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Latest update - https://github.com/openssl/openssl/commit/46d085096c6ead624c61e4b8b301421301511e64

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This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2018-09-22 13:24:05 +09:00
parent ebab062ce0
commit 75a46534f3
35 changed files with 384 additions and 100 deletions
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Configurations/00-base-templates.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ my %targets=(
shared_extension => "",
#### Defaults for the benefit of the config targets who don't inherit
#### a BASE and assume Unixly defaults
#### a BASE and assume Unix defaults
#### THESE WILL DISAPPEAR IN OpenSSL 1.2
build_scheme => [ "unified", "unix" ],
build_file => "Makefile",
Configurations/README
+1 -1
View File
@@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ In each table entry, the following keys are significant:
apps, as needed by the target. This code
cannot be placed in a library, as the rest
of the code isn't expected to link to it
explicitely.
explicitly.
cpuid_asm_src => assembler implementation of cpuid code as
well as OPENSSL_cleanse().
Default to mem_clr.c
Configurations/common0.tmpl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
? ()
: ( map { @{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$_}} }
keys %{$unified_info{shared_sources}} ),
# Things we explicitely depend on are usually generated
# Things we explicitly depend on are usually generated
( map { $_ eq "" ? () : @{$unified_info{depends}->{$_}} }
keys %{$unified_info{depends}} ));
our @generated =
INSTALL
+5 -5
View File
@@ -614,8 +614,8 @@
Windows, and as a comma separated list of
libraries on VMS.
RANLIB The library archive indexer.
RC The Windows resources manipulator.
RCFLAGS Flags for the Windows reources manipulator.
RC The Windows resource compiler.
RCFLAGS Flags for the Windows resource compiler.
RM The command to remove files and directories.
These cannot be mixed with compiling / linking flags given
@@ -969,7 +969,7 @@
BUILDFILE
Use a different build file name than the platform default
("Makefile" on Unixly platforms, "makefile" on native Windows,
("Makefile" on Unix-like platforms, "makefile" on native Windows,
"descrip.mms" on OpenVMS). This requires that there is a
corresponding build file template. See Configurations/README
for further information.
@@ -1171,7 +1171,7 @@
part of the file name, i.e. for OpenSSL 1.1.x, 1.1 is somehow part of
the name.
On most POSIXly platforms, shared libraries are named libcrypto.so.1.1
On most POSIX platforms, shared libraries are named libcrypto.so.1.1
and libssl.so.1.1.
on Cygwin, shared libraries are named cygcrypto-1.1.dll and cygssl-1.1.dll
@@ -1202,7 +1202,7 @@
The seeding method can be configured using the --with-rand-seed option,
which can be used to specify a comma separated list of seed methods.
However in most cases OpenSSL will choose a suitable default method,
so it is not necessary to explicitely provide this option. Note also
so it is not necessary to explicitly provide this option. Note also
that not all methods are available on all platforms.
I) On operating systems which provide a suitable randomness source (in
apps/ca.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ end_of_options:
/*
* outdir is a directory spec, but access() for VMS demands a
* filename. We could use the DEC C routine to convert the
* directory syntax to Unixly, and give that to app_isdir,
* directory syntax to Unix, and give that to app_isdir,
* but for now the fopen will catch the error if it's not a
* directory
*/
crypto/LPdir_unix.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
#endif
/*
* The POSIXly macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is
* The POSIX macro for the maximum number of characters in a file path is
* NAME_MAX. However, some operating systems use PATH_MAX instead.
* Therefore, it seems natural to first check for PATH_MAX and use that, and
* if it doesn't exist, use NAME_MAX.
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-gcc.c
-6
View File
@@ -64,12 +64,6 @@
* machine.
*/
# if defined(_WIN64) || !defined(__LP64__)
# define BN_ULONG unsigned long long
# else
# define BN_ULONG unsigned long
# endif
# undef mul
# undef mul_add
crypto/engine/eng_devcrypto.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static const struct cipher_data_st {
{ NID_aes_192_cbc, 16, 192 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CBC },
{ NID_aes_256_cbc, 16, 256 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CBC_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CBC },
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC4
{ NID_rc4, 1, 16, 0, CRYPTO_ARC4 },
{ NID_rc4, 1, 16, 0, EVP_CIPH_STREAM_CIPHER, CRYPTO_ARC4 },
#endif
#if !defined(CHECK_BSD_STYLE_MACROS) || defined(CRYPTO_AES_CTR)
{ NID_aes_128_ctr, 16, 128 / 8, 16, EVP_CIPH_CTR_MODE, CRYPTO_AES_CTR },
crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+1 -1
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@@ -2255,7 +2255,7 @@ static int s390x_aes_ccm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
if (!cctx->aes.ccm.len_set) {
/*-
* In case message length was not previously set explicitely via
* In case message length was not previously set explicitly via
* Update(), set it now.
*/
ivec = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(ctx);
crypto/o_fopen.c
+1 -3
View File
@@ -25,14 +25,12 @@
# endif
# endif
#include "e_os.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_STDIO)
# include <stdio.h>
# ifdef _WIN32
# include <windows.h>
# endif
# ifdef __DJGPP__
# include <unistd.h>
# endif
crypto/rsa/rsa_meth.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -163,13 +163,13 @@ int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *meth,
/* Can be null */
int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
return meth->rsa_mod_exp;
}
int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *meth,
int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
BN_CTX *ctx))
{
meth->rsa_mod_exp = mod_exp;
crypto/ui/ui_openssl.c
+18
View File
@@ -415,6 +415,24 @@ static int open_console(UI *ui)
is_a_tty = 0;
else
# endif
# ifdef ENXIO
/*
* Solaris can return ENXIO.
* This should be ok
*/
if (errno == ENXIO)
is_a_tty = 0;
else
# endif
# ifdef EIO
/*
* Linux can return EIO.
* This should be ok
*/
if (errno == EIO)
is_a_tty = 0;
else
# endif
# ifdef ENODEV
/*
* MacOS X returns ENODEV (Operation not supported by device),
demos/evp/Makefile
+5 -3
View File
@@ -7,17 +7,19 @@
#
# LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesccm
# LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./aesgcm
# LD_LIBRARY_PATH=../.. ./gmac
CFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_INCS_LOCATION)
LDFLAGS = $(OPENSSL_LIBS_LOCATION) -lssl -lcrypto
all: aesccm aesgcm
all: aesccm aesgcm gmac
aesccm: aesccm.o
aesgcm: aesgcm.o
gmac: gmac.o
aesccm aesgcm:
aesccm aesgcm gmac:
$(CC) $(CFLAGS) -o $@ $< $(LDFLAGS)
clean:
$(RM) aesccm aesgcm *.o
$(RM) aesccm aesgcm gmac *.o
demos/evp/gmac.c
+103
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Simple AES GMAC test program, uses the same NIST data used for the FIPS
* self test but uses the application level EVP APIs.
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
/* AES-GMAC test data from NIST public test vectors */
static const unsigned char gmac_key[] = { 0x77, 0xbe, 0x63, 0x70, 0x89, 0x71, 0xc4, 0xe2,
0x40, 0xd1, 0xcb, 0x79, 0xe8, 0xd7, 0x7f, 0xeb };
static const unsigned char gmac_iv[] = { 0xe0, 0xe0, 0x0f, 0x19, 0xfe, 0xd7, 0xba, 0x01,
0x36, 0xa7, 0x97, 0xf3 };
static const unsigned char gmac_aad[] = { 0x7a, 0x43, 0xec, 0x1d, 0x9c, 0x0a, 0x5a, 0x78,
0xa0, 0xb1, 0x65, 0x33, 0xa6, 0x21, 0x3c, 0xab };
static const unsigned char gmac_tag[] = { 0x20, 0x9f, 0xcc, 0x8d, 0x36, 0x75, 0xed, 0x93,
0x8e, 0x9c, 0x71, 0x66, 0x70, 0x9d, 0xd9, 0x46 };
static int aes_gmac(void)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
int outlen, tmplen;
unsigned char outbuf[1024];
int ret = 0;
printf("AES GMAC:\n");
printf("Authenticated Data:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gmac_aad, sizeof(gmac_aad));
if ((ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
printf("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new: failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Set cipher type and mode */
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_128_gcm(), NULL, NULL, NULL)) {
printf("EVP_EncryptInit_ex: failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Set IV length if default 96 bits is not appropriate */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN, sizeof(gmac_iv),
NULL)) {
printf("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl: set IV length failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Initialise key and IV */
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, NULL, NULL, gmac_key, gmac_iv)) {
printf("EVP_EncryptInit_ex: set key and IV failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Zero or more calls to specify any AAD */
if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, NULL, &outlen, gmac_aad, sizeof(gmac_aad))) {
printf("EVP_EncryptUpdate: setting AAD failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Finalise: note get no output for GMAC */
if (!EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, outbuf, &outlen)) {
printf("EVP_EncryptFinal_ex: failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Get tag */
if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, 16, outbuf)) {
printf("EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl: failed\n");
goto err;
}
/* Output tag */
printf("Tag:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stdout, outbuf, 16);
/* Is the tag correct? */
if (memcmp(outbuf, gmac_tag, sizeof(gmac_tag)) != 0) {
printf("Expected:\n");
BIO_dump_fp(stdout, gmac_tag, sizeof(gmac_tag));
} else
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
return aes_gmac() ? EXIT_SUCCESS : EXIT_FAILURE;
}
doc/man1/enc.pod
+25
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@@ -277,6 +277,7 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management.
bf-cbc Blowfish in CBC mode
bf Alias for bf-cbc
blowfish Alias for bf-cbc
bf-cfb Blowfish in CFB mode
bf-ecb Blowfish in ECB mode
bf-ofb Blowfish in OFB mode
@@ -288,6 +289,8 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management.
cast5-ecb CAST5 in ECB mode
cast5-ofb CAST5 in OFB mode
chacha20 ChaCha20 algorithm
des-cbc DES in CBC mode
des Alias for des-cbc
des-cfb DES in CFB mode
@@ -334,6 +337,19 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management.
rc5-ecb RC5 cipher in ECB mode
rc5-ofb RC5 cipher in OFB mode
seed-cbc SEED cipher in CBC mode
seed Alias for seed-cbc
seed-cfb SEED cipher in CFB mode
seed-ecb SEED cipher in ECB mode
seed-ofb SEED cipher in OFB mode
sm4-cbc SM4 cipher in CBC mode
sm4 Alias for sm4-cbc
sm4-cfb SM4 cipher in CFB mode
sm4-ctr SM4 cipher in CTR mode
sm4-ecb SM4 cipher in ECB mode
sm4-ofb SM4 cipher in OFB mode
aes-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit AES in CBC mode
aes[128|192|256] Alias for aes-[128|192|256]-cbc
aes-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit AES in 128 bit CFB mode
@@ -343,6 +359,15 @@ standard data format and performs the needed key/iv/nonce management.
aes-[128|192|256]-ecb 128/192/256 bit AES in ECB mode
aes-[128|192|256]-ofb 128/192/256 bit AES in OFB mode
aria-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit ARIA in CBC mode
aria[128|192|256] Alias for aria-[128|192|256]-cbc
aria-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 128 bit CFB mode
aria-[128|192|256]-cfb1 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 1 bit CFB mode
aria-[128|192|256]-cfb8 128/192/256 bit ARIA in 8 bit CFB mode
aria-[128|192|256]-ctr 128/192/256 bit ARIA in CTR mode
aria-[128|192|256]-ecb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in ECB mode
aria-[128|192|256]-ofb 128/192/256 bit ARIA in OFB mode
camellia-[128|192|256]-cbc 128/192/256 bit Camellia in CBC mode
camellia[128|192|256] Alias for camellia-[128|192|256]-cbc
camellia-[128|192|256]-cfb 128/192/256 bit Camellia in 128 bit CFB mode
doc/man3/EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md.pod
+2 -2
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@@ -68,12 +68,12 @@ error occurs.
=back
EVP_PKEY_set_hkdf_md() sets the message digest associated with the HKDF.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_md() sets the message digest associated with the HKDF.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_salt() sets the salt to B<saltlen> bytes of the
buffer B<salt>. Any existing value is replaced.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_hkdf_key() sets the key to B<keylen> bytes of the buffer
EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_hkdf_key() sets the key to B<keylen> bytes of the buffer
B<key>. Any existing value is replaced.
EVP_PKEY_CTX_add1_hkdf_info() sets the info value to B<infolen> bytes of the
doc/man3/RSA_meth_new.pod
+2 -2
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@@ -64,10 +64,10 @@ RSA_meth_get_multi_prime_keygen, RSA_meth_set_multi_prime_keygen
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding));
/* Can be null */
int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I,
int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i,
RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
int (*mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
int (*mod_exp)(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
BN_CTX *ctx));
/* Can be null */
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown.pod
+2 -2
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@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ SSL_get_quiet_shutdown() returns the "quiet shutdown" setting of B<ssl>.
=head1 NOTES
Normally when a SSL connection is finished, the parties must send out
"close notify" alert messages using L<SSL_shutdown(3)>
close_notify alert messages using L<SSL_shutdown(3)>
for a clean shutdown.
When setting the "quiet shutdown" flag to 1, L<SSL_shutdown(3)>
@@ -41,7 +41,7 @@ will set the internal flags to SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN.
(L<SSL_shutdown(3)> then behaves like
L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> called with
SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN|SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN.)
The session is thus considered to be shutdown, but no "close notify" alert
The session is thus considered to be shutdown, but no close_notify alert
is sent to the peer. This behaviour violates the TLS standard.
The default is normal shutdown behaviour as described by the TLS standard.
doc/man3/SSL_get_error.pod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ if and only if B<ret E<gt> 0>.
=item SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN
The TLS/SSL peer has closed the connection for writing by sending the
"close notify" alert.
close_notify alert.
No more data can be read.
Note that B<SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN> does not necessarily
indicate that the underlying transport has been closed.
doc/man3/SSL_set_shutdown.pod
+4 -4
View File
@@ -30,12 +30,12 @@ No shutdown setting, yet.
=item SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
A "close notify" shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being
A close_notify shutdown alert was sent to the peer, the connection is being
considered closed and the session is closed and correct.
=item SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN
A shutdown alert was received form the peer, either a normal "close notify"
A shutdown alert was received form the peer, either a normal close_notify
or a fatal error.
=back
@@ -47,13 +47,13 @@ the ssl session. If the session is still open, when
L<SSL_clear(3)> or L<SSL_free(3)> is called,
it is considered bad and removed according to RFC2246.
The actual condition for a correctly closed session is SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
(according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the "close notify"
(according to the TLS RFC, it is acceptable to only send the close_notify
alert but to not wait for the peer's answer, when the underlying connection
is closed).
SSL_set_shutdown() can be used to set this state without sending a
close alert to the peer (see L<SSL_shutdown(3)>).
If a "close notify" was received, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN will be set,
If a close_notify was received, SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN will be set,
for setting SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN the application must however still call
L<SSL_shutdown(3)> or SSL_set_shutdown() itself.
doc/man3/SSL_shutdown.pod
+45 -33
View File
@@ -13,27 +13,36 @@ SSL_shutdown - shut down a TLS/SSL connection
=head1 DESCRIPTION
SSL_shutdown() shuts down an active TLS/SSL connection. It sends the
"close notify" shutdown alert to the peer.
close_notify shutdown alert to the peer.
=head1 NOTES
SSL_shutdown() tries to send the "close notify" shutdown alert to the peer.
SSL_shutdown() tries to send the close_notify shutdown alert to the peer.
Whether the operation succeeds or not, the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag is set and
a currently open session is considered closed and good and will be kept in the
session cache for further reuse.
The shutdown procedure consists of 2 steps: the sending of the "close notify"
shutdown alert and the reception of the peer's "close notify" shutdown
alert. According to the TLS standard, it is acceptable for an application
to only send its shutdown alert and then close the underlying connection
without waiting for the peer's response (this way resources can be saved,
as the process can already terminate or serve another connection).
When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the
complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional "close notify" alerts) must be
performed, so that the peers stay synchronized.
The shutdown procedure consists of two steps: sending of the close_notify
shutdown alert, and reception of the peer's close_notify shutdown alert.
The order of those two steps depends on the application.
SSL_shutdown() supports both uni- and bidirectional shutdown by its 2 step
behaviour.
It is acceptable for an application to only send its shutdown alert and
then close the underlying connection without waiting for the peer's response.
This way resources can be saved, as the process can already terminate or
serve another connection.
This should only be done when it is known that the other side will not send more
data, otherwise there is a risk of a truncation attack.
When a client only writes and never reads from the connection, and the server
has sent a session ticket to establish a session, the client might not be able
to resume the session because it did not received and process the session ticket
from the server.
In case the application wants to be able to resume the session, it is recommended to
do a complete shutdown procedure (bidirectional close_notify alerts).
When the underlying connection shall be used for more communications, the
complete shutdown procedure must be performed, so that the peers stay
synchronized.
SSL_shutdown() only closes the write direction.
It is not possible to call SSL_write() after calling SSL_shutdown().
@@ -41,45 +50,43 @@ The read direction is closed by the peer.
=head2 First to close the connection
When the application is the first party to send the "close notify"
When the application is the first party to send the close_notify
alert, SSL_shutdown() will only send the alert and then set the
SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN flag (so that the session is considered good and will
be kept in the cache).
SSL_shutdown() will then return with 0.
If successful, SSL_shutdown() will return 0.
If a unidirectional shutdown is enough (the underlying connection shall be
closed anyway), this first call to SSL_shutdown() is sufficient.
closed anyway), this first successful call to SSL_shutdown() is sufficient.
In order to complete the bidirectional shutdown handshake, the peer needs
to send back a "close notify" alert.
to send back a close_notify alert.
The SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag will be set after receiving and processing
it.
SSL_shutdown() will return 1 when it has been received.
The peer is still allowed to send data after receiving the "close notify"
The peer is still allowed to send data after receiving the close_notify
event.
If the peer did send data it needs to be processed by calling SSL_read()
before calling SSL_shutdown() a second time.
When it is done sending data, it will send the close_notify alert.
SSL_read() should be called until all data is received.
SSL_read() will indicate the end of the peer data by returning <= 0
and SSL_get_error() returning SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN.
It is recommended to call SSL_read() between SSL_shutdown() calls.
=head2 Peer closes the connection
If the peer already sent the "close notify" alert B<and> it was
If the peer already sent the close_notify alert B<and> it was
already processed implicitly inside another function
(L<SSL_read(3)>), the SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN flag is set.
SSL_read() will return <= 0 in that case, and SSL_get_error() will return
SSL_ERROR_ZERO_RETURN.
SSL_shutdown() will send the "close notify" alert, set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
flag and will immediately return with 1.
SSL_shutdown() will send the close_notify alert, set the SSL_SENT_SHUTDOWN
flag.
If successful, SSL_shutdown() will return 1.
Whether SSL_RECEIVED_SHUTDOWN is already set can be checked using the
SSL_get_shutdown() (see also L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)> call.
=head1 NOTES
It is recommended to do a bidirectional shutdown by checking the return value
of SSL_shutdown() and call it again until it returns 1 or a fatal error.
The behaviour of SSL_shutdown() additionally depends on the underlying BIO.
If the underlying BIO is B<blocking>, SSL_shutdown() will only return once the
handshake step has been finished or an error occurred.
@@ -95,8 +102,13 @@ nothing is to be done, but select() can be used to check for the required
condition. When using a buffering BIO, like a BIO pair, data must be written
into or retrieved out of the BIO before being able to continue.
After SSL_shutdown() returned 0, it is possible to call SSL_shutdown() again
to wait for the peer's close_notify alert.
SSL_shutdown() will return 1 in that case.
However, it is recommended to wait for it using SSL_read() instead.
SSL_shutdown() can be modified to only set the connection to "shutdown"
state but not actually send the "close notify" alert messages,
state but not actually send the close_notify alert messages,
see L<SSL_CTX_set_quiet_shutdown(3)>.
When "quiet shutdown" is enabled, SSL_shutdown() will always succeed
and return 1.
@@ -109,16 +121,16 @@ The following return values can occur:
=item Z<>0
The shutdown is not yet finished: the "close notify" was send but the peer
The shutdown is not yet finished: the close_notify was sent but the peer
did not send it back yet.
Call SSL_shutdown() again to do a bidirectional shutdown.
Call SSL_read() to do a bidirectional shutdown.
The output of L<SSL_get_error(3)> may be misleading, as an
erroneous SSL_ERROR_SYSCALL may be flagged even though no error occurred.
=item Z<>1
The shutdown was successfully completed. The "close notify" alert was sent
and the peer's "close notify" alert was received.
The shutdown was successfully completed. The close_notify alert was sent
and the peer's close_notify alert was received.
=item E<lt>0
doc/man7/RAND_DRBG.pod
+1 -1
View File
@@ -189,7 +189,7 @@ In addition to automatic reseeding, the caller can request an immediate
reseeding of the DRBG with fresh entropy by setting the
I<prediction resistance> parameter to 1 when calling L<RAND_DRBG_generate(3)>.
The dcoument [NIST SP 800-90C] describes prediction resistance requests
The document [NIST SP 800-90C] describes prediction resistance requests
in detail and imposes strict conditions on the entropy sources that are
approved for providing prediction resistance.
Since the default DRBG implementation does not have access to such an approved
e_os.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ extern FILE *_imp___iob;
Finally, we add the VMS C facility code 0x35a000, because there are some
programs, such as Perl, that will reinterpret the code back to something
POSIXly. 'man perlvms' explains it further.
POSIX. 'man perlvms' explains it further.
NOTE: the perlvms manual wants to turn all codes 2 to 255 into success
codes (status type = 1). I couldn't disagree more. Fortunately, the
include/openssl/rsa.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -456,9 +456,9 @@ int RSA_meth_set_priv_dec(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa,
int padding));
int (*RSA_meth_get_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
(BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa, BN_CTX *ctx);
int RSA_meth_set_mod_exp(RSA_METHOD *rsa,
int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *I, RSA *rsa,
int (*mod_exp) (BIGNUM *r0, const BIGNUM *i, RSA *rsa,
BN_CTX *ctx));
int (*RSA_meth_get_bn_mod_exp(const RSA_METHOD *meth))
(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *p,
ssl/ssl_ciph.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1360,7 +1360,7 @@ static int ciphersuite_cb(const char *elem, int len, void *arg)
return 1;
}
int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str)
static __owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str)
{
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *newciphers = sk_SSL_CIPHER_new_null();
ssl/ssl_lib.c
+4
View File
@@ -654,6 +654,10 @@ int SSL_CTX_set_ssl_version(SSL_CTX *ctx, const SSL_METHOD *meth)
ctx->method = meth;
if (!SSL_CTX_set_ciphersuites(ctx, TLS_DEFAULT_CIPHERSUITES)) {
SSLerr(SSL_F_SSL_CTX_SET_SSL_VERSION, SSL_R_SSL_LIBRARY_HAS_NO_CIPHERS);
return 0;
}
sk = ssl_create_cipher_list(ctx->method,
ctx->tls13_ciphersuites,
&(ctx->cipher_list),
ssl/ssl_locl.h
+1 -2
View File
@@ -471,7 +471,7 @@ struct ssl_method_st {
long (*ssl_ctx_callback_ctrl) (SSL_CTX *s, int cb_id, void (*fp) (void));
};
# define TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH 64
# define TLS13_MAX_RESUMPTION_PSK_LENGTH PSK_MAX_PSK_LEN
/*-
* Lets make this into an ASN.1 type structure as follows
@@ -2290,7 +2290,6 @@ __owur int ssl_cipher_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *a, const SSL_CIPHER *b);
DECLARE_OBJ_BSEARCH_GLOBAL_CMP_FN(SSL_CIPHER, SSL_CIPHER, ssl_cipher_id);
__owur int ssl_cipher_ptr_id_cmp(const SSL_CIPHER *const *ap,
const SSL_CIPHER *const *bp);
__owur int set_ciphersuites(STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) **currciphers, const char *str);
__owur STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *ssl_create_cipher_list(const SSL_METHOD *ssl_method,
STACK_OF(SSL_CIPHER) *tls13_ciphersuites,
struct ssl_cipher_preference_list_st **cipher_list,
ssl/statem/statem_srvr.c
+17 -15
View File
@@ -2057,10 +2057,6 @@ static int tls_early_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s)
#else
s->session->compress_meth = (comp == NULL) ? 0 : comp->id;
#endif
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
/* SSLfatal() already called */
goto err;
}
}
sk_SSL_CIPHER_free(ciphers);
@@ -2228,19 +2224,25 @@ WORK_STATE tls_post_process_client_hello(SSL *s, WORK_STATE wst)
if (wst == WORK_MORE_B) {
if (!s->hit || SSL_IS_TLS13(s)) {
/* Let cert callback update server certificates if required */
if (!s->hit && s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
if (!s->hit) {
if (s->cert->cert_cb != NULL) {
int rv = s->cert->cert_cb(s, s->cert->cert_cb_arg);
if (rv == 0) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR,
SSL_F_TLS_POST_PROCESS_CLIENT_HELLO,
SSL_R_CERT_CB_ERROR);
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
if (!tls1_set_server_sigalgs(s)) {
/* SSLfatal already called */
goto err;
}
if (rv < 0) {
s->rwstate = SSL_X509_LOOKUP;
return WORK_MORE_B;
}
s->rwstate = SSL_NOTHING;
}
/* In TLSv1.3 we selected the ciphersuite before resumption */
test/build.info
+4 -1
View File
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=main
PROGRAMS_NO_INST=\
versions \
aborttest test_test \
sanitytest exdatatest bntest \
sanitytest rsa_complex exdatatest bntest \
ectest ecstresstest ecdsatest gmdifftest pbelutest ideatest \
md2test \
hmactest \
@@ -64,6 +64,9 @@ INCLUDE_MAIN___test_libtestutil_OLB = /INCLUDE=main
INCLUDE[sanitytest]=../include
DEPEND[sanitytest]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
SOURCE[rsa_complex]=rsa_complex.c
INCLUDE[rsa_complex]=../include
SOURCE[test_test]=test_test.c
INCLUDE[test_test]=../include
DEPEND[test_test]=../libcrypto libtestutil.a
test/evp_test.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -459,7 +459,7 @@ typedef struct cipher_data_st {
size_t plaintext_len;
unsigned char *ciphertext;
size_t ciphertext_len;
/* GCM, CCM only */
/* GCM, CCM and OCB only */
unsigned char *aad;
size_t aad_len;
unsigned char *tag;
@@ -487,7 +487,7 @@ static int cipher_test_init(EVP_TEST *t, const char *alg)
if (m == EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE
|| m == EVP_CIPH_OCB_MODE
|| m == EVP_CIPH_CCM_MODE)
cdat->aead = EVP_CIPHER_mode(cipher);
cdat->aead = m;
else if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
cdat->aead = -1;
else
test/rsa_complex.c
+27
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Check to see if there is a conflict between complex.h and openssl/rsa.h.
* The former defines "I" as a macro and earlier versions of the latter use
* for function arguments.
*/
#if defined(__STDC_VERSION__)
# if __STDC_VERSION__ >= 199901L
# include <complex.h>
# endif
#endif
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
int main(int argc, char *argv[])
{
/* There are explicitly no run time checks for this one */
return EXIT_SUCCESS;
}
test/sslapitest.c
+95
View File
@@ -5497,6 +5497,100 @@ static int test_shutdown(int tst)
return testresult;
}
static int cert_cb_cnt;
static int cert_cb(SSL *s, void *arg)
{
SSL_CTX *ctx = (SSL_CTX *)arg;
if (cert_cb_cnt == 0) {
/* Suspend the handshake */
cert_cb_cnt++;
return -1;
} else if (cert_cb_cnt == 1) {
/*
* Update the SSL_CTX, set the certificate and private key and then
* continue the handshake normally.
*/
if (ctx != NULL && !TEST_ptr(SSL_set_SSL_CTX(s, ctx)))
return 0;
if (!TEST_true(SSL_use_certificate_file(s, cert, SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_use_PrivateKey_file(s, privkey,
SSL_FILETYPE_PEM))
|| !TEST_true(SSL_check_private_key(s)))
return 0;
cert_cb_cnt++;
return 1;
}
/* Abort the handshake */
return 0;
}
/*
* Test the certificate callback.
* Test 0: Callback fails
* Test 1: Success - no SSL_set_SSL_CTX() in the callback
* Test 2: Success - SSL_set_SSL_CTX() in the callback
*/
static int test_cert_cb_int(int prot, int tst)
{
SSL_CTX *cctx = NULL, *sctx = NULL, *snictx = NULL;
SSL *clientssl = NULL, *serverssl = NULL;
int testresult = 0, ret;
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_ctx_pair(TLS_server_method(),
TLS_client_method(),
TLS1_VERSION,
prot,
&sctx, &cctx, NULL, NULL)))
goto end;
if (tst == 0)
cert_cb_cnt = -1;
else
cert_cb_cnt = 0;
if (tst == 2)
snictx = SSL_CTX_new(TLS_server_method());
SSL_CTX_set_cert_cb(sctx, cert_cb, snictx);
if (!TEST_true(create_ssl_objects(sctx, cctx, &serverssl, &clientssl,
NULL, NULL)))
goto end;
ret = create_ssl_connection(serverssl, clientssl, SSL_ERROR_NONE);
if (!TEST_true(tst == 0 ? !ret : ret)
|| (tst > 0 && !TEST_int_eq(cert_cb_cnt, 2))) {
goto end;
}
testresult = 1;
end:
SSL_free(serverssl);
SSL_free(clientssl);
SSL_CTX_free(sctx);
SSL_CTX_free(cctx);
SSL_CTX_free(snictx);
return testresult;
}
static int test_cert_cb(int tst)
{
int testresult = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_2
testresult &= test_cert_cb_int(TLS1_2_VERSION, tst);
#endif
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_TLS1_3
testresult &= test_cert_cb_int(TLS1_3_VERSION, tst);
#endif
return testresult;
}
int setup_tests(void)
{
if (!TEST_ptr(cert = test_get_argument(0))
@@ -5599,6 +5693,7 @@ int setup_tests(void)
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ssl_get_shared_ciphers, OSSL_NELEM(shared_ciphers_data));
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_ticket_callbacks, 12);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_shutdown, 7);
ADD_ALL_TESTS(test_cert_cb, 3);
return 1;
}
test/ssltestlib.c
+3 -1
View File
@@ -712,7 +712,9 @@ int create_bare_ssl_connection(SSL *serverssl, SSL *clientssl, int want)
err = SSL_get_error(serverssl, rets);
}
if (!servererr && rets <= 0 && err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ) {
if (!servererr && rets <= 0
&& err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_READ
&& err != SSL_ERROR_WANT_X509_LOOKUP) {
TEST_info("SSL_accept() failed %d, %d", rets, err);
servererr = 1;
}
util/add-depends.pl
+3 -3
View File
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ my $abs_blddir = rel2abs($blddir);
# files we depend on in the same directory that only differ by character case,
# we're fine.
my %depconv_cache =
map { lc catfile($abs_blddir, $_) => $_ }
map { catfile($abs_blddir, $_) => $_ }
keys %{$unified_info{generate}};
my %procedures = (
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ my %procedures = (
# VMS C gives us absolute paths, always. Let's see if we can
# make them relative instead.
$line = lc canonpath($line);
$line = canonpath($line);
unless (defined $depconv_cache{$line}) {
my $dep = $line;
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ my %procedures = (
# VC gives us absolute paths for all include files, so to
# remove system header dependencies, we need to check that
# they don't match $abs_srcdir or $abs_blddir.
$tail = lc canonpath($tail);
$tail = canonpath($tail);
unless (defined $depconv_cache{$tail}) {
my $dep = $tail;
util/mkdef.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -247,7 +247,7 @@ $crypto.=" include/internal/o_str.h";
$crypto.=" include/internal/err.h";
$crypto.=" include/internal/sslconf.h";
foreach my $f ( glob(catfile($config{sourcedir},'include/openssl/*.h')) ) {
my $fn = "include/openssl/" . lc(basename($f));
my $fn = "include/openssl/" . basename($f);
$crypto .= " $fn" if !defined $skipthese{$fn};
}