Hakase/openssl-custom
1
0 Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

Latest update.

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2020-02-11 23:20:44 +09:00
parent 047a30700b
commit 9dfeec3942
639 changed files with 14024 additions and 31198 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
crypto/dsa/dsa_ossl.c
+49 -39
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,9 @@ DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign_int(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const unsigned char *dgst,
DSA_SIG *ret = NULL;
int rv = 0;
if (dsa->p == NULL || dsa->q == NULL || dsa->g == NULL) {
if (dsa->params.p == NULL
|| dsa->params.q == NULL
|| dsa->params.g == NULL) {
reason = DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS;
goto err;
}
@@ -102,13 +104,13 @@ DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign_int(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const unsigned char *dgst,
if (!dsa_sign_setup(dsa, ctx, &kinv, &ret->r, dgst, dlen))
goto err;
if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->q))
if (dlen > BN_num_bytes(dsa->params.q))
/*
* if the digest length is greater than the size of q use the
* BN_num_bits(dsa->q) leftmost bits of the digest, see fips 186-3,
* 4.2
*/
dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->q);
dlen = BN_num_bytes(dsa->params.q);
if (BN_bin2bn(dgst, dlen, m) == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -124,7 +126,7 @@ DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign_int(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const unsigned char *dgst,
/* Generate a blinding value */
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->q) - 1,
if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(blind, BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q) - 1,
BN_RAND_TOP_ANY, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, ctx))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(blind));
@@ -133,27 +135,27 @@ DSA_SIG *dsa_do_sign_int(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const unsigned char *dgst,
BN_set_flags(tmp, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
/* tmp := blind * priv_key * r mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, blind, dsa->priv_key, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(tmp, tmp, ret->r, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/* blindm := blind * m mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(blindm, blind, m, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s : = (blind * priv_key * r) + (blind * m) mod q */
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(ret->s, tmp, blindm, dsa->q))
if (!BN_mod_add_quick(ret->s, tmp, blindm, dsa->params.q))
goto err;
/* s := s * k^-1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, kinv, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/* s:= s * blind^-1 mod q */
if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->q, ctx) == NULL)
if (BN_mod_inverse(blind, blind, dsa->params.q, ctx) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, blind, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(ret->s, ret->s, blind, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/*
@@ -197,13 +199,15 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
int ret = 0;
int q_bits, q_words;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
if (!dsa->params.p || !dsa->params.q || !dsa->params.g) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
/* Reject obviously invalid parameters */
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->p) || BN_is_zero(dsa->q) || BN_is_zero(dsa->g)) {
if (BN_is_zero(dsa->params.p)
|| BN_is_zero(dsa->params.q)
|| BN_is_zero(dsa->params.g)) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_SIGN_SETUP, DSA_R_INVALID_PARAMETERS);
return 0;
}
@@ -225,8 +229,8 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
ctx = ctx_in;
/* Preallocate space */
q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->q);
q_bits = BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q);
q_words = bn_get_top(dsa->params.q);
if (!bn_wexpand(k, q_words + 2)
|| !bn_wexpand(l, q_words + 2))
goto err;
@@ -238,10 +242,10 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
* We calculate k from SHA512(private_key + H(message) + random).
* This protects the private key from a weak PRNG.
*/
if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
if (!BN_generate_dsa_nonce(k, dsa->params.q, dsa->priv_key, dgst,
dlen, ctx))
goto err;
} else if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(k, dsa->q, ctx))
} else if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(k, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
} while (BN_is_zero(k));
@@ -250,7 +254,7 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
if (!BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx))
dsa->lock, dsa->params.p, ctx))
goto err;
}
@@ -269,26 +273,27 @@ static int dsa_sign_setup(DSA *dsa, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
* https://github.com/openssl/openssl/pull/7486#discussion_r228323705
* The fix is to rework BN so these gymnastics aren't required.
*/
if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->q)
|| !BN_add(k, l, dsa->q))
if (!BN_add(l, k, dsa->params.q)
|| !BN_add(k, l, dsa->params.q))
goto err;
BN_consttime_swap(BN_is_bit_set(l, q_bits), k, l, q_words + 2);
if ((dsa)->meth->bn_mod_exp != NULL) {
if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p))
if (!dsa->meth->bn_mod_exp(dsa, r, dsa->params.g, k, dsa->params.p,
ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->g, k, dsa->p, ctx, dsa->method_mont_p))
if (!BN_mod_exp_mont(r, dsa->params.g, k, dsa->params.p, ctx,
dsa->method_mont_p))
goto err;
}
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod(r, r, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/* Compute part of 's = inv(k) (m + xr) mod q' */
if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
if ((kinv = dsa_mod_inverse_fermat(k, dsa->params.q, ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
BN_clear_free(*kinvp);
@@ -313,19 +318,22 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
const BIGNUM *r, *s;
int ret = -1, i;
if (!dsa->p || !dsa->q || !dsa->g) {
if (dsa->params.p == NULL
|| dsa->params.q == NULL
|| dsa->params.g == NULL) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MISSING_PARAMETERS);
return -1;
}
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->q);
i = BN_num_bits(dsa->params.q);
/* fips 186-3 allows only different sizes for q */
if (i != 160 && i != 224 && i != 256) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_BAD_Q_VALUE);
return -1;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
if (BN_num_bits(dsa->params.p) > OPENSSL_DSA_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DSAerr(DSA_F_DSA_DO_VERIFY, DSA_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
@@ -339,12 +347,12 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
DSA_SIG_get0(sig, &r, &s);
if (BN_is_zero(r) || BN_is_negative(r) ||
BN_ucmp(r, dsa->q) >= 0) {
BN_ucmp(r, dsa->params.q) >= 0) {
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
if (BN_is_zero(s) || BN_is_negative(s) ||
BN_ucmp(s, dsa->q) >= 0) {
BN_ucmp(s, dsa->params.q) >= 0) {
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
@@ -352,7 +360,7 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
/*
* Calculate W = inv(S) mod Q save W in u2
*/
if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->q, ctx)) == NULL)
if ((BN_mod_inverse(u2, s, dsa->params.q, ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* save M in u1 */
@@ -367,32 +375,32 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
goto err;
/* u1 = M * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(u1, u1, u2, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/* u2 = r * w mod q */
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod_mul(u2, r, u2, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
if (dsa->flags & DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dsa->method_mont_p,
dsa->lock, dsa->p, ctx);
dsa->lock, dsa->params.p, ctx);
if (!mont)
goto err;
}
if (dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp != NULL) {
if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
dsa->p, ctx, mont))
if (!dsa->meth->dsa_mod_exp(dsa, t1, dsa->params.g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
dsa->params.p, ctx, mont))
goto err;
} else {
if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2, dsa->p, ctx,
mont))
if (!BN_mod_exp2_mont(t1, dsa->params.g, u1, dsa->pub_key, u2,
dsa->params.p, ctx, mont))
goto err;
}
/* let u1 = u1 mod q */
if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->q, ctx))
if (!BN_mod(u1, t1, dsa->params.q, ctx))
goto err;
/*
@@ -413,6 +421,8 @@ static int dsa_do_verify(const unsigned char *dgst, int dgst_len,
static int dsa_init(DSA *dsa)
{
dsa->flags |= DSA_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
ffc_params_init(&dsa->params);
dsa->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}