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Latest update, add TLS 1.3 session time configuration.

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This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2019-04-13 23:25:53 +09:00
parent 48ec086472
commit 704c3822e0
166 changed files with 3539 additions and 1083 deletions
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ssl/record/rec_layer_s3.c
+7 -3
View File
@@ -268,11 +268,15 @@ int ssl3_read_n(SSL *s, size_t n, size_t max, int extend, int clearold,
return -1;
}
/* We always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS */
if (!s->rlayer.read_ahead && !SSL_IS_DTLS(s))
/*
* Ktls always reads full records.
* Also, we always act like read_ahead is set for DTLS.
*/
if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !s->rlayer.read_ahead
&& !SSL_IS_DTLS(s)) {
/* ignore max parameter */
max = n;
else {
} else {
if (max < n)
max = n;
if (max > rb->len - rb->offset)
ssl/record/ssl3_record.c
+42 -5
View File
@@ -187,9 +187,11 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
size_t num_recs = 0, max_recs, j;
PACKET pkt, sslv2pkt;
size_t first_rec_len;
int is_ktls_left;
rr = RECORD_LAYER_get_rrec(&s->rlayer);
rbuf = RECORD_LAYER_get_rbuf(&s->rlayer);
is_ktls_left = (rbuf->left > 0);
max_recs = s->max_pipelines;
if (max_recs == 0)
max_recs = 1;
@@ -208,8 +210,32 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
rret = ssl3_read_n(s, SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH,
SSL3_BUFFER_get_len(rbuf), 0,
num_recs == 0 ? 1 : 0, &n);
if (rret <= 0)
return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
if (rret <= 0) {
if (!BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio))
return rret; /* error or non-blocking */
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
switch (errno) {
case EBADMSG:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_BAD_RECORD_MAC,
SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DECRYPTION_FAILED_OR_BAD_RECORD_MAC);
break;
case EMSGSIZE:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW,
SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_PACKET_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
break;
case EINVAL:
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_PROTOCOL_VERSION,
SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_WRONG_VERSION_NUMBER);
break;
default:
break;
}
return rret;
#endif
}
RECORD_LAYER_set_rstate(&s->rlayer, SSL_ST_READ_BODY);
p = RECORD_LAYER_get_packet(&s->rlayer);
@@ -387,7 +413,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
len -= SSL3_RT_MAX_COMPRESSED_OVERHEAD;
#endif
if (thisrr->length > len) {
if (thisrr->length > len && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_ENCRYPTED_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
@@ -405,6 +431,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
} else {
more = thisrr->length;
}
if (more > 0) {
/* now s->packet_length == SSL3_RT_HEADER_LENGTH */
@@ -492,6 +519,13 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
return 1;
}
/*
* KTLS reads full records. If there is any data left,
* then it is from before enabling ktls
*/
if (BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio) && !is_ktls_left)
goto skip_decryption;
/*
* If in encrypt-then-mac mode calculate mac from encrypted record. All
* the details below are public so no timing details can leak.
@@ -674,6 +708,8 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
return -1;
}
skip_decryption:
for (j = 0; j < num_recs; j++) {
thisrr = &rr[j];
@@ -735,7 +771,7 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
return -1;
}
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH) {
if (thisrr->length > SSL3_RT_MAX_PLAIN_LENGTH && !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;
@@ -743,7 +779,8 @@ int ssl3_get_record(SSL *s)
/* If received packet overflows current Max Fragment Length setting */
if (s->session != NULL && USE_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH_EXT(s->session)
&& thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)) {
&& thisrr->length > GET_MAX_FRAGMENT_LENGTH(s->session)
&& !BIO_get_ktls_recv(s->rbio)) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_RECORD_OVERFLOW, SSL_F_SSL3_GET_RECORD,
SSL_R_DATA_LENGTH_TOO_LONG);
return -1;