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Hakase
2020-02-11 23:20:44 +09:00
parent 047a30700b
commit 9dfeec3942
639 changed files with 14024 additions and 31198 deletions
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crypto/dh/dh_key.c
+180 -117
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -11,20 +11,102 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "dh_local.h"
#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "crypto/dh.h"
static int generate_key(DH *dh);
static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh);
static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx);
static int dh_init(DH *dh);
static int dh_finish(DH *dh);
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
int dh_compute_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *key,
const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
return dh->meth->generate_key(dh);
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp;
int ret = -1;
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
int check_result;
#endif
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p,
dh->lock, dh->params.p, ctx);
BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!mont)
goto err;
}
/* TODO(3.0) : Solve in a PR related to Key validation for DH */
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
#endif
if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->params.p, ctx,
mont)) {
DHerr(0, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
return dh_compute_key(NULL, key, pub_key, dh);
}
int dh_compute_key_padded(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, unsigned char *key,
const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int rv, pad;
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
rv = dh_compute_key(libctx, key, pub_key, dh);
#else
rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
#endif
if (rv <= 0)
return rv;
pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->params.p) - rv;
if (pad > 0) {
memmove(key + pad, key, rv);
memset(key, 0, pad);
}
return rv + pad;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
return dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
@@ -32,17 +114,9 @@ int DH_compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
int DH_compute_key_padded(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
{
int rv, pad;
rv = dh->meth->compute_key(key, pub_key, dh);
if (rv <= 0)
return rv;
pad = BN_num_bytes(dh->p) - rv;
if (pad > 0) {
memmove(key + pad, key, rv);
memset(key, 0, pad);
}
return rv + pad;
return dh_compute_key_padded(NULL, key, pub_key, dh);
}
#endif
static DH_METHOD dh_ossl = {
"OpenSSL DH Method",
@@ -63,36 +137,66 @@ const DH_METHOD *DH_OpenSSL(void)
return &dh_ossl;
}
void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth)
{
default_DH_method = meth;
}
const DH_METHOD *DH_get_default_method(void)
{
return default_DH_method;
}
static int generate_key(DH *dh)
static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
{
return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
}
static int dh_init(DH *dh)
{
dh->flags |= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
ffc_params_init(&dh->params);
dh->dirty_cnt++;
return 1;
}
static int dh_finish(DH *dh)
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
return 1;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
void DH_set_default_method(const DH_METHOD *meth)
{
default_DH_method = meth;
}
int DH_generate_key(DH *dh)
{
return dh->meth->generate_key(dh);
}
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
static int dh_generate_key(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, DH *dh)
{
int ok = 0;
int generate_new_key = 0;
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
unsigned l;
#endif
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *pub_key = NULL, *priv_key = NULL;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
if (BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(0, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
ctx = BN_CTX_new_ex(libctx);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
@@ -113,30 +217,58 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p,
dh->lock, dh->p, ctx);
dh->lock, dh->params.p, ctx);
if (!mont)
goto err;
}
if (generate_new_key) {
if (dh->q) {
do {
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, dh->q))
goto err;
}
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key) || BN_is_one(priv_key));
} else {
/* secret exponent length */
l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->p) - 1;
if (!BN_priv_rand(priv_key, l, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY))
goto err;
/* Is it an approved safe prime ?*/
if (DH_get_nid(dh) != NID_undef) {
/*
* We handle just one known case where g is a quadratic non-residue:
* for g = 2: p % 8 == 3
* The safe prime group code sets N = 2*s
* (where s = max security strength supported).
* N = dh->length (N = maximum bit length of private key)
*/
if (BN_is_word(dh->g, DH_GENERATOR_2) && !BN_is_bit_set(dh->p, 2)) {
/* clear bit 0, since it won't be a secret anyway */
if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
if (dh->length == 0
|| dh->params.q == NULL
|| dh->length > BN_num_bits(dh->params.q))
goto err;
if (!ffc_generate_private_key(ctx, &dh->params, dh->length,
dh->length / 2, priv_key))
goto err;
} else {
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
if (dh->params.q == NULL)
goto err;
#else
if (dh->params.q == NULL) {
/* secret exponent length */
l = dh->length ? dh->length : BN_num_bits(dh->params.p) - 1;
if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(priv_key, l, BN_RAND_TOP_ONE,
BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY, ctx))
goto err;
/*
* We handle just one known case where g is a quadratic non-residue:
* for g = 2: p % 8 == 3
*/
if (BN_is_word(dh->params.g, DH_GENERATOR_2)
&& !BN_is_bit_set(dh->params.p, 2)) {
/* clear bit 0, since it won't be a secret anyway */
if (!BN_clear_bit(priv_key, 0))
goto err;
}
} else
#endif
{
/*
* For FFC FIPS 186-4 keygen
* security strength s = 112,
* Max Private key size N = len(q)
*/
if (!ffc_generate_private_key(ctx, &dh->params,
BN_num_bits(dh->params.q), 112,
priv_key))
goto err;
}
}
@@ -149,7 +281,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
goto err;
BN_with_flags(prk, priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key, dh->g, prk, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
/* pub_key = g^priv_key mod p */
if (!dh->meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, pub_key, dh->params.g, prk, dh->params.p,
ctx, mont)) {
BN_clear_free(prk);
goto err;
}
@@ -163,7 +297,7 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
ok = 1;
err:
if (ok != 1)
DHerr(DH_F_GENERATE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
DHerr(0, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
if (pub_key != dh->pub_key)
BN_free(pub_key);
@@ -173,80 +307,9 @@ static int generate_key(DH *dh)
return ok;
}
static int compute_key(unsigned char *key, const BIGNUM *pub_key, DH *dh)
static int generate_key(DH *dh)
{
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BN_MONT_CTX *mont = NULL;
BIGNUM *tmp;
int ret = -1;
int check_result;
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) > OPENSSL_DH_MAX_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_LARGE);
goto err;
}
if (BN_num_bits(dh->p) < DH_MIN_MODULUS_BITS) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_MODULUS_TOO_SMALL);
return 0;
}
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (tmp == NULL)
goto err;
if (dh->priv_key == NULL) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_NO_PRIVATE_VALUE);
goto err;
}
if (dh->flags & DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P) {
mont = BN_MONT_CTX_set_locked(&dh->method_mont_p,
dh->lock, dh->p, ctx);
BN_set_flags(dh->priv_key, BN_FLG_CONSTTIME);
if (!mont)
goto err;
}
if (!DH_check_pub_key(dh, pub_key, &check_result) || check_result) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, DH_R_INVALID_PUBKEY);
goto err;
}
if (!dh->
meth->bn_mod_exp(dh, tmp, pub_key, dh->priv_key, dh->p, ctx, mont)) {
DHerr(DH_F_COMPUTE_KEY, ERR_R_BN_LIB);
goto err;
}
ret = BN_bn2bin(tmp, key);
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
static int dh_bn_mod_exp(const DH *dh, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
const BIGNUM *m, BN_CTX *ctx, BN_MONT_CTX *m_ctx)
{
return BN_mod_exp_mont(r, a, p, m, ctx, m_ctx);
}
static int dh_init(DH *dh)
{
dh->flags |= DH_FLAG_CACHE_MONT_P;
return 1;
}
static int dh_finish(DH *dh)
{
BN_MONT_CTX_free(dh->method_mont_p);
return 1;
return dh_generate_key(NULL, dh);
}
int dh_buf2key(DH *dh, const unsigned char *buf, size_t len)