OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre2
This commit is contained in:
Hakase
+81
-118
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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@@ -12,17 +12,17 @@
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#include <errno.h>
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#include <limits.h>
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#include "internal/ctype.h"
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/lhash.h>
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#include <openssl/buffer.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/asn1.h>
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#include <openssl/x509.h>
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#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include <internal/dane.h>
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#include <internal/x509_int.h>
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#include "internal/dane.h"
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#include "internal/x509_int.h"
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#include "x509_lcl.h"
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/* CRL score values */
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@@ -1756,119 +1756,67 @@ int X509_cmp_current_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm)
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int X509_cmp_time(const ASN1_TIME *ctm, time_t *cmp_time)
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{
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char *str;
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ASN1_TIME atm;
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long offset;
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char buff1[24], buff2[24], *p;
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int i, j, remaining;
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static const size_t utctime_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
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static const size_t generalizedtime_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ") - 1;
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ASN1_TIME *asn1_cmp_time = NULL;
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int i, day, sec, ret = 0;
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p = buff1;
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remaining = ctm->length;
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str = (char *)ctm->data;
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/*
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* Note that the following (historical) code allows much more slack in the
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* time format than RFC5280. In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
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* Note that ASN.1 allows much more slack in the time format than RFC5280.
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* In RFC5280, the representation is fixed:
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* UTCTime: YYMMDDHHMMSSZ
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* GeneralizedTime: YYYYMMDDHHMMSSZ
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*
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* We do NOT currently enforce the following RFC 5280 requirement:
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* "CAs conforming to this profile MUST always encode certificate
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* validity dates through the year 2049 as UTCTime; certificate validity
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* dates in 2050 or later MUST be encoded as GeneralizedTime."
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*/
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if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
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/* YYMMDDHHMM[SS]Z or YYMMDDHHMM[SS](+-)hhmm */
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int min_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
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int max_length = sizeof("YYMMDDHHMMSS+hhmm") - 1;
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if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
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switch (ctm->type) {
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case V_ASN1_UTCTIME:
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if (ctm->length != (int)(utctime_length))
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return 0;
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memcpy(p, str, 10);
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p += 10;
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str += 10;
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remaining -= 10;
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} else {
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/* YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.fff]]Z or YYYYMMDDHHMM[SS[.f[f[f]]]](+-)hhmm */
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int min_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMZ") - 1;
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int max_length = sizeof("YYYYMMDDHHMMSS.fff+hhmm") - 1;
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if (remaining < min_length || remaining > max_length)
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break;
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case V_ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME:
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if (ctm->length != (int)(generalizedtime_length))
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return 0;
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memcpy(p, str, 12);
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p += 12;
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str += 12;
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remaining -= 12;
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}
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if ((*str == 'Z') || (*str == '-') || (*str == '+')) {
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*(p++) = '0';
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*(p++) = '0';
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} else {
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/* SS (seconds) */
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if (remaining < 2)
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return 0;
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*(p++) = *(str++);
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*(p++) = *(str++);
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remaining -= 2;
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/*
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* Skip any (up to three) fractional seconds...
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* TODO(emilia): in RFC5280, fractional seconds are forbidden.
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* Can we just kill them altogether?
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*/
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if (remaining && *str == '.') {
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str++;
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remaining--;
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for (i = 0; i < 3 && remaining; i++, str++, remaining--) {
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if (*str < '0' || *str > '9')
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break;
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}
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}
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}
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*(p++) = 'Z';
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*(p++) = '\0';
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/* We now need either a terminating 'Z' or an offset. */
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if (!remaining)
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break;
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default:
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return 0;
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if (*str == 'Z') {
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if (remaining != 1)
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return 0;
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offset = 0;
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} else {
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/* (+-)HHMM */
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if ((*str != '+') && (*str != '-'))
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return 0;
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/* Historical behaviour: the (+-)hhmm offset is forbidden in RFC5280. */
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if (remaining != 5)
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return 0;
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if (str[1] < '0' || str[1] > '9' || str[2] < '0' || str[2] > '9' ||
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str[3] < '0' || str[3] > '9' || str[4] < '0' || str[4] > '9')
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return 0;
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offset = ((str[1] - '0') * 10 + (str[2] - '0')) * 60;
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offset += (str[3] - '0') * 10 + (str[4] - '0');
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if (*str == '-')
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offset = -offset;
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}
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atm.type = ctm->type;
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atm.flags = 0;
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atm.length = sizeof(buff2);
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atm.data = (unsigned char *)buff2;
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if (X509_time_adj(&atm, offset * 60, cmp_time) == NULL)
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/**
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* Verify the format: the ASN.1 functions we use below allow a more
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* flexible format than what's mandated by RFC 5280.
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* Digit and date ranges will be verified in the conversion methods.
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*/
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for (i = 0; i < ctm->length - 1; i++) {
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if (!ossl_isdigit(ctm->data[i]))
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return 0;
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}
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if (ctm->data[ctm->length - 1] != 'Z')
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return 0;
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if (ctm->type == V_ASN1_UTCTIME) {
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i = (buff1[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff1[1] - '0');
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if (i < 50)
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i += 100; /* cf. RFC 2459 */
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j = (buff2[0] - '0') * 10 + (buff2[1] - '0');
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if (j < 50)
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j += 100;
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/*
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* There is ASN1_UTCTIME_cmp_time_t but no
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* ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_cmp_time_t or ASN1_TIME_cmp_time_t,
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* so we go through ASN.1
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*/
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asn1_cmp_time = X509_time_adj(NULL, 0, cmp_time);
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if (asn1_cmp_time == NULL)
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_TIME_diff(&day, &sec, ctm, asn1_cmp_time))
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goto err;
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if (i < j)
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return -1;
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if (i > j)
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return 1;
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}
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i = strcmp(buff1, buff2);
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if (i == 0) /* wait a second then return younger :-) */
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return -1;
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else
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return i;
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/*
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* X509_cmp_time comparison is <=.
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* The return value 0 is reserved for errors.
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*/
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ret = (day >= 0 && sec >= 0) ? -1 : 1;
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err:
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ASN1_TIME_free(asn1_cmp_time);
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return ret;
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}
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ASN1_TIME *X509_gmtime_adj(ASN1_TIME *s, long adj)
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@@ -2896,7 +2844,11 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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int i;
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/* Our chain starts with a single untrusted element. */
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OPENSSL_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num);
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if (!ossl_assert(num == 1 && ctx->num_untrusted == num)) {
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X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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return 0;
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}
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#define S_DOUNTRUSTED (1 << 0) /* Search untrusted chain */
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#define S_DOTRUSTED (1 << 1) /* Search trusted store */
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@@ -3033,7 +2985,14 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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* certificate among the ones from the trust store.
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*/
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if ((search & S_DOALTERNATE) != 0) {
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OPENSSL_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0);
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if (!ossl_assert(num > i && i > 0 && ss == 0)) {
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X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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X509_free(xtmp);
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trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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search = 0;
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continue;
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}
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search &= ~S_DOALTERNATE;
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for (; num > i; --num)
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X509_free(sk_X509_pop(ctx->chain));
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@@ -3096,7 +3055,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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* certificate with ctx->num_untrusted <= num.
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*/
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if (ok) {
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OPENSSL_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num);
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if (!ossl_assert(ctx->num_untrusted <= num)) {
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X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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search = 0;
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continue;
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}
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search &= ~S_DOUNTRUSTED;
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switch (trust = check_trust(ctx, num)) {
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case X509_TRUST_TRUSTED:
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@@ -3135,7 +3100,13 @@ static int build_chain(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx)
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*/
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if ((search & S_DOUNTRUSTED) != 0) {
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num = sk_X509_num(ctx->chain);
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OPENSSL_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted);
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if (!ossl_assert(num == ctx->num_untrusted)) {
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X509err(X509_F_BUILD_CHAIN, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
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trust = X509_TRUST_REJECTED;
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ctx->error = X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED;
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search = 0;
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continue;
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}
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x = sk_X509_value(ctx->chain, num-1);
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/*
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@@ -3254,8 +3225,6 @@ static int check_key_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
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*/
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static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
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{
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int nid = X509_get_signature_nid(cert);
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int mdnid = NID_undef;
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int secbits = -1;
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int level = ctx->param->auth_level;
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@@ -3264,14 +3233,8 @@ static int check_sig_level(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert)
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if (level > NUM_AUTH_LEVELS)
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level = NUM_AUTH_LEVELS;
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/* Lookup signature algorithm digest */
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if (nid && OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, &mdnid, NULL)) {
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const EVP_MD *md;
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/* Assume 4 bits of collision resistance for each hash octet */
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if (mdnid != NID_undef && (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(mdnid)) != NULL)
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secbits = EVP_MD_size(md) * 4;
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}
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if (!X509_get_signature_info(cert, NULL, NULL, &secbits, NULL))
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return 0;
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return secbits >= minbits_table[level - 1];
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}
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