509)
/*
/*-
* Verify a message protected by signature according to section 5.1.3.3
* (sha1+RSA/DSA or any other algorithm supported by OpenSSL).
*
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
/* verify signature of protected part */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(msg->header->protectionAlg->algorithm),
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header),
&digest_nid, &pk_nid)
|| digest_nid == NID_undef || pk_nid == NID_undef
|| (digest = EVP_get_digestbynid(digest_nid)) == NULL) {
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ static int verify_signature(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *cmp_ctx,
sig_err:
res = x509_print_ex_brief(bio, cert, X509_FLAG_NO_EXTENSIONS);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_SIGNATURE);
if (res)
ERR_add_error_mem_bio("\n", bio);
res = 0;
@@ -132,15 +132,15 @@ static int verify_PBMAC(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
return valid;
}
/*
/*-
* Attempt to validate certificate and path using any given store with trusted
* certs (possibly including CRLs and a cert verification callback function)
* and non-trusted intermediate certs from the given ctx.
*
* Returns 1 on successful validation and 0 otherwise.
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
X509 *cert)
int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509_STORE *trusted_store, X509 *cert)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE_CTX *csc = NULL;
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
}
/* Return 0 if expect_name != NULL and there is no matching actual_name */
static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
static int check_name(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int log_success,
const char *actual_desc, const X509_NAME *actual_name,
const char *expect_desc, const X509_NAME *expect_name)
{
@@ -190,10 +190,16 @@ static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
ossl_cmp_log1(WARN, ctx, "missing %s", actual_desc);
return 0;
}
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0)
str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0);
if (X509_NAME_cmp(actual_name, expect_name) == 0) {
if (log_success && str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " subject matches %s: %s", expect_desc,
str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(actual_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " actual name in %s = %s", actual_desc, str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(expect_name, NULL, 0)) != NULL)
@@ -203,11 +209,11 @@ static int check_name(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
}
/* Return 0 if skid != NULL and there is no matching subject key ID in cert */
static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
X509 *cert, const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
static int check_kid(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid)
{
char *actual, *expect;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ckid = X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert);
char *str;
if (skid == NULL)
return 1; /* no expectation, thus trivially fulfilled */
@@ -217,19 +223,25 @@ static int check_kid(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "missing Subject Key Identifier in certificate");
return 0;
}
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0)
str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length);
if (ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ckid, skid) == 0) {
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subjectKID matches senderKID: %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 1;
}
if ((actual = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(ckid->data, ckid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", actual);
if ((expect = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", expect);
OPENSSL_free(expect);
OPENSSL_free(actual);
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " cert Subject Key Identifier = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if ((str = OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " does not match senderKID = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
return 0;
}
static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
static int already_checked(const X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
{
int i;
@@ -239,7 +251,7 @@ static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
return 0;
}
/*
/*-
* Check if the given cert is acceptable as sender cert of the given message.
* The subject DN must match, the subject key ID as well if present in the msg,
* and the cert must be current (checked if ctx->trusted is not NULL).
@@ -247,7 +259,7 @@ static int already_checked(X509 *cert, const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked)
*
* Returns 0 on error or not acceptable, else 1.
*/
static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
static int cert_acceptable(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const char *desc1, const char *desc2, X509 *cert,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
@@ -285,19 +297,19 @@ static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
return 0;
}
if (!check_name(ctx,
if (!check_name(ctx, 1,
"cert subject", X509_get_subject_name(cert),
"sender field", msg->header->sender->d.directoryName))
return 0;
if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
if (!check_kid(ctx, X509_get0_subject_key_id(cert), msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
static int check_msg_valid_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
X509 *scrt, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt)) {
@@ -319,7 +331,7 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
int valid = 0;
@@ -361,11 +373,21 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
return valid;
}
/*
static int check_msg_given_cert(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
return cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert",
cert, NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, cert, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, cert, msg));
}
/*-
* Try all certs in given list for verifying msg, normally or in 3GPP mode.
* If already_checked1 == NULL then certs are assumed to be the msg->extraCerts.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
const char *desc,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked1,
const STACK_OF(X509) *already_checked2,
@@ -406,9 +428,10 @@ static int check_msg_with_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs,
return 0;
}
/*
/*-
* Verify msg trying first ctx->untrusted_certs, which should include extraCerts
* at its front, then trying the trusted certs in truststore (if any) of ctx.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
int mode_3gpp)
@@ -451,7 +474,10 @@ static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
return 1;
}
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
/*-
* Verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*/
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509 *scrt = ctx->validatedSrvCert; /* previous successful sender cert */
@@ -472,29 +498,28 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
if (scrt != NULL) {
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
if (check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg)) {
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
/* re-do the above check (just) for adding diagnostic information */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
(void)check_msg_given_cert(ctx, scrt, msg);
}
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
@@ -518,8 +543,8 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */);
(void)check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
}
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NO_SUITABLE_SENDER_CERT);
@@ -538,12 +563,13 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
return res;
}
/*
/*-
* Validate the protection of the given PKIMessage using either password-
* based mac (PBM) or a signature algorithm. In the case of signature algorithm,
* the sender certificate can have been pinned by providing it in ctx->srvCert,
* else it is searched in msg->extraCerts, ctx->untrusted_certs, in ctx->trusted
* (in this order) and is path is validated against ctx->trusted.
* On success cache the found cert using ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert().
*
* If ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR is true and when validating a CMP IP msg,
* the trust anchor for validating the IP msg may be taken from msg->extraCerts
@@ -555,9 +581,6 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
*/
int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_ALGOR *alg;
int nid = NID_undef, pk_nid = NID_undef;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
X509 *scrt;
if (ctx == NULL || msg == NULL
@@ -566,17 +589,13 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
return 0;
}
if ((alg = msg->header->protectionAlg) == NULL /* unprotected message */
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL /* unprotected message */
|| msg->protection == NULL || msg->protection->data == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return 0;
}
/* determine the nid for the used protection algorithm */
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, NULL, NULL, alg);
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID);
switch (nid) {
switch (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(msg->header)) {
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
@@ -584,34 +603,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case -1:
return 0;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue))
return 1;
}
break;
/*
@@ -626,28 +619,6 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
* 5.1.3.3. Signature
*/
default:
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm), NULL, &pk_nid)
|| pk_nid == NID_undef) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
break;
}
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (msg->header->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
break; /* FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Expected name can be set explicitly or the subject of ctx->srvCert.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused certificate of an unauthorized
* entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
if (!check_name(ctx, "sender DN field",
msg->header->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", ctx->expected_sender))
break;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
scrt = ctx->srvCert;
if (scrt == NULL) {
if (check_msg_find_cert(ctx, msg))
@@ -656,9 +627,6 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/* use ctx->srvCert for signature check even if not acceptable */
if (verify_signature(ctx, msg, scrt))
return 1;
/* call cert_acceptable() for adding diagnostic information */
(void)cert_acceptable(ctx, "explicitly set", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg);
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SRVCERT_DOES_NOT_VALIDATE_MSG);
}
@@ -670,9 +638,11 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
/*-
* Check received message (i.e., response by server or request from client)
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs
* Any msg->extraCerts are prepended to ctx->untrusted_certs.
*
* Ensures that:
* its sender is of appropriate type (curently only X509_NAME) and
* matches any expected sender or srvCert subject given in the ctx
* it has a valid body type
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
@@ -681,30 +651,63 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
*
* If everything is fine:
* learns the senderNonce from the received message,
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx.
* learns the transaction ID if it is not yet in ctx,
* and makes any certs in caPubs directly trusted.
*
* returns body type (which is >= 0) of the message on success, -1 on error
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error.
*/
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
int ossl_cmp_msg_check_update(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
ossl_cmp_allow_unprotected_cb_t cb, int cb_arg)
{
int rcvd_type;
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr;
const X509_NAME *expected_sender;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return -1;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL && msg->header != NULL))
return 0;
hdr = OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg);
/* validate sender name of received msg */
if (hdr->sender->type != GEN_DIRNAME) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_SENDER_GENERALNAME_TYPE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0; /* TODO FR#42: support for more than X509_NAME */
}
/*
* Compare actual sender name of response with expected sender name.
* Mitigates risk to accept misused PBM secret
* or misused certificate of an unauthorized entity of a trusted hierarchy.
*/
expected_sender = ctx->expected_sender;
if (expected_sender == NULL && ctx->srvCert != NULL)
expected_sender = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
if (!check_name(ctx, 0, "sender DN field", hdr->sender->d.directoryName,
"expected sender", expected_sender))
return 0;
/* Note: if recipient was NULL-DN it could be learned here if needed */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) > 10)
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"received CMP message contains more than 10 extraCerts");
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for use in OSSL_CMP_validate_msg()
* and for future use, such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* Note that it does not help validating the message before storing the
* extraCerts because they do not belong to the protected msg part anyway.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return 0;
/* validate message protection */
if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
if (hdr->protectionAlg != NULL) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
} else {
@@ -712,34 +715,34 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
}
/* check CMP version number in header */
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(hdr) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
if (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) < 0) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
&& (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
&& (hdr->transactionID == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->transactionID,
msg->header->transactionID) != 0)) {
hdr->transactionID) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_TRANSACTIONID_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -747,10 +750,10 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
if (ctx->senderNonce != NULL
&& (msg->header->recipNonce == NULL
|| ASN1_OCTET_STRING_cmp(ctx->senderNonce,
msg->header->recipNonce) != 0)) {
hdr->recipNonce) != 0)) {
#ifndef FUZZING_BUILD_MODE_UNSAFE_FOR_PRODUCTION
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_RECIPNONCE_UNMATCHED);
return -1;
return 0;
#endif
}
@@ -759,26 +762,40 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
* the senderNonce of the previous message in the transaction.
* --> Store for setting in next message
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, msg->header->senderNonce))
return -1;
if (!ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
return 0;
/* if not yet present, learn transactionID */
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
return -1;
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, hdr->transactionID))
return 0;
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return -1;
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_protection_nid(hdr) == NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
* "shared secret information", then any certificate transported in
* the caPubs field may be directly trusted as a root CA
* certificate by the initiator.'
*/
switch (ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP:
if (ctx->trusted != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *certs = msg->body->value.ip->caPubs;
/* value.ip is same for cp, kup, and ccp */
return rcvd_type;
if (!ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(ctx->trusted, certs, 0))
/* adds both self-issued and not self-issued certs */
return 0;
}
break;
default:
break;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_cmp_verify_popo(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int accept_RAVerified)