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Hakase
2018-10-17 15:13:06 +09:00
parent aa5d30d379
commit 95369e3f0a
31 changed files with 256 additions and 140 deletions
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crypto/rand/drbg_lib.c
+17 -12
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@@ -286,7 +286,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
return drbg;
err:
err:
if (drbg->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_free(drbg);
else
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
entropylen = drbg->get_entropy(drbg, &entropy, min_entropy,
min_entropylen, max_entropylen, 0);
if (entropylen < min_entropylen
|| entropylen > max_entropylen) {
|| entropylen > max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_INSTANTIATE, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
@@ -408,10 +408,10 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->reseed_prop_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter;
}
end:
end:
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce!= NULL )
if (nonce != NULL && drbg->cleanup_nonce != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_nonce(drbg, nonce, noncelen);
if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY) {
@@ -504,7 +504,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->max_entropylen,
prediction_resistance);
if (entropylen < drbg->min_entropylen
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
|| entropylen > drbg->max_entropylen) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESEED, RAND_R_ERROR_RETRIEVING_ENTROPY);
goto end;
}
@@ -522,7 +522,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
drbg->reseed_prop_counter = drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter;
}
end:
end:
if (entropy != NULL && drbg->cleanup_entropy != NULL)
drbg->cleanup_entropy(drbg, entropy, entropylen);
if (drbg->state == DRBG_READY)
@@ -556,8 +556,10 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
if (drbg->pool != NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
rand_pool_free(drbg->pool);
drbg->pool = NULL;
return 0;
}
if (buffer != NULL) {
@@ -565,24 +567,25 @@ int rand_drbg_restart(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
if (drbg->max_entropylen < len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
if (entropy > 8 * len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART, RAND_R_ENTROPY_OUT_OF_RANGE);
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
/* will be picked up by the rand_drbg_get_entropy() callback */
drbg->pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, len, len);
drbg->pool = rand_pool_attach(buffer, len, entropy);
if (drbg->pool == NULL)
return 0;
rand_pool_add(drbg->pool, buffer, len, entropy);
} else {
if (drbg->max_adinlen < len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_RESTART,
RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG);
drbg->state = DRBG_ERROR;
return 0;
}
adin = buffer;
@@ -1040,14 +1043,16 @@ static int drbg_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
if (num < 0 || randomness < 0.0)
return 0;
if (randomness > (double)drbg->max_entropylen) {
if (randomness > (double)RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH) {
/*
* The purpose of this check is to bound |randomness| by a
* relatively small value in order to prevent an integer
* overflow when multiplying by 8 in the rand_drbg_restart()
* call below.
* call below. Note that randomness is measured in bytes,
* not bits, so this value corresponds to eight times the
* security strength.
*/
return 0;
randomness = (double)RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH;
}
rand_drbg_lock(drbg);