OpenSSL 1.1.1-pre2
This commit is contained in:
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
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SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
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rsa_ossl.c rsa_gen.c rsa_lib.c rsa_sign.c rsa_saos.c rsa_err.c \
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rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c rsa_null.c \
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rsa_pk1.c rsa_ssl.c rsa_none.c rsa_oaep.c rsa_chk.c \
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rsa_pss.c rsa_x931.c rsa_asn1.c rsa_depr.c rsa_ameth.c rsa_prn.c \
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rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c
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rsa_pmeth.c rsa_crpt.c rsa_x931g.c rsa_meth.c rsa_mp.c
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+451
-217
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
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/*
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* Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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@@ -24,15 +24,68 @@ static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
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static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
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#endif
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static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg);
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/* Set any parameters associated with pkey */
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static int rsa_param_encode(const EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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ASN1_STRING **pstr, int *pstrtype)
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{
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const RSA *rsa = pkey->pkey.rsa;
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*pstr = NULL;
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/* If RSA it's just NULL type */
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if (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA) {
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_NULL;
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return 1;
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}
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/* If no PSS parameters we omit parameters entirely */
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if (rsa->pss == NULL) {
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_UNDEF;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Encode PSS parameters */
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if (ASN1_item_pack(rsa->pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), pstr) == NULL)
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return 0;
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*pstrtype = V_ASN1_SEQUENCE;
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return 1;
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}
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/* Decode any parameters and set them in RSA structure */
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static int rsa_param_decode(RSA *rsa, const X509_ALGOR *alg)
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{
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const ASN1_OBJECT *algoid;
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const void *algp;
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int algptype;
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X509_ALGOR_get0(&algoid, &algptype, &algp, alg);
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(algoid) == EVP_PKEY_RSA)
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return 1;
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if (algptype == V_ASN1_UNDEF)
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return 1;
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if (algptype != V_ASN1_SEQUENCE) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PARAM_DECODE, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
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return 0;
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}
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rsa->pss = rsa_pss_decode(alg);
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if (rsa->pss == NULL)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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}
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static int rsa_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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unsigned char *penc = NULL;
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int penclen;
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ASN1_STRING *str;
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int strtype;
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if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype))
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return 0;
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penclen = i2d_RSAPublicKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &penc);
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if (penclen <= 0)
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return 0;
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA),
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V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, penc, penclen))
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if (X509_PUBKEY_set0_param(pk, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id),
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strtype, str, penc, penclen))
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return 1;
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OPENSSL_free(penc);
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@@ -43,15 +96,20 @@ static int rsa_pub_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, X509_PUBKEY *pubkey)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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int pklen;
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X509_ALGOR *alg;
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RSA *rsa = NULL;
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if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, pubkey))
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if (!X509_PUBKEY_get0_param(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, pubkey))
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return 0;
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if ((rsa = d2i_RSAPublicKey(NULL, &p, pklen)) == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -72,7 +130,7 @@ static int old_rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey,
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RSAerr(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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@@ -85,16 +143,23 @@ static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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{
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unsigned char *rk = NULL;
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int rklen;
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ASN1_STRING *str;
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int strtype;
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if (!rsa_param_encode(pkey, &str, &strtype))
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return 0;
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rklen = i2d_RSAPrivateKey(pkey->pkey.rsa, &rk);
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if (rklen <= 0) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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ASN1_STRING_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsaEncryption), 0,
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V_ASN1_NULL, NULL, rk, rklen)) {
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_set0(p8, OBJ_nid2obj(pkey->ameth->pkey_id), 0,
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strtype, str, rk, rklen)) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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ASN1_STRING_free(str);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -104,10 +169,23 @@ static int rsa_priv_encode(PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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static int rsa_priv_decode(EVP_PKEY *pkey, const PKCS8_PRIV_KEY_INFO *p8)
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{
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const unsigned char *p;
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RSA *rsa;
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int pklen;
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, NULL, p8))
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const X509_ALGOR *alg;
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if (!PKCS8_pkey_get0(NULL, &p, &pklen, &alg, p8))
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return 0;
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return old_rsa_priv_decode(pkey, &p, pklen);
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rsa = d2i_RSAPrivateKey(NULL, &p, pklen);
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if (rsa == NULL) {
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RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, ERR_R_RSA_LIB);
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return 0;
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}
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if (!rsa_param_decode(rsa, alg)) {
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RSA_free(rsa);
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return 0;
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}
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EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, pkey->ameth->pkey_id, rsa);
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return 1;
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}
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static int int_rsa_size(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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@@ -130,104 +208,40 @@ static void int_rsa_free(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
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RSA_free(pkey->pkey.rsa);
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}
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static int do_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const RSA *x, int off, int priv)
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{
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char *str;
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const char *s;
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int ret = 0, mod_len = 0;
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if (x->n != NULL)
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mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
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goto err;
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if (priv && x->d) {
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
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goto err;
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str = "modulus:";
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s = "publicExponent:";
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} else {
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if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
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goto err;
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str = "Modulus:";
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s = "Exponent:";
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}
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (priv) {
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off))
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goto err;
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}
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ret = 1;
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err:
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return (ret);
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}
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static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
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ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
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{
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return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 0);
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}
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static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
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ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
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{
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return do_rsa_print(bp, pkey->pkey.rsa, indent, 1);
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}
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/* Given an MGF1 Algorithm ID decode to an Algorithm Identifier */
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static X509_ALGOR *rsa_mgf1_decode(X509_ALGOR *alg)
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{
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if (alg == NULL)
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return NULL;
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if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1)
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return NULL;
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return ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR),
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alg->parameter);
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}
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static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
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X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
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{
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RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
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*pmaskHash = NULL;
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pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
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alg->parameter);
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if (!pss)
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return NULL;
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*pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
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return pss;
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}
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static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
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X509_ALGOR *maskHash, int indent)
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static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, int pss_key, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
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int indent)
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{
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int rv = 0;
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if (!pss) {
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if (BIO_puts(bp, " (INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
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X509_ALGOR *maskHash = NULL;
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if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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goto err;
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if (pss_key) {
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if (pss == NULL) {
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if (BIO_puts(bp, "No PSS parameter restrictions\n") <= 0)
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return 0;
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return 1;
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||||
} else {
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||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, "PSS parameter restrictions:") <= 0)
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return 0;
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||||
}
|
||||
} else if (pss == NULL) {
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||||
if (BIO_puts(bp,"(INVALID PSS PARAMETERS)\n") <= 0)
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||||
return 0;
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||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
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||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (pss_key)
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||||
indent += 2;
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||||
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
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||||
goto err;
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||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Hash Algorithm: ") <= 0)
|
||||
@@ -236,8 +250,9 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
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||||
if (pss->hashAlgorithm) {
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||||
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, pss->hashAlgorithm->algorithm) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0)
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -252,24 +267,28 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, " with ") <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (maskHash) {
|
||||
maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
||||
if (maskHash != NULL) {
|
||||
if (i2a_ASN1_OBJECT(bp, maskHash->algorithm) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0)
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "INVALID") <= 0) {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0)
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "mgf1 with sha1 (default)") <= 0) {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (BIO_puts(bp, "Salt Length: 0x") <= 0)
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s Salt Length: 0x", pss_key ? "Minimum" : "") <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (pss->saltLength) {
|
||||
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->saltLength) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0)
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "14 (default)") <= 0) {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128))
|
||||
@@ -279,32 +298,155 @@ static int rsa_pss_param_print(BIO *bp, RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss,
|
||||
if (pss->trailerField) {
|
||||
if (i2a_ASN1_INTEGER(bp, pss->trailerField) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0)
|
||||
} else if (BIO_puts(bp, "BC (default)") <= 0) {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_puts(bp, "\n");
|
||||
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int off, int priv)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const RSA *x = pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||||
char *str;
|
||||
const char *s;
|
||||
int ret = 0, mod_len = 0, ex_primes;
|
||||
|
||||
if (x->n != NULL)
|
||||
mod_len = BN_num_bits(x->n);
|
||||
ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%s ", pkey_is_pss(pkey) ? "RSA-PSS" : "RSA") <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (priv && x->d) {
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "Private-Key: (%d bit, %d primes)\n",
|
||||
mod_len, ex_primes <= 0 ? 2 : ex_primes + 2) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
str = "modulus:";
|
||||
s = "publicExponent:";
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "Public-Key: (%d bit)\n", mod_len) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
str = "Modulus:";
|
||||
s = "Exponent:";
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, str, x->n, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, s, x->e, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (priv) {
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "privateExponent:", x->d, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime1:", x->p, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "prime2:", x->q, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent1:", x->dmp1, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "exponent2:", x->dmq1, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "coefficient:", x->iqmp, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(x->prime_infos); i++) {
|
||||
/* print multi-prime info */
|
||||
BIGNUM *bn = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
int j;
|
||||
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(x->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 3; j++) {
|
||||
if (!BIO_indent(bp, off, 128))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
switch (j) {
|
||||
case 0:
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "prime%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
bn = pinfo->r;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 1:
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "exponent%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
bn = pinfo->d;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
case 2:
|
||||
if (BIO_printf(bp, "coefficient%d:", i + 3) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
bn = pinfo->t;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
default:
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!ASN1_bn_print(bp, "", bn, NULL, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey) && !rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 1, x->pss, off))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_pub_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
||||
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_priv_print(BIO *bp, const EVP_PKEY *pkey, int indent,
|
||||
ASN1_PCTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return pkey_rsa_print(bp, pkey, indent, 1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
|
||||
pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS),
|
||||
alg->parameter);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss->maskGenAlgorithm != NULL) {
|
||||
pss->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenAlgorithm);
|
||||
if (pss->maskHash == NULL) {
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return pss;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
||||
const ASN1_STRING *sig, int indent, ASN1_PCTX *pctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == NID_rsassaPss) {
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
||||
int rv;
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
|
||||
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
|
||||
rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, pss, maskHash, indent);
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
||||
|
||||
rv = rsa_pss_param_print(bp, 0, pss, indent);
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
||||
if (!rv)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0)
|
||||
} else if (!sig && BIO_puts(bp, "\n") <= 0) {
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sig)
|
||||
return X509_signature_dump(bp, sig, indent);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
@@ -313,6 +455,7 @@ static int rsa_sig_print(BIO *bp, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
||||
static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (op) {
|
||||
|
||||
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
||||
@@ -321,6 +464,8 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
||||
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
if (arg1 == 0)
|
||||
PKCS7_RECIP_INFO_get0_alg(arg2, &alg);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
@@ -333,6 +478,8 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENVELOPE:
|
||||
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
if (arg1 == 0)
|
||||
return rsa_cms_encrypt(arg2);
|
||||
else if (arg1 == 1)
|
||||
@@ -340,6 +487,8 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case ASN1_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_RI_TYPE:
|
||||
if (pkey_is_pss(pkey))
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
*(int *)arg2 = CMS_RECIPINFO_TRANS;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -363,7 +512,7 @@ static int rsa_pkey_ctrl(EVP_PKEY *pkey, int op, long arg1, void *arg2)
|
||||
/* allocate and set algorithm ID from EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
||||
static int rsa_md_to_algor(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *md)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1)
|
||||
if (md == NULL || EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_sha1)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
||||
if (*palg == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -377,13 +526,14 @@ static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
|
||||
{
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *algtmp = NULL;
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *stmp = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
*palg = NULL;
|
||||
if (EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1)
|
||||
if (mgf1md == NULL || EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) == NID_sha1)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
/* need to embed algorithm ID inside another */
|
||||
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&algtmp, mgf1md))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp))
|
||||
if (ASN1_item_pack(algtmp, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(X509_ALGOR), &stmp) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
*palg = X509_ALGOR_new();
|
||||
if (*palg == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -402,6 +552,7 @@ static int rsa_md_to_mgf1(X509_ALGOR **palg, const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
|
||||
static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!alg)
|
||||
return EVP_sha1();
|
||||
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(alg->algorithm);
|
||||
@@ -410,55 +561,39 @@ static const EVP_MD *rsa_algor_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
||||
return md;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* convert MGF1 algorithm ID to EVP_MD, default SHA1 */
|
||||
static const EVP_MD *rsa_mgf1_to_md(X509_ALGOR *alg, X509_ALGOR *maskHash)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||||
if (!alg)
|
||||
return EVP_sha1();
|
||||
/* Check mask and lookup mask hash algorithm */
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm) != NID_mgf1) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!maskHash) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
md = EVP_get_digestbyobj(maskHash->algorithm);
|
||||
if (md == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return md;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX is PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter,
|
||||
* Convert EVP_PKEY_CTX in PSS mode into corresponding algorithm parameter,
|
||||
* suitable for setting an AlgorithmIdentifier.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
||||
static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
const EVP_MD *sigmd, *mgf1md;
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = NULL;
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pk = EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_pkey(pkctx);
|
||||
int saltlen, rv = 0;
|
||||
int saltlen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_signature_md(pkctx, &sigmd) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_mgf1_md(pkctx, &mgf1md) <= 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if (!EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_pss_saltlen(pkctx, &saltlen))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (saltlen == -1)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if (saltlen == -1) {
|
||||
saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
|
||||
else if (saltlen == -2) {
|
||||
} else if (saltlen == -2) {
|
||||
saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
|
||||
if (((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) - 1) & 0x7) == 0)
|
||||
if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
|
||||
saltlen--;
|
||||
}
|
||||
pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
|
||||
|
||||
return rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = RSA_PSS_PARAMS_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (saltlen != 20) {
|
||||
@@ -470,20 +605,31 @@ static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->hashAlgorithm, sigmd))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (mgf1md == NULL)
|
||||
mgf1md = sigmd;
|
||||
if (!rsa_md_to_mgf1(&pss->maskGenAlgorithm, mgf1md))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* Finally create string with pss parameter encoding. */
|
||||
if (!ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), &os))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
if (!rsa_md_to_algor(&pss->maskHash, mgf1md))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
return pss;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
if (rv)
|
||||
return os;
|
||||
ASN1_STRING_free(os);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static ASN1_STRING *rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *os;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
os = ASN1_item_pack(pss, ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_PSS_PARAMS), NULL);
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
return os;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* From PSS AlgorithmIdentifier set public key parameters. If pkey isn't NULL
|
||||
* then the EVP_MD_CTX is setup and initialised. If it is NULL parameters are
|
||||
@@ -497,51 +643,21 @@ static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
|
||||
int saltlen;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Decode PSS parameters */
|
||||
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg, &maskHash);
|
||||
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss == NULL) {
|
||||
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(pss->maskGenAlgorithm, maskHash);
|
||||
if (!mgf1md)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
|
||||
if (!md)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pss->saltLength) {
|
||||
saltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Could perform more salt length sanity checks but the main RSA
|
||||
* routines will trap other invalid values anyway.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (saltlen < 0) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
saltlen = 20;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
|
||||
* PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We have all parameters now set up context */
|
||||
|
||||
if (pkey) {
|
||||
if (!EVP_DigestVerifyInit(ctx, &pkctx, md, NULL, pkey))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -568,22 +684,60 @@ static int rsa_pss_to_ctx(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx,
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
|
||||
const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (pss == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
*pmd = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->hashAlgorithm);
|
||||
if (*pmd == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
*pmgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(pss->maskHash);
|
||||
if (*pmgf1md == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (pss->saltLength) {
|
||||
*psaltlen = ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->saltLength);
|
||||
if (*psaltlen < 0) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
*psaltlen = 20;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* low-level routines support only trailer field 0xbc (value 1) and
|
||||
* PKCS#1 says we should reject any other value anyway.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (pss->trailerField && ASN1_INTEGER_get(pss->trailerField) != 1) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
static int rsa_cms_verify(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int nid, nid2;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
|
||||
|
||||
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
||||
nid = OBJ_obj2nid(alg->algorithm);
|
||||
if (nid == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
|
||||
/* Only PSS allowed for PSS keys */
|
||||
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(pkctx)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_VERIFY, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (nid == NID_rsaEncryption)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
if (nid == NID_rsassaPss)
|
||||
return rsa_pss_to_ctx(NULL, pkctx, alg, NULL);
|
||||
/* Workaround for some implementation that use a signature OID */
|
||||
if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(nid, NULL, &nid2)) {
|
||||
if (nid2 == NID_rsaEncryption)
|
||||
@@ -603,7 +757,7 @@ static int rsa_item_verify(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != NID_rsassaPss) {
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -621,6 +775,7 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *alg;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_SignerInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(si);
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *os = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
CMS_SignerInfo_get0_algs(si, NULL, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
||||
if (pkctx) {
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
||||
@@ -633,10 +788,10 @@ static int rsa_cms_sign(CMS_SignerInfo *si)
|
||||
/* We don't support it */
|
||||
if (pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
os = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
|
||||
os = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
|
||||
if (!os)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS), V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
@@ -647,13 +802,14 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int pad_mode;
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
|
||||
return 2;
|
||||
if (pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING) {
|
||||
ASN1_STRING *os1 = NULL;
|
||||
os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss(pkctx);
|
||||
os1 = rsa_ctx_to_pss_string(pkctx);
|
||||
if (!os1)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Duplicate parameters if we have to */
|
||||
@@ -663,33 +819,70 @@ static int rsa_item_sign(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
|
||||
ASN1_STRING_free(os1);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
|
||||
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_rsassaPss),
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS),
|
||||
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, os1);
|
||||
return 3;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg,
|
||||
X509_ALGOR **pmaskHash)
|
||||
static int rsa_sig_info_set(X509_SIG_INFO *siginf, const X509_ALGOR *sigalg,
|
||||
const ASN1_STRING *sig)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
int mdnid, saltlen;
|
||||
uint32_t flags;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
|
||||
*pmaskHash = NULL;
|
||||
/* Sanity check: make sure it is PSS */
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(sigalg->algorithm) != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Decode PSS parameters */
|
||||
pss = rsa_pss_decode(sigalg);
|
||||
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(pss, &md, &mgf1md, &saltlen))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
mdnid = EVP_MD_type(md);
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For TLS need SHA256, SHA384 or SHA512, digest and MGF1 digest must
|
||||
* match and salt length must equal digest size
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if ((mdnid == NID_sha256 || mdnid == NID_sha384 || mdnid == NID_sha512)
|
||||
&& mdnid == EVP_MD_type(mgf1md) && saltlen == EVP_MD_size(md))
|
||||
flags = X509_SIG_INFO_TLS;
|
||||
else
|
||||
flags = 0;
|
||||
/* Note: security bits half number of digest bits */
|
||||
X509_SIG_INFO_set(siginf, mdnid, EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS, EVP_MD_size(md) * 4,
|
||||
flags);
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(pss);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pss = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS),
|
||||
alg->parameter);
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
static RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *rsa_oaep_decode(const X509_ALGOR *alg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pss)
|
||||
oaep = ASN1_TYPE_unpack_sequence(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS),
|
||||
alg->parameter);
|
||||
|
||||
if (oaep == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
*pmaskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(pss->maskGenFunc);
|
||||
|
||||
return pss;
|
||||
if (oaep->maskGenFunc != NULL) {
|
||||
oaep->maskHash = rsa_mgf1_decode(oaep->maskGenFunc);
|
||||
if (oaep->maskHash == NULL) {
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
return oaep;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
@@ -702,9 +895,9 @@ static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
int labellen = 0;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md = NULL, *md = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *maskHash;
|
||||
|
||||
pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
|
||||
if (!pkctx)
|
||||
if (pkctx == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (!CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &cmsalg))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@@ -716,22 +909,23 @@ static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Decode OAEP parameters */
|
||||
oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg, &maskHash);
|
||||
oaep = rsa_oaep_decode(cmsalg);
|
||||
|
||||
if (oaep == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
mgf1md = rsa_mgf1_to_md(oaep->maskGenFunc, maskHash);
|
||||
if (!mgf1md)
|
||||
mgf1md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->maskHash);
|
||||
if (mgf1md == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
md = rsa_algor_to_md(oaep->hashFunc);
|
||||
if (!md)
|
||||
if (md == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (oaep->pSourceFunc) {
|
||||
if (oaep->pSourceFunc != NULL) {
|
||||
X509_ALGOR *plab = oaep->pSourceFunc;
|
||||
|
||||
if (OBJ_obj2nid(plab->algorithm) != NID_pSpecified) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -760,7 +954,6 @@ static int rsa_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS_free(oaep);
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(maskHash);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -773,8 +966,8 @@ static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx = CMS_RecipientInfo_get0_pkey_ctx(ri);
|
||||
int pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING, rv = 0, labellen;
|
||||
unsigned char *label;
|
||||
if (CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
CMS_RecipientInfo_ktri_get0_algs(ri, NULL, NULL, &alg);
|
||||
if (pkctx) {
|
||||
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_rsa_padding(pkctx, &pad_mode) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -828,6 +1021,11 @@ static int rsa_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri)
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_pkey_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return RSA_check_key_ex(pkey->pkey.rsa, NULL);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = {
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
||||
@@ -858,10 +1056,46 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_asn1_meths[2] = {
|
||||
old_rsa_priv_decode,
|
||||
old_rsa_priv_encode,
|
||||
rsa_item_verify,
|
||||
rsa_item_sign},
|
||||
rsa_item_sign,
|
||||
rsa_sig_info_set,
|
||||
rsa_pkey_check
|
||||
},
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA2,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA,
|
||||
ASN1_PKEY_ALIAS}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD rsa_pss_asn1_meth = {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
||||
ASN1_PKEY_SIGPARAM_NULL,
|
||||
|
||||
"RSA-PSS",
|
||||
"OpenSSL RSA-PSS method",
|
||||
|
||||
rsa_pub_decode,
|
||||
rsa_pub_encode,
|
||||
rsa_pub_cmp,
|
||||
rsa_pub_print,
|
||||
|
||||
rsa_priv_decode,
|
||||
rsa_priv_encode,
|
||||
rsa_priv_print,
|
||||
|
||||
int_rsa_size,
|
||||
rsa_bits,
|
||||
rsa_security_bits,
|
||||
|
||||
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
|
||||
rsa_sig_print,
|
||||
int_rsa_free,
|
||||
rsa_pkey_ctrl,
|
||||
0, 0,
|
||||
rsa_item_verify,
|
||||
rsa_item_sign,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
rsa_pkey_check
|
||||
};
|
||||
+48
-8
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,11 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/* Override the default free and new methods */
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Override the default free and new methods,
|
||||
* and calculate helper products for multi-prime
|
||||
* RSA keys.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
||||
void *exarg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -27,12 +31,25 @@ static int rsa_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
||||
RSA_free((RSA *)*pval);
|
||||
*pval = NULL;
|
||||
return 2;
|
||||
} else if (operation == ASN1_OP_D2I_POST) {
|
||||
if (((RSA *)*pval)->version != RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
|
||||
/* not a multi-prime key, skip */
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return (rsa_multip_calc_product((RSA *)*pval) == 1) ? 2 : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Based on definitions in RFC 8017 appendix A.1.2 */
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PRIME_INFO) = {
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, r, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, d, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA_PRIME_INFO, t, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, version, LONG),
|
||||
ASN1_EMBED(RSA, version, INT32),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, n, BIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, d, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
@@ -40,7 +57,8 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPrivateKey, rsa_cb) = {
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, q, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmp1, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, dmq1, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM)
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, iqmp, CBIGNUM),
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE_OF_OPT(RSA, prime_infos, RSA_PRIME_INFO)
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPrivateKey)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -49,20 +67,42 @@ ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSAPublicKey, rsa_cb) = {
|
||||
ASN1_SIMPLE(RSA, e, BIGNUM),
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA, RSAPublicKey)
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_PSS_PARAMS) = {
|
||||
/* Free up maskHash */
|
||||
static int rsa_pss_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
||||
void *exarg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss = (RSA_PSS_PARAMS *)*pval;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(pss->maskHash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, rsa_pss_cb) = {
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, hashAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,0),
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, maskGenAlgorithm, X509_ALGOR,1),
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, saltLength, ASN1_INTEGER,2),
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, trailerField, ASN1_INTEGER,3)
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA_PSS_PARAMS, RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
|
||||
|
||||
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_PSS_PARAMS)
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS) = {
|
||||
/* Free up maskHash */
|
||||
static int rsa_oaep_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
|
||||
void *exarg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (operation == ASN1_OP_FREE_PRE) {
|
||||
RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *oaep = (RSA_OAEP_PARAMS *)*pval;
|
||||
X509_ALGOR_free(oaep->maskHash);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ASN1_SEQUENCE_cb(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, rsa_oaep_cb) = {
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, hashFunc, X509_ALGOR, 0),
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, maskGenFunc, X509_ALGOR, 1),
|
||||
ASN1_EXP_OPT(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, pSourceFunc, X509_ALGOR, 2),
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
|
||||
} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END_cb(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS, RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
|
||||
|
||||
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(RSA_OAEP_PARAMS)
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+78
-6
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *i, *j, *k, *l, *m;
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx;
|
||||
int ret = 1;
|
||||
int ret = 1, ex_primes = 0, idx;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
if (key->p == NULL || key->q == NULL || key->n == NULL
|
||||
|| key->e == NULL || key->d == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -28,6 +29,16 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* multi-prime? */
|
||||
if (key->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
|
||||
ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(key->prime_infos);
|
||||
if (ex_primes <= 0
|
||||
|| (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(BN_num_bits(key->n))) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
i = BN_new();
|
||||
j = BN_new();
|
||||
k = BN_new();
|
||||
@@ -62,17 +73,37 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* n = p*q? */
|
||||
/* r_i prime? */
|
||||
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
|
||||
if (BN_is_prime_ex(pinfo->r, BN_prime_checks, NULL, cb) != 1) {
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* n = p*q * r_3...r_i? */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(i, key->p, key->q, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(i, i, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(i, key->n) != 0) {
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
|
||||
if (ex_primes)
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX,
|
||||
RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES);
|
||||
else
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* d*e = 1 mod lcm(p-1,q-1)? */
|
||||
/* d*e = 1 mod \lambda(n)? */
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(i, key->p, BN_value_one())) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -82,7 +113,7 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* now compute k = lcm(i,j) */
|
||||
/* now compute k = \lambda(n) = LCM(i, j, r_3 - 1...) */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(l, i, j, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -91,6 +122,21 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(k, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(l, l, k, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_gcd(m, m, k, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_div(k, NULL, l, m, ctx)) { /* remainder is 0 */
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -145,6 +191,32 @@ int RSA_check_key_ex(const RSA *key, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (idx = 0; idx < ex_primes; idx++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(key->prime_infos, idx);
|
||||
/* d_i = d mod (r_i - 1)? */
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(i, pinfo->r, BN_value_one())) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(j, key->d, i, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(j, pinfo->d) != 0) {
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* t_i = R_i ^ -1 mod r_i ? */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(i, pinfo->pp, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
|
||||
ret = -1;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(i, pinfo->t) != 0) {
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(i);
|
||||
BN_free(j);
|
||||
|
||||
+12
-21
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -10,48 +10,47 @@
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/bn_int.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/rand.h>
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_bits(const RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (BN_num_bits(r->n));
|
||||
return BN_num_bits(r->n);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_size(const RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (BN_num_bytes(r->n));
|
||||
return BN_num_bytes(r->n);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
||||
RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_pub_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_priv_enc(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_priv_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from, unsigned char *to,
|
||||
RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding));
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_pub_dec(flen, from, to, rsa, padding);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_flags(const RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return ((r == NULL) ? 0 : r->meth->flags);
|
||||
return r == NULL ? 0 : r->meth->flags;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RSA_blinding_off(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +76,7 @@ int RSA_blinding_on(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
rsa->flags &= ~RSA_FLAG_NO_BLINDING;
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static BIGNUM *rsa_get_public_exp(const BIGNUM *d, const BIGNUM *p,
|
||||
@@ -117,8 +116,9 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
|
||||
if (in_ctx == NULL) {
|
||||
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ctx = in_ctx;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
e = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
@@ -133,17 +133,8 @@ BN_BLINDING *RSA_setup_blinding(RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *in_ctx)
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
e = rsa->e;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((RAND_status() == 0) && rsa->d != NULL
|
||||
&& bn_get_words(rsa->d) != NULL) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if PRNG is not properly seeded, resort to secret exponent as
|
||||
* unpredictable seed
|
||||
*/
|
||||
RAND_add(bn_get_words(rsa->d), bn_get_dmax(rsa->d) * sizeof(BN_ULONG),
|
||||
0.0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
|
||||
+203
-145
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -8,165 +8,224 @@
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/err.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/rsaerr.h>
|
||||
|
||||
/* BEGIN ERROR CODES */
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
|
||||
|
||||
# define ERR_FUNC(func) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,func,0)
|
||||
# define ERR_REASON(reason) ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA,0,reason)
|
||||
|
||||
static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = {
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD), "check_padding_md"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1), "encode_pkcs1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY), "int_rsa_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE), "old_rsa_priv_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL), "pkey_rsa_ctrl"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR), "pkey_rsa_ctrl_str"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN), "pkey_rsa_sign"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY), "pkey_rsa_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER), "pkey_rsa_verifyrecover"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD), "rsa_algor_to_md"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN), "rsa_builtin_keygen"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY), "RSA_check_key"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX), "RSA_check_key_ex"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT), "rsa_cms_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY), "rsa_item_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP), "RSA_meth_dup"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW), "RSA_meth_new"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME), "RSA_meth_set1_name"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD), "rsa_mgf1_to_md"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD), "RSA_new_method"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL), "RSA_NULL"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_private_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_private_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "RSA_null_public_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "RSA_null_public_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT), "rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE), "RSA_padding_add_none"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP),
|
||||
static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_functs[] = {
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_CHECK_PADDING_MD, 0), "check_padding_md"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_ENCODE_PKCS1, 0), "encode_pkcs1"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_INT_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "int_rsa_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_OLD_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0),
|
||||
"old_rsa_priv_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_PSS_INIT, 0), "pkey_pss_init"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, 0), "pkey_rsa_ctrl"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_rsa_ctrl_str"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_SIGN, 0), "pkey_rsa_sign"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "pkey_rsa_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_VERIFYRECOVER, 0),
|
||||
"pkey_rsa_verifyrecover"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_ALGOR_TO_MD, 0), "rsa_algor_to_md"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, 0), "rsa_builtin_keygen"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY, 0), "RSA_check_key"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CHECK_KEY_EX, 0), "RSA_check_key_ex"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CMS_DECRYPT, 0), "rsa_cms_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_CMS_VERIFY, 0), "rsa_cms_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_ITEM_VERIFY, 0), "rsa_item_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_DUP, 0), "RSA_meth_dup"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_NEW, 0), "RSA_meth_new"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_METH_SET1_NAME, 0), "RSA_meth_set1_name"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_MGF1_TO_MD, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NEW_METHOD, 0), "RSA_new_method"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, 0), ""},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, 0),
|
||||
"rsa_ossl_private_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, 0),
|
||||
"rsa_ossl_private_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, 0),
|
||||
"rsa_ossl_public_decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, 0),
|
||||
"rsa_ossl_public_encrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_none"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS), "RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931), "RSA_padding_add_X931"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE), "RSA_padding_check_none"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_SSLv23"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_X931, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_add_X931"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_none"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23), "RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931), "RSA_padding_check_X931"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT), "RSA_print"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP), "RSA_print_fp"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE), "rsa_priv_encode"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX), "rsa_pss_to_ctx"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE), "rsa_pub_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN), "RSA_sign"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_SSLv23"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_padding_check_X931"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PARAM_DECODE, 0), "rsa_param_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRINT, 0), "RSA_print"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, 0), "RSA_print_fp"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_DECODE, 0), "rsa_priv_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PRIV_ENCODE, 0), "rsa_priv_encode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PSS_GET_PARAM, 0), "rsa_pss_get_param"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PSS_TO_CTX, 0), "rsa_pss_to_ctx"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_PUB_DECODE, 0), "rsa_pub_decode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SETUP_BLINDING, 0), "RSA_setup_blinding"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SIGN, 0), "RSA_sign"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY), "RSA_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY, 0), "RSA_verify"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING"},
|
||||
{ERR_FUNC(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1), "RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, 0),
|
||||
"RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1"},
|
||||
{0, NULL}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT), "bad fixed header decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01), "block type is not 01"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02), "block type is not 02"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
|
||||
"data greater than mod len"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
|
||||
"data too large for key size"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),
|
||||
"data too large for modulus"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
|
||||
"data too small for key size"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH), "digest does not match"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),
|
||||
"digest too big for rsa key"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmp1 not congruent to d"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D), "dmq1 not congruent to d"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1), "d e not congruent to 1"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID), "first octet invalid"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
|
||||
"illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH), "invalid digest length"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH), "invalid message length"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS), "invalid oaep parameters"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE), "invalid padding mode"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS), "invalid pss parameters"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN), "invalid pss saltlen"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH), "invalid salt length"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST), "invalid x931 digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q), "iqmp not inverse of q"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
|
||||
"null before block missing"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q), "n does not equal p q"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR), "oaep decoding error"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
|
||||
"operation not supported for this keytype"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED), "padding check failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR), "pkcs decoding error"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
||||
"rsa operations not supported"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED), "salt length check failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED), "salt length recovery failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK), "sslv3 rollback attack"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
|
||||
"the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE), "unknown algorithm type"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST), "unknown mask digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE), "unknown padding type"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE),
|
||||
"unsupported encryption type"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE), "unsupported label source"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),
|
||||
"unsupported mask algorithm"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),
|
||||
"unsupported mask parameter"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
|
||||
"unsupported signature type"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
|
||||
{ERR_REASON(RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH), "wrong signature length"},
|
||||
static const ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_ALGORITHM_MISMATCH), "algorithm mismatch"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_E_VALUE), "bad e value"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT),
|
||||
"bad fixed header decrypt"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT), "bad pad byte count"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE), "bad signature"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01),
|
||||
"block type is not 01"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02),
|
||||
"block type is not 02"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_GREATER_THAN_MOD_LEN),
|
||||
"data greater than mod len"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE), "data too large"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
|
||||
"data too large for key size"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_MODULUS),
|
||||
"data too large for modulus"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL), "data too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE),
|
||||
"data too small for key size"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_DOES_NOT_MATCH),
|
||||
"digest does not match"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED), "digest not allowed"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY),
|
||||
"digest too big for rsa key"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DMP1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
|
||||
"dmp1 not congruent to d"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_DMQ1_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
|
||||
"dmq1 not congruent to d"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_D_E_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_1),
|
||||
"d e not congruent to 1"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_FIRST_OCTET_INVALID),
|
||||
"first octet invalid"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_ILLEGAL_OR_UNSUPPORTED_PADDING_MODE),
|
||||
"illegal or unsupported padding mode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST_LENGTH),
|
||||
"invalid digest length"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_HEADER), "invalid header"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_LABEL), "invalid label"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MESSAGE_LENGTH),
|
||||
"invalid message length"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MGF1_MD), "invalid mgf1 md"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_MULTI_PRIME_KEY),
|
||||
"invalid multi prime key"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_OAEP_PARAMETERS),
|
||||
"invalid oaep parameters"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING), "invalid padding"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PADDING_MODE),
|
||||
"invalid padding mode"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_PARAMETERS),
|
||||
"invalid pss parameters"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN),
|
||||
"invalid pss saltlen"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH),
|
||||
"invalid salt length"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER), "invalid trailer"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_INVALID_X931_DIGEST),
|
||||
"invalid x931 digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_IQMP_NOT_INVERSE_OF_Q),
|
||||
"iqmp not inverse of q"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID),
|
||||
"key prime num invalid"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL), "key size too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_LAST_OCTET_INVALID), "last octet invalid"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED),
|
||||
"mgf1 digest not allowed"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE), "modulus too large"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_COEFFICIENT_NOT_INVERSE_OF_R),
|
||||
"mp coefficient not inverse of r"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_EXPONENT_NOT_CONGRUENT_TO_D),
|
||||
"mp exponent not congruent to d"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_MP_R_NOT_PRIME), "mp r not prime"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NO_PUBLIC_EXPONENT), "no public exponent"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING),
|
||||
"null before block missing"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_PRODUCT_OF_PRIMES),
|
||||
"n does not equal product of primes"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_N_DOES_NOT_EQUAL_P_Q),
|
||||
"n does not equal p q"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR),
|
||||
"oaep decoding error"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE),
|
||||
"operation not supported for this keytype"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED),
|
||||
"padding check failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR),
|
||||
"pkcs decoding error"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL),
|
||||
"pss saltlen too small"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_P_NOT_PRIME), "p not prime"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_Q_NOT_PRIME), "q not prime"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED),
|
||||
"rsa operations not supported"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED),
|
||||
"salt length check failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED),
|
||||
"salt length recovery failed"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK),
|
||||
"sslv3 rollback attack"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_THE_ASN1_OBJECT_IDENTIFIER_IS_NOT_KNOWN_FOR_THIS_MD),
|
||||
"the asn1 object identifier is not known for this md"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_TYPE),
|
||||
"unknown algorithm type"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_DIGEST), "unknown digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_MASK_DIGEST),
|
||||
"unknown mask digest"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE),
|
||||
"unknown padding type"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_ENCRYPTION_TYPE),
|
||||
"unsupported encryption type"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_LABEL_SOURCE),
|
||||
"unsupported label source"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_ALGORITHM),
|
||||
"unsupported mask algorithm"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_MASK_PARAMETER),
|
||||
"unsupported mask parameter"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_UNSUPPORTED_SIGNATURE_TYPE),
|
||||
"unsupported signature type"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
|
||||
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RSA, 0, RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH),
|
||||
"wrong signature length"},
|
||||
{0, NULL}
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -175,10 +234,9 @@ static ERR_STRING_DATA RSA_str_reasons[] = {
|
||||
int ERR_load_RSA_strings(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
|
||||
|
||||
if (ERR_func_error_string(RSA_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
|
||||
ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_functs);
|
||||
ERR_load_strings(0, RSA_str_reasons);
|
||||
ERR_load_strings_const(RSA_str_functs);
|
||||
ERR_load_strings_const(RSA_str_reasons);
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
+243
-68
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
|
||||
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
BN_GENCB *cb);
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -31,29 +31,60 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int RSA_generate_key_ex(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen)
|
||||
if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL)
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
|
||||
return RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, bits, RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM,
|
||||
e_value, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
int RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
BIGNUM *e_value, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* multi-prime is only supported with the builtin key generation */
|
||||
if (rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen != NULL) {
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen(rsa, bits, primes,
|
||||
e_value, cb);
|
||||
} else if (rsa->meth->rsa_keygen != NULL) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* However, if rsa->meth implements only rsa_keygen, then we
|
||||
* have to honour it in 2-prime case and assume that it wouldn't
|
||||
* know what to do with multi-prime key generated by builtin
|
||||
* subroutine...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (primes == 2)
|
||||
return rsa->meth->rsa_keygen(rsa, bits, e_value, cb);
|
||||
else
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return rsa_builtin_keygen(rsa, bits, primes, e_value, cb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *r3 = NULL, *tmp;
|
||||
int bitsp, bitsq, ok = -1, n = 0;
|
||||
BIGNUM *r0 = NULL, *r1 = NULL, *r2 = NULL, *tmp, *prime;
|
||||
int ok = -1, n = 0, bitsr[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM], bitse = 0;
|
||||
int i = 0, quo = 0, rmd = 0, adj = 0, retries = 0;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo = NULL;
|
||||
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos = NULL;
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
BN_ULONG bitst = 0;
|
||||
unsigned long error = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* When generating ridiculously small keys, we can get stuck
|
||||
* continually regenerating the same prime values.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (bits < 16) {
|
||||
if (bits < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||||
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (primes < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || primes > rsa_multip_cap(bits)) {
|
||||
ok = 0; /* we set our own err */
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_BUILTIN_KEYGEN, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
@@ -61,12 +92,15 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
r0 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
r3 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
if (r3 == NULL)
|
||||
if (r2 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
bitsp = (bits + 1) / 2;
|
||||
bitsq = bits - bitsp;
|
||||
/* divide bits into 'primes' pieces evenly */
|
||||
quo = bits / primes;
|
||||
rmd = bits % primes;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < primes; i++)
|
||||
bitsr[i] = (i < rmd) ? quo + 1 : quo;
|
||||
|
||||
/* We need the RSA components non-NULL */
|
||||
if (!rsa->n && ((rsa->n = BN_new()) == NULL))
|
||||
@@ -86,81 +120,201 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
if (!rsa->iqmp && ((rsa->iqmp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* initialize multi-prime components */
|
||||
if (primes > RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM) {
|
||||
rsa->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
|
||||
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, primes - 2);
|
||||
if (prime_infos == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (rsa->prime_infos != NULL) {
|
||||
/* could this happen? */
|
||||
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(rsa->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
|
||||
}
|
||||
rsa->prime_infos = prime_infos;
|
||||
|
||||
/* prime_info from 2 to |primes| -1 */
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
|
||||
if (pinfo == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_copy(rsa->e, e_value) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
/* generate p and q */
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->p, bitsp, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ERR_set_mark();
|
||||
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
|
||||
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
||||
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
|
||||
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
|
||||
/* GCD != 1 */
|
||||
ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
/* generate p, q and other primes (if any) */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
adj = 0;
|
||||
retries = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (i == 0) {
|
||||
prime = rsa->p;
|
||||
} else if (i == 1) {
|
||||
prime = rsa->q;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
prime = pinfo->r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 0))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
do {
|
||||
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(rsa->q, bitsq, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
|
||||
|
||||
for (;;) {
|
||||
redo:
|
||||
if (!BN_generate_prime_ex(prime, bitsr[i] + adj, 0, NULL, NULL, cb))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* prime should not be equal to p, q, r_3...
|
||||
* (those primes prior to this one)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
{
|
||||
int j;
|
||||
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < i; j++) {
|
||||
BIGNUM *prev_prime;
|
||||
|
||||
if (j == 0)
|
||||
prev_prime = rsa->p;
|
||||
else if (j == 1)
|
||||
prev_prime = rsa->q;
|
||||
else
|
||||
prev_prime = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos,
|
||||
j - 2)->r;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BN_cmp(prime, prev_prime)) {
|
||||
goto redo;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r2, prime, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ERR_set_mark();
|
||||
BN_set_flags(r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
|
||||
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
||||
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
|
||||
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
|
||||
/* GCD != 1 */
|
||||
ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} while (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) == 0);
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
ERR_set_mark();
|
||||
if (BN_mod_inverse(r1, r2, rsa->e, ctx) != NULL) {
|
||||
/* GCD == 1 since inverse exists */
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
error = ERR_peek_last_error();
|
||||
if (ERR_GET_LIB(error) == ERR_LIB_BN
|
||||
&& ERR_GET_REASON(error) == BN_R_NO_INVERSE) {
|
||||
/* GCD != 1 */
|
||||
ERR_pop_to_mark();
|
||||
|
||||
bitse += bitsr[i];
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate n immediately to see if it's sufficient */
|
||||
if (i == 1) {
|
||||
/* we get at least 2 primes */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else if (i != 0) {
|
||||
/* modulus n = p * q * r_3 * r_4 ... */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r1, rsa->n, prime, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* i == 0, do nothing */
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* if |r1|, product of factors so far, is not as long as expected
|
||||
* (by checking the first 4 bits are less than 0x9 or greater than
|
||||
* 0xF). If so, re-generate the last prime.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* NOTE: This actually can't happen in two-prime case, because of
|
||||
* the way factors are generated.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Besides, another consideration is, for multi-prime case, even the
|
||||
* length modulus is as long as expected, the modulus could start at
|
||||
* 0x8, which could be utilized to distinguish a multi-prime private
|
||||
* key by using the modulus in a certificate. This is also covered
|
||||
* by checking the length should not be less than 0x9.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (!BN_rshift(r2, r1, bitse - 4))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
bitst = BN_get_word(r2);
|
||||
|
||||
if (bitst < 0x9 || bitst > 0xF) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* For keys with more than 4 primes, we attempt longer factor to
|
||||
* meet length requirement.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Otherwise, we just re-generate the prime with the same length.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* This strategy has the following goals:
|
||||
*
|
||||
* 1. 1024-bit factors are effcient when using 3072 and 4096-bit key
|
||||
* 2. stay the same logic with normal 2-prime key
|
||||
*/
|
||||
bitse -= bitsr[i];
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 2, n++))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (primes > 4) {
|
||||
if (bitst < 0x9)
|
||||
adj++;
|
||||
else
|
||||
adj--;
|
||||
} else if (retries == 4) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* re-generate all primes from scratch, mainly used
|
||||
* in 4 prime case to avoid long loop. Max retry times
|
||||
* is set to 4.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
i = -1;
|
||||
bitse = 0;
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
retries++;
|
||||
goto redo;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* save product of primes for further use, for multi-prime only */
|
||||
if (i > 1 && BN_copy(pinfo->pp, rsa->n) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (BN_copy(rsa->n, r1) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, i))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_GENCB_call(cb, 3, 1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_cmp(rsa->p, rsa->q) < 0) {
|
||||
tmp = rsa->p;
|
||||
rsa->p = rsa->q;
|
||||
rsa->q = tmp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate n */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(rsa->n, rsa->p, rsa->q, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate d */
|
||||
|
||||
/* p - 1 */
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r1, rsa->p, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err; /* p-1 */
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* q - 1 */
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r2, rsa->q, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err; /* q-1 */
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* (p - 1)(q - 1) */
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r0, r1, r2, ctx))
|
||||
goto err; /* (p-1)(q-1) */
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* multi-prime */
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
/* save r_i - 1 to pinfo->d temporarily */
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(pinfo->d, pinfo->r, BN_value_one()))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r0, r0, pinfo->d, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *pr0 = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (pr0 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_with_flags(pr0, r0, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(rsa->d, rsa->e, pr0, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr0);
|
||||
@@ -175,15 +329,26 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
|
||||
if (d == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_with_flags(d, rsa->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
if ( /* calculate d mod (p-1) */
|
||||
!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
|
||||
/* calculate d mod (q-1) */
|
||||
/* calculate d mod (p-1) and d mod (q - 1) */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(rsa->dmp1, d, r1, ctx)
|
||||
|| !BN_mod(rsa->dmq1, d, r2, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate CRT exponents */
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
/* pinfo->d == r_i - 1 */
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(pinfo->d, d, pinfo->d, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We MUST free d before any further use of rsa->d */
|
||||
BN_free(d);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -200,6 +365,17 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate CRT coefficient for other primes */
|
||||
for (i = 2; i < primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(prime_infos, i - 2);
|
||||
BN_with_flags(p, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_mod_inverse(pinfo->t, pinfo->pp, p, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* We MUST free p before any further use of rsa->p */
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -213,6 +389,5 @@ static int rsa_builtin_keygen(RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e_value,
|
||||
if (ctx != NULL)
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
return ok;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+160
-9
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -10,9 +10,11 @@
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/lhash.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/refcount.h"
|
||||
#include "internal/bn_int.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/engine.h>
|
||||
#include <openssl/evp.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
RSA *RSA_new(void)
|
||||
@@ -71,8 +73,9 @@ RSA *RSA_new_method(ENGINE *engine)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret->engine = engine;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret->engine = ENGINE_get_default_RSA();
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret->engine) {
|
||||
ret->meth = ENGINE_get_RSA(ret->engine);
|
||||
if (ret->meth == NULL) {
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +109,7 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
|
||||
if (r == NULL)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
|
||||
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, -1, &i, r->lock);
|
||||
CRYPTO_DOWN_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock);
|
||||
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
|
||||
if (i > 0)
|
||||
return;
|
||||
@@ -130,6 +133,8 @@ void RSA_free(RSA *r)
|
||||
BN_clear_free(r->dmp1);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(r->dmq1);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(r->iqmp);
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS_free(r->pss);
|
||||
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(r->prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free);
|
||||
BN_BLINDING_free(r->blinding);
|
||||
BN_BLINDING_free(r->mt_blinding);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(r->bignum_data);
|
||||
@@ -140,27 +145,36 @@ int RSA_up_ref(RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (CRYPTO_atomic_add(&r->references, 1, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
|
||||
if (CRYPTO_UP_REF(&r->references, &i, r->lock) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
REF_PRINT_COUNT("RSA", r);
|
||||
REF_ASSERT_ISNT(i < 2);
|
||||
return ((i > 1) ? 1 : 0);
|
||||
return i > 1 ? 1 : 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_set_ex_data(RSA *r, int idx, void *arg)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg));
|
||||
return CRYPTO_set_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx, arg);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void *RSA_get_ex_data(const RSA *r, int idx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx));
|
||||
return CRYPTO_get_ex_data(&r->ex_data, idx);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_security_bits(const RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return BN_security_bits(BN_num_bits(rsa->n), -1);
|
||||
int bits = BN_num_bits(rsa->n);
|
||||
|
||||
if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) {
|
||||
/* This ought to mean that we have private key at hand. */
|
||||
int ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos);
|
||||
|
||||
if (ex_primes <= 0 || (ex_primes + 2) > rsa_multip_cap(bits))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return BN_security_bits(bits, -1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
|
||||
@@ -236,6 +250,71 @@ int RSA_set0_crt_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *dmp1, BIGNUM *dmq1, BIGNUM *iqmp)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Is it better to export RSA_PRIME_INFO structure
|
||||
* and related functions to let user pass a triplet?
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int RSA_set0_multi_prime_params(RSA *r, BIGNUM *primes[], BIGNUM *exps[],
|
||||
BIGNUM *coeffs[], int pnum)
|
||||
{
|
||||
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos, *old = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
if (primes == NULL || exps == NULL || coeffs == NULL || pnum == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
prime_infos = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_new_reserve(NULL, pnum);
|
||||
if (prime_infos == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
if (r->prime_infos != NULL)
|
||||
old = r->prime_infos;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = rsa_multip_info_new();
|
||||
if (pinfo == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if (primes[i] != NULL && exps[i] != NULL && coeffs[i] != NULL) {
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->r);
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->d);
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->t);
|
||||
pinfo->r = primes[i];
|
||||
pinfo->d = exps[i];
|
||||
pinfo->t = coeffs[i];
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
rsa_multip_info_free(pinfo);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
(void)sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_push(prime_infos, pinfo);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
r->prime_infos = prime_infos;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!rsa_multip_calc_product(r)) {
|
||||
r->prime_infos = old;
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (old != NULL) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is hard to deal with, since the old infos could
|
||||
* also be set by this function and r, d, t should not
|
||||
* be freed in that case. So currently, stay consistent
|
||||
* with other *set0* functions: just free it...
|
||||
*/
|
||||
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(old, rsa_multip_info_free);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
r->version = RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI;
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
/* r, d, t should not be freed */
|
||||
sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_pop_free(prime_infos, rsa_multip_info_free_ex);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RSA_get0_key(const RSA *r,
|
||||
const BIGNUM **n, const BIGNUM **e, const BIGNUM **d)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -255,6 +334,36 @@ void RSA_get0_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM **p, const BIGNUM **q)
|
||||
*q = r->q;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(const RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int pnum;
|
||||
|
||||
pnum = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(r->prime_infos);
|
||||
if (pnum <= 0)
|
||||
pnum = 0;
|
||||
return pnum;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_factors(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *primes[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
int pnum, i;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* return other primes
|
||||
* it's caller's responsibility to allocate oth_primes[pnum]
|
||||
*/
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
primes[i] = pinfo->r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
|
||||
const BIGNUM **dmp1, const BIGNUM **dmq1,
|
||||
const BIGNUM **iqmp)
|
||||
@@ -267,6 +376,32 @@ void RSA_get0_crt_params(const RSA *r,
|
||||
*iqmp = r->iqmp;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_get0_multi_prime_crt_params(const RSA *r, const BIGNUM *exps[],
|
||||
const BIGNUM *coeffs[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
int pnum;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((pnum = RSA_get_multi_prime_extra_count(r)) == 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* return other primes */
|
||||
if (exps != NULL || coeffs != NULL) {
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
|
||||
/* it's the user's job to guarantee the buffer length */
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < pnum; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(r->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
if (exps != NULL)
|
||||
exps[i] = pinfo->d;
|
||||
if (coeffs != NULL)
|
||||
coeffs[i] = pinfo->t;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void RSA_clear_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
|
||||
{
|
||||
r->flags &= ~flags;
|
||||
@@ -282,7 +417,23 @@ void RSA_set_flags(RSA *r, int flags)
|
||||
r->flags |= flags;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_get_version(RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* { two-prime(0), multi(1) } */
|
||||
return r->version;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
ENGINE *RSA_get0_engine(const RSA *r)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return r->engine;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_pkey_ctx_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int optype, int cmd, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* If key type not RSA or RSA-PSS return error */
|
||||
if (ctx != NULL && ctx->pmeth != NULL
|
||||
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA
|
||||
&& ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, -1, optype, cmd, p1, p2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
+40
-4
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -8,14 +8,30 @@
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/refcount.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#define RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM 5
|
||||
#define RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS 512
|
||||
|
||||
typedef struct rsa_prime_info_st {
|
||||
BIGNUM *r;
|
||||
BIGNUM *d;
|
||||
BIGNUM *t;
|
||||
/* save product of primes prior to this one */
|
||||
BIGNUM *pp;
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX *m;
|
||||
} RSA_PRIME_INFO;
|
||||
|
||||
DECLARE_ASN1_ITEM(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
|
||||
DEFINE_STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO)
|
||||
|
||||
struct rsa_st {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* The first parameter is used to pickup errors where this is passed
|
||||
* instead of aEVP_PKEY, it is set to 0
|
||||
* instead of an EVP_PKEY, it is set to 0
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int pad;
|
||||
long version;
|
||||
int32_t version;
|
||||
const RSA_METHOD *meth;
|
||||
/* functional reference if 'meth' is ENGINE-provided */
|
||||
ENGINE *engine;
|
||||
@@ -27,9 +43,13 @@ struct rsa_st {
|
||||
BIGNUM *dmp1;
|
||||
BIGNUM *dmq1;
|
||||
BIGNUM *iqmp;
|
||||
/* for multi-prime RSA, defined in RFC 8017 */
|
||||
STACK_OF(RSA_PRIME_INFO) *prime_infos;
|
||||
/* If a PSS only key this contains the parameter restrictions */
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss;
|
||||
/* be careful using this if the RSA structure is shared */
|
||||
CRYPTO_EX_DATA ex_data;
|
||||
int references;
|
||||
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT references;
|
||||
int flags;
|
||||
/* Used to cache montgomery values */
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX *_method_mod_n;
|
||||
@@ -88,9 +108,25 @@ struct rsa_meth_st {
|
||||
* things as "builtin software" implementations.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
int (*rsa_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
|
||||
int (*rsa_multi_prime_keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes,
|
||||
BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb);
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
extern int int_rsa_verify(int dtype, const unsigned char *m,
|
||||
unsigned int m_len, unsigned char *rm,
|
||||
size_t *prm_len, const unsigned char *sigbuf,
|
||||
size_t siglen, RSA *rsa);
|
||||
/* Macros to test if a pkey or ctx is for a PSS key */
|
||||
#define pkey_is_pss(pkey) (pkey->ameth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
#define pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx) (ctx->pmeth->pkey_id == EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS)
|
||||
|
||||
RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_pss_params_create(const EVP_MD *sigmd,
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md, int saltlen);
|
||||
int rsa_pss_get_param(const RSA_PSS_PARAMS *pss, const EVP_MD **pmd,
|
||||
const EVP_MD **pmgf1md, int *psaltlen);
|
||||
/* internal function to clear and free multi-prime parameters */
|
||||
void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
|
||||
void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo);
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void);
|
||||
int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa);
|
||||
int rsa_multip_cap(int bits);
|
||||
@@ -271,3 +271,17 @@ int RSA_meth_set_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int (*RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
|
||||
(RSA *rsa, int bits, int primes, BIGNUM *e, BN_GENCB *cb)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen(RSA_METHOD *meth,
|
||||
int (*keygen) (RSA *rsa, int bits,
|
||||
int primes, BIGNUM *e,
|
||||
BN_GENCB *cb))
|
||||
{
|
||||
meth->rsa_multi_prime_keygen = keygen;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
void rsa_multip_info_free_ex(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* free pp and pinfo only */
|
||||
BN_clear_free(pinfo->pp);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void rsa_multip_info_free(RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo)
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* free a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
|
||||
BN_clear_free(pinfo->r);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(pinfo->d);
|
||||
BN_clear_free(pinfo->t);
|
||||
rsa_multip_info_free_ex(pinfo);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *rsa_multip_info_new(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
/* create a RSA_PRIME_INFO structure */
|
||||
pinfo = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(RSA_PRIME_INFO));
|
||||
if (pinfo == NULL)
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
if ((pinfo->r = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if ((pinfo->d = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if ((pinfo->t = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
if ((pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
return pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->r);
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->d);
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->t);
|
||||
BN_free(pinfo->pp);
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(pinfo);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Refill products of primes */
|
||||
int rsa_multip_calc_product(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
BIGNUM *p1 = NULL, *p2 = NULL;
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
|
||||
int i, rv = 0, ex_primes;
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0) {
|
||||
/* invalid */
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* calculate pinfo->pp = p * q for first 'extra' prime */
|
||||
p1 = rsa->p;
|
||||
p2 = rsa->q;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
if (pinfo->pp == NULL) {
|
||||
pinfo->pp = BN_secure_new();
|
||||
if (pinfo->pp == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(pinfo->pp, p1, p2, ctx))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/* save previous one */
|
||||
p1 = pinfo->pp;
|
||||
p2 = pinfo->r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int rsa_multip_cap(int bits)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int cap = 5;
|
||||
|
||||
if (bits < 1024)
|
||||
cap = 2;
|
||||
else if (bits < 4096)
|
||||
cap = 3;
|
||||
else if (bits < 8192)
|
||||
cap = 4;
|
||||
|
||||
if (cap > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM)
|
||||
cap = RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM;
|
||||
|
||||
return cap;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -16,16 +16,16 @@ int RSA_padding_add_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (flen > tlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (flen < tlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(to, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
@@ -34,10 +34,10 @@ int RSA_padding_check_none(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
|
||||
if (flen > tlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_NONE, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
memset(to, 0, tlen - flen);
|
||||
memcpy(to + tlen - flen, from, flen);
|
||||
return (tlen);
|
||||
return tlen;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,93 +0,0 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1999-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||||
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
|
||||
#include <openssl/bn.h>
|
||||
#include "rsa_locl.h"
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* This is a dummy RSA implementation that just returns errors when called.
|
||||
* It is designed to allow some RSA functions to work while stopping those
|
||||
* covered by the RSA patent. That is RSA, encryption, decryption, signing
|
||||
* and verify is not allowed but RSA key generation, key checking and other
|
||||
* operations (like storing RSA keys) are permitted.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
||||
static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
||||
static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
||||
static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
|
||||
static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa);
|
||||
static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa);
|
||||
static RSA_METHOD rsa_null_meth = {
|
||||
"Null RSA",
|
||||
RSA_null_public_encrypt,
|
||||
RSA_null_public_decrypt,
|
||||
RSA_null_private_encrypt,
|
||||
RSA_null_private_decrypt,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
RSA_null_init,
|
||||
RSA_null_finish,
|
||||
0,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
NULL
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (&rsa_null_meth);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT,
|
||||
RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT,
|
||||
RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_NULL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, RSA_R_RSA_OPERATIONS_NOT_SUPPORTED);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_init(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int RSA_null_finish(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -78,11 +78,6 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
memcpy(db + emlen - flen - mdlen, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(seed, mdlen) <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
#ifdef PKCS_TESTVECT
|
||||
memcpy(seed,
|
||||
"\xaa\xfd\x12\xf6\x59\xca\xe6\x34\x89\xb4\x79\xe5\x07\x6d\xde\xc2\xf0\x6c\xb5\x8f",
|
||||
20);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
dbmask = OPENSSL_malloc(emlen - mdlen);
|
||||
if (dbmask == NULL) {
|
||||
|
||||
+156
-18
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ static RSA_METHOD rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth = {
|
||||
NULL,
|
||||
0, /* rsa_sign */
|
||||
0, /* rsa_verify */
|
||||
NULL /* rsa_keygen */
|
||||
NULL, /* rsa_keygen */
|
||||
NULL /* rsa_multi_prime_keygen */
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
static const RSA_METHOD *default_RSA_meth = &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
|
||||
@@ -58,6 +59,11 @@ const RSA_METHOD *RSA_PKCS1_OpenSSL(void)
|
||||
return &rsa_pkcs1_ossl_meth;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const RSA_METHOD *RSA_null_method(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +97,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
|
||||
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
|
||||
if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -150,7 +156,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
|
||||
return (r);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
@@ -195,12 +201,12 @@ static BN_BLINDING *rsa_get_blinding(RSA *rsa, int *local, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
static int rsa_blinding_convert(BN_BLINDING *b, BIGNUM *f, BIGNUM *unblind,
|
||||
BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (unblind == NULL)
|
||||
if (unblind == NULL) {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Local blinding: store the unblinding factor in BN_BLINDING.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
return BN_BLINDING_convert_ex(f, NULL, b, ctx);
|
||||
else {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Shared blinding: store the unblinding factor outside BN_BLINDING.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
@@ -252,7 +258,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
|
||||
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
|
||||
if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -303,6 +309,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
|
||||
(rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
|
||||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
|
||||
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
|
||||
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
|
||||
@@ -342,8 +349,9 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
res = f;
|
||||
else
|
||||
res = ret;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
res = ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* put in leading 0 bytes if the number is less than the length of the
|
||||
@@ -360,7 +368,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
|
||||
return (r);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
@@ -387,7 +395,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
|
||||
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
|
||||
if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -431,6 +439,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
|
||||
/* do the decrypt */
|
||||
if ((rsa->flags & RSA_FLAG_EXT_PKEY) ||
|
||||
(rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI) ||
|
||||
((rsa->p != NULL) &&
|
||||
(rsa->q != NULL) &&
|
||||
(rsa->dmp1 != NULL) && (rsa->dmq1 != NULL) && (rsa->iqmp != NULL))) {
|
||||
@@ -491,7 +500,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
|
||||
return (r);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* signature verification */
|
||||
@@ -529,7 +538,7 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
ret = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
num = BN_num_bytes(rsa->n);
|
||||
buf = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
|
||||
if (f == NULL || ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
if (ret == NULL || buf == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PUBLIC_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -590,22 +599,29 @@ static int rsa_ossl_public_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(buf, num);
|
||||
return (r);
|
||||
return r;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy;
|
||||
int ret = 0;
|
||||
BIGNUM *r1, *m1, *vrfy, *r2, *m[RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2];
|
||||
int ret = 0, i, ex_primes = 0;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
|
||||
|
||||
r1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
r2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
m1 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
vrfy = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
|
||||
if (vrfy == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rsa->version == RSA_ASN1_VERSION_MULTI
|
||||
&& ((ex_primes = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos)) <= 0
|
||||
|| ex_primes > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM - 2))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
BIGNUM *p = BN_new(), *q = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -630,6 +646,28 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ex_primes > 0) {
|
||||
/* cache BN_MONT_CTX for other primes */
|
||||
BIGNUM *r = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (r == NULL) {
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
BN_with_flags(r, pinfo->r, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&pinfo->m, rsa->lock, r, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(p);
|
||||
BN_free(q);
|
||||
BN_free(r);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
BN_free(r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* We MUST free p and q before any further use of rsa->p and rsa->q
|
||||
@@ -699,6 +737,56 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
BN_free(dmp1);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* calculate m_i in multi-prime case
|
||||
*
|
||||
* TODO:
|
||||
* 1. squash the following two loops and calculate |m_i| there.
|
||||
* 2. remove cc and reuse |c|.
|
||||
* 3. remove |dmq1| and |dmp1| in previous block and use |di|.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* If these things are done, the code will be more readable.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (ex_primes > 0) {
|
||||
BIGNUM *di = BN_new(), *cc = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (cc == NULL || di == NULL) {
|
||||
BN_free(cc);
|
||||
BN_free(di);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
|
||||
/* prepare m_i */
|
||||
if ((m[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL) {
|
||||
BN_free(cc);
|
||||
BN_free(di);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
|
||||
/* prepare c and d_i */
|
||||
BN_with_flags(cc, I, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
BN_with_flags(di, pinfo->d, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(r1, cc, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(cc);
|
||||
BN_free(di);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* compute r1 ^ d_i mod r_i */
|
||||
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(m[i], r1, di, pinfo->r, ctx, pinfo->m)) {
|
||||
BN_free(cc);
|
||||
BN_free(di);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_free(cc);
|
||||
BN_free(di);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r0, r0, m1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
@@ -741,6 +829,49 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
if (!BN_add(r0, r1, m1))
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
/* add m_i to m in multi-prime case */
|
||||
if (ex_primes > 0) {
|
||||
BIGNUM *pr2 = BN_new();
|
||||
|
||||
if (pr2 == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < ex_primes; i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
if (!BN_sub(r1, m[i], r0)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r2, r1, pinfo->t, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
BN_with_flags(pr2, r2, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!BN_mod(r1, pr2, pinfo->r, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (BN_is_negative(r1))
|
||||
if (!BN_add(r1, r1, pinfo->r)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_mul(r1, r1, pinfo->pp, ctx)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (!BN_add(r0, r0, r1)) {
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
BN_free(pr2);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (rsa->e && rsa->n) {
|
||||
if (!rsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(vrfy, r0, rsa->e, rsa->n, ctx,
|
||||
rsa->_method_mod_n))
|
||||
@@ -782,19 +913,26 @@ static int rsa_ossl_mod_exp(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_ossl_init(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
rsa->flags |= RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PUBLIC | RSA_FLAG_CACHE_PRIVATE;
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int rsa_ossl_finish(RSA *rsa)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
RSA_PRIME_INFO *pinfo;
|
||||
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_n);
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_p);
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX_free(rsa->_method_mod_q);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_num(rsa->prime_infos); i++) {
|
||||
pinfo = sk_RSA_PRIME_INFO_value(rsa->prime_infos, i);
|
||||
BN_MONT_CTX_free(pinfo->m);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+13
-13
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if (flen > (tlen - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
|
||||
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = (unsigned char *)to;
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
p += j;
|
||||
*(p++) = '\0';
|
||||
memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 0x01)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
|
||||
RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_01);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
|
||||
RSA_R_BAD_FIXED_HEADER_DECRYPT);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
p++;
|
||||
@@ -95,23 +95,23 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if (i == j) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
|
||||
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (i < 8) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1,
|
||||
RSA_R_BAD_PAD_BYTE_COUNT);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
|
||||
j -= i;
|
||||
if (j > tlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
|
||||
|
||||
return (j);
|
||||
return j;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
|
||||
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = (unsigned char *)to;
|
||||
@@ -135,12 +135,12 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
j = tlen - 3 - flen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
|
||||
if (*p == '\0')
|
||||
do {
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} while (*p == '\0');
|
||||
p++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
*(p++) = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
|
||||
+241
-50
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
/* Key gen parameters */
|
||||
int nbits;
|
||||
BIGNUM *pub_exp;
|
||||
int primes;
|
||||
/* Keygen callback info */
|
||||
int gentmp[2];
|
||||
/* RSA padding mode */
|
||||
@@ -35,6 +36,8 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
||||
/* PSS salt length */
|
||||
int saltlen;
|
||||
/* Minimum salt length or -1 if no PSS parameter restriction */
|
||||
int min_saltlen;
|
||||
/* Temp buffer */
|
||||
unsigned char *tbuf;
|
||||
/* OAEP label */
|
||||
@@ -42,15 +45,24 @@ typedef struct {
|
||||
size_t oaep_labellen;
|
||||
} RSA_PKEY_CTX;
|
||||
|
||||
/* True if PSS parameters are restricted */
|
||||
#define rsa_pss_restricted(rctx) (rctx->min_saltlen != -1)
|
||||
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx;
|
||||
rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*rctx));
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
rctx->nbits = 1024;
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
||||
rctx->saltlen = -2;
|
||||
rctx->primes = RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM;
|
||||
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
||||
else
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
||||
/* Maximum for sign, auto for verify */
|
||||
rctx->saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
||||
rctx->min_saltlen = -1;
|
||||
ctx->data = rctx;
|
||||
ctx->keygen_info = rctx->gentmp;
|
||||
ctx->keygen_info_count = 2;
|
||||
@@ -61,6 +73,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *dctx, *sctx;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pkey_rsa_init(dst))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
sctx = src->data;
|
||||
@@ -86,7 +99,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_copy(EVP_PKEY_CTX *dst, EVP_PKEY_CTX *src)
|
||||
|
||||
static int setup_tbuf(RSA_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTX *pk)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (ctx->tbuf)
|
||||
if (ctx->tbuf != NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
ctx->tbuf = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pk->pkey));
|
||||
if (ctx->tbuf == NULL)
|
||||
@@ -159,11 +172,13 @@ static int pkey_rsa_sign(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sig,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(RSA_size(rsa), rctx->tbuf,
|
||||
sig, rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_encrypt(tbslen, tbs, sig, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
*siglen = ret;
|
||||
@@ -207,11 +222,13 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verifyrecover(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
ret = sltmp;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_decrypt(siglen, sig, rout, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
*routlen = ret;
|
||||
@@ -225,6 +242,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
RSA *rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||||
size_t rslen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->md) {
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_PADDING)
|
||||
return RSA_verify(EVP_MD_type(rctx->md), tbs, tbslen,
|
||||
@@ -250,8 +268,9 @@ static int pkey_rsa_verify(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
if (ret <= 0)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@@ -274,6 +293,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||||
int klen = RSA_size(ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa);
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
@@ -286,9 +306,10 @@ static int pkey_rsa_encrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(klen, rctx->tbuf, out,
|
||||
ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_public_encrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
*outlen = ret;
|
||||
@@ -301,6 +322,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
{
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (!setup_tbuf(rctx, ctx))
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
@@ -313,9 +335,10 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
rctx->oaep_label,
|
||||
rctx->oaep_labellen,
|
||||
rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = RSA_private_decrypt(inlen, in, out, ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa,
|
||||
rctx->pad_mode);
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret < 0)
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
*outlen = ret;
|
||||
@@ -325,6 +348,7 @@ static int pkey_rsa_decrypt(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int mdnid;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!md)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -354,6 +378,10 @@ static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
|
||||
case NID_md4:
|
||||
case NID_mdc2:
|
||||
case NID_ripemd160:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_224:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_256:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_384:
|
||||
case NID_sha3_512:
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@@ -369,6 +397,7 @@ static int check_padding_md(const EVP_MD *md, int padding)
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
|
||||
switch (type) {
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_PADDING:
|
||||
if ((p1 >= RSA_PKCS1_PADDING) && (p1 <= RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING)) {
|
||||
@@ -380,6 +409,8 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
goto bad_pad;
|
||||
if (!rctx->md)
|
||||
rctx->md = EVP_sha1();
|
||||
} else if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
||||
goto bad_pad;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (p1 == RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||||
if (!(ctx->operation & EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT))
|
||||
@@ -405,17 +436,30 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN)
|
||||
if (type == EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_PSS_SALTLEN) {
|
||||
*(int *)p2 = rctx->saltlen;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
if (p1 < -2)
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (p1 < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX)
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||||
if (p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO
|
||||
&& ctx->operation == EVP_PKEY_OP_VERIFY) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_INVALID_PSS_SALTLEN);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((p1 == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST
|
||||
&& rctx->min_saltlen > EVP_MD_size(rctx->md))
|
||||
|| (p1 >= 0 && p1 < rctx->min_saltlen)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_PSS_SALTLEN_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
rctx->saltlen = p1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_BITS:
|
||||
if (p1 < 512) {
|
||||
if (p1 < RSA_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_SIZE_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -431,6 +475,14 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
rctx->pub_exp = p2;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_KEYGEN_PRIMES:
|
||||
if (p1 < RSA_DEFAULT_PRIME_NUM || p1 > RSA_MAX_PRIME_NUM) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_KEY_PRIME_NUM_INVALID);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rctx->primes = p1;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_RSA_OAEP_MD:
|
||||
if (rctx->pad_mode != RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING) {
|
||||
@@ -446,6 +498,12 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD:
|
||||
if (!check_padding_md(p2, rctx->pad_mode))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||||
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rctx->md = p2;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -465,8 +523,15 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->mgf1md;
|
||||
else
|
||||
*(const EVP_MD **)p2 = rctx->md;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
if (rsa_pss_restricted(rctx)) {
|
||||
if (EVP_MD_type(rctx->mgf1md) == EVP_MD_type(p2))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL, RSA_R_MGF1_DIGEST_NOT_ALLOWED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
rctx->mgf1md = p2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_LABEL:
|
||||
@@ -493,16 +558,21 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
return rctx->oaep_labellen;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_DIGESTINIT:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_ENCRYPT:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_DECRYPT:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PKCS7_SIGN:
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_DECRYPT:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_ENCRYPT:
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_CMS_SIGN:
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
/* fall through */
|
||||
case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PEER_KEY:
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL,
|
||||
RSA_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED_FOR_THIS_KEYTYPE);
|
||||
@@ -517,27 +587,28 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
const char *type, const char *value)
|
||||
{
|
||||
if (!value) {
|
||||
if (value == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_VALUE_MISSING);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_padding_mode") == 0) {
|
||||
int pm;
|
||||
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0)
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(value, "pkcs1") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "sslv23") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_SSLV23_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "none") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_NO_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "oeap") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "oaep") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_OAEP_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "x931") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_X931_PADDING;
|
||||
else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0)
|
||||
} else if (strcmp(value, "pss") == 0) {
|
||||
pm = RSA_PKCS1_PSS_PADDING;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -546,18 +617,27 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_saltlen") == 0) {
|
||||
int saltlen;
|
||||
saltlen = atoi(value);
|
||||
|
||||
if (!strcmp(value, "digest"))
|
||||
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(value, "max"))
|
||||
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
|
||||
else if (!strcmp(value, "auto"))
|
||||
saltlen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO;
|
||||
else
|
||||
saltlen = atoi(value);
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_bits") == 0) {
|
||||
int nbits;
|
||||
nbits = atoi(value);
|
||||
int nbits = atoi(value);
|
||||
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_bits(ctx, nbits);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_pubexp") == 0) {
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
BIGNUM *pubexp = NULL;
|
||||
if (!BN_asc2bn(&pubexp, value))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -567,27 +647,43 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0) {
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||||
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_mgf1_md(ctx, md);
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_keygen_primes") == 0) {
|
||||
int nprimes = atoi(value);
|
||||
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_keygen_primes(ctx, nprimes);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0) {
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||||
if ((md = EVP_get_digestbyname(value)) == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_RSA_CTRL_STR, RSA_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_SIG | EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
||||
|
||||
if (pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx)) {
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_mgf1_md") == 0)
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_MGF1_MD, value);
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_md") == 0)
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_KEYGEN,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_MD, value);
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen") == 0) {
|
||||
int saltlen = atoi(value);
|
||||
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_pss_keygen_saltlen(ctx, saltlen);
|
||||
}
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_rsa_oaep_md(ctx, md);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_md") == 0)
|
||||
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_md(ctx, EVP_PKEY_OP_TYPE_CRYPT,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_RSA_OAEP_MD, value);
|
||||
|
||||
if (strcmp(type, "rsa_oaep_label") == 0) {
|
||||
unsigned char *lab;
|
||||
long lablen;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
lab = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(value, &lablen);
|
||||
if (!lab)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
@@ -600,12 +696,30 @@ static int pkey_rsa_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
|
||||
return -2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Set PSS parameters when generating a key, if necessary */
|
||||
static int rsa_set_pss_param(RSA *rsa, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
|
||||
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
/* If all parameters are default values don't set pss */
|
||||
if (rctx->md == NULL && rctx->mgf1md == NULL && rctx->saltlen == -2)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
rsa->pss = rsa_pss_params_create(rctx->md, rctx->mgf1md,
|
||||
rctx->saltlen == -2 ? 0 : rctx->saltlen);
|
||||
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA *rsa = NULL;
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
BN_GENCB *pcb;
|
||||
int ret;
|
||||
|
||||
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL) {
|
||||
rctx->pub_exp = BN_new();
|
||||
if (rctx->pub_exp == NULL || !BN_set_word(rctx->pub_exp, RSA_F4))
|
||||
@@ -621,12 +735,18 @@ static int pkey_rsa_keygen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
evp_pkey_set_cb_translate(pcb, ctx);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
pcb = NULL;
|
||||
ret = RSA_generate_key_ex(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
|
||||
}
|
||||
ret = RSA_generate_multi_prime_key(rsa, rctx->nbits, rctx->primes,
|
||||
rctx->pub_exp, pcb);
|
||||
BN_GENCB_free(pcb);
|
||||
if (ret > 0 && !rsa_set_pss_param(rsa, ctx)) {
|
||||
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (ret > 0)
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_assign_RSA(pkey, rsa);
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_assign(pkey, ctx->pmeth->pkey_id, rsa);
|
||||
else
|
||||
RSA_free(rsa);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
@@ -666,3 +786,74 @@ const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pkey_meth = {
|
||||
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
||||
};
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Called for PSS sign or verify initialisation: checks PSS parameter
|
||||
* sanity and sets any restrictions on key usage.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
static int pkey_pss_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RSA *rsa;
|
||||
RSA_PKEY_CTX *rctx = ctx->data;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *md;
|
||||
const EVP_MD *mgf1md;
|
||||
int min_saltlen, max_saltlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Should never happen */
|
||||
if (!pkey_ctx_is_pss(ctx))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
rsa = ctx->pkey->pkey.rsa;
|
||||
/* If no restrictions just return */
|
||||
if (rsa->pss == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
/* Get and check parameters */
|
||||
if (!rsa_pss_get_param(rsa->pss, &md, &mgf1md, &min_saltlen))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
|
||||
/* See if minimum salt length exceeds maximum possible */
|
||||
max_saltlen = RSA_size(rsa) - EVP_MD_size(md);
|
||||
if ((RSA_bits(rsa) & 0x7) == 1)
|
||||
max_saltlen--;
|
||||
if (min_saltlen > max_saltlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_PKEY_PSS_INIT, RSA_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
rctx->min_saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Set PSS restrictions as defaults: we can then block any attempt to
|
||||
* use invalid values in pkey_rsa_ctrl
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
rctx->md = md;
|
||||
rctx->mgf1md = mgf1md;
|
||||
rctx->saltlen = min_saltlen;
|
||||
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
const EVP_PKEY_METHOD rsa_pss_pkey_meth = {
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_RSA_PSS,
|
||||
EVP_PKEY_FLAG_AUTOARGLEN,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_init,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_copy,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_cleanup,
|
||||
|
||||
0, 0,
|
||||
|
||||
0,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_keygen,
|
||||
|
||||
pkey_pss_init,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_sign,
|
||||
|
||||
pkey_pss_init,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_verify,
|
||||
|
||||
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,
|
||||
|
||||
pkey_rsa_ctrl,
|
||||
pkey_rsa_ctrl_str
|
||||
};
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -20,12 +20,12 @@ int RSA_print_fp(FILE *fp, const RSA *x, int off)
|
||||
|
||||
if ((b = BIO_new(BIO_s_file())) == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PRINT_FP, ERR_R_BUF_LIB);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
BIO_set_fp(b, fp, BIO_NOCLOSE);
|
||||
ret = RSA_print(b, x, off);
|
||||
BIO_free(b);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
+16
-14
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -41,7 +41,6 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
|
||||
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
|
||||
unsigned char H_[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
if (ctx == NULL)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -55,13 +54,12 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
|
||||
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
|
||||
* -1 sLen == hLen
|
||||
* -2 salt length is autorecovered from signature
|
||||
* -3 salt length is maximized
|
||||
* -N reserved
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (sLen == -1)
|
||||
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
|
||||
sLen = hLen;
|
||||
else if (sLen == -2)
|
||||
sLen = -2;
|
||||
else if (sLen < -2) {
|
||||
} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -80,7 +78,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
|
||||
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
|
||||
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
|
||||
} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) { /* sLen can be small negative */
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_RECOVERY_FAILED);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sLen >= 0 && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
|
||||
if (sLen != RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_AUTO && (maskedDBLen - i) != sLen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -123,8 +123,9 @@ int RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, const unsigned char *mHash,
|
||||
if (memcmp(H_, H, hLen)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
ret = 0;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
err:
|
||||
OPENSSL_free(DB);
|
||||
@@ -162,13 +163,14 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
|
||||
* Negative sLen has special meanings:
|
||||
* -1 sLen == hLen
|
||||
* -2 salt length is maximized
|
||||
* -3 same as above (on signing)
|
||||
* -N reserved
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (sLen == -1)
|
||||
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_DIGEST) {
|
||||
sLen = hLen;
|
||||
else if (sLen == -2)
|
||||
sLen = -2;
|
||||
else if (sLen < -2) {
|
||||
} else if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX_SIGN) {
|
||||
sLen = RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX;
|
||||
} else if (sLen < RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1, RSA_R_SLEN_CHECK_FAILED);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -184,7 +186,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(RSA *rsa, unsigned char *EM,
|
||||
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (sLen == -2) {
|
||||
if (sLen == RSA_PSS_SALTLEN_MAX) {
|
||||
sLen = emLen - hLen - 2;
|
||||
} else if (sLen > emLen - hLen - 2) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_PKCS1_PSS_MGF1,
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -32,12 +32,12 @@ int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
|
||||
if (i > (j - RSA_PKCS1_PADDING_SIZE)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
|
||||
RSA_R_DIGEST_TOO_BIG_FOR_RSA_KEY);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)j + 1);
|
||||
if (s == NULL) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_SIGN_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
p = s;
|
||||
i2d_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(&sig, &p);
|
||||
@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@ int RSA_sign_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int type,
|
||||
*siglen = i;
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)j + 1);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
|
||||
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
|
||||
if (siglen != (unsigned int)RSA_size(rsa)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING,
|
||||
RSA_R_WRONG_SIGNATURE_LENGTH);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
s = OPENSSL_malloc((unsigned int)siglen);
|
||||
@@ -85,10 +85,11 @@ int RSA_verify_ASN1_OCTET_STRING(int dtype,
|
||||
if (((unsigned int)sig->length != m_len) ||
|
||||
(memcmp(m, sig->data, m_len) != 0)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_VERIFY_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, RSA_R_BAD_SIGNATURE);
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
ret = 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
err:
|
||||
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(sig);
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(s, (unsigned int)siglen);
|
||||
return (ret);
|
||||
return ret;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+11
-11
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if (flen > (tlen - 11)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_ADD_SSLV23,
|
||||
RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE_FOR_KEY_SIZE);
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p = (unsigned char *)to;
|
||||
@@ -34,12 +34,12 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
j = tlen - 3 - 8 - flen;
|
||||
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(p, j) <= 0)
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < j; i++) {
|
||||
if (*p == '\0')
|
||||
do {
|
||||
if (RAND_bytes(p, 1) <= 0)
|
||||
return (0);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
} while (*p == '\0');
|
||||
p++;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
*(p++) = '\0';
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
@@ -61,11 +61,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
p = from;
|
||||
if (flen < 10) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* scan over padding data */
|
||||
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
|
||||
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
|
||||
if (p[k] != 0x03)
|
||||
@@ -85,16 +85,16 @@ int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (k == -1) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
|
||||
j -= i;
|
||||
if (j > tlen) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
|
||||
return (-1);
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
|
||||
|
||||
return (j);
|
||||
return j;
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 2005-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -34,9 +34,9 @@ int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
p = (unsigned char *)to;
|
||||
|
||||
/* If no padding start and end nibbles are in one byte */
|
||||
if (j == 0)
|
||||
if (j == 0) {
|
||||
*p++ = 0x6A;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
*p++ = 0x6B;
|
||||
if (j > 1) {
|
||||
memset(p, 0xBB, j - 1);
|
||||
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ int RSA_padding_add_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
memcpy(p, from, (unsigned int)flen);
|
||||
p += flen;
|
||||
*p = 0xCC;
|
||||
return (1);
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
@@ -81,8 +81,9 @@ int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
return -1;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
j = flen - 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (p[j] != 0xCC) {
|
||||
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_X931, RSA_R_INVALID_TRAILER);
|
||||
@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_X931(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
|
||||
|
||||
memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
|
||||
|
||||
return (j);
|
||||
return j;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Translate between X931 hash ids and NIDs */
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||||
*
|
||||
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||||
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||||
@@ -44,8 +44,9 @@ int RSA_X931_derive_ex(RSA *rsa, BIGNUM *p1, BIGNUM *p2, BIGNUM *q1,
|
||||
rsa->e = BN_dup(e);
|
||||
if (!rsa->e)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
} else
|
||||
} else {
|
||||
e = rsa->e;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* If not all parameters present only calculate what we can. This allows
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user