Version bump

This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2018-04-27 20:47:40 +09:00
parent 6aa2bc2941
commit a08448ab40
304 changed files with 7574 additions and 2162 deletions
+63 -31
View File
@@ -165,6 +165,7 @@ static const TLS_GROUP_INFO nid_list[] = {
{NID_brainpoolP384r1, 192, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpoolP384r1 (27) */
{NID_brainpoolP512r1, 256, TLS_CURVE_PRIME}, /* brainpool512r1 (28) */
{EVP_PKEY_X25519, 128, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X25519 (29) */
{EVP_PKEY_X448, 224, TLS_CURVE_CUSTOM}, /* X448 (30) */
};
static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
@@ -177,6 +178,7 @@ static const unsigned char ecformats_default[] = {
static const uint16_t eccurves_default[] = {
29, /* X25519 (29) */
23, /* secp256r1 (23) */
30, /* X448 (30) */
25, /* secp521r1 (25) */
24, /* secp384r1 (24) */
};
@@ -622,6 +624,7 @@ static const uint16_t tls12_sigalgs[] = {
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_secp521r1_sha512,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
#endif
TLSEXT_SIGALG_rsa_pss_pss_sha256,
@@ -672,6 +675,9 @@ static const SIGALG_LOOKUP sigalg_lookup_tbl[] = {
{"ed25519", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed25519,
NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED25519, SSL_PKEY_ED25519,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{"ed448", TLSEXT_SIGALG_ed448,
NID_undef, -1, EVP_PKEY_ED448, SSL_PKEY_ED448,
NID_undef, NID_undef},
{NULL, TLSEXT_SIGALG_ecdsa_sha224,
NID_sha224, SSL_MD_SHA224_IDX, EVP_PKEY_EC, SSL_PKEY_ECC,
NID_ecdsa_with_SHA224, NID_undef},
@@ -764,7 +770,8 @@ static const uint16_t tls_default_sigalg[] = {
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102001_gostr3411, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST01 */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_256_gostr34112012_256, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256 */
TLSEXT_SIGALG_gostr34102012_512_gostr34112012_512, /* SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512 */
0 /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED25519 */
0, /* SSL_PKEY_ED448 */
};
/* Lookup TLS signature algorithm */
@@ -1198,8 +1205,8 @@ int tls1_set_server_sigalgs(SSL *s)
* s->ctx->ext.ticket_key_cb asked to renew the client's ticket.
* Otherwise, s->ext.ticket_expected is set to 0.
*/
TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
SSL_SESSION **ret)
SSL_TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
SSL_SESSION **ret)
{
int retv;
size_t size;
@@ -1214,11 +1221,11 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
* resumption.
*/
if (s->version <= SSL3_VERSION || !tls_use_ticket(s))
return TICKET_NONE;
return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
ticketext = &hello->pre_proc_exts[TLSEXT_IDX_session_ticket];
if (!ticketext->present)
return TICKET_NONE;
return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
size = PACKET_remaining(&ticketext->data);
if (size == 0) {
@@ -1227,7 +1234,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
* one.
*/
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_EMPTY;
return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
}
if (s->ext.session_secret_cb) {
/*
@@ -1236,25 +1243,49 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
* abbreviated handshake based on external mechanism to
* calculate the master secret later.
*/
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
retv = tls_decrypt_ticket(s, PACKET_data(&ticketext->data), size,
hello->session_id, hello->session_id_len, ret);
/*
* If set, the decrypt_ticket_cb() is always called regardless of the
* return from tls_decrypt_ticket(). The callback is responsible for
* checking |retv| before it performs any action
*/
if (s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb != NULL) {
size_t keyname_len = size;
if (keyname_len > TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH)
keyname_len = TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH;
retv = s->session_ctx->decrypt_ticket_cb(s, *ret,
PACKET_data(&ticketext->data),
keyname_len,
retv, s->session_ctx->ticket_cb_data);
}
switch (retv) {
case TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
case SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT:
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
case TICKET_SUCCESS:
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS:
return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
case TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
case SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW:
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
case SSL_TICKET_EMPTY:
s->ext.ticket_expected = 1;
return SSL_TICKET_EMPTY;
case SSL_TICKET_NONE:
return SSL_TICKET_NONE;
default:
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
}
@@ -1268,15 +1299,15 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_get_ticket_from_client(SSL *s, CLIENTHELLO_MSG *hello,
* psess: (output) on return, if a ticket was decrypted, then this is set to
* point to the resulting session.
*/
TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
SSL_TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
size_t eticklen, const unsigned char *sess_id,
size_t sesslen, SSL_SESSION **psess)
{
SSL_SESSION *sess;
unsigned char *sdec;
const unsigned char *p;
int slen, renew_ticket = 0, declen;
TICKET_RETURN ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
SSL_TICKET_RETURN ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
size_t mlen;
unsigned char tick_hmac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
HMAC_CTX *hctx = NULL;
@@ -1285,17 +1316,17 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
/* Need at least keyname + iv */
if (eticklen < TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
/* Initialize session ticket encryption and HMAC contexts */
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
ret = TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_MALLOC;
goto err;
}
if (tctx->ext.ticket_key_cb) {
@@ -1306,7 +1337,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
if (rv < 0)
goto err;
if (rv == 0) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
if (rv == 2)
@@ -1315,7 +1346,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
if (HMAC_Init_ex(hctx, tctx->ext.tick_hmac_key,
@@ -1338,7 +1369,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
/* Sanity check ticket length: must exceed keyname + IV + HMAC */
if (eticklen <=
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(ctx) + mlen) {
ret = TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto err;
}
eticklen -= mlen;
@@ -1350,7 +1381,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(tick_hmac, etick + eticklen, mlen)) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/* Attempt to decrypt session data */
/* Move p after IV to start of encrypted ticket, update length */
@@ -1361,12 +1392,12 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
(int)eticklen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
return SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
}
if (EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, sdec + slen, &declen) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(sdec);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
slen += declen;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
@@ -1380,7 +1411,7 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
/* Some additional consistency checks */
if (slen != 0 || sess->session_id_length != 0) {
SSL_SESSION_free(sess);
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
}
/*
* The session ID, if non-empty, is used by some clients to detect
@@ -1393,15 +1424,15 @@ TICKET_RETURN tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
sess->session_id_length = sesslen;
*psess = sess;
if (renew_ticket)
return TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS_RENEW;
else
return TICKET_SUCCESS;
return SSL_TICKET_SUCCESS;
}
ERR_clear_error();
/*
* For session parse failure, indicate that we need to send a new ticket.
*/
return TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
return SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
@@ -2180,6 +2211,7 @@ void tls1_set_cert_validity(SSL *s)
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_256);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_GOST12_512);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED25519);
tls1_check_chain(s, NULL, NULL, NULL, SSL_PKEY_ED448);
}
/* User level utility function to check a chain is suitable */