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Fix crash and latest update.

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Hakase
2019-03-16 01:19:24 +09:00
parent ee0cf37f98
commit c03e0c45f8
168 changed files with 12859 additions and 1295 deletions
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crypto/crmf/build.info
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=crmf_asn.c crmf_err.c crmf_lib.c crmf_pbm.c
crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c
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/*-
* Copyright 2007-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2018
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2018
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.
*/
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "crmf_int.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO, version, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO, privateKeyAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO, privateKey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_IMP_SET_OF_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO, attributes, X509_ATTRIBUTE, 0)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO)
ASN1_CHOICE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER, value.string, ASN1_UTF8STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER, value.generalName, GENERAL_NAME)
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID, privateKey, OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO),
ASN1_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID, identifier,
OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID, issuer, GENERAL_NAME),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE) = {
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, intendedAlg, X509_ALGOR, 0),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, symmAlg, X509_ALGOR, 1),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, encSymmKey, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, keyAlg, X509_ALGOR, 3),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, valueHint, ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 4),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE, encValue, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO, pubMethod, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO, pubLocation, GENERAL_NAME)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO, action, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO, pubInfos,
OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE, algId, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE, value, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE)
ASN1_CHOICE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY) = {
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, value.thisMessage, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 0),
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, value.subsequentMessage, ASN1_INTEGER, 1),
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, value.dhMAC, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 2),
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, value.agreeMAC, OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE, 3),
/*
* TODO: This is not ASN1_NULL but CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA which should be somehow
* taken from crypto/cms which exists now - this is not used anywhere so far
*/
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, value.encryptedKey, ASN1_NULL, 4),
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER, salt, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER, owf, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER, iterationCount, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER, mac, X509_ALGOR)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER)
ASN1_CHOICE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO) = {
ASN1_EXP(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO, value.sender,
GENERAL_NAME, 0),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO, value.publicKeyMAC,
OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE)
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT, authInfo,
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT, publicKey, X509_PUBKEY)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY) = {
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY, poposkInput,
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT, 0),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY, algorithmIdentifier, X509_ALGOR),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY, signature, ASN1_BIT_STRING)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY)
ASN1_CHOICE(OSSL_CRMF_POPO) = {
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPO, value.raVerified, ASN1_NULL, 0),
ASN1_IMP(OSSL_CRMF_POPO, value.signature, OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY, 1),
ASN1_EXP(OSSL_CRMF_POPO, value.keyEncipherment, OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, 2),
ASN1_EXP(OSSL_CRMF_POPO, value.keyAgreement, OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY, 3)
} ASN1_CHOICE_END(OSSL_CRMF_POPO)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPO)
ASN1_ADB_TEMPLATE(attributetypeandvalue_default) = ASN1_OPT(
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE, value.other, ASN1_ANY);
ASN1_ADB(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) = {
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regCtrl_regToken,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.regToken, ASN1_UTF8STRING)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.authenticator, ASN1_UTF8STRING)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.pkiPublicationInfo,
OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.oldCertID, OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.protocolEncrKey, X509_PUBKEY)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.utf8Pairs, ASN1_UTF8STRING)),
ADB_ENTRY(NID_id_regInfo_certReq,
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE,
value.certReq, OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)),
} ASN1_ADB_END(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE, 0, type, 0,
&attributetypeandvalue_default_tt, NULL);
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
ASN1_ADB_OBJECT(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY) = {
ASN1_EXP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY, notBefore, ASN1_TIME, 0),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY, notAfter, ASN1_TIME, 1)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE) = {
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, version, ASN1_INTEGER, 0),
/*
* serialNumber MUST be omitted. This field is assigned by the CA
* during certificate creation.
*/
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, serialNumber, ASN1_INTEGER, 1),
/*
* signingAlg MUST be omitted. This field is assigned by the CA
* during certificate creation.
*/
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, signingAlg, X509_ALGOR, 2),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, issuer, X509_NAME, 3),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, validity,
OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY, 4),
ASN1_EXP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, subject, X509_NAME, 5),
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, publicKey, X509_PUBKEY, 6),
/* issuerUID is deprecated in version 2 */
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, issuerUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 7),
/* subjectUID is deprecated in version 2 */
ASN1_IMP_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, subjectUID, ASN1_BIT_STRING, 8),
ASN1_IMP_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE, extensions,
X509_EXTENSION, 9),
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST, certReqId, ASN1_INTEGER),
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST, certTemplate, OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST, controls,
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
ASN1_SEQUENCE(OSSL_CRMF_MSG) = {
ASN1_SIMPLE(OSSL_CRMF_MSG, certReq, OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST),
ASN1_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_MSG, popo, OSSL_CRMF_POPO),
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(OSSL_CRMF_MSG, regInfo,
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0,
OSSL_CRMF_MSGS, OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
crypto/crmf/crmf_err.c
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/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/crmferr.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRMF_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, 0),
"CRMF_poposigningkey_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_GEN, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_FILL, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_CREATE_POPO, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_create_popo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_GET0_TMPL, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_GET_CERTREQID, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get_certReqId"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO_PUSH0_SINGLEPUBINFO, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PKIPublicationInfo_push0_SinglePubInfo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_EXTENSION, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_extension"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGCTRL, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regCtrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGINFO, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regInfo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET0_EXTENSIONS, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_extensions"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET0_SINGLEPUBINFO, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_SinglePubInfo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_CERTREQID, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_certReqId"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO_ACTION, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_PKIPublicationInfo_action"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_VALIDITY, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_validity"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, 0),
"OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, 0), "OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new"},
{0, NULL}
};
static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRMF_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT),
"bad pbm iterationcount"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_CRMFERROR), "crmferror"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_ERROR), "error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_ERROR_DECODING_CERTIFICATE),
"error decoding certificate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_ERROR_DECRYPTING_CERTIFICATE),
"error decrypting certificate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_ERROR_DECRYPTING_SYMMETRIC_KEY),
"error decrypting symmetric key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM),
"failure obtaining random"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_ITERATIONCOUNT_BELOW_100),
"iterationcount below 100"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_MALFORMED_IV), "malformed iv"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT), "null argument"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_SETTING_MAC_ALGOR_FAILURE),
"setting mac algor failure"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_SETTING_OWF_ALGOR_FAILURE),
"setting owf algor failure"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM),
"unsupported algorithm"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALG_FOR_POPSIGNINGKEY),
"unsupported alg for popsigningkey"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER),
"unsupported cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD_FOR_CREATING_POPO),
"unsupported method for creating popo"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_POPO_METHOD),
"unsupported popo method"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRMF, 0, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_POPO_NOT_ACCEPTED),
"unsupported popo not accepted"},
{0, NULL}
};
#endif
int ERR_load_CRMF_strings(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
if (ERR_func_error_string(CRMF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
ERR_load_strings_const(CRMF_str_functs);
ERR_load_strings_const(CRMF_str_reasons);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
crypto/crmf/crmf_int.h
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/*-
* Copyright 2007-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2018
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2018
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.
*/
#ifndef OSSL_HEADER_CRMF_INT_H
# define OSSL_HEADER_CRMF_INT_H
# include <openssl/crmf.h>
# include <openssl/err.h>
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
# include <openssl/ossl_typ.h>
# include <openssl/safestack.h>
# include <openssl/x509.h>
# include <openssl/x509v3.h>
/*-
* EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used
* symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value
* encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
* -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value
* keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
* valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
* -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content
* -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and
* -- used only if EncryptedValue might be re-examined
* -- by the sending entity in the future)
* encValue BIT STRING
* -- the encrypted value itself
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_encryptedvalue_st {
X509_ALGOR *intendedAlg; /* 0 */
X509_ALGOR *symmAlg; /* 1 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *encSymmKey; /* 2 */
X509_ALGOR *keyAlg; /* 3 */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *valueHint; /* 4 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *encValue;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE */;
/*-
* Attributes ::= SET OF Attribute
* => X509_ATTRIBUTE
*
* PrivateKeyInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* version INTEGER,
* privateKeyAlgorithm AlgorithmIdentifier,
* privateKey OCTET STRING,
* attributes [0] IMPLICIT Attributes OPTIONAL
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_privatekeyinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version;
X509_ALGOR *privateKeyAlgorithm;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privateKey;
STACK_OF(X509_ATTRIBUTE) *attributes; /* [ 0 ] */
} OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO)
/*-
* section 4.2.1 Private Key Info Content Type
* id-ct-encKeyWithID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {id-ct 21}
*
* EncKeyWithID ::= SEQUENCE {
* privateKey PrivateKeyInfo,
* identifier CHOICE {
* string UTF8String,
* generalName GeneralName
* } OPTIONAL
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_enckeywithid_identifier_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_UTF8STRING *string;
GENERAL_NAME *generalName;
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER)
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_enckeywithid_st {
OSSL_CRMF_PRIVATEKEYINFO *privateKey;
/* [0] */
OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID_IDENTIFIER *identifier;
} OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ENCKEYWITHID)
/*-
* CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
* issuer GeneralName,
* serialNumber INTEGER
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_certid_st {
GENERAL_NAME *issuer;
ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTID */;
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
/*-
* SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* pubMethod INTEGER {
* dontCare (0),
* x500 (1),
* web (2),
* ldap (3) },
* pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_singlepubinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *pubMethod;
GENERAL_NAME *pubLocation;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO */;
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO)
typedef STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO) OSSL_CRMF_PUBINFOS;
/*-
* PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* action INTEGER {
* dontPublish (0),
* pleasePublish (1) },
* pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL
* -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
* -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
* -- "dontCare" is assumed)
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_pkipublicationinfo_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *action;
OSSL_CRMF_PUBINFOS *pubInfos;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO */;
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO)
/*-
* PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
* algId AlgorithmIdentifier,
* -- algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
* -- parameter value is PBMParameter
* value BIT STRING
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_pkmacvalue_st {
X509_ALGOR *algId;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *value;
} OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE)
/*-
* SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER {
* encrCert (0),
* -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the
* -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a
* -- confirmation message)
* challengeResp (1)
* -- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with
* -- end entity in order to prove private key possession
* }
*
* POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
* thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated
* -- possession is proven in this message (which contains the private
* -- key itself (encrypted for the CA))
* subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
* -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message
* dhMAC [2] BIT STRING, -- Deprecated
* agreeMAC [3] PKMACValue,
* encryptedKey [4] EnvelopedData
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_popoprivkey_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *thisMessage; /* 0 */ /* Deprecated */
ASN1_INTEGER *subsequentMessage; /* 1 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *dhMAC; /* 2 */ /* Deprecated */
OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE *agreeMAC; /* 3 */
/*
* TODO: This is not ASN1_NULL but CMS_ENVELOPEDDATA which should be
* somehow taken from crypto/cms which exists now
* - this is not used anywhere so far
*/
ASN1_NULL *encryptedKey; /* 4 */
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY)
/*-
* PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
* salt OCTET STRING,
* owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
* -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
* iterationCount INTEGER,
* -- number of times the OWF is applied
* mac AlgorithmIdentifier
* -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
* -- or HMAC [HMAC, RFC2202])
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *salt;
X509_ALGOR *owf;
ASN1_INTEGER *iterationCount;
X509_ALGOR *mac;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER */;
#define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
/*-
* POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
* authInfo CHOICE {
* sender [0] GeneralName,
* -- used only if an authenticated identity has been
* -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
* -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate)
* publicKeyMAC PKMACValue },
* -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
* -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC
* -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
* publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_authinfo_st {
int type;
union {
/* 0 */ GENERAL_NAME *sender;
/* 1 */ OSSL_CRMF_PKMACVALUE *publicKeyMAC;
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO)
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_st {
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT_AUTHINFO *authInfo;
X509_PUBKEY *publicKey;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT)
/*-
* POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
* poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
* algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
* signature BIT STRING
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_poposigningkey_st {
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT *poposkInput;
X509_ALGOR *algorithmIdentifier;
ASN1_BIT_STRING *signature;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY)
/*-
* ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
* raVerified [0] NULL,
* -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in
* -- possession of the private key
* signature [1] POPOSigningKey,
* keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey,
* keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey
* }
*/
typedef struct OSSL_crmf_popo_st {
int type;
union {
ASN1_NULL *raVerified; /* 0 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY *signature; /* 1 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY *keyEncipherment; /* 2 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY *keyAgreement; /* 3 */
} value;
} OSSL_CRMF_POPO;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_POPO)
/*-
* OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE {
* notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL,
* notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL -- at least one MUST be present
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_optionalvalidity_st {
/* 0 */ ASN1_TIME *notBefore;
/* 1 */ ASN1_TIME *notAfter;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY)
/*-
* CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
* version [0] Version OPTIONAL,
* serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
* signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL,
* validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL,
* subject [5] Name OPTIONAL,
* publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
* issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
* extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_certtemplate_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *version; /* 0 */
ASN1_INTEGER *serialNumber; /* 1 */ /* serialNumber MUST be omitted */
/* This field is assigned by the CA during certificate creation */
X509_ALGOR *signingAlg; /* 2 */ /* signingAlg MUST be omitted */
/* This field is assigned by the CA during certificate creation */
X509_NAME *issuer; /* 3 */
OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY *validity; /* 4 */
X509_NAME *subject; /* 5 */
X509_PUBKEY *publicKey; /* 6 */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *issuerUID; /* 7 */ /* deprecated in version 2 */
/* According to rfc 3280: UniqueIdentifier ::= BIT STRING */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *subjectUID; /* 8 */ /* deprecated in version 2 */
/* Could be X509_EXTENSION*S*, but that's only cosmetic */
STACK_OF(X509_EXTENSION) *extensions; /* 9 */
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE */;
/*-
* CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
* certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply
* certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued
* controls Controls OPTIONAL -- Attributes affecting issuance
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_certrequest_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *certReqId;
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *certTemplate;
/* TODO: make OSSL_CRMF_CONTROLS out of that - but only cosmetical */
STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) *controls;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST)
/* TODO: isn't there a better way to have this for ANY type? */
struct OSSL_crmf_attributetypeandvalue_st {
ASN1_OBJECT *type;
union {
/* NID_id_regCtrl_regToken */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *regToken;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_authenticator */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *authenticator;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_pkiPublicationInfo */
OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO *pkiPublicationInfo;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_oldCertID */
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *oldCertID;
/* NID_id_regCtrl_protocolEncrKey */
X509_PUBKEY *protocolEncrKey;
/* NID_id_regInfo_utf8Pairs */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8Pairs;
/* NID_id_regInfo_certReq */
OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST *certReq;
ASN1_TYPE *other;
} value;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE)
/*-
* CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg
* CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
* certReq CertRequest,
* popo ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL,
* -- content depends upon key type
* regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL
* }
*/
struct OSSL_crmf_msg_st {
OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST *certReq;
/* 0 */
OSSL_CRMF_POPO *popo;
/* 1 */
STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) *regInfo;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_MSG */;
/* DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_MSG) */
#endif
crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
+753
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,753 @@
/*-
* Copyright 2007-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2018
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2018
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.
*/
/*
* This file contains the functions that handle the individual items inside
* the CRMF structures
*/
/*
* NAMING
*
* The 0 functions use the supplied structure pointer directly in the parent and
* it will be freed up when the parent is freed.
*
* The 1 functions use a copy of the supplied structure pointer (or in some
* cases increases its link count) in the parent and so both should be freed up.
*/
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "crmf_int.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
/*-
* atyp = Attribute Type
* valt = Value Type
* ctrlinf = "regCtrl" or "regInfo"
*/
#define IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(atyp, valt, ctrlinf) \
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set1_##ctrlinf##_##atyp(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *msg, \
const valt *in) \
{ \
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE *atav = NULL; \
\
if (msg == NULL || in == NULL) \
goto err; \
if ((atav = OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_new()) == NULL) \
goto err; \
if ((atav->type = OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_##ctrlinf##_##atyp)) == NULL) \
goto err; \
if ((atav->value.atyp = valt##_dup(in)) == NULL) \
goto err; \
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_##ctrlinf(msg, atav)) \
goto err; \
return 1; \
err: \
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_free(atav); \
return 0; \
}
/*-
* Pushes the given control attribute into the controls stack of a CertRequest
* (section 6)
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
static int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regCtrl(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE *ctrl)
{
int new = 0;
if (crm == NULL || crm->certReq == NULL || ctrl == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGCTRL, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (crm->certReq->controls == NULL) {
crm->certReq->controls = sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_new_null();
if (crm->certReq->controls == NULL)
goto oom;
new = 1;
}
if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_push(crm->certReq->controls, ctrl))
goto oom;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGCTRL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (new != 0) {
sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_free(crm->certReq->controls);
crm->certReq->controls = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
/* id-regCtrl-regToken Control (section 6.1) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(regToken, ASN1_STRING, regCtrl)
/* id-regCtrl-authenticator Control (section 6.2) */
#define ASN1_UTF8STRING_dup ASN1_STRING_dup
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(authenticator, ASN1_UTF8STRING, regCtrl)
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_SinglePubInfo(OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO *spi,
int method, GENERAL_NAME *nm)
{
if (spi == NULL
|| method < OSSL_CRMF_PUB_METHOD_DONTCARE
|| method > OSSL_CRMF_PUB_METHOD_LDAP) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET0_SINGLEPUBINFO,
ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(spi->pubMethod, method))
return 0;
GENERAL_NAME_free(spi->pubLocation);
spi->pubLocation = nm;
return 1;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PKIPublicationInfo_push0_SinglePubInfo(
OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO *pi,
OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO *spi)
{
if (pi == NULL || spi == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO_PUSH0_SINGLEPUBINFO,
CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (pi->pubInfos == NULL)
pi->pubInfos = sk_OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO_new_null();
if (pi->pubInfos == NULL)
goto oom;
if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_SINGLEPUBINFO_push(pi->pubInfos, spi))
goto oom;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO_PUSH0_SINGLEPUBINFO,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_PKIPublicationInfo_action(
OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO *pi, int action)
{
if (pi == NULL
|| action < OSSL_CRMF_PUB_ACTION_DONTPUBLISH
|| action > OSSL_CRMF_PUB_ACTION_PLEASEPUBLISH) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO_ACTION,
ERR_R_PASSED_INVALID_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
return ASN1_INTEGER_set(pi->action, action);
}
/* id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo Control (section 6.3) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(pkiPublicationInfo, OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO,
regCtrl)
/* id-regCtrl-oldCertID Control (section 6.5) from the given */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(oldCertID, OSSL_CRMF_CERTID, regCtrl)
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(const X509_NAME *issuer,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid = NULL;
if (issuer == NULL || serial == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_GEN, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
if ((cid = OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
if (!X509_NAME_set(&cid->issuer->d.directoryName, issuer))
goto oom;
cid->issuer->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
ASN1_INTEGER_free(cid->serialNumber);
if ((cid->serialNumber = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serial)) == NULL)
goto oom;
return cid;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_GEN, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_free(cid);
return NULL;
}
/*
* id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey Control (section 6.6)
*
* For some reason X509_PUBKEY_dup() is not implemented in OpenSSL X509
* TODO: check whether that should go elsewhere
*/
static IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(X509_PUBKEY)
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(protocolEncrKey, X509_PUBKEY, regCtrl)
/*-
* Pushes the attribute given in regInfo in to the CertReqMsg->regInfo stack.
* (section 7)
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
static int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regInfo(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE *ri)
{
STACK_OF(OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE) *info = NULL;
if (crm == NULL || ri == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGINFO, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (crm->regInfo == NULL)
crm->regInfo = info = sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_new_null();
if (crm->regInfo == NULL)
goto oom;
if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_push(crm->regInfo, ri))
goto oom;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_REGINFO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (info != NULL)
crm->regInfo = NULL;
sk_OSSL_CRMF_ATTRIBUTETYPEANDVALUE_free(info);
return 0;
}
/* id-regInfo-utf8Pairs to regInfo (section 7.1) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(utf8Pairs, ASN1_UTF8STRING, regInfo)
/* id-regInfo-certReq to regInfo (section 7.2) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(certReq, OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST, regInfo)
/* retrieves the certificate template of crm */
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(const OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm)
{
if (crm == NULL || crm->certReq == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_GET0_TMPL, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
return crm->certReq->certTemplate;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_validity(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm, time_t from, time_t to)
{
OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY *vld = NULL;
ASN1_TIME *from_asn = NULL;
ASN1_TIME *to_asn = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm);
if (tmpl == NULL) { /* also crm == NULL implies this */
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_VALIDITY, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (from != 0 && ((from_asn = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, from)) == NULL))
goto oom;
if (to != 0 && ((to_asn = ASN1_TIME_set(NULL, to)) == NULL))
goto oom;
if ((vld = OSSL_CRMF_OPTIONALVALIDITY_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
vld->notBefore = from_asn;
vld->notAfter = to_asn;
tmpl->validity = vld;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_VALIDITY, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ASN1_TIME_free(from_asn);
ASN1_TIME_free(to_asn);
return 0;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_certReqId(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm, int rid)
{
if (crm == NULL || crm->certReq == NULL || crm->certReq->certReqId == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET_CERTREQID, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
return ASN1_INTEGER_set(crm->certReq->certReqId, rid);
}
/* get ASN.1 encoded integer, return -1 on error */
static int crmf_asn1_get_int(int func, const ASN1_INTEGER *a)
{
int64_t res;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&res, a)) {
CRMFerr(func, ASN1_R_INVALID_NUMBER);
return -1;
}
if (res < INT_MIN) {
CRMFerr(func, ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
if (res > INT_MAX) {
CRMFerr(func, ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
return (int)res;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get_certReqId(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm)
{
if (crm == NULL || /* not really needed: */ crm->certReq == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_GET_CERTREQID, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return -1;
}
return crmf_asn1_get_int(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_GET_CERTREQID,
crm->certReq->certReqId);
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_extensions(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
X509_EXTENSIONS *exts)
{
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm);
if (tmpl == NULL) { /* also crm == NULL implies this */
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_SET0_EXTENSIONS, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (sk_X509_EXTENSION_num(exts) == 0) {
sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(exts);
exts = NULL; /* do not include empty extensions list */
}
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(tmpl->extensions, X509_EXTENSION_free);
tmpl->extensions = exts;
return 1;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_extension(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
const X509_EXTENSION *ext)
{
int new = 0;
OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm);
if (tmpl == NULL || ext == NULL) { /* also crm == NULL implies this */
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_EXTENSION, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (tmpl->extensions == NULL) {
if ((tmpl->extensions = sk_X509_EXTENSION_new_null()) == NULL)
goto oom;
new = 1;
}
if (!sk_X509_EXTENSION_push(tmpl->extensions, (X509_EXTENSION *)ext))
goto oom;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_PUSH0_EXTENSION, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
if (new != 0) {
sk_X509_EXTENSION_free(tmpl->extensions);
tmpl->extensions = NULL;
}
return 0;
}
/* TODO: support cases 1+2 (besides case 3) defined in RFC 4211, section 4.1. */
static int CRMF_poposigningkey_init(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY *ps,
OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST *cr,
EVP_PKEY *pkey, int dgst)
{
int len;
size_t crlen;
size_t siglen;
unsigned char *crder = NULL, *sig = NULL;
int alg_nid = 0;
int md_nid = 0;
const EVP_MD *alg = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
int ret = 0;
if (ps == NULL || cr == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
ps->signature->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
ps->signature->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST(cr, &crder);
if (len < 0 || crder == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, CRMF_R_ERROR);
goto err;
}
crlen = (size_t)len;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&alg_nid, dgst, EVP_PKEY_id(pkey))) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALG_FOR_POPSIGNINGKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(alg_nid, &md_nid, NULL)
|| (alg = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_nid)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALG_FOR_POPSIGNINGKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(ps->algorithmIdentifier, OBJ_nid2obj(alg_nid),
V_ASN1_NULL, NULL)
|| (ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignInit(ctx, NULL, alg, NULL, pkey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(ctx, crder, crlen) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, NULL, &siglen) <= 0) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, CRMF_R_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if ((sig = OPENSSL_malloc(siglen)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(ctx, sig, &siglen) <= 0
|| !ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(ps->signature, sig, siglen)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_INIT, CRMF_R_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_free(crder);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sig);
return ret;
}
int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_create_popo(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm, EVP_PKEY *pkey,
int dgst, int ppmtd)
{
OSSL_CRMF_POPO *pp = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *tag = NULL;
if (crm == NULL || (ppmtd == OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE && pkey == NULL)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_CREATE_POPO, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (ppmtd == OSSL_CRMF_POPO_NONE)
goto end;
if ((pp = OSSL_CRMF_POPO_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
pp->type = ppmtd;
switch (ppmtd) {
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_RAVERIFIED:
if ((pp->value.raVerified = ASN1_NULL_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
break;
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE:
{
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY *ps = OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_new();
if (ps == NULL
|| !CRMF_poposigningkey_init(ps, crm->certReq, pkey, dgst)){
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY_free(ps);
goto err;
}
pp->value.signature = ps;
}
break;
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYENC:
if ((pp->value.keyEncipherment = OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
tag = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
pp->value.keyEncipherment->type =
OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE;
pp->value.keyEncipherment->value.subsequentMessage = tag;
if (tag == NULL
|| !ASN1_INTEGER_set(tag, OSSL_CRMF_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE_ENCRCERT))
goto oom;
break;
default:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_CREATE_POPO,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_METHOD_FOR_CREATING_POPO);
goto err;
}
end:
OSSL_CRMF_POPO_free(crm->popo);
crm->popo = pp;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_CREATE_POPO, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
err:
OSSL_CRMF_POPO_free(pp);
return 0;
}
/* returns 0 for equal, -1 for a < b or error on a, 1 for a > b or error on b */
static int X509_PUBKEY_cmp(X509_PUBKEY *a, X509_PUBKEY *b)
{
X509_ALGOR *algA = NULL, *algB = NULL;
int res = 0;
if (a == b)
return 0;
if (a == NULL || !X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, NULL, NULL, &algA, a)
|| algA == NULL)
return -1;
if (b == NULL || !X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, NULL, NULL, &algB, b)
|| algB == NULL)
return 1;
if ((res = X509_ALGOR_cmp(algA, algB)) != 0)
return res;
return EVP_PKEY_cmp(X509_PUBKEY_get0(a), X509_PUBKEY_get0(b));
}
/* verifies the Proof-of-Possession of the request with the given rid in reqs */
int OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(const OSSL_CRMF_MSGS *reqs,
int rid, int acceptRAVerified)
{
OSSL_CRMF_MSG *req = NULL;
X509_PUBKEY *pubkey = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEY *sig = NULL;
if (reqs == NULL
|| (req = sk_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_value(reqs, rid)) == NULL
|| req->popo == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO,
CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
switch (req->popo->type) {
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_RAVERIFIED:
if (acceptRAVerified)
return 1;
break;
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE:
pubkey = req->certReq->certTemplate->publicKey;
sig = req->popo->value.signature;
if (sig->poposkInput != NULL) {
/*
* According to RFC 4211: publicKey contains a copy of
* the public key from the certificate template. This MUST be
* exactly the same value as contained in the certificate template.
*/
if (pubkey == NULL
|| sig->poposkInput->publicKey == NULL
|| X509_PUBKEY_cmp(pubkey, sig->poposkInput->publicKey)
|| ASN1_item_verify(
ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CRMF_POPOSIGNINGKEYINPUT),
sig->algorithmIdentifier, sig->signature,
sig->poposkInput, X509_PUBKEY_get0(pubkey)) < 1)
break;
} else {
if (pubkey == NULL
|| req->certReq->certTemplate->subject == NULL
|| ASN1_item_verify(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(OSSL_CRMF_CERTREQUEST),
sig->algorithmIdentifier, sig->signature,
req->certReq,
X509_PUBKEY_get0(pubkey)) < 1)
break;
}
return 1;
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYENC:
/*
* TODO: when OSSL_CMP_certrep_new() supports encrypted certs,
* return 1 if the type of req->popo->value.keyEncipherment
* is OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE and
* its value.subsequentMessage == OSSL_CRMF_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE_ENCRCERT
*/
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYAGREE:
default:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_POPO_METHOD);
return 0;
}
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_POPO_NOT_ACCEPTED);
return 0;
}
/* retrieves the serialNumber of the given cert template or NULL on error */
ASN1_INTEGER *OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_get0_serialNumber(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl)
{
return tmpl != NULL ? tmpl->serialNumber : NULL;
}
/* retrieves the issuer name of the given cert template or NULL on error */
X509_NAME *OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_get0_issuer(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl)
{
return tmpl != NULL ? tmpl->issuer : NULL;
}
/*
* fill in certificate template.
* Any value argument that is NULL will leave the respective field unchanged.
*/
int OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE *tmpl,
EVP_PKEY *pubkey,
const X509_NAME *subject,
const X509_NAME *issuer,
const ASN1_INTEGER *serial)
{
if (tmpl == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_FILL, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (subject != NULL && !X509_NAME_set(&tmpl->subject, subject))
goto oom;
if (issuer != NULL && !X509_NAME_set(&tmpl->issuer, issuer))
goto oom;
if (serial != NULL) {
ASN1_INTEGER_free(tmpl->serialNumber);
if ((tmpl->serialNumber = ASN1_INTEGER_dup(serial)) == NULL)
goto oom;
}
if (pubkey != NULL && !X509_PUBKEY_set(&tmpl->publicKey, pubkey))
goto oom;
return 1;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_FILL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*-
* Decrypts the certificate in the given encryptedValue
* this is needed for the indirect PoP method as in RFC 4210 section 5.2.8.2
*
* returns a pointer to the decrypted certificate
* returns NULL on error or if no certificate available
*/
X509 *OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE *ecert,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
X509 *cert = NULL; /* decrypted certificate */
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL; /* context for symmetric encryption */
unsigned char *ek = NULL; /* decrypted symmetric encryption key */
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL; /* used cipher */
unsigned char *iv = NULL; /* initial vector for symmetric encryption */
unsigned char *outbuf = NULL; /* decryption output buffer */
const unsigned char *p = NULL; /* needed for decoding ASN1 */
int symmAlg = 0; /* NIDs for symmetric algorithm */
int n, outlen = 0;
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = NULL; /* private key context */
if (ecert == NULL || ecert->symmAlg == NULL || ecert->encSymmKey == NULL
|| ecert->encValue == NULL || pkey == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
if ((symmAlg = OBJ_obj2nid(ecert->symmAlg->algorithm)) == 0) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
return NULL;
}
/* first the symmetric key needs to be decrypted */
pkctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkey, NULL);
if (pkctx != NULL && EVP_PKEY_decrypt_init(pkctx)) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING *encKey = ecert->encSymmKey;
size_t eksize = 0;
if (EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkctx, NULL, &eksize, encKey->data, encKey->length)
<= 0
|| (ek = OPENSSL_malloc(eksize)) == NULL
|| EVP_PKEY_decrypt(pkctx, ek, &eksize, encKey->data,
encKey->length) <= 0) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_ERROR_DECRYPTING_SYMMETRIC_KEY);
goto end;
}
} else {
goto oom;
}
/* select symmetric cipher based on algorithm given in message */
if ((cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(symmAlg)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CIPHER);
goto end;
}
if ((iv = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))) == NULL)
goto oom;
if (ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(ecert->symmAlg->parameter, iv,
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))
!= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_MALFORMED_IV);
goto end;
}
/*
* d2i_X509 changes the given pointer, so use p for decoding the message and
* keep the original pointer in outbuf so the memory can be freed later
*/
if ((p = outbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(ecert->encValue->length +
EVP_CIPHER_block_size(cipher))) == NULL
|| (evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto oom;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_padding(evp_ctx, 0);
if (!EVP_DecryptInit(evp_ctx, cipher, ek, iv)
|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(evp_ctx, outbuf, &outlen,
ecert->encValue->data,
ecert->encValue->length)
|| !EVP_DecryptFinal(evp_ctx, outbuf + outlen, &n)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_ERROR_DECRYPTING_CERTIFICATE);
goto end;
}
outlen += n;
/* convert decrypted certificate from DER to internal ASN.1 structure */
if ((cert = d2i_X509(NULL, &p, outlen)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_ERROR_DECODING_CERTIFICATE);
}
goto end;
oom:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
end:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(pkctx);
OPENSSL_free(outbuf);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ek);
OPENSSL_free(iv);
return cert;
}
crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c
+231
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,231 @@
/*-
* Copyright 2007-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2018
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2018
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*
* CRMF implementation by Martin Peylo, Miikka Viljanen, and David von Oheimb.
*/
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "crmf_int.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
/*-
* creates and initializes OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER (section 4.4)
* |slen| SHOULD be > 8 (16 is common)
* |owfnid| e.g., NID_sha256
* |itercnt| MUST be > 100 (500 is common)
* |macnid| e.g., NID_hmac_sha1
* returns pointer to OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER on success, NULL on error
*/
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(size_t slen, int owfnid,
int itercnt, int macnid)
{
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
unsigned char *salt = NULL;
if ((pbm = OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_new()) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* salt contains a randomly generated value used in computing the key
* of the MAC process. The salt SHOULD be at least 8 octets (64
* bits) long.
*/
if ((salt = OPENSSL_malloc(slen)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (RAND_bytes(salt, (int)slen) <= 0) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, CRMF_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM);
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(pbm->salt, salt, (int)slen))
goto err;
/*
* owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to
* compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST
* support SHA-1.
*/
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->owf, OBJ_nid2obj(owfnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, CRMF_R_SETTING_OWF_ALGOR_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* iterationCount identifies the number of times the hash is applied
* during the key computation process. The iterationCount MUST be a
* minimum of 100. Many people suggest using values as high as 1000
* iterations as the minimum value. The trade off here is between
* protection of the password from attacks and the time spent by the
* server processing all of the different iterations in deriving
* passwords. Hashing is generally considered a cheap operation but
* this may not be true with all hash functions in the future.
*/
if (itercnt < 100) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, CRMF_R_ITERATIONCOUNT_BELOW_100);
goto err;
}
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(pbm->iterationCount, itercnt)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, CRMF_R_CRMFERROR);
goto err;
}
/*
* mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
* function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC].
* All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11].
*/
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(pbm->mac, OBJ_nid2obj(macnid), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBMP_NEW, CRMF_R_SETTING_MAC_ALGOR_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
OPENSSL_free(salt);
return pbm;
err:
OPENSSL_free(salt);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* calculates the PBM based on the settings of the given OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER
* |pbmp| identifies the algorithms, salt to use
* |msg| message to apply the PBM for
* |msglen| length of the message
* |sec| key to use
* |seclen| length of the key
* |mac| pointer to the computed mac, will be set on success
* |maclen| if not NULL, will set variable to the length of the mac on success
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,
const unsigned char *msg, size_t msglen,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t seclen,
unsigned char **mac, size_t *maclen)
{
int mac_nid, hmac_md_nid = NID_undef;
const EVP_MD *m = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned char basekey[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int bklen = EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE;
int64_t iterations;
unsigned char *mac_res = 0;
int ok = 0;
EVP_MAC_CTX *mctx = NULL;
if (mac == NULL || pbmp == NULL || pbmp->mac == NULL
|| pbmp->mac->algorithm == NULL || msg == NULL || sec == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
goto err;
}
if ((mac_res = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/*
* owf identifies the hash algorithm and associated parameters used to
* compute the key used in the MAC process. All implementations MUST
* support SHA-1.
*/
if ((m = EVP_get_digestbyobj(pbmp->owf->algorithm)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if ((ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
/* compute the basekey of the salted secret */
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, m, NULL))
goto err;
/* first the secret */
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, sec, seclen))
goto err;
/* then the salt */
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, pbmp->salt->data, pbmp->salt->length))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&iterations, pbmp->iterationCount)
|| iterations < 100 /* min from RFC */
|| iterations > OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_BAD_PBM_ITERATIONCOUNT);
goto err;
}
/* the first iteration was already done above */
while (--iterations > 0) {
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctx, m, NULL))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, basekey, bklen))
goto err;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, basekey, &bklen))
goto err;
}
/*
* mac identifies the algorithm and associated parameters of the MAC
* function to be used. All implementations MUST support HMAC-SHA1 [HMAC].
* All implementations SHOULD support DES-MAC and Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11].
*/
mac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbmp->mac->algorithm);
if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, mac_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL)
|| ((m = EVP_get_digestbynid(hmac_md_nid)) == NULL)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
if ((mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(EVP_get_macbyname("HMAC"))) == NULL
|| EVP_MAC_ctrl(mctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, m) <= 0
|| EVP_MAC_ctrl(mctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, basekey, bklen) <= 0
|| !EVP_MAC_init(mctx)
|| !EVP_MAC_update(mctx, msg, msglen)
|| !EVP_MAC_final(mctx, mac_res, maclen))
goto err;
ok = 1;
err:
/* cleanup */
OPENSSL_cleanse(basekey, bklen);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(mctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
if (ok == 1) {
*mac = mac_res;
return 1;
}
OPENSSL_free(mac_res);
if (pbmp != NULL && pbmp->mac != NULL) {
char buf[128];
if (OBJ_obj2txt(buf, sizeof(buf), pbmp->mac->algorithm, 0))
ERR_add_error_data(1, buf);
}
return 0;
}