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Latest update, add TLS 1.3 session time configuration.

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Hakase
2019-04-13 23:25:53 +09:00
parent 48ec086472
commit 704c3822e0
166 changed files with 3539 additions and 1083 deletions
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CHANGES
+19
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,24 @@
Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
*) The functions AES_ige_encrypt() and AES_bi_ige_encrypt() have been
deprecated. These undocumented functions were never integrated into the EVP
layer and implement the AES Infinite Garble Extension (IGE) mode and AES
Bi-directional IGE mode. These modes were never formally standardised and
usage of these functions is believed to be very small. In particular
AES_bi_ige_encrypt() has a known bug. It accepts 2 AES keys, but only one
is ever used. The security implications are believed to be minimal, but
this issue was never fixed for backwards compatibility reasons. New code
should not use these modes.
[Matt Caswell]
*) Add prediction resistance to the DRBG reseeding process.
[Paul Dale]
*) Limit the number of blocks in a data unit for AES-XTS to 2^20 as
mandated by IEEE Std 1619-2018.
[Paul Dale]
*) Added newline escaping functionality to a filename when using openssl dgst.
This output format is to replicate the output format found in the '*sum'
checksum programs. This aims to preserve backward compatibility.
@@ -16,6 +34,7 @@
*) Removed the heartbeat message in DTLS feature, as it has very
little usage and doesn't seem to fulfill a valuable purpose.
The configuration option is now deprecated.
[Richard Levitte]
*) Changed the output of 'openssl {digestname} < file' to display the
Configurations/10-main.conf
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1431,7 +1431,7 @@ my %targets = (
#### Cygwin
"Cygwin-common" => {
inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix", asm("x86_asm") ],
inherit_from => [ "BASE_unix" ],
template => 1,
CC => "gcc",
Configurations/common.tmpl
+2 -2
View File
@@ -151,9 +151,9 @@
return "" if $cache{$lib};
$OUT .= obj2dso(lib => $lib,
attrs => $unified_info{attributes}->{$lib},
objs => $unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib},
objs => $unified_info{sources}->{$lib},
deps => [ resolvedepends($lib) ]);
foreach (@{$unified_info{shared_sources}->{$lib}}) {
foreach (@{$unified_info{sources}->{$lib}}) {
# If this is somehow a compiled object, take care of it that way
# Otherwise, it might simply be generated
if (defined $unified_info{sources}->{$_}) {
Configurations/shared-info.pl
+1
View File
@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ my %shared_info;
return {
%{$shared_info{'gnu-shared'}},
shared_defflag => '-Wl,--version-script=',
dso_ldflags => '-z defs',
};
},
'bsd-gcc-shared' => sub { return $shared_info{'linux-shared'}; },
Configure
+31 -18
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ use OpenSSL::Glob;
my $orig_death_handler = $SIG{__DIE__};
$SIG{__DIE__} = \&death_handler;
my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-dso] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lxxx] [-Lxxx] [-fxxx] [-Kxxx] [no-hw-xxx|no-hw] [[no-]threads] [[no-]shared] [[no-]zlib|zlib-dynamic] [no-asm] [no-egd] [sctp] [386] [--prefix=DIR] [--openssldir=OPENSSLDIR] [--with-xxx[=vvv]] [--config=FILE] os/compiler[:flags]\n";
# Options:
#
@@ -59,8 +59,6 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lx
# [no-]pic [don't] try to build position independent code when supported.
# If disabled, it also disables shared and dynamic-engine.
# no-asm do not use assembler
# no-dso do not compile in any native shared-library methods. This
# will ensure that all methods just return NULL.
# no-egd do not compile support for the entropy-gathering daemon APIs
# [no-]zlib [don't] compile support for zlib compression.
# zlib-dynamic Like "zlib", but the zlib library is expected to be a shared
@@ -76,7 +74,7 @@ my $usage="Usage: Configure [no-<cipher> ...] [enable-<cipher> ...] [-Dxxx] [-lx
# -static while -static is also a pass-through compiler option (and
# as such is limited to environments where it's actually
# meaningful), it triggers a number configuration options,
# namely no-dso, no-pic, no-shared and no-threads. It is
# namely no-pic, no-shared and no-threads. It is
# argued that the only reason to produce statically linked
# binaries (and in context it means executables linked with
# -static flag, and not just executables linked with static
@@ -359,7 +357,6 @@ my @disablables = (
"dgram",
"dh",
"dsa",
"dso",
"dtls",
"dynamic-engine",
"ec",
@@ -372,14 +369,17 @@ my @disablables = (
"err",
"external-tests",
"filenames",
"fips",
"fuzz-libfuzzer",
"fuzz-afl",
"gost",
"idea",
"legacy",
"makedepend",
"md2",
"md4",
"mdc2",
"module",
"msan",
"multiblock",
"nextprotoneg",
@@ -440,6 +440,8 @@ my %deprecated_disablables = (
"hw-padlock" => "padlockeng",
"ripemd" => "rmd160",
"ui" => "ui-console",
"dso" => undef,
"heartbeats" => undef,
);
# All of the following are disabled by default:
@@ -494,12 +496,25 @@ my @disable_cascades = (
"crypto-mdebug" => [ "crypto-mdebug-backtrace" ],
# Without DSO, we can't load dynamic engines, so don't build them dynamic
"dso" => [ "dynamic-engine" ],
# If no modules, then no dynamic engines either
"module" => [ "dynamic-engine" ],
# Without position independent code, there can be no shared libraries or DSOs
"pic" => [ "shared" ],
# Without shared libraries, dynamic engines aren't possible.
# This is due to them having to link with libcrypto and register features
# using the ENGINE functionality, and since that relies on global tables,
# those *have* to be exacty the same as the ones accessed from the app,
# which cannot be guaranteed if shared libraries aren't present.
# (note that even with shared libraries, both the app and dynamic engines
# must be linked with the same library)
"shared" => [ "dynamic-engine" ],
# Other modules don't necessarily have to link with libcrypto, so shared
# libraries do not have to be a condition to produce those.
# Without position independent code, there can be no shared libraries
# or modules.
"pic" => [ "shared", "module" ],
"module" => [ "fips", "legacy" ],
"engine" => [ grep /eng$/, @disablables ],
"hw" => [ "padlockeng" ],
@@ -518,6 +533,7 @@ my @disable_cascades = (
sub { !$disabled{"msan"} } => [ "asm" ],
sub { $disabled{cmac}; } => [ "siv" ],
"legacy" => [ "md2" ],
);
# Avoid protocol support holes. Also disable all versions below N, if version
@@ -876,7 +892,6 @@ while (@argvcopy)
elsif (/^-static$/)
{
push @{$useradd{LDFLAGS}}, $_;
$disabled{"dso"} = "forced";
$disabled{"pic"} = "forced";
$disabled{"shared"} = "forced";
$disabled{"threads"} = "forced";
@@ -1211,9 +1226,9 @@ foreach my $what (sort keys %disabled) {
$config{options} .= " no-$what";
if (!grep { $what eq $_ } ( 'buildtest-c++', 'dso', 'threads', 'shared',
'pic', 'dynamic-engine', 'makedepend',
'zlib-dynamic', 'zlib', 'sse2' )) {
if (!grep { $what eq $_ } ( 'buildtest-c++', 'fips', 'threads', 'shared',
'module', 'pic', 'dynamic-engine', 'makedepend',
'zlib-dynamic', 'zlib', 'sse2', 'legacy' )) {
(my $WHAT = uc $what) =~ s|-|_|g;
my $skipdir = $what;
@@ -1317,9 +1332,8 @@ if ($target{shared_target} eq "")
{
$no_shared_warn = 1
if (!$disabled{shared} || !$disabled{"dynamic-engine"});
$disabled{shared} = "no-shared-target";
$disabled{pic} = $disabled{shared} = $disabled{"dynamic-engine"} =
"no-shared-target";
$disabled{module} = "no-shared-target";
}
if ($disabled{"dynamic-engine"}) {
@@ -2196,9 +2210,8 @@ EOF
src => [ 'sources',
'shared_sources' ],
dst => 'shared_sources' } },
modules => { dso => { src => [ 'sources',
'shared_sources' ],
dst => 'shared_sources' } },
modules => { dso => { src => [ 'sources' ],
dst => 'sources' } },
scripts => { script => { src => [ 'sources' ],
dst => 'sources' } }
} -> {$prodtype};
INSTALL
+11 -3
View File
@@ -353,9 +353,6 @@
on BSD implementations, in which case it can be disabled with
no-devcryptoeng.
no-dso
Don't build support for loading Dynamic Shared Objects.
no-dynamic-engine
Don't build the dynamically loaded engines. This only has an
effect in a "shared" build
@@ -397,6 +394,9 @@
Don't compile in filename and line number information (e.g.
for errors and memory allocation).
no-fips
Don't compile the FIPS module
enable-fuzz-libfuzzer, enable-fuzz-afl
Build with support for fuzzing using either libfuzzer or AFL.
These are developer options only. They may not work on all
@@ -409,9 +409,17 @@
available if the GOST algorithms are also available through
loading an externally supplied engine.
no-legacy
Don't build the legacy provider. Disabling this also disables
the legacy algorithms: MD2 (already disabled by default).
no-makedepend
Don't generate dependencies.
no-module
Don't build any dynamically loadable engines. This also
implies 'no-dynamic-engine'.
no-multiblock
Don't build support for writing multiple records in one
go in libssl (Note: this is a different capability to the
apps/ecparam.c
+17 -2
View File
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_INFORM, OPT_OUTFORM, OPT_IN, OPT_OUT, OPT_TEXT, OPT_C,
OPT_CHECK, OPT_LIST_CURVES, OPT_NO_SEED, OPT_NOOUT, OPT_NAME,
OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_ENGINE,
OPT_CONV_FORM, OPT_PARAM_ENC, OPT_GENKEY, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_CHECK_NAMED,
OPT_R_ENUM
} OPTION_CHOICE;
@@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ const OPTIONS ecparam_options[] = {
{"text", OPT_TEXT, '-', "Print the ec parameters in text form"},
{"C", OPT_C, '-', "Print a 'C' function creating the parameters"},
{"check", OPT_CHECK, '-', "Validate the ec parameters"},
{"check_named", OPT_CHECK_NAMED, '-',
"Check that named EC curve parameters have not been modified"},
{"list_curves", OPT_LIST_CURVES, '-',
"Prints a list of all curve 'short names'"},
{"no_seed", OPT_NO_SEED, '-',
@@ -90,7 +92,7 @@ int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
int informat = FORMAT_PEM, outformat = FORMAT_PEM, noout = 0, C = 0;
int ret = 1, private = 0;
int list_curves = 0, no_seed = 0, check = 0, new_form = 0;
int text = 0, i, genkey = 0;
int text = 0, i, genkey = 0, check_named = 0;
prog = opt_init(argc, argv, ecparam_options);
while ((o = opt_next()) != OPT_EOF) {
@@ -127,6 +129,9 @@ int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
case OPT_CHECK:
check = 1;
break;
case OPT_CHECK_NAMED:
check_named = 1;
break;
case OPT_LIST_CURVES:
list_curves = 1;
break;
@@ -266,6 +271,16 @@ int ecparam_main(int argc, char **argv)
goto end;
}
if (check_named) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "validating named elliptic curve parameters: ");
if (EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 0) <= 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "failed\n");
ERR_print_errors(bio_err);
goto end;
}
BIO_printf(bio_err, "ok\n");
}
if (check) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "checking elliptic curve parameters: ");
if (!EC_GROUP_check(group, NULL)) {
apps/enc.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -500,7 +500,7 @@ int enc_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (hiv != NULL) {
int siz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
if (siz == 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not use by this cipher\n");
BIO_printf(bio_err, "warning: iv not used by this cipher\n");
} else if (!set_hex(hiv, iv, siz)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "invalid hex iv value\n");
goto end;
apps/include/fmt.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -32,8 +32,8 @@
# define FORMAT_PKCS12 6
# define FORMAT_SMIME (7 | B_FORMAT_TEXT)
# define FORMAT_ENGINE 8 /* Not really a file format */
# define FORMAT_PEMRSA (9 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) /* PEM RSAPubicKey format */
# define FORMAT_ASN1RSA 10 /* DER RSAPubicKey format */
# define FORMAT_PEMRSA (9 | B_FORMAT_TEXT) /* PEM RSAPublicKey format */
# define FORMAT_ASN1RSA 10 /* DER RSAPublicKey format */
# define FORMAT_MSBLOB 11 /* MS Key blob format */
# define FORMAT_PVK 12 /* MS PVK file format */
# define FORMAT_HTTP 13 /* Download using HTTP */
apps/ocsp.c
+27 -7
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,8 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *md,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig);
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig,
const EVP_MD *resp_md);
static char **lookup_serial(CA_DB *db, ASN1_INTEGER *ser);
static BIO *init_responder(const char *port);
@@ -138,6 +139,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_RESPOUT, OPT_PATH, OPT_ISSUER, OPT_CERT, OPT_SERIAL,
OPT_INDEX, OPT_CA, OPT_NMIN, OPT_REQUEST, OPT_NDAYS, OPT_RSIGNER,
OPT_RKEY, OPT_ROTHER, OPT_RMD, OPT_RSIGOPT, OPT_HEADER,
OPT_RCID,
OPT_V_ENUM,
OPT_MD,
OPT_MULTI
@@ -220,6 +222,7 @@ const OPTIONS ocsp_options[] = {
{"rmd", OPT_RMD, 's', "Digest Algorithm to use in signature of OCSP response"},
{"rsigopt", OPT_RSIGOPT, 's', "OCSP response signature parameter in n:v form"},
{"header", OPT_HEADER, 's', "key=value header to add"},
{"rcid", OPT_RCID, 's', "Use specified algorithm for cert id in response"},
{"", OPT_MD, '-', "Any supported digest algorithm (sha1,sha256, ... )"},
OPT_V_OPTIONS,
{NULL}
@@ -243,6 +246,7 @@ int ocsp_main(int argc, char **argv)
STACK_OF(X509) *issuers = NULL;
X509 *issuer = NULL, *cert = NULL;
STACK_OF(X509) *rca_cert = NULL;
const EVP_MD *resp_certid_md = NULL;
X509 *signer = NULL, *rsigner = NULL;
X509_STORE *store = NULL;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = NULL;
@@ -499,6 +503,11 @@ int ocsp_main(int argc, char **argv)
if (!X509V3_add_value(header, value, &headers))
goto end;
break;
case OPT_RCID:
resp_certid_md = EVP_get_digestbyname(opt_arg());
if (resp_certid_md == NULL)
goto opthelp;
break;
case OPT_MD:
if (trailing_md) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
@@ -684,7 +693,8 @@ redo_accept:
if (rdb != NULL) {
make_ocsp_response(bio_err, &resp, req, rdb, rca_cert, rsigner, rkey,
rsign_md, rsign_sigopts, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig);
rsign_md, rsign_sigopts, rother, rflags, nmin, ndays, badsig,
resp_certid_md);
if (cbio != NULL)
send_ocsp_response(cbio, resp);
} else if (host != NULL) {
@@ -1138,7 +1148,8 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
EVP_PKEY *rkey, const EVP_MD *rmd,
STACK_OF(OPENSSL_STRING) *sigopts,
STACK_OF(X509) *rother, unsigned long flags,
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig)
int nmin, int ndays, int badsig,
const EVP_MD *resp_md)
{
ASN1_TIME *thisupd = NULL, *nextupd = NULL;
OCSP_CERTID *cid;
@@ -1169,6 +1180,8 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
int found = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *cert_id_md_oid;
const EVP_MD *cert_id_md;
OCSP_CERTID *cid_resp_md = NULL;
one = OCSP_request_onereq_get0(req, i);
cid = OCSP_onereq_get0_id(one);
@@ -1184,11 +1197,18 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
X509 *ca_cert = sk_X509_value(ca, jj);
OCSP_CERTID *ca_id = OCSP_cert_to_id(cert_id_md, NULL, ca_cert);
if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid) == 0)
if (OCSP_id_issuer_cmp(ca_id, cid) == 0) {
found = 1;
if (resp_md != NULL)
cid_resp_md = OCSP_cert_to_id(resp_md, NULL, ca_cert);
}
OCSP_CERTID_free(ca_id);
}
OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid);
inf = lookup_serial(db, serial);
/* at this point, we can have cid be an alias of cid_resp_md */
cid = (cid_resp_md != NULL) ? cid_resp_md : cid;
if (!found) {
OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
@@ -1196,8 +1216,6 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
0, NULL, thisupd, nextupd);
continue;
}
OCSP_id_get0_info(NULL, NULL, NULL, &serial, cid);
inf = lookup_serial(db, serial);
if (inf == NULL) {
OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_UNKNOWN,
@@ -1212,6 +1230,7 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *invtm = NULL;
OCSP_SINGLERESP *single;
int reason = -1;
unpack_revinfo(&revtm, &reason, &inst, &invtm, inf[DB_rev_date]);
single = OCSP_basic_add1_status(bs, cid,
V_OCSP_CERTSTATUS_REVOKED,
@@ -1227,6 +1246,7 @@ static void make_ocsp_response(BIO *err, OCSP_RESPONSE **resp, OCSP_REQUEST *req
ASN1_TIME_free(revtm);
ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_free(invtm);
}
OCSP_CERTID_free(cid_resp_md);
}
OCSP_copy_nonce(bs, req);
apps/pkeyutl.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -688,7 +688,7 @@ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
if (filesize < 0) {
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"Error: unable to determine file size for oneshot operation\n");
return rv;
goto end;
}
mbuf = app_malloc(filesize, "oneshot sign/verify buffer");
switch(pkey_op) {
@@ -717,7 +717,6 @@ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
}
break;
}
OPENSSL_free(mbuf);
goto end;
}
@@ -767,6 +766,7 @@ static int do_raw_keyop(int pkey_op, EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx,
}
end:
OPENSSL_free(mbuf);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(mctx);
return rv;
}
apps/s_client.c
+3 -1
View File
@@ -2277,7 +2277,7 @@ int s_client_main(int argc, char **argv)
do {
mbuf_len = BIO_gets(fbio, mbuf, BUFSIZZ);
}
while (mbuf_len > 3 && mbuf[3] == '-');
while (mbuf_len > 3 && (!isdigit(mbuf[0]) || !isdigit(mbuf[1]) || !isdigit(mbuf[2]) || mbuf[3] != ' '));
(void)BIO_flush(fbio);
BIO_pop(fbio);
BIO_free(fbio);
@@ -3313,6 +3313,8 @@ static void print_stuff(BIO *bio, SSL *s, int full)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
if (BIO_get_ktls_send(SSL_get_wbio(s)))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using Kernel TLS for sending\n");
if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(SSL_get_rbio(s)))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using Kernel TLS for receiving\n");
#endif
if (OSSL_TRACE_ENABLED(TLS)) {
apps/s_server.c
+2
View File
@@ -2921,6 +2921,8 @@ static void print_connection_info(SSL *con)
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
if (BIO_get_ktls_send(SSL_get_wbio(con)))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using Kernel TLS for sending\n");
if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(SSL_get_rbio(con)))
BIO_printf(bio_err, "Using Kernel TLS for receiving\n");
#endif
(void)BIO_flush(bio_s_out);
apps/speed.c
+94 -5
View File
@@ -57,6 +57,9 @@
# include <openssl/md5.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
#include <openssl/cmac.h>
#endif
#include <openssl/sha.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RMD160
# include <openssl/ripemd.h>
@@ -163,10 +166,12 @@ static int DES_ede3_cbc_encrypt_loop(void *args);
#endif
static int AES_cbc_128_encrypt_loop(void *args);
static int AES_cbc_192_encrypt_loop(void *args);
static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args);
static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args);
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args);
static int AES_ige_192_encrypt_loop(void *args);
static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args);
#endif
static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args);
static int RAND_bytes_loop(void *args);
static int EVP_Update_loop(void *args);
@@ -300,7 +305,7 @@ typedef enum OPTION_choice {
OPT_ERR = -1, OPT_EOF = 0, OPT_HELP,
OPT_ELAPSED, OPT_EVP, OPT_HMAC, OPT_DECRYPT, OPT_ENGINE, OPT_MULTI,
OPT_MR, OPT_MB, OPT_MISALIGN, OPT_ASYNCJOBS, OPT_R_ENUM,
OPT_PRIMES, OPT_SECONDS, OPT_BYTES, OPT_AEAD
OPT_PRIMES, OPT_SECONDS, OPT_BYTES, OPT_AEAD, OPT_CMAC
} OPTION_CHOICE;
const OPTIONS speed_options[] = {
@@ -309,6 +314,9 @@ const OPTIONS speed_options[] = {
{"help", OPT_HELP, '-', "Display this summary"},
{"evp", OPT_EVP, 's', "Use EVP-named cipher or digest"},
{"hmac", OPT_HMAC, 's', "HMAC using EVP-named digest"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
{"cmac", OPT_CMAC, 's', "CMAC using EVP-named cipher"},
#endif
{"decrypt", OPT_DECRYPT, '-',
"Time decryption instead of encryption (only EVP)"},
{"aead", OPT_AEAD, '-',
@@ -371,6 +379,7 @@ const OPTIONS speed_options[] = {
#define D_GHASH 29
#define D_RAND 30
#define D_EVP_HMAC 31
#define D_EVP_CMAC 32
/* name of algorithms to test */
static const char *names[] = {
@@ -381,7 +390,7 @@ static const char *names[] = {
"camellia-128 cbc", "camellia-192 cbc", "camellia-256 cbc",
"evp", "sha256", "sha512", "whirlpool",
"aes-128 ige", "aes-192 ige", "aes-256 ige", "ghash",
"rand", "hmac"
"rand", "hmac", "cmac"
};
#define ALGOR_NUM OSSL_NELEM(names)
@@ -421,9 +430,11 @@ static const OPT_PAIR doit_choices[] = {
{"aes-128-cbc", D_CBC_128_AES},
{"aes-192-cbc", D_CBC_192_AES},
{"aes-256-cbc", D_CBC_256_AES},
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
{"aes-128-ige", D_IGE_128_AES},
{"aes-192-ige", D_IGE_192_AES},
{"aes-256-ige", D_IGE_256_AES},
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RC2
{"rc2-cbc", D_CBC_RC2},
{"rc2", D_CBC_RC2},
@@ -629,6 +640,9 @@ typedef struct loopargs_st {
#endif
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
HMAC_CTX *hctx;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx;
#endif
GCM128_CONTEXT *gcm_ctx;
} loopargs_t;
static int run_benchmark(int async_jobs, int (*loop_function) (void *),
@@ -859,6 +873,7 @@ static int AES_cbc_256_encrypt_loop(void *args)
return count;
}
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
static int AES_ige_128_encrypt_loop(void *args)
{
loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args;
@@ -894,6 +909,7 @@ static int AES_ige_256_encrypt_loop(void *args)
(size_t)lengths[testnum], &aes_ks3, iv, AES_ENCRYPT);
return count;
}
#endif
static int CRYPTO_gcm128_aad_loop(void *args)
{
@@ -1064,6 +1080,33 @@ static int EVP_HMAC_loop(void *args)
return count;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
static const EVP_CIPHER *evp_cmac_cipher = NULL;
static char *evp_cmac_name = NULL;
static int EVP_CMAC_loop(void *args)
{
loopargs_t *tempargs = *(loopargs_t **) args;
unsigned char *buf = tempargs->buf;
CMAC_CTX *cmac_ctx = tempargs->cmac_ctx;
static const char key[16] = "This is a key...";
unsigned char mac[16];
size_t len = sizeof(mac);
int count;
#ifndef SIGALRM
int nb_iter = save_count * 4 * lengths[0] / lengths[testnum];
#endif
for (count = 0; COND(nb_iter); count++) {
if (!CMAC_Init(cmac_ctx, key, sizeof(key), evp_cmac_cipher, NULL)
|| !CMAC_Update(cmac_ctx, buf, lengths[testnum])
|| !CMAC_Final(cmac_ctx, mac, &len))
return -1;
}
return count;
}
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
static long rsa_c[RSA_NUM][2]; /* # RSA iteration test */
@@ -1610,6 +1653,17 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
doit[D_EVP_HMAC] = 1;
break;
case OPT_CMAC:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
evp_cmac_cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(opt_arg());
if (evp_cmac_cipher == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "%s: %s is an unknown cipher\n",
prog, opt_arg());
goto end;
}
doit[D_EVP_CMAC] = 1;
#endif
break;
case OPT_DECRYPT:
decrypt = 1;
break;
@@ -1848,9 +1902,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
e = setup_engine(engine_id, 0);
/* No parameters; turn on everything. */
if (argc == 0 && !doit[D_EVP] && !doit[D_EVP_HMAC]) {
if (argc == 0 && !doit[D_EVP] && !doit[D_EVP_HMAC] && !doit[D_EVP_CMAC]) {
for (i = 0; i < ALGOR_NUM; i++)
if (i != D_EVP && i != D_EVP_HMAC)
if (i != D_EVP && i != D_EVP_HMAC && i != D_EVP_CMAC)
doit[i] = 1;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RSA
for (i = 0; i < RSA_NUM; i++)
@@ -2381,6 +2435,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
if (doit[D_IGE_128_AES]) {
for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) {
print_message(names[D_IGE_128_AES], c[D_IGE_128_AES][testnum],
@@ -2414,6 +2469,7 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
print_result(D_IGE_256_AES, testnum, count, d);
}
}
#endif
if (doit[D_GHASH]) {
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
loopargs[i].gcm_ctx =
@@ -2719,6 +2775,36 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
}
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
if (doit[D_EVP_CMAC]) {
if (evp_cmac_cipher != NULL) {
const char *cipher_name = OBJ_nid2ln(EVP_CIPHER_type(evp_cmac_cipher));
evp_cmac_name = app_malloc(sizeof("CMAC()") + strlen(cipher_name),
"CMAC name");
sprintf(evp_cmac_name, "CMAC(%s)", cipher_name);
names[D_EVP_CMAC] = evp_cmac_name;
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++) {
loopargs[i].cmac_ctx = CMAC_CTX_new();
if (loopargs[i].cmac_ctx == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "CMAC malloc failure, exiting...");
exit(1);
}
}
for (testnum = 0; testnum < size_num; testnum++) {
print_message(names[D_EVP_CMAC], save_count, lengths[testnum],
seconds.sym);
Time_F(START);
count = run_benchmark(async_jobs, EVP_CMAC_loop, loopargs);
d = Time_F(STOP);
print_result(D_EVP_CMAC, testnum, count, d);
}
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
CMAC_CTX_free(loopargs[i].cmac_ctx);
}
}
#endif
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
if (RAND_bytes(loopargs[i].buf, 36) <= 0)
goto end;
@@ -3418,6 +3504,9 @@ int speed_main(int argc, char **argv)
#endif
}
OPENSSL_free(evp_hmac_name);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMAC
OPENSSL_free(evp_cmac_name);
#endif
if (async_jobs > 0) {
for (i = 0; i < loopargs_len; i++)
apps/verify.c
+26 -14
View File
@@ -246,27 +246,37 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
if (sm2id != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
ASN1_OCTET_STRING v;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *v;
v.data = sm2id;
v.length = sm2idlen;
v = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (v == NULL) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: SM2 ID allocation failed\n");
goto end;
}
X509_set_sm2_id(x, &v);
if (!ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(v, sm2id, sm2idlen)) {
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error: setting SM2 ID failed\n");
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(v);
goto end;
}
X509_set0_sm2_id(x, v);
#endif
}
csc = X509_STORE_CTX_new();
if (csc == NULL) {
printf("error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
BIO_printf(bio_err, "error %s: X.509 store context allocation failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}
X509_STORE_set_flags(ctx, vflags);
if (!X509_STORE_CTX_init(csc, ctx, x, uchain)) {
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
printf("error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"error %s: X.509 store context initialization failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
goto end;
}
if (tchain != NULL)
@@ -275,28 +285,30 @@ static int check(X509_STORE *ctx, const char *file,
X509_STORE_CTX_set0_crls(csc, crls);
i = X509_verify_cert(csc);
if (i > 0 && X509_STORE_CTX_get_error(csc) == X509_V_OK) {
printf("%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
BIO_printf(bio_out, "%s: OK\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
ret = 1;
if (show_chain) {
int j;
chain = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_chain(csc);
num_untrusted = X509_STORE_CTX_get_num_untrusted(csc);
printf("Chain:\n");
BIO_printf(bio_out, "Chain:\n");
for (j = 0; j < sk_X509_num(chain); j++) {
X509 *cert = sk_X509_value(chain, j);
printf("depth=%d: ", j);
BIO_printf(bio_out, "depth=%d: ", j);
X509_NAME_print_ex_fp(stdout,
X509_get_subject_name(cert),
0, get_nameopt());
if (j < num_untrusted)
printf(" (untrusted)");
printf("\n");
BIO_printf(bio_out, " (untrusted)");
BIO_printf(bio_out, "\n");
}
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
}
} else {
printf("error %s: verification failed\n", (file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
BIO_printf(bio_err,
"error %s: verification failed\n",
(file == NULL) ? "stdin" : file);
}
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
+14
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#if OPENSSL_API_3
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "aes_locl.h"
@@ -34,6 +38,7 @@ typedef struct {
/* N.B. The IV for this mode is _twice_ the block size */
/* Use of this function is deprecated. */
void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
size_t length, const AES_KEY *key,
unsigned char *ivec, const int enc)
@@ -162,6 +167,14 @@ void AES_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
/*
* Note that its effectively impossible to do biIGE in anything other
* than a single pass, so no provision is made for chaining.
*
* NB: The implementation of AES_bi_ige_encrypt has a bug. It is supposed to use
* 2 AES keys, but in fact only one is ever used. This bug has been present
* since this code was first implemented. It is believed to have minimal
* security impact in practice and has therefore not been fixed for backwards
* compatibility reasons.
*
* Use of this function is deprecated.
*/
/* N.B. The IV for this mode is _four times_ the block size */
@@ -282,3 +295,4 @@ void AES_bi_ige_encrypt(const unsigned char *in, unsigned char *out,
}
}
}
#endif
crypto/bio/b_addr.c
+6
View File
@@ -683,6 +683,12 @@ int BIO_lookup_ex(const char *host, const char *service, int lookup_type,
hints.ai_family = family;
hints.ai_socktype = socktype;
hints.ai_protocol = protocol;
#ifdef AI_ADDRCONFIG
#ifdef AF_UNSPEC
if (family == AF_UNSPEC)
#endif
hints.ai_flags |= AI_ADDRCONFIG;
#endif
if (lookup_type == BIO_LOOKUP_SERVER)
hints.ai_flags |= AI_PASSIVE;
crypto/bio/bss_sock.c
+13 -6
View File
@@ -108,7 +108,12 @@ static int sock_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
if (out != NULL) {
clear_socket_error();
ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl);
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(b))
ret = ktls_read_record(b->num, out, outl);
else
# endif
ret = readsocket(b->num, out, outl);
BIO_clear_retry_flags(b);
if (ret <= 0) {
if (BIO_sock_should_retry(ret))
@@ -177,20 +182,22 @@ static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
ret = 1;
break;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
case BIO_CTRL_SET_KTLS_SEND:
case BIO_CTRL_SET_KTLS:
crypto_info = (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)ptr;
ret = ktls_start(b->num, crypto_info, sizeof(*crypto_info), num);
if (ret)
BIO_set_ktls_flag(b);
BIO_set_ktls_flag(b, num);
break;
case BIO_CTRL_GET_KTLS_SEND:
return BIO_should_ktls_flag(b);
case BIO_CTRL_SET_KTLS_SEND_CTRL_MSG:
return BIO_should_ktls_flag(b, 1);
case BIO_CTRL_GET_KTLS_RECV:
return BIO_should_ktls_flag(b, 0);
case BIO_CTRL_SET_KTLS_TX_SEND_CTRL_MSG:
BIO_set_ktls_ctrl_msg_flag(b);
b->ptr = (void *)num;
ret = 0;
break;
case BIO_CTRL_CLEAR_KTLS_CTRL_MSG:
case BIO_CTRL_CLEAR_KTLS_TX_CTRL_MSG:
BIO_clear_ktls_ctrl_msg_flag(b);
ret = 0;
break;
crypto/build.info
+7 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ SUBDIRS=objects buffer bio stack lhash rand evp asn1 pem x509 x509v3 conf \
LIBS=../libcrypto
# The Core
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=provider_core.c provider_predefined.c core_fetch.c
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=provider_core.c provider_predefined.c provider_conf.c \
core_fetch.c
# Central utilities
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\
@@ -20,6 +21,11 @@ SOURCE[../libcrypto]=\
trace.c provider.c params.c \
{- $target{cpuid_asm_src} -} {- $target{uplink_aux_src} -}
# FIPS module
SOURCE[../providers/fips]=\
cryptlib.c mem.c mem_clr.c params.c
DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h
GENERATE[buildinf.h]=../util/mkbuildinf.pl "$(CC) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(CPPFLAGS_Q)" "$(PLATFORM)"
DEPEND[buildinf.h]=../configdata.pm
crypto/conf/conf_lib.c
+4 -2
View File
@@ -356,8 +356,10 @@ OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *OPENSSL_INIT_new(void)
{
OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *ret = malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret != NULL)
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
memset(ret, 0, sizeof(*ret));
ret->flags = DEFAULT_CONF_MFLAGS;
return ret;
crypto/conf/conf_mall.c
+2
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include "internal/provider.h"
#include "conf_lcl.h"
/* Load all OpenSSL builtin modules */
@@ -28,4 +29,5 @@ void OPENSSL_load_builtin_modules(void)
#endif
EVP_add_alg_module();
conf_add_ssl_module();
ossl_provider_add_conf_module();
}
crypto/conf/conf_mod.c
+4
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include "internal/conf.h"
#include "internal/dso.h"
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
#define DSO_mod_init_name "OPENSSL_init"
#define DSO_mod_finish_name "OPENSSL_finish"
@@ -92,6 +93,7 @@ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
return 1;
}
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuration in section %s\n", vsection);
values = NCONF_get_section(cnf, vsection);
if (!values)
@@ -100,6 +102,8 @@ int CONF_modules_load(const CONF *cnf, const char *appname,
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(values); i++) {
vl = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(values, i);
ret = module_run(cnf, vl->name, vl->value, flags);
OSSL_TRACE3(CONF, "Running module %s (%s) returned %d\n",
vl->name, vl->value, ret);
if (ret <= 0)
if (!(flags & CONF_MFLAGS_IGNORE_ERRORS))
return ret;
crypto/core_fetch.c
+3 -2
View File
@@ -35,8 +35,9 @@ static int ossl_method_construct_this(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider, void *cbdata)
const OSSL_ALGORITHM *thismap = map++;
void *method = NULL;
if ((method = data->mcm->construct(thismap->implementation, provider,
data->mcm_data)) == NULL)
if ((method = data->mcm->construct(thismap->algorithm_name,
thismap->implementation, provider,
data->mcm_data)) == NULL)
continue;
/*
crypto/cpt_err.c
+10
View File
@@ -50,8 +50,12 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_functs[] = {
"OSSL_PROVIDER_add_builtin"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ACTIVATE, 0),
"ossl_provider_activate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ADD_PARAMETER, 0),
"ossl_provider_add_parameter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_NEW, 0),
"ossl_provider_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_SET_MODULE_PATH, 0),
"ossl_provider_set_module_path"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PKEY_HMAC_INIT, 0), "pkey_hmac_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PKEY_POLY1305_INIT, 0),
"pkey_poly1305_init"},
@@ -59,6 +63,10 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_functs[] = {
"pkey_siphash_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_ACTIVATE, 0),
"provider_activate"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_INIT, 0),
"provider_conf_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_LOAD, 0),
"provider_conf_load"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_NEW, 0), "provider_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_STORE_NEW, 0),
"provider_store_new"},
@@ -75,6 +83,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_reasons[] = {
"odd number of digits"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_ALREADY_EXISTS),
"provider already exists"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR),
"provider section error"},
{0, NULL}
};
crypto/dso/dso_openssl.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@
#include "dso_locl.h"
#if !defined(DSO_VMS) && !defined(DSO_DLCFN) && !defined(DSO_DL) && !defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(DSO_DLFCN)
#ifdef DSO_NONE
static DSO_METHOD dso_meth_null = {
"NULL shared library method"
crypto/ec/curve25519.c
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -254,6 +254,7 @@ static void x25519_scalar_mulx(uint8_t out[32], const uint8_t scalar[32],
#if defined(X25519_ASM) \
|| ( (defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && __SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16) \
&& !defined(__sparc__) \
&& (!defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__) || (__SIZEOF_LONG__ == 8)) \
&& !(defined(__ANDROID__) && !defined(__clang__)) )
/*
* Base 2^51 implementation. It's virtually no different from reference
crypto/ec/curve448/curve448utils.h
+4 -2
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2015 Cryptography Research, Inc.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
*/
# ifndef C448_WORD_BITS
# if (defined(__SIZEOF_INT128__) && (__SIZEOF_INT128__ == 16)) \
&& !defined(__sparc__)
&& !defined(__sparc__) \
&& (!defined(__SIZEOF_LONG__) || (__SIZEOF_LONG__ == 8))
# define C448_WORD_BITS 64 /* The number of bits in a word */
# else
# define C448_WORD_BITS 32 /* The number of bits in a word */
crypto/ec/ec_check.c
+16 -1
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -10,6 +10,16 @@
#include "ec_lcl.h"
#include <openssl/err.h>
int EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, int nist_only)
{
int nid;
nid = ec_curve_nid_from_params(group);
if (nid > 0 && nist_only && EC_curve_nid2nist(nid) == NULL)
nid = NID_undef;
return nid;
}
int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret = 0;
@@ -17,6 +27,11 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
EC_POINT *point = NULL;
if (group == NULL || group->meth == NULL) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GROUP_CHECK, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
/* Custom curves assumed to be correct */
if ((group->meth->flags & EC_FLAGS_CUSTOM_CURVE) != 0)
return 1;
crypto/ec/ec_curve.c
+122 -1
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/o_str.h"
typedef struct {
int field_type, /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
@@ -1136,6 +1137,7 @@ static const struct {
},
{
/* no seed */
/* p */
0x02, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x04, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
@@ -1209,6 +1211,7 @@ static const struct {
},
{
/* no seed */
/* p */
0x80, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x40, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01,
@@ -1244,6 +1247,7 @@ static const struct {
},
{
/* no seed */
/* p */
0x08, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00,
0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x10, 0xA1,
@@ -1278,7 +1282,7 @@ static const struct {
NID_X9_62_characteristic_two_field, 20, 36, 2
},
{
/* no seed */
/* seed */
0x77, 0xE2, 0xB0, 0x73, 0x70, 0xEB, 0x0F, 0x83, 0x2A, 0x6D, 0xD5, 0xB6,
0x2D, 0xFC, 0x88, 0xCD, 0x06, 0xBB, 0x84, 0xBE,
/* p */
@@ -3197,3 +3201,120 @@ int EC_curve_nist2nid(const char *name)
}
return NID_undef;
}
#define NUM_BN_FIELDS 6
/*
* Validates EC domain parameter data for known named curves.
* This can be used when a curve is loaded explicitly (without a curve
* name) or to validate that domain parameters have not been modified.
*
* Returns: The nid associated with the found named curve, or NID_undef
* if not found. If there was an error it returns -1.
*/
int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group)
{
int ret = -1, nid, len, field_type, param_len;
size_t i, seed_len;
const unsigned char *seed, *params_seed, *params;
unsigned char *param_bytes = NULL;
const EC_CURVE_DATA *data;
const EC_POINT *generator = NULL;
const EC_METHOD *meth;
const BIGNUM *cofactor = NULL;
/* An array of BIGNUMs for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
BIGNUM *bn[NUM_BN_FIELDS] = {NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL};
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
meth = EC_GROUP_method_of(group);
if (meth == NULL)
return -1;
/* Use the optional named curve nid as a search field */
nid = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(group);
field_type = EC_METHOD_get_field_type(meth);
seed_len = EC_GROUP_get_seed_len(group);
seed = EC_GROUP_get0_seed(group);
cofactor = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(group);
ctx = BN_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
/*
* The built-in curves contains data fields (p, a, b, x, y, order) that are
* all zero-padded to be the same size. The size of the padding is
* determined by either the number of bytes in the field modulus (p) or the
* EC group order, whichever is larger.
*/
param_len = BN_num_bytes(group->order);
len = BN_num_bytes(group->field);
if (len > param_len)
param_len = len;
/* Allocate space to store the padded data for (p, a, b, x, y, order) */
param_bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS);
if (param_bytes == NULL)
goto end;
/* Create the bignums */
for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
if ((bn[i] = BN_CTX_get(ctx)) == NULL)
goto end;
}
/*
* Fill in the bn array with the same values as the internal curves
* i.e. the values are p, a, b, x, y, order.
*/
/* Get p, a & b */
if (!(EC_GROUP_get_curve(group, bn[0], bn[1], bn[2], ctx)
&& ((generator = EC_GROUP_get0_generator(group)) != NULL)
/* Get x & y */
&& EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(group, generator, bn[3], bn[4], ctx)
/* Get order */
&& EC_GROUP_get_order(group, bn[5], ctx)))
goto end;
/*
* Convert the bignum array to bytes that are joined together to form
* a single buffer that contains data for all fields.
* (p, a, b, x, y, order) are all zero padded to be the same size.
*/
for (i = 0; i < NUM_BN_FIELDS; ++i) {
if (BN_bn2binpad(bn[i], &param_bytes[i*param_len], param_len) <= 0)
goto end;
}
for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++) {
const ec_list_element curve = curve_list[i];
data = curve.data;
/* Get the raw order byte data */
params_seed = (const unsigned char *)(data + 1); /* skip header */
params = params_seed + data->seed_len;
/* Look for unique fields in the fixed curve data */
if (data->field_type == field_type
&& param_len == data->param_len
&& (nid <= 0 || nid == curve.nid)
/* check the optional cofactor (ignore if its zero) */
&& (BN_is_zero(cofactor)
|| BN_is_word(cofactor, (const BN_ULONG)curve.data->cofactor))
/* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
&& (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
|| ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
&& OPENSSL_memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
/* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
&& OPENSSL_memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
== 0) {
ret = curve.nid;
goto end;
}
}
/* Gets here if the group was not found */
ret = NID_undef;
end:
OPENSSL_free(param_bytes);
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
crypto/ec/ec_key.c
+123 -27
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -195,59 +195,90 @@ int ossl_ec_key_gen(EC_KEY *eckey)
return eckey->group->meth->keygen(eckey);
}
/*
* ECC Key generation.
* See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2 "Key Pair Generation by Testing Candidates"
*
* Params:
* eckey An EC key object that contains domain params. The generated keypair
* is stored in this object.
* Returns 1 if the keypair was generated or 0 otherwise.
*/
int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0;
BN_CTX *ctx = NULL;
BIGNUM *priv_key = NULL;
const BIGNUM *order = NULL;
EC_POINT *pub_key = NULL;
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
const EC_GROUP *group = eckey->group;
if (eckey->priv_key == NULL) {
priv_key = BN_new();
priv_key = BN_secure_new();
if (priv_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
priv_key = eckey->priv_key;
order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(eckey->group);
/*
* Steps (1-2): Check domain parameters and security strength.
* These steps must be done by the user. This would need to be
* stated in the security policy.
*/
order = EC_GROUP_get0_order(group);
if (order == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* Steps (3-7): priv_key = DRBG_RAND(order_n_bits) (range [1, n-1]).
* Although this is slightly different from the standard, it is effectively
* equivalent as it gives an unbiased result ranging from 1..n-1. It is also
* faster as the standard needs to retry more often. Also doing
* 1 + rand[0..n-2] would effect the way that tests feed dummy entropy into
* rand so the simpler backward compatible method has been used here.
*/
do
if (!BN_priv_rand_range(priv_key, order))
goto err;
while (BN_is_zero(priv_key)) ;
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL) {
pub_key = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group);
pub_key = EC_POINT_new(group);
if (pub_key == NULL)
goto err;
} else
pub_key = eckey->pub_key;
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, ctx))
/* Step (8) : pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve) */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(group, pub_key, priv_key, NULL, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
eckey->priv_key = priv_key;
eckey->pub_key = pub_key;
priv_key = NULL;
pub_key = NULL;
ok = 1;
err:
if (eckey->pub_key == NULL)
EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
if (eckey->priv_key != priv_key)
BN_free(priv_key);
BN_CTX_free(ctx);
err:
/* Step (9): If there is an error return an invalid keypair. */
if (!ok) {
BN_clear(eckey->priv_key);
if (eckey->pub_key != NULL)
EC_POINT_set_to_infinity(group, eckey->pub_key);
}
EC_POINT_free(pub_key);
BN_clear_free(priv_key);
return ok;
}
int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey)
{
/*
* See SP800-56AR3 5.6.1.2.2: Step (8)
* pub_key = priv_key * G (where G is a point on the curve)
*/
return EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, eckey->priv_key, NULL,
NULL, NULL);
}
@@ -267,6 +298,58 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
return eckey->group->meth->keycheck(eckey);
}
/*
* Check the range of the EC public key.
* See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
* i.e.
* - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
* interval[0, p − 1], OR
* - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
* Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
*/
static int ec_key_public_range_check(BN_CTX *ctx, const EC_KEY *key)
{
int ret = 0;
BIGNUM *x, *y;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
x = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
y = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
if (y == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EC_POINT_get_affine_coordinates(key->group, key->pub_key, x, y, ctx))
goto err;
if (EC_METHOD_get_field_type(key->group->meth) == NID_X9_62_prime_field) {
if (BN_is_negative(x)
|| BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0
|| BN_is_negative(y)
|| BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0) {
goto err;
}
} else {
int m = EC_GROUP_get_degree(key->group);
if (BN_num_bits(x) > m || BN_num_bits(y) > m) {
goto err;
}
}
ret = 1;
err:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
return ret;
}
/*
* ECC Key validation as specified in SP800-56A R3.
* Section 5.6.2.3.3 ECC Full Public-Key Validation
* Section 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
* Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency
* NOTES:
* Before calling this method in fips mode, there should be an assurance that
* an approved elliptic-curve group is used.
* Returns 1 if the key is valid, otherwise it returns 0.
*/
int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
{
int ok = 0;
@@ -279,6 +362,7 @@ int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
return 0;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 1): Q != infinity */
if (EC_POINT_is_at_infinity(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_AT_INFINITY);
goto err;
@@ -286,20 +370,28 @@ int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
if ((ctx = BN_CTX_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((point = EC_POINT_new(eckey->group)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* testing whether the pub_key is on the elliptic curve */
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 2) Test if the public key is in range */
if (!ec_key_public_range_check(ctx, eckey)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 3) is the pub_key on the elliptic curve */
if (EC_POINT_is_on_curve(eckey->group, eckey->pub_key, ctx) <= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_POINT_IS_NOT_ON_CURVE);
goto err;
}
/* testing whether pub_key * order is the point at infinity */
order = eckey->group->order;
if (BN_is_zero(order)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_INVALID_GROUP_ORDER);
goto err;
}
/* 5.6.2.3.3 (Step 4) : pub_key * order is the point at infinity. */
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, NULL, eckey->pub_key, order, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
goto err;
@@ -308,15 +400,21 @@ int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
goto err;
}
/*
* in case the priv_key is present : check if generator * priv_key ==
* pub_key
*/
if (eckey->priv_key != NULL) {
if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
/*
* 5.6.2.1.2 Owner Assurance of Private-Key Validity
* The private key is in the range [1, order-1]
*/
if (BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, BN_value_one()) < 0
|| BN_cmp(eckey->priv_key, order) >= 0) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, EC_R_WRONG_ORDER);
goto err;
}
/*
* Section 5.6.2.1.4 Owner Assurance of Pair-wise Consistency (b)
* Check if generator * priv_key = pub_key
*/
if (!EC_POINT_mul(eckey->group, point, eckey->priv_key,
NULL, NULL, ctx)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SIMPLE_CHECK_KEY, ERR_R_EC_LIB);
@@ -368,12 +466,10 @@ int EC_KEY_set_public_key_affine_coordinates(EC_KEY *key, BIGNUM *x,
goto err;
/*
* Check if retrieved coordinates match originals and are less than field
* order: if not values are out of range.
* Check if retrieved coordinates match originals. The range check is done
* inside EC_KEY_check_key().
*/
if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)
|| (BN_cmp(x, key->group->field) >= 0)
|| (BN_cmp(y, key->group->field) >= 0)) {
if (BN_cmp(x, tx) || BN_cmp(y, ty)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_KEY_SET_PUBLIC_KEY_AFFINE_COORDINATES,
EC_R_COORDINATES_OUT_OF_RANGE);
goto err;
crypto/ec/ec_lcl.h
+6 -7
View File
@@ -309,13 +309,10 @@ struct ec_point_st {
static ossl_inline int ec_point_is_compat(const EC_POINT *point,
const EC_GROUP *group)
{
if (group->meth != point->meth
|| (group->curve_name != 0
&& point->curve_name != 0
&& group->curve_name != point->curve_name))
return 0;
return 1;
return group->meth == point->meth
&& (group->curve_name == 0
|| point->curve_name == 0
|| group->curve_name == point->curve_name);
}
NISTP224_PRE_COMP *EC_nistp224_pre_comp_dup(NISTP224_PRE_COMP *);
@@ -595,6 +592,8 @@ int ec_key_simple_generate_key(EC_KEY *eckey);
int ec_key_simple_generate_public_key(EC_KEY *eckey);
int ec_key_simple_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey);
int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group);
/* EC_METHOD definitions */
struct ec_key_method_st {
crypto/ec/ec_lib.c
+30 -15
View File
@@ -284,15 +284,17 @@ int EC_GROUP_set_generator(EC_GROUP *group, const EC_POINT *generator,
if (order != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(group->order, order))
return 0;
} else
} else {
BN_zero(group->order);
}
/* The cofactor is an optional field, so it should be able to be NULL. */
if (cofactor != NULL) {
if (!BN_copy(group->cofactor, cofactor))
return 0;
} else
} else {
BN_zero(group->cofactor);
}
/*
* Some groups have an order with
* factors of two, which makes the Montgomery setup fail.
@@ -530,30 +532,43 @@ int EC_GROUP_cmp(const EC_GROUP *a, const EC_GROUP *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
!b->meth->group_get_curve(b, b1, b2, b3, ctx))
r = 1;
if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) || BN_cmp(a2, b2) || BN_cmp(a3, b3))
/* return 1 if the curve parameters are different */
if (r || BN_cmp(a1, b1) != 0 || BN_cmp(a2, b2) != 0 || BN_cmp(a3, b3) != 0)
r = 1;
/* XXX EC_POINT_cmp() assumes that the methods are equal */
/* return 1 if the generators are different */
if (r || EC_POINT_cmp(a, EC_GROUP_get0_generator(a),
EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx))
EC_GROUP_get0_generator(b), ctx) != 0)
r = 1;
if (!r) {
const BIGNUM *ao, *bo, *ac, *bc;
/* compare the order and cofactor */
/* compare the orders */
ao = EC_GROUP_get0_order(a);
bo = EC_GROUP_get0_order(b);
if (ao == NULL || bo == NULL) {
/* return an error if either order is NULL */
r = -1;
goto end;
}
if (BN_cmp(ao, bo) != 0) {
/* return 1 if orders are different */
r = 1;
goto end;
}
/*
* It gets here if the curve parameters and generator matched.
* Now check the optional cofactors (if both are present).
*/
ac = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(a);
bc = EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor(b);
if (ao == NULL || bo == NULL) {
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
return -1;
}
if (BN_cmp(ao, bo) || BN_cmp(ac, bc))
/* Returns 1 (mismatch) if both cofactors are specified and different */
if (!BN_is_zero(ac) && !BN_is_zero(bc) && BN_cmp(ac, bc) != 0)
r = 1;
/* Returns 0 if the parameters matched */
}
end:
BN_CTX_end(ctx);
BN_CTX_free(ctx_new);
@@ -622,8 +637,8 @@ int EC_POINT_copy(EC_POINT *dest, const EC_POINT *src)
}
if (dest->meth != src->meth
|| (dest->curve_name != src->curve_name
&& dest->curve_name != 0
&& src->curve_name != 0)) {
&& dest->curve_name != 0
&& src->curve_name != 0)) {
ECerr(EC_F_EC_POINT_COPY, EC_R_INCOMPATIBLE_OBJECTS);
return 0;
}
crypto/ec/ecdsa_ossl.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@ static int ecdsa_sign_setup(EC_KEY *eckey, BN_CTX *ctx_in,
}
}
k = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
k = BN_secure_new(); /* this value is later returned in *kinvp */
r = BN_new(); /* this value is later returned in *rp */
X = BN_new();
if (k == NULL || r == NULL || X == NULL) {
crypto/engine/eng_cnf.c
+3 -3
View File
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ static int int_engine_configure(const char *name, const char *value, const CONF
int soft = 0;
name = skip_dot(name);
OSSL_TRACE1(ENGINE_CONF, "Configuring engine %s\n", name);
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring engine %s\n", name);
/* Value is a section containing ENGINE commands */
ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ static int int_engine_configure(const char *name, const char *value, const CONF
ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
ctrlname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
ctrlvalue = ecmd->value;
OSSL_TRACE2(ENGINE_CONF, "ENGINE conf: doing ctrl(%s,%s)\n",
OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "ENGINE: doing ctrl(%s,%s)\n",
ctrlname, ctrlvalue);
/* First handle some special pseudo ctrls */
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ static int int_engine_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *elist;
CONF_VALUE *cval;
int i;
OSSL_TRACE2(ENGINE_CONF, "Called engine module: name %s, value %s\n",
OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Called engine module: name %s, value %s\n",
CONF_imodule_get_name(md), CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
/* Value is a section containing ENGINEs to configure */
elist = NCONF_get_section(cnf, CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
crypto/err/openssl.txt
+16
View File
@@ -392,11 +392,15 @@ CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_SK_DEEP_COPY:127:OPENSSL_sk_deep_copy
CRYPTO_F_OPENSSL_SK_DUP:128:OPENSSL_sk_dup
CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ACTIVATE:130:ossl_provider_activate
CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ADD_BUILTIN:132:OSSL_PROVIDER_add_builtin
CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ADD_PARAMETER:139:ossl_provider_add_parameter
CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_NEW:131:ossl_provider_new
CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_SET_MODULE_PATH:140:ossl_provider_set_module_path
CRYPTO_F_PKEY_HMAC_INIT:123:pkey_hmac_init
CRYPTO_F_PKEY_POLY1305_INIT:124:pkey_poly1305_init
CRYPTO_F_PKEY_SIPHASH_INIT:125:pkey_siphash_init
CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_ACTIVATE:134:provider_activate
CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_INIT:137:provider_conf_init
CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_LOAD:138:provider_conf_load
CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_NEW:135:provider_new
CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_STORE_NEW:136:provider_store_new
CRYPTO_F_SK_RESERVE:129:sk_reserve
@@ -750,12 +754,16 @@ ESS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_NEW_INIT:102:ESS_SIGNING_CERT_new_init
ESS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2_ADD:105:ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2_add
ESS_F_ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2_NEW_INIT:103:ESS_SIGNING_CERT_V2_new_init
EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY:165:aesni_init_key
EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY:233:aesni_xts_init_key
EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL:196:aes_gcm_ctrl
EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER:207:aes_gcm_tls_cipher
EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY:133:aes_init_key
EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER:169:aes_ocb_cipher
EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY:178:aes_t4_init_key
EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY:234:aes_t4_xts_init_key
EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER:170:aes_wrap_cipher
EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER:229:aes_xts_cipher
EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY:235:aes_xts_init_key
EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT:177:alg_module_init
EVP_F_ARIA_CCM_INIT_KEY:175:aria_ccm_init_key
EVP_F_ARIA_GCM_CTRL:197:aria_gcm_ctrl
@@ -795,6 +803,7 @@ EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTRL_STR:210:EVP_MAC_ctrl_str
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_COPY:211:EVP_MAC_CTX_copy
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_NEW:213:EVP_MAC_CTX_new
EVP_F_EVP_MAC_INIT:212:EVP_MAC_init
EVP_F_EVP_MD_BLOCK_SIZE:232:EVP_MD_block_size
EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX:110:EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex
EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE:162:EVP_MD_size
EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT:102:EVP_OpenInit
@@ -849,6 +858,7 @@ EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY:142:EVP_PKEY_verify
EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_INIT:143:EVP_PKEY_verify_init
EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER:144:EVP_PKEY_verify_recover
EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT:145:EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init
EVP_F_EVP_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES:236:EVP_set_default_properties
EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL:107:EVP_SignFinal
EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL:108:EVP_VerifyFinal
EVP_F_GMAC_CTRL:215:gmac_ctrl
@@ -1093,6 +1103,7 @@ PROP_F_PARSE_OCT:105:parse_oct
PROP_F_PARSE_STRING:106:parse_string
PROP_F_PARSE_UNQUOTED:107:parse_unquoted
RAND_F_DRBG_BYTES:101:drbg_bytes
RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT:125:drbg_ctr_init
RAND_F_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY:105:drbg_get_entropy
RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP:117:drbg_setup
RAND_F_GET_ENTROPY:106:get_entropy
@@ -2159,6 +2170,7 @@ CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED:101:fips mode not supported
CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT:102:illegal hex digit
CRYPTO_R_ODD_NUMBER_OF_DIGITS:103:odd number of digits
CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_ALREADY_EXISTS:104:provider already exists
CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR:105:provider section error
CT_R_BASE64_DECODE_ERROR:108:base64 decode error
CT_R_INVALID_LOG_ID_LENGTH:100:invalid log id length
CT_R_LOG_CONF_INVALID:109:log conf invalid
@@ -2413,6 +2425,8 @@ EVP_R_UNSUPPORTED_SALT_TYPE:126:unsupported salt type
EVP_R_UPDATE_ERROR:189:update error
EVP_R_WRAP_MODE_NOT_ALLOWED:170:wrap mode not allowed
EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH:109:wrong final block length
EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE:191:xts data unit is too large
EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS:192:xts duplicated keys
KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST:100:invalid digest
KDF_R_INVALID_MAC_TYPE:116:invalid mac type
KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT:109:missing iteration count
@@ -2594,6 +2608,8 @@ RAND_R_ADDITIONAL_INPUT_TOO_LONG:102:additional input too long
RAND_R_ALREADY_INSTANTIATED:103:already instantiated
RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE:105:argument out of range
RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE:121:Cannot open file
RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS:137:\
derivation function mandatory for fips
RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED:129:drbg already initialized
RAND_R_DRBG_NOT_INITIALISED:104:drbg not initialised
RAND_R_ENTROPY_INPUT_TOO_LONG:106:entropy input too long
crypto/evp/digest.c
+18 -1
View File
@@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ void EVP_MD_CTX_free(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
EVP_MD_meth_free(ctx->fetched_digest);
ctx->fetched_digest = NULL;
ctx->digest = NULL;
ctx->reqdigest = NULL;
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
return;
@@ -106,6 +107,9 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
EVP_MD_CTX_clear_flags(ctx, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_CLEANED);
if (type != NULL)
ctx->reqdigest = type;
/* TODO(3.0): Legacy work around code below. Remove this */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/*
@@ -141,6 +145,7 @@ int EVP_DigestInit_ex(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const EVP_MD *type, ENGINE *impl)
if (type->prov == NULL) {
switch(type->type) {
case NID_sha256:
case NID_md2:
break;
default:
goto legacy;
@@ -545,6 +550,11 @@ static void *evp_md_from_dispatch(int mdtype, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
break;
md->size = OSSL_get_OP_digest_size(fns);
break;
case OSSL_FUNC_DIGEST_BLOCK_SIZE:
if (md->dblock_size != NULL)
break;
md->dblock_size = OSSL_get_OP_digest_block_size(fns);
break;
}
}
if ((fncnt != 0 && fncnt != 5)
@@ -576,10 +586,17 @@ static void evp_md_free(void *md)
EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
}
static int evp_md_nid(void *vmd)
{
EVP_MD *md = vmd;
return md->type;
}
EVP_MD *EVP_MD_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, const char *algorithm,
const char *properties)
{
return evp_generic_fetch(ctx, OSSL_OP_DIGEST, algorithm, properties,
evp_md_from_dispatch, evp_md_upref,
evp_md_free);
evp_md_free, evp_md_nid);
}
crypto/evp/e_aes.c
+80 -53
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -390,22 +390,33 @@ static int aesni_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
return 1;
if (key) {
/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
const int bits = bytes * 8;
/*
* Verify that the two keys are different.
*
* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
*/
if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
return 0;
}
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
aesni_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_encrypt;
} else {
aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
aesni_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aesni_decrypt;
xctx->stream = aesni_xts_decrypt;
}
aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks2.ks);
aesni_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aesni_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
@@ -796,7 +807,21 @@ static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
return 1;
if (key) {
int bits = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4;
/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
const int bits = bytes * 8;
/*
* Verify that the two keys are different.
*
* This addresses Rogaway's vulnerability.
* See comment in aes_xts_init_key() below.
*/
if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
return 0;
}
xctx->stream = NULL;
/* key_len is two AES keys */
if (enc) {
@@ -813,8 +838,7 @@ static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
return 0;
}
} else {
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
aes_t4_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) aes_t4_decrypt;
switch (bits) {
case 128:
@@ -828,9 +852,7 @@ static int aes_t4_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
}
}
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks2.ks);
aes_t4_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) aes_t4_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
@@ -3414,8 +3436,33 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
if (!iv && !key)
return 1;
if (key)
if (key) {
do {
/* The key is two half length keys in reality */
const int bytes = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2;
const int bits = bytes * 8;
/*
* Verify that the two keys are different.
*
* This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's
* September 2004 paper:
*
* "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and
* Refinements to Modes OCB and PMAC".
* (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf)
*
* FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states
* that:
* "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place
* BEFORE using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process
* data with them."
*/
if (memcmp(key, key + bytes, bytes) == 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS);
return 0;
}
#ifdef AES_XTS_ASM
xctx->stream = enc ? AES_xts_encrypt : AES_xts_decrypt;
#else
@@ -3425,26 +3472,20 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
#ifdef HWAES_CAPABLE
if (HWAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
# ifdef HWAES_xts_encrypt
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_encrypt;
# endif
} else {
HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
HWAES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) HWAES_decrypt;
# ifdef HWAES_xts_decrypt
xctx->stream = HWAES_xts_decrypt;
#endif
}
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks2.ks);
HWAES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) HWAES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
@@ -3459,20 +3500,14 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
#ifdef VPAES_CAPABLE
if (VPAES_CAPABLE) {
if (enc) {
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
} else {
vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
vpaes_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) vpaes_decrypt;
}
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks2.ks);
vpaes_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) vpaes_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
@@ -3482,22 +3517,19 @@ static int aes_xts_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
if (enc) {
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
AES_set_encrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
} else {
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks1.ks);
AES_set_decrypt_key(key, bits, &xctx->ks1.ks);
xctx->xts.block1 = (block128_f) AES_decrypt;
}
AES_set_encrypt_key(key + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) * 4,
&xctx->ks2.ks);
AES_set_encrypt_key(key + bytes, bits, &xctx->ks2.ks);
xctx->xts.block2 = (block128_f) AES_encrypt;
xctx->xts.key1 = &xctx->ks1;
} while (0);
}
if (iv) {
xctx->xts.key2 = &xctx->ks2;
@@ -3520,20 +3552,15 @@ static int aes_xts_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
return 0;
/*
* Verify that the two keys are different.
*
* This addresses the vulnerability described in Rogaway's September 2004
* paper (http://web.cs.ucdavis.edu/~rogaway/papers/offsets.pdf):
* "Efficient Instantiations of Tweakable Blockciphers and Refinements
* to Modes OCB and PMAC".
*
* FIPS 140-2 IG A.9 XTS-AES Key Generation Requirements states that:
* "The check for Key_1 != Key_2 shall be done at any place BEFORE
* using the keys in the XTS-AES algorithm to process data with them."
*/
if (CRYPTO_memcmp(xctx->xts.key1, xctx->xts.key2,
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_key_length(ctx) / 2) == 0)
* Impose a limit of 2^20 blocks per data unit as specifed by
* IEEE Std 1619-2018. The earlier and obsolete IEEE Std 1619-2007
* indicated that this was a SHOULD NOT rather than a MUST NOT.
* NIST SP 800-38E mandates the same limit.
*/
if (len > XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT * AES_BLOCK_SIZE) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE);
return 0;
}
if (xctx->stream)
(*xctx->stream) (in, out, len,
crypto/evp/e_chacha20_poly1305.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ static EVP_CIPHER chacha20_poly1305_draft = {
NID_chacha20_poly1305_draft,
1, /* block_size */
CHACHA_KEY_SIZE, /* key_len */
0, /* iv_len, none */
0, /* iv_len, none */
EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER | EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV |
EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT |
EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER,
crypto/evp/evp_cnf.c
+18 -4
View File
@@ -13,9 +13,11 @@
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
/* Algorithm configuration module. */
/* TODO(3.0): the config module functions should be passed a library context */
static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
{
int i;
@@ -23,6 +25,9 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sktmp;
CONF_VALUE *oval;
OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Loading EVP module: name %s, value %s\n",
CONF_imodule_get_name(md), CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
oid_section = CONF_imodule_get_value(md);
if ((sktmp = NCONF_get_section(cnf, oid_section)) == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_ERROR_LOADING_SECTION);
@@ -32,18 +37,26 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
oval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sktmp, i);
if (strcmp(oval->name, "fips_mode") == 0) {
int m;
if (!X509V3_get_value_bool(oval, &m)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_INVALID_FIPS_MODE);
return 0;
}
if (m > 0) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
/*
* fips_mode is deprecated and should not be used in new
* configurations. Old configurations are likely to ONLY
* have this, so we assume that no default properties have
* been set before this.
*/
if (m > 0)
EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, "fips=yes");
} else if (strcmp(oval->name, "default_properties") == 0) {
EVP_set_default_properties(NULL, oval->value);
} else {
EVPerr(EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, EVP_R_UNKNOWN_OPTION);
ERR_add_error_data(4, "name=", oval->name,
", value=", oval->value);
return 0;
}
}
@@ -52,5 +65,6 @@ static int alg_module_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
void EVP_add_alg_module(void)
{
OSSL_TRACE(CONF, "Adding config module 'alg_section'\n");
CONF_module_add("alg_section", alg_module_init, 0);
}
crypto/evp/evp_enc.c
+10 -9
View File
@@ -305,6 +305,11 @@ static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
bl = ctx->cipher->block_size;
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
/* If block size > 1 then the cipher will have to do this check */
if (bl == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) {
@@ -320,10 +325,6 @@ static int evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx,
return 1;
}
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (is_partially_overlapping(out + ctx->buf_len, in, cmpl)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_ENCRYPTDECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
return 0;
@@ -457,6 +458,11 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_test_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPH_FLAG_LENGTH_BITS))
cmpl = (cmpl + 7) / 8;
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->cipher->flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER) {
if (b == 1 && is_partially_overlapping(out, in, cmpl)) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_DECRYPTUPDATE, EVP_R_PARTIALLY_OVERLAPPING);
@@ -472,11 +478,6 @@ int EVP_DecryptUpdate(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out, int *outl,
return 1;
}
if (inl <= 0) {
*outl = 0;
return inl == 0;
}
if (ctx->flags & EVP_CIPH_NO_PADDING)
return evp_EncryptDecryptUpdate(ctx, out, outl, in, inl);
crypto/evp/evp_err.c
+12
View File
@@ -15,12 +15,17 @@
static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AESNI_INIT_KEY, 0), "aesni_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AESNI_XTS_INIT_KEY, 0), "aesni_xts_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_CTRL, 0), "aes_gcm_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_GCM_TLS_CIPHER, 0), "aes_gcm_tls_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_OCB_CIPHER, 0), "aes_ocb_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_T4_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_t4_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_T4_XTS_INIT_KEY, 0),
"aes_t4_xts_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_WRAP_CIPHER, 0), "aes_wrap_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_XTS_CIPHER, 0), "aes_xts_cipher"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_AES_XTS_INIT_KEY, 0), "aes_xts_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_ALG_MODULE_INIT, 0), "alg_module_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_ARIA_CCM_INIT_KEY, 0), "aria_ccm_init_key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_ARIA_GCM_CTRL, 0), "aria_gcm_ctrl"},
@@ -70,6 +75,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_COPY, 0), "EVP_MAC_CTX_copy"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MAC_CTX_NEW, 0), "EVP_MAC_CTX_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MAC_INIT, 0), "EVP_MAC_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MD_BLOCK_SIZE, 0), "EVP_MD_block_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MD_CTX_COPY_EX, 0), "EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_MD_SIZE, 0), "EVP_MD_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, 0), "EVP_OpenInit"},
@@ -150,6 +156,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_functs[] = {
"EVP_PKEY_verify_recover"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_PKEY_VERIFY_RECOVER_INIT, 0),
"EVP_PKEY_verify_recover_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, 0),
"EVP_set_default_properties"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_SIGNFINAL, 0), "EVP_SignFinal"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_EVP_VERIFYFINAL, 0), "EVP_VerifyFinal"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, EVP_F_GMAC_CTRL, 0), "gmac_ctrl"},
@@ -303,6 +311,10 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA EVP_str_reasons[] = {
"wrap mode not allowed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_WRONG_FINAL_BLOCK_LENGTH),
"wrong final block length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_XTS_DATA_UNIT_IS_TOO_LARGE),
"xts data unit is too large"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_EVP, 0, EVP_R_XTS_DUPLICATED_KEYS),
"xts duplicated keys"},
{0, NULL}
};
crypto/evp/evp_fetch.c
+29 -11
View File
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ struct method_data_st {
OSSL_PROVIDER *);
int (*refcnt_up_method)(void *method);
void (*destruct_method)(void *method);
int (*nid_method)(void *method);
};
/*
@@ -78,8 +79,7 @@ static void *alloc_tmp_method_store(void)
ossl_method_store_free(store);
}
static
struct OSSL_METHOD_STORE *get_default_method_store(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
static OSSL_METHOD_STORE *get_default_method_store(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&default_method_store_init_flag,
do_default_method_store_init))
@@ -107,29 +107,35 @@ static void *get_method_from_store(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, void *store,
}
static int put_method_in_store(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, void *store,
const char *propdef, void *method,
void *data)
const char *propdef,
void *method, void *data)
{
struct method_data_st *methdata = data;
int nid = methdata->nid_method(method);
if (nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
if (store == NULL
&& (store = get_default_method_store(libctx)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (methdata->refcnt_up_method(method)
&& ossl_method_store_add(store, methdata->nid, propdef, method,
&& ossl_method_store_add(store, nid, propdef, method,
methdata->destruct_method))
return 1;
return 0;
}
static void *construct_method(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
static void *construct_method(const char *algorithm_name,
const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
void *data)
{
struct method_data_st *methdata = data;
void *method = NULL;
int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(algorithm_name);
if (methdata->nid == NID_undef) {
if (nid == NID_undef) {
/* Create a new NID for that name on the fly */
ASN1_OBJECT tmpobj;
@@ -140,13 +146,13 @@ static void *construct_method(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
tmpobj.length = 0;
tmpobj.data = NULL;
methdata->nid = OBJ_add_object(&tmpobj);
nid = OBJ_add_object(&tmpobj);
}
if (methdata->nid == NID_undef)
if (nid == NID_undef)
return NULL;
method = methdata->method_from_dispatch(methdata->nid, fns, prov);
method = methdata->method_from_dispatch(nid, fns, prov);
if (method == NULL)
return NULL;
return method;
@@ -164,7 +170,8 @@ void *evp_generic_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, int operation_id,
void *(*new_method)(int nid, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov),
int (*upref_method)(void *),
void (*free_method)(void *))
void (*free_method)(void *),
int (*nid_method)(void *))
{
int nid = OBJ_sn2nid(algorithm);
void *method = NULL;
@@ -187,6 +194,7 @@ void *evp_generic_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, int operation_id,
mcmdata.destruct_method = free_method;
mcmdata.refcnt_up_method = upref_method;
mcmdata.destruct_method = free_method;
mcmdata.nid_method = nid_method;
method = ossl_method_construct(libctx, operation_id, algorithm,
properties, 0 /* !force_cache */,
&mcm, &mcmdata);
@@ -195,3 +203,13 @@ void *evp_generic_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, int operation_id,
return method;
}
int EVP_set_default_properties(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq)
{
OSSL_METHOD_STORE *store = get_default_method_store(libctx);
if (store != NULL)
return ossl_method_store_set_global_properties(store, propq);
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_SET_DEFAULT_PROPERTIES, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
crypto/evp/evp_lib.c
+10 -2
View File
@@ -298,6 +298,14 @@ int EVP_CIPHER_CTX_nid(const EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx)
int EVP_MD_block_size(const EVP_MD *md)
{
if (md == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_MD_BLOCK_SIZE, EVP_R_MESSAGE_DIGEST_IS_NULL);
return -1;
}
if (md->prov != NULL && md->dblock_size != NULL)
return (int)md->dblock_size();
return md->block_size;
}
@@ -479,9 +487,9 @@ int (*EVP_MD_meth_get_ctrl(const EVP_MD *md))(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, int cmd,
const EVP_MD *EVP_MD_CTX_md(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!ctx)
if (ctx == NULL)
return NULL;
return ctx->digest;
return ctx->reqdigest;
}
EVP_PKEY_CTX *EVP_MD_CTX_pkey_ctx(const EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
crypto/evp/evp_locl.h
+3 -1
View File
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
/* EVP_MD_CTX related stuff */
struct evp_md_ctx_st {
const EVP_MD *reqdigest; /* The original requested digest */
const EVP_MD *digest;
ENGINE *engine; /* functional reference if 'digest' is
* ENGINE-provided */
@@ -89,4 +90,5 @@ void *evp_generic_fetch(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int operation_id,
void *(*new_method)(int nid, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov),
int (*upref_method)(void *),
void (*free_method)(void *));
void (*free_method)(void *),
int (*nid_method)(void *));
crypto/evp/p_open.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ int EVP_OpenInit(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const EVP_CIPHER *type,
}
size = EVP_PKEY_size(priv);
key = OPENSSL_malloc(size + 2);
key = OPENSSL_malloc(size);
if (key == NULL) {
/* ERROR */
EVPerr(EVP_F_EVP_OPENINIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
crypto/ex_data.c
+7 -2
View File
@@ -235,7 +235,7 @@ int CRYPTO_new_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad)
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
if (storage[i] && storage[i]->new_func) {
if (storage[i] != NULL && storage[i]->new_func != NULL) {
ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(ad, i);
storage[i]->new_func(obj, ptr, ad, i,
storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp);
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ int CRYPTO_dup_ex_data(int class_index, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *to,
for (i = 0; i < mx; i++) {
ptr = CRYPTO_get_ex_data(from, i);
if (storage[i] && storage[i]->dup_func)
if (storage[i] != NULL && storage[i]->dup_func != NULL)
if (!storage[i]->dup_func(to, from, &ptr, i,
storage[i]->argl, storage[i]->argp))
goto err;
@@ -380,6 +380,8 @@ int CRYPTO_alloc_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
return 1;
ip = get_and_lock(class_index);
if (ip == NULL)
return 0;
f = sk_EX_CALLBACK_value(ip->meth, idx);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ex_data_lock);
@@ -387,6 +389,9 @@ int CRYPTO_alloc_ex_data(int class_index, void *obj, CRYPTO_EX_DATA *ad,
* This should end up calling CRYPTO_set_ex_data(), which allocates
* everything necessary to support placing the new data in the right spot.
*/
if (f->new_func == NULL)
return 0;
f->new_func(obj, curval, ad, idx, f->argl, f->argp);
return 1;
crypto/include/internal/dso_conf.h.in
+3 -2
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,6 @@
#ifndef HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
# define HEADER_DSO_CONF_H
{- output_off() if $disabled{dso} -}
{- # The DSO code currently always implements all functions so that no
# applications will have to worry about that from a compilation point
# of view. However, the "method"s may return zero unless that platform
@@ -18,6 +17,9 @@
# by a define "DSO_<name>" ... we translate the "dso_scheme" config
# string entry into using the following logic;
my $scheme = uc $target{dso_scheme};
if (!$scheme) {
$scheme = "NONE";
}
my @macros = ( "DSO_$scheme" );
if ($scheme eq 'DLFCN') {
@macros = ( "DSO_DLFCN", "HAVE_DLFCN_H" );
@@ -26,5 +28,4 @@
}
join("\n", map { "# define $_" } @macros); -}
# define DSO_EXTENSION "{- platform->dsoext() -}"
{- output_on() if $disabled{dso} -}
#endif
crypto/include/internal/evp_int.h
+1
View File
@@ -204,6 +204,7 @@ struct evp_md_st {
OSSL_OP_digest_freectx_fn *freectx;
OSSL_OP_digest_dupctx_fn *dupctx;
OSSL_OP_digest_size_fn *size;
OSSL_OP_digest_block_size_fn *dblock_size;
} /* EVP_MD */ ;
crypto/include/internal/x509_int.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ struct x509_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
volatile int ex_cached;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
ASN1_OCTET_STRING sm2_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id;
# endif
} /* X509 */ ;
crypto/init.c
+5 -7
View File
@@ -160,8 +160,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete)
{
OSSL_TRACE(INIT, "ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete()\n");
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE) \
#if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
# if defined(DSO_WIN32) && !defined(_WIN32_WCE)
{
@@ -179,7 +178,7 @@ DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(ossl_init_load_crypto_nodelete)
(ret == TRUE ? "No!" : "Yes."));
return (ret == TRUE) ? 1 : 0;
}
# else
# elif !defined(DSO_NONE)
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to ourselves. This will force the library
* to remain loaded until the atexit() handler is run at process exit.
@@ -671,7 +670,7 @@ int OPENSSL_init_crypto(uint64_t opts, const OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS *settings)
ret = RUN_ONCE(&config, ossl_init_config);
conf_settings = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(init_lock);
if (!ret)
if (ret <= 0)
return 0;
}
@@ -733,8 +732,7 @@ int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
{
OPENSSL_INIT_STOP *newhand;
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_DSO) \
&& !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
#if !defined(OPENSSL_USE_NODELETE)\
&& !defined(OPENSSL_NO_PINSHARED)
{
union {
@@ -759,7 +757,7 @@ int OPENSSL_atexit(void (*handler)(void))
if (!ret)
return 0;
}
# else
# elif !defined(DSO_NONE)
/*
* Deliberately leak a reference to the handler. This will force the
* library/code containing the handler to remain loaded until we run the
crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
+27 -7
View File
@@ -182,6 +182,8 @@ static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
int sz;
if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
return SIZE_MAX;
@@ -189,7 +191,11 @@ static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
return sz;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
@@ -241,8 +247,13 @@ static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int ret;
size_t prk_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
int ret, sz;
size_t prk_len;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
prk_len = (size_t)sz;
if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, key, key_len, prk, prk_len))
return 0;
@@ -258,7 +269,11 @@ static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
{
if (prk_len != (size_t)EVP_MD_size(evp_md)) {
int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
@@ -271,11 +286,16 @@ static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
int ret = 0;
int ret = 0, sz;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
size_t n = okm_len / dig_len;
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz <= 0)
return 0;
dig_len = (size_t)sz;
n = okm_len / dig_len;
if (okm_len % dig_len)
n++;
crypto/mem.c
+6 -6
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <limits.h>
#include <openssl/crypto.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG_BACKTRACE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
# include <execinfo.h>
#endif
@@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ static void *(*realloc_impl)(void *, size_t, const char *, int)
static void (*free_impl)(void *, const char *, int)
= CRYPTO_free;
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
static TSAN_QUALIFIER int malloc_count;
@@ -94,7 +94,7 @@ void CRYPTO_get_mem_functions(
*f = free_impl;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
void CRYPTO_get_alloc_counts(int *mcount, int *rcount, int *fcount)
{
if (mcount != NULL)
@@ -209,7 +209,7 @@ void *CRYPTO_malloc(size_t num, const char *file, int line)
*/
allow_customize = 0;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
if (call_malloc_debug) {
CRYPTO_mem_debug_malloc(NULL, num, 0, file, line);
ret = malloc(num);
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ void *CRYPTO_realloc(void *str, size_t num, const char *file, int line)
return NULL;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
if (call_malloc_debug) {
void *ret;
CRYPTO_mem_debug_realloc(str, NULL, num, 0, file, line);
@@ -300,7 +300,7 @@ void CRYPTO_free(void *str, const char *file, int line)
return;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_CRYPTO_MDEBUG) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
if (call_malloc_debug) {
CRYPTO_mem_debug_free(str, 0, file, line);
free(str);
crypto/modes/modes_lcl.h
+6
View File
@@ -133,6 +133,12 @@ struct gcm128_context {
#endif
};
/*
* The maximum permitted number of cipher blocks per data unit in XTS mode.
* Reference IEEE Std 1619-2018.
*/
#define XTS_MAX_BLOCKS_PER_DATA_UNIT (1<<20)
struct xts128_context {
void *key1, *key2;
block128_f block1, block2;
crypto/params.c
+23 -4
View File
@@ -348,6 +348,13 @@ OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(const char *key, size_t *buf,
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER, buf,
sizeof(size_t), rsize); }
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
/*
* TODO(3.0): Make this available in FIPS mode.
*
* Temporarily we don't include these functions in FIPS mode to avoid pulling
* in the entire BN sub-library into the module at this point.
*/
int OSSL_PARAM_get_BN(const OSSL_PARAM *p, BIGNUM **val)
{
BIGNUM *b;
@@ -375,6 +382,10 @@ int OSSL_PARAM_set_BN(const OSSL_PARAM *p, const BIGNUM *val)
if (val == NULL || p->data_type != OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER)
return 0;
/* For the moment, only positive values are permitted */
if (BN_is_negative(val))
return 0;
bytes = (size_t)BN_num_bytes(val);
SET_RETURN_SIZE(p, bytes);
return p->data_size >= bytes
@@ -387,6 +398,7 @@ OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_BN(const char *key, unsigned char *buf,
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_UNSIGNED_INTEGER,
buf, bsize, rsize);
}
#endif
int OSSL_PARAM_get_double(const OSSL_PARAM *p, double *val)
{
@@ -568,13 +580,20 @@ int OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr(const OSSL_PARAM *p, const void *val,
}
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(const char *key, char **buf,
size_t *rsize)
size_t bsize, size_t *rsize)
{
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_PTR, buf, 0, rsize);
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_PTR, buf, bsize, rsize);
}
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(const char *key, void **buf,
size_t *rsize)
size_t bsize, size_t *rsize)
{
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, buf, 0, rsize);
return ossl_param_construct(key, OSSL_PARAM_OCTET_PTR, buf, bsize, rsize);
}
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(void)
{
OSSL_PARAM end = OSSL_PARAM_END;
return end;
}
crypto/pem/pem_sign.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -31,7 +31,7 @@ int PEM_SignFinal(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *sigret,
int i, ret = 0;
unsigned int m_len;
m = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey) + 2);
m = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_PKEY_size(pkey));
if (m == NULL) {
PEMerr(PEM_F_PEM_SIGNFINAL, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
crypto/property/property_parse.c
+1
View File
@@ -523,6 +523,7 @@ int ossl_property_parse_init(void)
{
static const char *const predefined_names[] = {
"default", /* Being provided by the default built-in provider */
"legacy", /* Provided by the legacy provider */
"provider", /* Name of provider (default, fips) */
"version", /* Version number of this provider */
"fips", /* FIPS supporting provider */
crypto/provider_conf.c
+184
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,184 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/trace.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/conf.h>
#include <openssl/safestack.h>
#include "internal/provider.h"
/* PROVIDER config module */
DEFINE_STACK_OF(OSSL_PROVIDER)
static STACK_OF(OSSL_PROVIDER) *activated_providers = NULL;
static const char *skip_dot(const char *name)
{
const char *p = strchr(name, '.');
if (p != NULL)
return p + 1;
return name;
}
static int provider_conf_params(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
const char *name, const char *value,
const CONF *cnf)
{
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *sect;
int ok = 1;
sect = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
if (sect != NULL) {
int i;
char buffer[512];
size_t buffer_len = 0;
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Provider params: start section %s\n", value);
if (name != NULL) {
OPENSSL_strlcpy(buffer, name, sizeof(buffer));
OPENSSL_strlcat(buffer, ".", sizeof(buffer));
buffer_len = strlen(buffer);
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(sect); i++) {
CONF_VALUE *sectconf = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(sect, i);
if (buffer_len + strlen(sectconf->name) >= sizeof(buffer))
return 0;
buffer[buffer_len] = '\0';
OPENSSL_strlcat(buffer, sectconf->name, sizeof(buffer));
if (!provider_conf_params(prov, buffer, sectconf->value, cnf))
return 0;
}
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Provider params: finish section %s\n", value);
} else {
OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider params: %s = %s\n", name, value);
ok = ossl_provider_add_parameter(prov, name, value);
}
return ok;
}
static int provider_conf_load(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
const char *value, const CONF *cnf)
{
int i;
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *ecmds;
int soft = 0;
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov = NULL;
const char *path = NULL;
long activate = 0;
int ok = 0;
name = skip_dot(name);
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Configuring provider %s\n", name);
/* Value is a section containing PROVIDER commands */
ecmds = NCONF_get_section(cnf, value);
if (!ecmds) {
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_LOAD, CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/* Find the needed data first */
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(ecmds); i++) {
CONF_VALUE *ecmd = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(ecmds, i);
const char *confname = skip_dot(ecmd->name);
const char *confvalue = ecmd->value;
OSSL_TRACE2(CONF, "Provider command: %s = %s\n",
confname, confvalue);
/* First handle some special pseudo confs */
/* Override provider name to use */
if (strcmp(confname, "identity") == 0)
name = confvalue;
else if (strcmp(confname, "soft_load") == 0)
soft = 1;
/* Load a dynamic PROVIDER */
else if (strcmp(confname, "module") == 0)
path = confvalue;
else if (strcmp(confname, "activate") == 0)
activate = 1;
}
prov = ossl_provider_new(libctx, name, NULL);
if (prov == NULL) {
if (soft)
ERR_clear_error();
return 0;
}
if (path != NULL)
ossl_provider_set_module_path(prov, path);
ok = provider_conf_params(prov, NULL, value, cnf);
if (ok && activate) {
if (!ossl_provider_activate(prov)) {
ok = 0;
} else {
if (activated_providers == NULL)
activated_providers = sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_new_null();
sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_push(activated_providers, prov);
ok = 1;
}
}
if (!(activate && ok))
ossl_provider_free(prov);
return ok;
}
static int provider_conf_init(CONF_IMODULE *md, const CONF *cnf)
{
STACK_OF(CONF_VALUE) *elist;
CONF_VALUE *cval;
int i;
OSSL_TRACE1(CONF, "Loading providers module: section %s\n",
CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
/* Value is a section containing PROVIDERs to configure */
elist = NCONF_get_section(cnf, CONF_imodule_get_value(md));
if (!elist) {
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_PROVIDER_CONF_INIT,
CRYPTO_R_PROVIDER_SECTION_ERROR);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < sk_CONF_VALUE_num(elist); i++) {
cval = sk_CONF_VALUE_value(elist, i);
if (!provider_conf_load(NULL, cval->name, cval->value, cnf))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static void provider_conf_deinit(CONF_IMODULE *md)
{
sk_OSSL_PROVIDER_pop_free(activated_providers, ossl_provider_free);
activated_providers = NULL;
OSSL_TRACE(CONF, "Cleaned up providers\n");
}
void ossl_provider_add_conf_module(void)
{
OSSL_TRACE(CONF, "Adding config module 'providers'\n");
CONF_module_add("providers", provider_conf_init, provider_conf_deinit);
}
crypto/provider_core.c
+81 -21
View File
@@ -9,6 +9,7 @@
#include <openssl/core.h>
#include <openssl/core_numbers.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
@@ -25,6 +26,12 @@ static OSSL_PROVIDER *provider_new(const char *name,
* =========================
*/
typedef struct {
char *name;
char *value;
} INFOPAIR;
DEFINE_STACK_OF(INFOPAIR)
struct provider_store_st; /* Forward declaration */
struct ossl_provider_st {
@@ -36,8 +43,10 @@ struct ossl_provider_st {
CRYPTO_REF_COUNT refcnt;
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *refcnt_lock; /* For the ref counter */
char *name;
char *path;
DSO *module;
OSSL_provider_init_fn *init_function;
STACK_OF(INFOPAIR) *parameters;
struct provider_store_st *store; /* The store this instance belongs to */
/* Provider side functions */
@@ -243,6 +252,13 @@ OSSL_PROVIDER *ossl_provider_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *name,
return prov;
}
static void free_infopair(INFOPAIR *pair)
{
OPENSSL_free(pair->name);
OPENSSL_free(pair->value);
OPENSSL_free(pair);
}
void ossl_provider_free(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
{
if (prov != NULL) {
@@ -270,6 +286,8 @@ void ossl_provider_free(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
if (ref == 0) {
DSO_free(prov->module);
OPENSSL_free(prov->name);
OPENSSL_free(prov->path);
sk_INFOPAIR_pop_free(prov->parameters, free_infopair);
#ifndef HAVE_ATOMICS
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(prov->refcnt_lock);
#endif
@@ -278,6 +296,40 @@ void ossl_provider_free(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
}
}
/* Setters */
int ossl_provider_set_module_path(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov, const char *module_path)
{
OPENSSL_free(prov->path);
if (module_path == NULL)
return 1;
if ((prov->path = OPENSSL_strdup(module_path)) != NULL)
return 1;
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_SET_MODULE_PATH, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
int ossl_provider_add_parameter(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
const char *name, const char *value)
{
INFOPAIR *pair = NULL;
if ((pair = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pair))) != NULL
&& (prov->parameters != NULL
|| (prov->parameters = sk_INFOPAIR_new_null()) != NULL)
&& (pair->name = OPENSSL_strdup(name)) != NULL
&& (pair->value = OPENSSL_strdup(value)) != NULL
&& sk_INFOPAIR_push(prov->parameters, pair) > 0)
return 1;
if (pair != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(pair->name);
OPENSSL_free(pair->value);
OPENSSL_free(pair);
}
CRYPTOerr(CRYPTO_F_OSSL_PROVIDER_ADD_PARAMETER, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
/*
* Provider activation.
*
@@ -310,8 +362,9 @@ static int provider_activate(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
*/
if (prov->init_function == NULL) {
if (prov->module == NULL) {
char *platform_module_name = NULL;
char *module_path = NULL;
char *allocated_path = NULL;
const char *module_path = NULL;
char *merged_path = NULL;
const char *load_dir = ossl_safe_getenv("OPENSSL_MODULES");
if ((prov->module = DSO_new()) == NULL) {
@@ -324,19 +377,22 @@ static int provider_activate(OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
DSO_ctrl(prov->module, DSO_CTRL_SET_FLAGS,
DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY, NULL);
if ((platform_module_name =
DSO_convert_filename(prov->module, prov->name)) == NULL
|| (module_path =
DSO_merge(prov->module, platform_module_name,
load_dir)) == NULL
|| DSO_load(prov->module, module_path, NULL,
DSO_FLAG_NAME_TRANSLATION_EXT_ONLY) == NULL) {
module_path = prov->path;
if (module_path == NULL)
module_path = allocated_path =
DSO_convert_filename(prov->module, prov->name);
if (module_path != NULL)
merged_path = DSO_merge(prov->module, module_path, load_dir);
if (merged_path == NULL
|| (DSO_load(prov->module, merged_path, NULL, 0)) == NULL) {
DSO_free(prov->module);
prov->module = NULL;
}
OPENSSL_free(platform_module_name);
OPENSSL_free(module_path);
OPENSSL_free(merged_path);
OPENSSL_free(allocated_path);
}
if (prov->module != NULL)
@@ -565,17 +621,21 @@ static const OSSL_ITEM *core_get_param_types(const OSSL_PROVIDER *prov)
static int core_get_params(const OSSL_PROVIDER *prov, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
int i;
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
for (i = 0; params[i].key != NULL; i++) {
if (strcmp(params[i].key, "openssl-version") == 0) {
*(void **)params[i].data = OPENSSL_VERSION_STR;
if (params[i].return_size)
*params[i].return_size = sizeof(OPENSSL_VERSION_STR);
} else if (strcmp(params[i].key, "provider-name") == 0) {
*(void **)params[i].data = prov->name;
if (params[i].return_size)
*params[i].return_size = strlen(prov->name) + 1;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, "openssl-version")) != NULL)
OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, OPENSSL_VERSION_STR);
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, "provider-name")) != NULL)
OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, prov->name);
if (prov->parameters == NULL)
return 1;
for (i = 0; i < sk_INFOPAIR_num(prov->parameters); i++) {
INFOPAIR *pair = sk_INFOPAIR_value(prov->parameters, i);
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, pair->name)) != NULL)
OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_ptr(p, pair->value);
}
return 1;
crypto/rand/drbg_ctr.c
+6
View File
@@ -422,6 +422,11 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
drbg->max_perslen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
drbg->max_adinlen = DRBG_MAX_LENGTH;
} else {
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
RANDerr(RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT,
RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS);
return 0;
#else
drbg->min_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
drbg->max_entropylen = drbg->seedlen;
/* Nonce not used */
@@ -429,6 +434,7 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
drbg->max_noncelen = 0;
drbg->max_perslen = drbg->seedlen;
drbg->max_adinlen = drbg->seedlen;
#endif
}
drbg->max_request = 1 << 16;
crypto/rand/rand_err.c
+4 -1
View File
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
static const ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_DRBG_BYTES, 0), "drbg_bytes"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_DRBG_CTR_INIT, 0), "drbg_ctr_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY, 0), "drbg_get_entropy"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, 0), "drbg_setup"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_GET_ENTROPY, 0), "get_entropy"},
@@ -60,6 +61,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_ARGUMENT_OUT_OF_RANGE),
"argument out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_CANNOT_OPEN_FILE), "Cannot open file"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_DERIVATION_FUNCTION_MANDATORY_FOR_FIPS),
"derivation function mandatory for fips"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_DRBG_ALREADY_INITIALIZED),
"drbg already initialized"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, 0, RAND_R_DRBG_NOT_INITIALISED),
crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
-12
View File
@@ -183,17 +183,6 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
}
} else {
if (prediction_resistance) {
/*
* We don't have any entropy sources that comply with the NIST
* standard to provide prediction resistance (see NIST SP 800-90C,
* Section 5.4).
*/
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GET_ENTROPY,
RAND_R_PREDICTION_RESISTANCE_NOT_SUPPORTED);
goto err;
}
/* Get entropy by polling system entropy sources. */
entropy_available = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
}
@@ -203,7 +192,6 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
}
err:
if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
crypto/rand/rand_win.c
+2 -2
View File
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
# endif
# include <windows.h>
/* On Windows 7 or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0601
/* On Windows Vista or higher use BCrypt instead of the legacy CryptoAPI */
# if defined(_MSC_VER) && defined(_WIN32_WINNT) && _WIN32_WINNT >= 0x0600
# define USE_BCRYPTGENRANDOM
# endif
crypto/rsa/rsa_ameth.c
+3 -1
View File
@@ -583,10 +583,12 @@ static RSA_PSS_PARAMS *rsa_ctx_to_pss(EVP_PKEY_CTX *pkctx)
return NULL;
if (saltlen == -1) {
saltlen = EVP_MD_size(sigmd);
} else if (saltlen == -2) {
} else if (saltlen == -2 || saltlen == -3) {
saltlen = EVP_PKEY_size(pk) - EVP_MD_size(sigmd) - 2;
if ((EVP_PKEY_bits(pk) & 0x7) == 1)
saltlen--;
if (saltlen < 0)
return NULL;
}
return rsa_pss_params_create(sigmd, mgf1md, saltlen);
crypto/s390xcap.c
+306 -306
View File
@@ -152,17 +152,17 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Facility detection would fail on real hw (no STFLE).
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z900 = {
.stfle = {0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.klmd = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.km = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmc = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmac = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmctr = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmo = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmf = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.klmd = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.km = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -170,25 +170,25 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA. Facility detection would fail on real hw (no STFLE).
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z990 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1),
0ULL},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmo = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmf = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1),
0ULL},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -196,30 +196,30 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z9 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256),
0ULL},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmo = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmf = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256),
0ULL},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -227,36 +227,36 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1-2.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z10 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmo = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kmf = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
0ULL, 0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -264,55 +264,55 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1-4.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z196 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmo = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmf = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -320,55 +320,55 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1-4.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st zEC12 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
0ULL, 0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmo = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmf = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.prno = {0ULL, 0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.prno = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -376,59 +376,59 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1-5.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z13 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA5),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VX),
0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmo = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmf = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.prno = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512_DRNG),
0ULL},
.kma = {0ULL, 0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA5),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VX),
0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.prno = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512_DRNG),
0ULL},
/*.kma = */{0ULL, 0ULL},
};
/*-
@@ -436,78 +436,78 @@ static int parse_env(struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st *cap)
* Implements MSA and MSA1-8.
*/
static const struct OPENSSL_s390xcap_st z14 = {
.stfle = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA5),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VX)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VXD)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VXE)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA8),
0ULL},
.kimd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_224)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_384)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_256),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
.klmd = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_224)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_384)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_256),
0ULL},
.km = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmc = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmac = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmctr = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmo = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.kmf = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
.prno = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512_DRNG),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_TRNG)},
.kma = {S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.stfle = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_STCKF)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA5),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA3)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA4),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VX)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VXD)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_VXE)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_MSA8),
0ULL},
/*.kimd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_224)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_384)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_256),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_GHASH)},
/*.klmd = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_1)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_224)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_384)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA3_512)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHAKE_256),
0ULL},
/*.km = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_XTS_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmc = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmac = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmctr = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmo = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.kmf = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
/*.prno = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_SHA_512_DRNG),
S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_TRNG)},
/*.kma = */{S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_QUERY)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_128)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_192)
| S390X_CAPBIT(S390X_AES_256),
0ULL},
};
char *tok_begin, *tok_end, *buff, tok[S390X_STFLE_MAX][LEN + 1];
crypto/sha/build.info
+2
View File
@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
sha1dgst.c sha1_one.c sha256.c sha512.c {- $target{sha1_asm_src} -} \
{- $target{keccak1600_asm_src} -}
SOURCE[../../providers/fips]= sha256.c
GENERATE[sha1-586.s]=asm/sha1-586.pl \
$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(LIB_CPPFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
DEPEND[sha1-586.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
crypto/trace.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ static const struct trace_category_st trace_categories[] = {
TRACE_CATEGORY_(INIT),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(TLS),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(TLS_CIPHER),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(ENGINE_CONF),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(CONF),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(ENGINE_TABLE),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(ENGINE_REF_COUNT),
TRACE_CATEGORY_(PKCS5V2),
crypto/x509/x509_lu.c
+3
View File
@@ -297,6 +297,9 @@ int X509_STORE_CTX_get_by_subject(X509_STORE_CTX *vs, X509_LOOKUP_TYPE type,
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
stmp.type = X509_LU_NONE;
stmp.data.ptr = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(ctx->lock);
tmp = X509_OBJECT_retrieve_by_subject(ctx->objs, type, name);
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(ctx->lock);
crypto/x509/x_all.c
+4 -1
View File
@@ -72,7 +72,10 @@ static int x509_verify_sm2(X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey, int mdnid, int pknid)
ret = 0;
goto err;
}
if (EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, x->sm2_id.data, x->sm2_id.length) != 1) {
/* NOTE: we tolerate no actual ID, to provide maximum flexibility */
if (x->sm2_id != NULL
&& EVP_PKEY_CTX_set1_id(pctx, x->sm2_id->data,
x->sm2_id->length) != 1) {
X509err(X509_F_X509_VERIFY_SM2, ERR_R_EVP_LIB);
ret = 0;
goto err;
crypto/x509/x_x509.c
+10 -3
View File
@@ -72,6 +72,9 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
ret->rfc3779_addr = NULL;
ret->rfc3779_asid = NULL;
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
ret->sm2_id = NULL;
#endif
ret->aux = NULL;
ret->crldp = NULL;
@@ -91,6 +94,9 @@ static int x509_cb(int operation, ASN1_VALUE **pval, const ASN1_ITEM *it,
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_RFC3779
sk_IPAddressFamily_pop_free(ret->rfc3779_addr, IPAddressFamily_free);
ASIdentifiers_free(ret->rfc3779_asid);
#endif
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ret->sm2_id);
#endif
break;
@@ -246,13 +252,14 @@ int X509_get_signature_nid(const X509 *x)
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
void X509_set_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id)
void X509_set0_sm2_id(X509 *x, ASN1_OCTET_STRING *sm2_id)
{
x->sm2_id = *sm2_id;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(x->sm2_id);
x->sm2_id = sm2_id;
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *X509_get0_sm2_id(X509 *x)
{
return &x->sm2_id;
return x->sm2_id;
}
#endif
doc/internal/man3/evp_generic_fetch.pod
+6 -1
View File
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ evp_generic_fetch - generic algorithm fetcher and method creator for EVP
void *(*new_method)(int nid, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov),
int (*upref_method)(void *),
void (*free_method)(void *));
void (*free_method)(void *),
int (*nid_method)(void *));
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -41,6 +42,10 @@ one.
frees the given method.
=item nid_method()
returns the nid associated with the given method.
=back
=head1 RETURN VALUES
doc/internal/man3/ossl_method_construct.pod
+4 -3
View File
@@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ OSSL_METHOD_CONSTRUCT_METHOD, ossl_method_construct
int (*put)(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, void *store, const char *propdef,
void *method, void *data);
/* Construct a new method */
void *(*construct)(const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns, OSSL_PROVIDER *prov,
void *data);
void *(*construct)(const char *algorithm_name, const OSSL_DISPATCH *fns,
OSSL_PROVIDER *prov, void *data);
/* Destruct a method */
void (*destruct)(void *method);
};
@@ -107,7 +107,8 @@ This function is expected to increment the C<method>'s reference count.
=item construct()
Constructs a sub-system method given a dispatch table C<fns>.
Constructs a sub-system method for the given C<algorithm_name> and the given
dispatch table C<fns>.
The associated I<provider object> C<prov> is passed as well, to make
it possible for the sub-system constructor to keep a reference, which
doc/man1/ecparam.pod
+6
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ B<openssl ecparam>
[B<-text>]
[B<-C>]
[B<-check>]
[B<-check_named>]
[B<-name arg>]
[B<-list_curves>]
[B<-conv_form arg>]
@@ -79,6 +80,11 @@ be loaded by calling the get_ec_group_XXX() function.
Validate the elliptic curve parameters.
=item B<-check_named>
Validate the elliptic name curve parameters by checking if the curve parameters
match any built-in curves.
=item B<-name arg>
Use the EC parameters with the specified 'short' name. Use B<-list_curves>
doc/man1/ocsp.pod
+7
View File
@@ -88,6 +88,7 @@ B<openssl> B<ocsp>
[B<-ndays n>]
[B<-resp_key_id>]
[B<-nrequest n>]
[B<-rcid I<digest>>]
[B<-I<digest>>]
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -304,6 +305,12 @@ status information is immediately available. In this case the age of the
B<notBefore> field is checked to see it is not older than B<age> seconds old.
By default this additional check is not performed.
=item B<-rcid I<digest>>
This option sets the digest algorithm to use for certificate identification
in the OCSP response. Any digest supported by the OpenSSL B<dgst> command can
be used. The default is the same digest algorithm used in the request.
=item B<-I<digest>>
This option sets digest algorithm to use for certificate identification in the
doc/man1/speed.pod
+5
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ B<openssl speed>
[B<-elapsed>]
[B<-evp algo>]
[B<-hmac algo>]
[B<-cmac algo>]
[B<-decrypt>]
[B<-rand file...>]
[B<-writerand file>]
@@ -60,6 +61,10 @@ aes-128-cbc-hmac-sha1, then B<-mb> will time multi-buffer operation.
Time the HMAC algorithm using the specified message digest.
=item B<-cmac cipher>
Time the CMAC algorithm using the specified cipher e.g. B<speed -cmac aes128>.
=item B<-decrypt>
Time the decryption instead of encryption. Affects only the EVP testing.
doc/man3/BIO_connect.pod
+7 -7
View File
@@ -95,19 +95,19 @@ B<INVALID_SOCKET> (-1) on error. When an error has occurred, the
OpenSSL error stack will hold the error data and errno has the system
error.
=head1 HISTORY
BIO_gethostname(), BIO_get_port(), BIO_get_host_ip(),
BIO_get_accept_socket() and BIO_accept() were deprecated in
OpenSSL 1.1.0. Use the functions described above instead.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<BIO_ADDR(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
BIO_gethostname(), BIO_get_port(), BIO_get_host_ip(),
BIO_get_accept_socket() and BIO_accept() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
Use the functions described above instead.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/BIO_ctrl.pod
+11 -4
View File
@@ -5,7 +5,8 @@
BIO_ctrl, BIO_callback_ctrl, BIO_ptr_ctrl, BIO_int_ctrl, BIO_reset,
BIO_seek, BIO_tell, BIO_flush, BIO_eof, BIO_set_close, BIO_get_close,
BIO_pending, BIO_wpending, BIO_ctrl_pending, BIO_ctrl_wpending,
BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, BIO_info_cb, BIO_get_ktls_send
BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, BIO_info_cb, BIO_get_ktls_send,
BIO_get_ktls_recv
- BIO control operations
=head1 SYNOPSIS
@@ -35,6 +36,7 @@ BIO_get_info_callback, BIO_set_info_callback, BIO_info_cb, BIO_get_ktls_send
int BIO_set_info_callback(BIO *b, BIO_info_cb *cb);
int BIO_get_ktls_send(BIO *b);
int BIO_get_ktls_recv(BIO *b);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
@@ -74,8 +76,10 @@ Not all BIOs support these calls. BIO_ctrl_pending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending()
return a size_t type and are functions, BIO_pending() and BIO_wpending() are
macros which call BIO_ctrl().
BIO_get_ktls_send() return 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
BIO_get_ktls_send() returns 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
sending. Otherwise, it returns zero.
BIO_get_ktls_recv() returns 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
receiving. Otherwise, it returns zero.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
@@ -97,8 +101,10 @@ BIO_get_close() returns the close flag value: BIO_CLOSE or BIO_NOCLOSE.
BIO_pending(), BIO_ctrl_pending(), BIO_wpending() and BIO_ctrl_wpending()
return the amount of pending data.
BIO_get_ktls_send() return 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
BIO_get_ktls_send() returns 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
sending. Otherwise, it returns zero.
BIO_get_ktls_recv() returns 1 if the BIO is using the Kernel TLS data-path for
receiving. Otherwise, it returns zero.
=head1 NOTES
@@ -134,7 +140,8 @@ the case of BIO_seek() on a file BIO for a successful operation.
=head1 HISTORY
The BIO_get_ktls_send() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.0.
The BIO_get_ktls_send() and BIO_get_ktls_recv() functions were added in
OpenSSL 3.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
doc/man3/BN_rand.pod
+10 -10
View File
@@ -59,6 +59,15 @@ seeded with enough randomness to ensure an unpredictable byte sequence.
The functions return 1 on success, 0 on error.
The error codes can be obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
L<RAND_add(3)>,
L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND_priv_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND(7)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
=over 2
@@ -78,18 +87,9 @@ BN_priv_rand() and BN_priv_rand_range() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=back
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
L<RAND_add(3)>,
L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND_priv_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND(7)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/BN_security_bits.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -31,17 +31,17 @@ Number of security bits.
ECC (Elliptic Curve Cryptography) is not covered by the BN_security_bits()
function. The symmetric algorithms are not covered neither.
=head1 HISTORY
The BN_security_bits() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<DH_security_bits(3)>, L<DSA_security_bits(3)>, L<RSA_security_bits(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The BN_security_bits() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/DES_random_key.pod
+6 -6
View File
@@ -296,6 +296,11 @@ last 4 bytes of the checksum of the input.
DES_fcrypt() returns a pointer to the caller-provided buffer and DES_crypt() -
to a static buffer on success; otherwise they return NULL.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<des_modes(7)>,
L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The requirement that the B<salt> parameter to DES_crypt() and DES_fcrypt()
@@ -304,14 +309,9 @@ OpenSSL 1.1.0. Previous versions tried to use the letter uppercase B<A>
if both character were not present, and could crash when given non-ASCII
on some platforms.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<des_modes(7)>,
L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/EC_GROUP_copy.pod
+19 -3
View File
@@ -9,7 +9,8 @@ EC_GROUP_set_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_set_asn1_flag,
EC_GROUP_get_asn1_flag, EC_GROUP_set_point_conversion_form,
EC_GROUP_get_point_conversion_form, EC_GROUP_get0_seed,
EC_GROUP_get_seed_len, EC_GROUP_set_seed, EC_GROUP_get_degree,
EC_GROUP_check, EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_cmp,
EC_GROUP_check, EC_GROUP_check_named_curve,
EC_GROUP_check_discriminant, EC_GROUP_cmp,
EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis,
EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis, EC_GROUP_get0_field
- Functions for manipulating EC_GROUP objects
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis, EC_GROUP_get0_field
int EC_GROUP_get_degree(const EC_GROUP *group);
int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
int EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, int nist_only);
int EC_GROUP_check_discriminant(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx);
@@ -128,7 +130,7 @@ in that a parameter obtained in this way is highly unlikely to be susceptible to
If the seed is present for a curve then the b parameter was generated in a verifiable fashion using that seed. The OpenSSL EC library
does not use this seed value but does enable you to inspect it using EC_GROUP_get0_seed. This returns a pointer to a memory block
containing the seed that was used. The length of the memory block can be obtained using EC_GROUP_get_seed_len. A number of the
builtin curves within the library provide seed values that can be obtained. It is also possible to set a custom seed using
built-in curves within the library provide seed values that can be obtained. It is also possible to set a custom seed using
EC_GROUP_set_seed and passing a pointer to a memory block, along with the length of the seed. Again, the EC library will not use
this seed value, although it will be preserved in any ASN1 based communications.
@@ -143,6 +145,14 @@ The function EC_GROUP_check performs a number of checks on a curve to verify tha
verifying that the discriminant is non zero; that a generator has been defined; that the generator is on the curve and has
the correct order.
The function EC_GROUP_check_named_curve determines if the group's domain parameters match one of the built-in curves supported by the library.
The curve name is returned as a B<NID> if it matches. If the group's domain parameters have been modified then no match will be found.
If the curve name of the given group is B<NID_undef> (e.g. it has been created by using explicit parameters with no curve name),
then this method can be used to lookup the name of the curve that matches the group domain parameters. The built-in curves contain
aliases, so that multiple NID's can map to the same domain parameters. For such curves it is unspecified which of the aliases will be
returned if the curve name of the given group is NID_undef.
If B<nist_only> is 1 it will only look for NIST approved curves, otherwise it searches all built-in curves.
EC_GROUP_cmp compares B<a> and B<b> to determine whether they represent the same curve or not.
The functions EC_GROUP_get_basis_type, EC_GROUP_get_trinomial_basis and EC_GROUP_get_pentanomial_basis should only be called for curves
@@ -175,6 +185,8 @@ EC_GROUP_get_order, EC_GROUP_get_cofactor, EC_GROUP_get_curve_name, EC_GROUP_get
and EC_GROUP_get_degree return the order, cofactor, curve name (NID), ASN1 flag, point_conversion_form and degree for the
specified curve respectively. If there is no curve name associated with a curve then EC_GROUP_get_curve_name will return 0.
EC_GROUP_check_named_curve() returns the nid of the matching named curve, otherwise it returns 0 for no match, or -1 on error.
EC_GROUP_get0_order() returns an internal pointer to the group order.
EC_GROUP_order_bits() returns the number of bits in the group order.
EC_GROUP_get0_cofactor() returns an internal pointer to the group cofactor.
@@ -198,9 +210,13 @@ L<crypto(7)>, L<EC_GROUP_new(3)>,
L<EC_POINT_new(3)>, L<EC_POINT_add(3)>, L<EC_KEY_new(3)>,
L<EC_GFp_simple_method(3)>, L<d2i_ECPKParameters(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The EC_GROUP_check_named_curve() function was added in OpenSSL 3.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2013-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2013-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/EVP_DigestInit.pod
+6 -1
View File
@@ -182,7 +182,12 @@ EVP_MD_meth_set_app_datasize().
=item EVP_MD_CTX_md()
Returns the B<EVP_MD> structure corresponding to the passed B<EVP_MD_CTX>.
Returns the B<EVP_MD> structure corresponding to the passed B<EVP_MD_CTX>. This
will be the same B<EVP_MD> object originally passed to EVP_DigestInit_ex() (or
other similar function) when the EVP_MD_CTX was first initialised. Note that
where explicit fetch is in use (see L<EVP_MD_fetch(3)>) the value returned from
this function will not have its reference count incremented and therefore it
should not be used after the EVP_MD_CTX is freed.
=item EVP_MD_CTX_set_update_fn()
doc/man3/EVP_MD_fetch.pod
+24 -9
View File
@@ -21,13 +21,13 @@ calculate the digest of input data using functions such as
L<EVP_DigestInit_ex(3)>, L<EVP_DigestUpdate(3)> and L<EVP_DigestFinal_ex(3)>.
Digest implementations may be obtained in one of three ways, i.e. implicit
lookup, explicit lookup or user defined.
fetch, explicit fetch or user defined.
=over 4
=item Implicit Lookup
=item Implicit Fetch
With implicit lookup an application can use functions such as L<EVP_sha256(3)>,
With implicit fetch an application can use functions such as L<EVP_sha256(3)>,
L<EVP_sha512(3)> or L<EVP_blake2b512(3)> to obtain an B<EVP_MD> object. When
used in a function like L<EVP_DigestInit_ex(3)> the actual implementation to
be used will be fetched implicitly using default search criteria. Typically,
@@ -35,13 +35,15 @@ be used will be fetched implicitly using default search criteria. Typically,
have been loaded), this will return an implementation of the appropriate
algorithm from the default provider.
=item Explicit Lookup
=item Explicit Fetch
With explicit lookup an application uses the EVP_MD_fetch() function to obtain
With explicit fetch an application uses the EVP_MD_fetch() function to obtain
an algorithm implementation. An implementation with the given name and
satisfying the search criteria specified in the B<properties> parameter will be
looked for within the available providers and returned. See L<OSSL_PROVIDER(3)>
for information about providers.
satisfying the search criteria specified in the B<properties> parameter
combined with the default search criteria will be looked for within the
available providers and returned.
See L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)> for information on default search criteria
and L<OSSL_PROVIDER(3)> for information about providers.
=item User defined
@@ -83,6 +85,18 @@ The return value from a call to EVP_MD_fetch() must be freed by the caller using
L<EVP_MD_meth_free(3)>. Note that EVP_MD objects are reference counted. See
L<EVP_MD_upref(3)>.
=head1 NOTES
Where an application that previously used implicit fetch is converted to use
explicit fetch care should be taken with the L<EVP_MD_CTX_md(3)> function.
Specifically, this function returns the EVP_MD object orginally passed to
EVP_DigestInit_ex() (or other similar function). With implicit fetch the
returned EVP_MD object is guaranteed to be available throughout the application
lifetime. However, with explicit fetch EVP_MD objects are reference counted.
EVP_MD_CTX_md does not increment the reference count and so the returned EVP_MD
object may not be accessible beyond the lifetime of the EVP_MD_CTX it is
associated with.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_MD_fetch() returns a pointer to the algorithm implementation represented by
@@ -144,7 +158,8 @@ other providers:
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_DigestInit(3)>, L<EVP_MD_meth_new(3)>, L<EVP_MD_meth_free(3)>,
L<EVP_MD_upref(3)>, L<OSSL_PROVIDER_load(3)>, L<OPENSSL_CTX(3)>
L<EVP_MD_upref(3)>, L<OSSL_PROVIDER_load(3)>, L<OPENSSL_CTX(3)>,
L<EVP_set_default_properties(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
doc/man3/EVP_set_default_properties.pod
+52
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
=pod
=head1 NAME
EVP_set_default_properties
- Set default properties for future algorithm fetches
=head1 SYNOPSIS
#include <openssl/evp.h>
int EVP_set_default_properties(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx, const char *propq);
=head1 DESCRIPTION
EVP_set_default_properties() sets the default properties for all
future EVP algorithm fetches, implicit as well as explicit.
=for comment TODO(3.0) We should consider having an EVP document in
section 7 that details everything about implicit vs explicit fetches
and how they relate to properties.
EVP_set_default_properties stores the properties given with the string
I<propq> among the EVP data that's been stored in the library context
given with I<libctx> (NULL signifies the default library context).
Any previous default property for the specified library context will
be dropped.
=head1 RETURN VALUES
EVP_set_default_properties() returns 1 on success, or 0 on failure.
The latter adds an error on the error stack.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_MD_fetch>
=head1 HISTORY
The functions described here were added in OpenSSL 3.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
=cut
doc/man3/OSSL_PARAM_TYPE.pod
+19 -7
View File
@@ -10,7 +10,8 @@ OSSL_PARAM_SIZED_octet_ptr, OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_construct_TYPE,
OSSL_PARAM_END,
OSSL_PARAM_construct_BN, OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string,
OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr, OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string,
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr, OSSL_PARAM_locate, OSSL_PARAM_get_TYPE,
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr, OSSL_PARAM_construct_end,
OSSL_PARAM_locate, OSSL_PARAM_get_TYPE,
OSSL_PARAM_set_TYPE, OSSL_PARAM_get_BN, OSSL_PARAM_set_BN,
OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_string, OSSL_PARAM_set_utf8_string,
OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string, OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_string,
@@ -43,9 +44,10 @@ OSSL_PARAM_set_octet_ptr
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(const char *key, void *buf,
size_t bsize, size_t *rsize);
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr(const char *key, char **buf,
size_t *rsize);
size_t bsize, size_t *rsize);
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr(const char *key, void **buf,
size_t *rsize);
size_t bsize, size_t *rsize);
OSSL_PARAM OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(void);
OSSL_PARAM *OSSL_PARAM_locate(OSSL_PARAM *array, const char *key);
@@ -171,13 +173,16 @@ size B<rsize> is created.
OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_ptr() is a function that constructes a UTF string
pointer OSSL_PARAM structure.
A parameter with name B<key>, storage pointer B<*buf> and return size B<rsize>
is created.
A parameter with name B<key>, storage pointer B<*buf>, size B<bsize> and
return size B<rsize> is created.
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_ptr() is a function that constructes an OCTET string
pointer OSSL_PARAM structure.
A parameter with name B<key>, storage pointer B<*buf> and return size B<rsize>
is created.
A parameter with name B<key>, storage pointer B<*buf>, size B<bsize> and
return size B<rsize> is created.
OSSL_PARAM_construct_end() is a function that constructs the terminating
OSSL_PARAM structure.
OSSL_PARAM_locate() is a function that searches an B<array> of parameters for
the one matching the B<key> name.
@@ -249,6 +254,13 @@ Integral types will be widened and sign extended as required.
Apart from that, the functions must be used appropriately for the
expected type of the parameter.
For OSSL_PARAM_get_utf8_ptr() and OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_ptr(), B<bsize>
is not relevant if the purpose is to send the B<OSSL_PARAM> array to a
I<responder>, i.e. to get parameter data back.
In that case, B<bsize> can safely be given zero.
See L<OSSL_PARAM(3)/DESCRIPTION> for further information on the
possible purposes.
=head1 EXAMPLES
Reusing the examples from L<OSSL_PARAM(3)> to just show how
doc/man3/OSSL_trace_set_channel.pod
+4
View File
@@ -176,6 +176,10 @@ point during evaluation.
Traces BIGNUM context operations.
=item C<OSSL_TRACE_CATEGORY_PROVIDER_CONF>
Traces the OSSL_PROVIDER configuration.
=back
There is also C<OSSL_TRACE_CATEGORY_ALL>, which works as a fallback
doc/man3/PEM_read_bio_PrivateKey.pod
+6 -6
View File
@@ -459,20 +459,20 @@ Skeleton pass phrase callback:
return len;
}
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)>,
L<passphrase-encoding(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The old Netscape certificate sequences were no longer documented
in OpenSSL 1.1.0; applications should use the PKCS7 standard instead
as they will be formally deprecated in a future releases.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<EVP_EncryptInit(3)>, L<EVP_BytesToKey(3)>,
L<passphrase-encoding(7)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2001-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2001-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_generate.pod
+13 -11
View File
@@ -29,7 +29,9 @@ number of generate requests (I<reseed interval>) or the maximum timespan
(I<reseed time interval>) since its last seeding have been reached.
If this is the case, the DRBG reseeds automatically.
Additionally, an immediate reseeding can be requested by setting the
B<prediction_resistance> flag to 1. See NOTES section for more details.
B<prediction_resistance> flag to 1.
Requesting prediction resistance is a relative expensive operation.
See NOTES section for more details.
The caller can optionally provide additional data to be used for reseeding
by passing a pointer B<adin> to a buffer of length B<adinlen>.
@@ -59,15 +61,9 @@ If necessary, they can be changed using L<RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(3)>
and L<RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(3)>, respectively.
A request for prediction resistance can only be satisfied by pulling fresh
entropy from one of the approved entropy sources listed in section 5.5.2 of
[NIST SP 800-90C].
Since the default DRBG implementation does not have access to such an approved
entropy source, a request for prediction resistance will always fail.
In other words, prediction resistance is currently not supported yet by the DRBG.
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
entropy from a live entropy source (section 5.5.2 of [NIST SP 800-90C]).
It is up to the user to ensure that a live entropy source is configured
and is being used.
=head1 SEE ALSO
@@ -76,9 +72,15 @@ L<RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_time_interval(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
Prediction resistance is supported from OpenSSL 3.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_get0_master.pod
+5 -6
View File
@@ -53,11 +53,6 @@ During initialization, it is possible to change the reseed interval
and reseed time interval.
It is also possible to exchange the reseeding callbacks entirely.
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(3)>,
@@ -68,9 +63,13 @@ L<RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG_generate(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_new.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -134,10 +134,6 @@ To ensure that they are applied to the global and thread-local DRBG instances
RAND_DRBG_set_defaults() before creating any thread and before calling any
cryptographic routines that obtain random data directly or indirectly.
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<OPENSSL_zalloc(3)>,
@@ -145,9 +141,13 @@ L<OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG_generate(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_reseed.pod
+13 -6
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,8 @@ RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults
#include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
int RAND_DRBG_reseed(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen);
const unsigned char *adin, size_t adinlen,
int prediction_resistance);
int RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned int interval);
@@ -37,6 +38,10 @@ and mixing in the specified additional data provided in the buffer B<adin>
of length B<adinlen>.
The additional data can be omitted by setting B<adin> to NULL and B<adinlen>
to 0.
An immediate reseeding can be requested by setting the
B<prediction_resistance> flag to 1.
Requesting prediction resistance is a relative expensive operation.
See NOTES section for more details.
RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_interval()
sets the reseed interval of the B<drbg>, which is the maximum allowed number
@@ -88,10 +93,6 @@ To ensure that they are applied to the global and thread-local DRBG instances
RAND_DRBG_set_reseed_defaults() before creating any thread and before calling any
cryptographic routines that obtain random data directly or indirectly.
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_DRBG_generate(3)>,
@@ -99,9 +100,15 @@ L<RAND_DRBG_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks(3)>.
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
Prediction resistance is supported from OpenSSL 3.0.0.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks.pod
+8 -12
View File
@@ -104,12 +104,9 @@ contents safely before freeing it, in order not to leave sensitive information
about the DRBG's state in memory.
A request for prediction resistance can only be satisfied by pulling fresh
entropy from one of the approved entropy sources listed in section 5.5.2 of
[NIST SP 800-90C].
Since the default implementation of the get_entropy callback does not have access
to such an approved entropy source, a request for prediction resistance will
always fail.
In other words, prediction resistance is currently not supported yet by the DRBG.
entropy from a live entropy source (section 5.5.2 of [NIST SP 800-90C]).
It is up to the user to ensure that a live entropy source is configured
and is being used.
The derivation function is disabled during initialization by calling the
RAND_DRBG_set() function with the RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF flag.
@@ -124,20 +121,19 @@ In this case the DRBG will automatically request an extra amount of entropy
utilize for the nonce, following the recommendations of [NIST SP 800-90A Rev. 1],
section 8.6.7.
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_DRBG_new(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG_reseed(3)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The RAND_DRBG functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2017-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_add.pod
+6 -6
View File
@@ -80,11 +80,6 @@ RAND_event() returns RAND_status().
The other functions do not return values.
=head1 HISTORY
RAND_event() and RAND_screen() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and should
not be used.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
@@ -92,9 +87,14 @@ L<RAND_egd(3)>,
L<RAND_load_file(3)>,
L<RAND(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
RAND_event() and RAND_screen() were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0 and should
not be used.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_bytes.pod
+10 -10
View File
@@ -43,6 +43,15 @@ return 1 on success, -1 if not supported by the current
RAND method, or 0 on other failure. The error code can be
obtained by L<ERR_get_error(3)>.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_add(3)>,
L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND_priv_bytes(3)>,
L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
L<RAND(7)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
=over 2
@@ -57,18 +66,9 @@ The RAND_priv_bytes() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=back
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND_add(3)>,
L<RAND_bytes(3)>,
L<RAND_priv_bytes(3)>,
L<ERR_get_error(3)>,
L<RAND(7)>,
L<RAND_DRBG(7)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/RAND_cleanup.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -25,18 +25,18 @@ L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>.
RAND_cleanup() returns no value.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
RAND_cleanup() was deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0; do not use it.
See L<OPENSSL_init_crypto(3)>
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<RAND(7)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_CIPHER_get_name.pod
+10 -7
View File
@@ -124,7 +124,10 @@ Textual representation of the cipher name.
=item <protocol version>
Protocol version, such as B<TLSv1.2>, when the cipher was first defined.
The minimum protocol version that the ciphersuite supports, such as B<TLSv1.2>.
Note that this is not always the same as the protocol version in which the
ciphersuite was first defined because some ciphersuites are backwards compatible
with earlier protocol versions.
=item Kx=<key exchange>
@@ -177,6 +180,11 @@ SSL_CIPHER_get_id() returns a 4-byte integer representing the OpenSSL-specific I
SSL_CIPHER_get_protocol_id() returns a 2-byte integer representing the TLS
protocol-specific ID.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_current_cipher(3)>,
L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, L<ciphers(1)>
=head1 HISTORY
The SSL_CIPHER_get_version() function was updated to always return the
@@ -193,14 +201,9 @@ required to enable this function.
The OPENSSL_cipher_name() function was added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_get_current_cipher(3)>,
L<SSL_get_ciphers(3)>, L<ciphers(1)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_new.pod
+7 -7
View File
@@ -190,6 +190,11 @@ SSL_CTX_up_ref() returns 1 for success and 0 for failure.
=back
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
Support for SSLv2 and the corresponding SSLv2_method(),
@@ -198,18 +203,13 @@ removed in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
SSLv23_method(), SSLv23_server_method() and SSLv23_client_method()
were deprecated and the preferred TLS_method(), TLS_server_method()
and TLS_client_method() functions were introduced in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
and TLS_client_method() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
All version-specific methods were deprecated in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CTX_free(3)>, L<SSL_accept(3)>,
L<SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version(3)>, L<ssl(7)>, L<SSL_set_connect_state(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_default_passwd_cb.pod
+6 -6
View File
@@ -90,20 +90,20 @@ truncated.
return strlen(buf);
}
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ssl(7)>,
L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb(), SSL_CTX_get_default_passwd_cb_userdata(),
SSL_set_default_passwd_cb() and SSL_set_default_passwd_cb_userdata() were
added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<ssl(7)>,
L<SSL_CTX_use_certificate(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_min_proto_version.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -52,18 +52,18 @@ lowest or highest protocol, respectively.
All these functions are implemented using macros.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The setter functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0. The getter functions
were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_options(3)>, L<SSL_CONF_cmd(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_CTX_set_split_send_fragment.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -162,6 +162,10 @@ SSL_set_default_read_buffer_len(), SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(),
SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length() and SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length()
all these functions are implemented using macros.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<SSL_pending(3)>
=head1 HISTORY
The SSL_CTX_set_max_pipelines(), SSL_set_max_pipelines(),
@@ -172,13 +176,9 @@ functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.0.
The SSL_CTX_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length(), SSL_set_tlsext_max_fragment_length()
and SSL_SESSION_get_max_fragment_length() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_CTX_set_read_ahead(3)>, L<SSL_pending(3)>
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2016-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
doc/man3/SSL_read.pod
+5 -5
View File
@@ -126,10 +126,6 @@ You should instead call SSL_get_error() to find out if it's retryable.
=back
=head1 HISTORY
The SSL_read_ex() and SSL_peek_ex() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 SEE ALSO
L<SSL_get_error(3)>, L<SSL_write_ex(3)>,
@@ -140,9 +136,13 @@ L<SSL_pending(3)>,
L<SSL_shutdown(3)>, L<SSL_set_shutdown(3)>,
L<ssl(7)>, L<bio(7)>
=head1 HISTORY
The SSL_read_ex() and SSL_peek_ex() functions were added in OpenSSL 1.1.1.
=head1 COPYRIGHT
Copyright 2000-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy

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