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Hakase
2020-03-03 19:16:19 +09:00
parent f85de4da03
commit b412d79e8b
310 changed files with 32765 additions and 19720 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
crypto/ec/build.info
+1 -3
View File
@@ -43,8 +43,6 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
ENDIF
ENDIF
LIBS=../../libcrypto
$COMMON=ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \
ec_curve.c ec_check.c ec_print.c ec_key.c ec_asn1.c \
ec2_smpl.c \
@@ -55,7 +53,7 @@ $COMMON=ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \
curve448/curve448_tables.c curve448/eddsa.c curve448/curve448.c \
$ECASM
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON ec_ameth.c ec_pmeth.c ecx_meth.c ecx_key.c \
ec_err.c ecdh_kdf.c eck_prn.c
ec_err.c ecdh_kdf.c eck_prn.c ec_evp_lib.c
SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON
# Implementations are now spread across several libraries, so the defines
crypto/ec/ec_ameth.c
+174 -3
View File
@@ -22,6 +22,8 @@
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/param_build.h"
#include "ec_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
@@ -29,7 +31,7 @@ static int ecdh_cms_decrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
static int ecdh_cms_encrypt(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri);
#endif
static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, const EC_KEY *ec_key)
{
const EC_GROUP *group;
int nid;
@@ -63,7 +65,7 @@ static int eckey_param2type(int *pptype, void **ppval, EC_KEY *ec_key)
static int eckey_pub_encode(X509_PUBKEY *pk, const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec;
const EC_KEY *ec_key = pkey->pkey.ec;
void *pval = NULL;
int ptype;
unsigned char *penc = NULL, *p;
@@ -574,6 +576,167 @@ static int ec_pkey_param_check(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
return EC_GROUP_check(eckey->group, NULL);
}
static
size_t ec_pkey_dirty_cnt(const EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
return pkey->pkey.ec->dirty_cnt;
}
static ossl_inline
int ecparams_to_params(const EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_PARAM_BLD *tmpl)
{
const EC_GROUP *ecg;
int curve_nid;
if (eckey == NULL)
return 0;
ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey);
if (ecg == NULL)
return 0;
curve_nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(ecg);
if (curve_nid == NID_undef) {
/* explicit parameters */
/*
* TODO(3.0): should we support explicit parameters curves?
*/
return 0;
} else {
/* named curve */
const char *curve_name = NULL;
if ((curve_name = OBJ_nid2sn(curve_nid)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!ossl_param_bld_push_utf8_string(tmpl, OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_EC_NAME, curve_name, 0))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static
int ec_pkey_export_to(const EVP_PKEY *from, void *to_keydata,
EVP_KEYMGMT *to_keymgmt)
{
const EC_KEY *eckey = NULL;
const EC_GROUP *ecg = NULL;
unsigned char *pub_key_buf = NULL;
size_t pub_key_buflen;
OSSL_PARAM_BLD tmpl;
OSSL_PARAM *params = NULL;
const BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
const EC_POINT *pub_point = NULL;
int rv = 0;
if (from == NULL
|| (eckey = from->pkey.ec) == NULL
|| (ecg = EC_KEY_get0_group(eckey)) == NULL)
return 0;
ossl_param_bld_init(&tmpl);
/* export the domain parameters */
if (!ecparams_to_params(eckey, &tmpl))
return 0;
priv_key = EC_KEY_get0_private_key(eckey);
pub_point = EC_KEY_get0_public_key(eckey);
/* public_key must be present, priv_key is optional */
if (pub_point == NULL)
return 0;
/* convert pub_point to a octet string according to the SECG standard */
if ((pub_key_buflen = EC_POINT_point2buf(ecg, pub_point,
POINT_CONVERSION_COMPRESSED,
&pub_key_buf, NULL)) == 0)
return 0;
if (!ossl_param_bld_push_octet_string(&tmpl,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PUB_KEY,
pub_key_buf,
pub_key_buflen))
goto err;
if (priv_key != NULL) {
size_t sz;
int ecbits;
int ecdh_cofactor_mode;
/*
* Key import/export should never leak the bit length of the secret
* scalar in the key.
*
* For this reason, on export we use padded BIGNUMs with fixed length.
*
* When importing we also should make sure that, even if short lived,
* the newly created BIGNUM is marked with the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag as
* soon as possible, so that any processing of this BIGNUM might opt for
* constant time implementations in the backend.
*
* Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
* to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
* enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
* a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
* accesses.
*
* Fixed Length
* ------------
*
* The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
* a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
* generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
* secret scalars.
*
* For padding on export we just use the bit length of the order
* converted to bytes (rounding up).
*
* For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
* required for the internal representation of the order, and we
* preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
* might temporarily overflow the order length.
*/
ecbits = EC_GROUP_order_bits(ecg);
if (ecbits <= 0)
goto err;
sz = (ecbits + 7 ) / 8;
if (!ossl_param_bld_push_BN_pad(&tmpl,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_PRIV_KEY,
priv_key, sz))
goto err;
/*
* The ECDH Cofactor Mode is defined only if the EC_KEY actually
* contains a private key, so we check for the flag and export it only
* in this case.
*/
ecdh_cofactor_mode =
(EC_KEY_get_flags(eckey) & EC_FLAG_COFACTOR_ECDH) ? 1 : 0;
/* Export the ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE parameter */
if (!ossl_param_bld_push_int(&tmpl,
OSSL_PKEY_PARAM_USE_COFACTOR_ECDH,
ecdh_cofactor_mode))
goto err;
}
params = ossl_param_bld_to_param(&tmpl);
/* We export, the provider imports */
rv = evp_keymgmt_import(to_keymgmt, to_keydata, OSSL_KEYMGMT_SELECT_ALL,
params);
err:
ossl_param_bld_free(params);
OPENSSL_free(pub_key_buf);
return rv;
}
const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth = {
EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_EC,
@@ -611,7 +774,15 @@ const EVP_PKEY_ASN1_METHOD eckey_asn1_meth = {
ec_pkey_check,
ec_pkey_public_check,
ec_pkey_param_check
ec_pkey_param_check,
0, /* set_priv_key */
0, /* set_pub_key */
0, /* get_priv_key */
0, /* get_pub_key */
ec_pkey_dirty_cnt,
ec_pkey_export_to
};
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_SM2)
crypto/ec/ec_asn1.c
+5
View File
@@ -1051,6 +1051,7 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECPrivateKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
*a = ret;
EC_PRIVATEKEY_free(priv_key);
*in = p;
ret->dirty_cnt++;
return ret;
err:
@@ -1162,8 +1163,11 @@ EC_KEY *d2i_ECParameters(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
ECerr(EC_F_D2I_ECPARAMETERS, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
if (a == NULL || *a != ret)
EC_KEY_free(ret);
else
ret->dirty_cnt++;
return NULL;
}
ret->dirty_cnt++;
if (a)
*a = ret;
@@ -1183,6 +1187,7 @@ EC_KEY *o2i_ECPublicKey(EC_KEY **a, const unsigned char **in, long len)
return 0;
}
ret = *a;
/* EC_KEY_opt2key updates dirty_cnt */
if (!EC_KEY_oct2key(ret, *in, len, NULL)) {
ECerr(EC_F_O2I_ECPUBLICKEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
return 0;
crypto/ec/ec_evp_lib.c
+422
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,422 @@
/*
* Copyright 2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "crypto/evp.h"
#include "ec_local.h"
/*
* This file is meant to contain functions to provide EVP_PKEY support for EC
* keys.
*/
static ossl_inline
int evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(const EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
if (ctx == NULL || !EVP_PKEY_CTX_IS_DERIVE_OP(ctx)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
/* If key type not EC return error */
if (ctx->pmeth != NULL && ctx->pmeth->pkey_id != EVP_PKEY_EC)
return -1;
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_cofactor_mode(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int cofactor_mode)
{
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/*
* Valid input values are:
* * 0 for disable
* * 1 for enable
* * -1 for reset to default for associated priv key
*/
if (cofactor_mode < -1 || cofactor_mode > 1) {
/* Uses the same return value of pkey_ec_ctrl() */
return -2;
}
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR,
cofactor_mode, NULL);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE,
&cofactor_mode);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_cofactor_mode(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret, mode;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR, -2, NULL);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_int(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_EC_ECDH_COFACTOR_MODE,
&mode);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
} else if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (mode < 0 || mode > 1) {
/*
* The provider should return either 0 or 1, any other value is a
* provider error.
*/
return -1;
}
return mode;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int kdf)
{
int ret;
const char *kdf_type;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
switch (kdf) {
case EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE:
kdf_type = "";
break;
case EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63:
kdf_type = OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF;
break;
default:
return -2;
}
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, kdf, NULL);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE,
/*
* Cast away the const. This is read
* only so should be safe
*/
(char *)kdf_type, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_type(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret;
/* 80 should be big enough */
char kdf_type[80];
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_TYPE, -2, NULL);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_TYPE,
kdf_type, sizeof(kdf_type));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
} else if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (kdf_type[0] == '\0')
return EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_NONE;
else if (strcmp(kdf_type, OSSL_KDF_NAME_X963KDF) == 0)
return EVP_PKEY_ECDH_KDF_X9_63;
return -1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *md)
{
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
const char *md_name = NULL;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)(md));
md_name = (md == NULL) ? "" : EVP_MD_name(md);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST,
/*
* Cast away the const. This is read
* only so should be safe
*/
(char *)md_name, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_md(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD **pmd)
{
/* 80 should be big enough */
char name[80] = "";
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_MD, 0, (void *)(pmd));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_DIGEST,
name, sizeof(name));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
} else if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
/* May be NULL meaning "unknown" */
*pmd = EVP_get_digestbyname(name);
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ecdh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int in)
{
int ret;
size_t len = in;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, in, NULL);
if (in <= 0) {
/*
* This would ideally be -1 or 0, but we have to retain compatibility
* with legacy behaviour of EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl() which returned -2 if
* in <= 0
*/
return -2;
}
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN,
&len);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get_ecdh_kdf_outlen(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int *plen)
{
size_t len = UINT_MAX;
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_OUTLEN, 0,
(void *)(plen));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_OUTLEN,
&len);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
} else if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (len > INT_MAX)
return -1;
*plen = (int)len;
return 1;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_set0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *ukm, int len)
{
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_EC_KDF_UKM, len, (void *)(ukm));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM,
/*
* Cast away the const. This is read
* only so should be safe
*/
(void *)ukm,
(size_t)len);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_set_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
}
if (ret == 1)
OPENSSL_free(ukm);
return ret;
}
int EVP_PKEY_CTX_get0_ecdh_kdf_ukm(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char **pukm)
{
size_t ukmlen;
int ret;
OSSL_PARAM params[3], *p = params;
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_getset_ecdh_param_checks(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
return ret;
/* TODO(3.0): Remove this eventually when no more legacy */
if (ctx->op.kex.exchprovctx == NULL)
return EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_EC,
EVP_PKEY_OP_DERIVE,
EVP_PKEY_CTRL_GET_EC_KDF_UKM, 0,
(void *)(pukm));
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM,
(void **)pukm, 0);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_EXCHANGE_PARAM_KDF_UKM_LEN,
&ukmlen);
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
ret = evp_pkey_ctx_get_params_strict(ctx, params);
if (ret == -2) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_R_COMMAND_NOT_SUPPORTED);
/* Uses the same return values as EVP_PKEY_CTX_ctrl */
return -2;
} else if (ret != 1) {
return -1;
}
if (ukmlen > INT_MAX)
return -1;
return (int)ukmlen;
}
crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+182 -11
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -20,6 +20,11 @@
#include "internal/refcount.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/self_test.h>
#include "crypto/bn.h"
static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
void *cbarg);
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
EC_KEY *EC_KEY_new(void)
@@ -169,6 +174,8 @@ EC_KEY *EC_KEY_copy(EC_KEY *dest, const EC_KEY *src)
if (src->meth->copy != NULL && src->meth->copy(dest, src) == 0)
return NULL;
dest->dirty_cnt++;
return dest;
}
@@ -209,15 +216,28 @@ int EC_KEY_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL)
return eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
if (eckey->meth->keygen != NULL) {
int ret;
ret = eckey->meth->keygen(eckey);
if (ret == 1)
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
return ret;
}
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_GENERATE_KEY, EC_R_OPERATION_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
int ret;
ret = eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
if (ret == 1)
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
return ret;
}
/*
@@ -225,11 +245,14 @@ int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
* See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
*
* Params:
* libctx A context containing an optional self test callback.
* eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
* is stored in this object.
* pairwise_test Set to non zero to perform a pairwise test. If the test
* fails then the keypair is not generated,
* Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
*/
int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
int ec_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, EC_KEY *eckey, int pairwise_test)
{
int ok = 0;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
@@ -287,8 +310,20 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
priv_key = NULL;
pub_key = NULL;
ok = 1;
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
pairwise_test = 1;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
ok = 1;
if (pairwise_test) {
OSSL_CALLBACK *cb = NULL;
void *cbarg = NULL;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_get_callback(libctx, &cb, &cbarg);
ok = ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(eckey, cb, cbarg);
}
err:
/* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
if (!ok) {
@@ -303,14 +338,26 @@ err:
return ok;
}
int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
return ec_generate_key(NULL, eckey, 0);
}
int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ret;
/*
* See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
* pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
*/
return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
ret = EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
if (ret == 1)
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
return ret;
}
int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
@@ -505,6 +552,7 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
goto err;
}
/* EC_KEY_set_public_key updates dirty_cnt */
if (!EC_KEY_set_public_key(key, point))
goto err;
@@ -532,6 +580,7 @@ int EC_KEY_set_group(EC_KEY *key, const EC_GROUP *group)
return 0;
EC_GROUP_free(key->group);
key->group = EC_GROUP_dup(group);
key->dirty_cnt++;
return (key->group == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
}
@@ -542,17 +591,87 @@ const BIGNUM *EC_KEY_get0_private_key(const EC_KEY *key)
int EC_KEY_set_private_key(EC_KEY *key, const BIGNUM *priv_key)
{
int fixed_top;
const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp_key = NULL;
if (key->group == NULL || key->group->meth == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* Not only should key->group be set, but it should also be in a valid
* fully initialized state.
*
* Specifically, to operate in constant time, we need that the group order
* is set, as we use its length as the fixed public size of any scalar used
* as an EC private key.
*/
order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(key->group);
if (order == NULL || BN_is_zero(order))
return 0; /* This should never happen */
if (key->group->meth->set_private != NULL
&& key->group->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
return 0;
if (key->meth->set_private != NULL
&& key->meth->set_private(key, priv_key) == 0)
return 0;
/*
* We should never leak the bit length of the secret scalar in the key,
* so we always set the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag on the internal `BIGNUM`
* holding the secret scalar.
*
* This is important also because `BN_dup()` (and `BN_copy()`) do not
* propagate the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` flag from the source `BIGNUM`, and
* this brings an extra risk of inadvertently losing the flag, even when
* the called specifically set it.
*
* The propagation has been turned on and off a few times in the past
* years because in some conditions has shown unintended consequences in
* some code paths, so at the moment we can't fix this in the BN layer.
*
* In `EC_KEY_set_private_key()` we can work around the propagation by
* manually setting the flag after `BN_dup()` as we know for sure that
* inside the EC module the `BN_FLG_CONSTTIME` is always treated
* correctly and should not generate unintended consequences.
*
* Setting the BN_FLG_CONSTTIME flag alone is never enough, we also have
* to preallocate the BIGNUM internal buffer to a fixed public size big
* enough that operations performed during the processing never trigger
* a realloc which would leak the size of the scalar through memory
* accesses.
*
* Fixed Length
* ------------
*
* The order of the large prime subgroup of the curve is our choice for
* a fixed public size, as that is generally the upper bound for
* generating a private key in EC cryptosystems and should fit all valid
* secret scalars.
*
* For preallocating the BIGNUM storage we look at the number of "words"
* required for the internal representation of the order, and we
* preallocate 2 extra "words" in case any of the subsequent processing
* might temporarily overflow the order length.
*/
tmp_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
if (tmp_key == NULL)
return 0;
BN_set_flags(tmp_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
fixed_top = bn_get_top(order) + 2;
if (bn_wexpand(tmp_key, fixed_top) == NULL) {
BN_clear_free(tmp_key);
return 0;
}
BN_clear_free(key->priv_key);
key->priv_key = BN_dup(priv_key);
return (key->priv_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
key->priv_key = tmp_key;
key->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
const EC_POINT *EC_KEY_get0_public_key(const EC_KEY *key)
@@ -567,6 +686,7 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key(EC_KEY *key, const EC_POINT *pub_key)
return 0;
EC_POINT_free(key->pub_key);
key->pub_key = EC_POINT_dup(pub_key, key->group);
key->dirty_cnt++;
return (key->pub_key == NULL) ? 0 : 1;
}
@@ -613,11 +733,13 @@ int EC_KEY_get_flags(const EC_KEY *key)
void EC_KEY_set_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
{
key->flags |= flags;
key->dirty_cnt++;
}
void EC_KEY_clear_flags(EC_KEY *key, int flags)
{
key->flags &= ~flags;
key->dirty_cnt++;
}
size_t EC_KEY_key2buf(const EC_KEY *key, point_conversion_form_t form,
@@ -639,6 +761,7 @@ int EC_KEY_oct2key(EC_KEY *key, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len,
return 0;
if (EC_POINT_oct2point(key->group, key->pub_key, buf, len, ctx) == 0)
return 0;
key->dirty_cnt++;
/*
* Save the point conversion form.
* For non-custom curves the first octet of the buffer (excluding
@@ -689,13 +812,18 @@ size_t ec_key_simple_priv2oct(const EC_KEY *eckey,
int EC_KEY_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
{
int ret;
if (eckey->group == NULL || eckey->group->meth == NULL)
return 0;
if (eckey->group->meth->oct2priv == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_SHOULD_NOT_HAVE_BEEN_CALLED);
return 0;
}
return eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
ret = eckey->group->meth->oct2priv(eckey, buf, len);
if (ret == 1)
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
return ret;
}
int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
@@ -711,6 +839,7 @@ int ec_key_simple_oct2priv(EC_KEY *eckey, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_OCT2PRIV, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
return 0;
}
eckey->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
@@ -742,3 +871,45 @@ int EC_KEY_can_sign(const EC_KEY *eckey)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/*
* FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9 AS09.33
* Perform a sign/verify operation.
*
* NOTE: When generating keys for key-agreement schemes - FIPS 140-2 IG 9.9
* states that no additional pairwise tests are required (apart from the tests
* specified in SP800-56A) when generating keys. Hence pairwise ECDH tests are
* omitted here.
*/
static int ecdsa_keygen_pairwise_test(EC_KEY *eckey, OSSL_CALLBACK *cb,
void *cbarg)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char dgst[16] = {0};
int dgst_len = (int)sizeof(dgst);
ECDSA_SIG *sig = NULL;
OSSL_SELF_TEST *st = NULL;
st = OSSL_SELF_TEST_new(cb, cbarg);
if (st == NULL)
return 0;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onbegin(st, OSSL_SELF_TEST_TYPE_PCT,
OSSL_SELF_TEST_DESC_PCT_ECDSA);
sig = ECDSA_do_sign(dgst, dgst_len, eckey);
if (sig == NULL)
goto err;
OSSL_SELF_TEST_oncorrupt_byte(st, dgst);
if (ECDSA_do_verify(dgst, dgst_len, sig, eckey) != 1)
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
OSSL_SELF_TEST_onend(st, ret);
OSSL_SELF_TEST_free(st);
ECDSA_SIG_free(sig);
return ret;
}
crypto/ec/ec_local.h
+3
View File
@@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ struct ec_key_st {
#endif
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
/* Provider data */
size_t dirty_cnt; /* If any key material changes, increment this */
};
struct ec_point_st {
crypto/ec/ecp_nistp256.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -80,8 +80,8 @@ static const felem_bytearray nistp256_curve_params[5] = {
{0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01, /* a = -3 */
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc}, /* b */
{0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7,
0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xff, 0xfc},
{0x5a, 0xc6, 0x35, 0xd8, 0xaa, 0x3a, 0x93, 0xe7, /* b */
0xb3, 0xeb, 0xbd, 0x55, 0x76, 0x98, 0x86, 0xbc,
0x65, 0x1d, 0x06, 0xb0, 0xcc, 0x53, 0xb0, 0xf6,
0x3b, 0xce, 0x3c, 0x3e, 0x27, 0xd2, 0x60, 0x4b},
crypto/ec/ecp_s390x_nistp.c
+3 -2
View File
@@ -169,12 +169,13 @@ static ECDSA_SIG *ecdsa_s390x_nistp_sign_sig(const unsigned char *dgst,
if (r == NULL || kinv == NULL) {
/*
* Generate random k and copy to param param block. RAND_priv_bytes
* Generate random k and copy to param param block. RAND_priv_bytes_ex
* is used instead of BN_priv_rand_range or BN_generate_dsa_nonce
* because kdsa instruction constructs an in-range, invertible nonce
* internally implementing counter-measures for RNG weakness.
*/
if (RAND_priv_bytes(param + S390X_OFF_RN(len), len) != 1) {
if (RAND_priv_bytes_ex(eckey->libctx, param + S390X_OFF_RN(len),
len) != 1) {
ECerr(EC_F_ECDSA_S390X_NISTP_SIGN_SIG,
EC_R_RANDOM_NUMBER_GENERATION_FAILED);
goto ret;