OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre2

This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2018-04-07 17:29:40 +09:00
parent 82a44d2483
commit bbac8ca55d
17755 changed files with 221242 additions and 98415 deletions
+16 -14
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -55,13 +54,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
* -3 salt length is maximized
* -N reserved
*/
if (sLen == -1)
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
sLen = hLen;
else if (sLen == -2)
sLen = -2;
else if (sLen < -2) {
} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -80,7 +78,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
goto err;
}
if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -123,8 +123,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
ret = 0;
} else
} else {
ret = 1;
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(DB);
@@ -162,13 +163,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
* -1 sLen == hLen
* -2 salt length is maximized
* -3 same as above (on signing)
* -N reserved
*/
if (sLen == -1)
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
sLen = hLen;
else if (sLen == -2)
sLen = -2;
else if (sLen < -2) {
} else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
goto err;
}
@@ -184,7 +186,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
goto err;
}
if (sLen == -2) {
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,