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Hakase
2019-05-23 12:02:56 +09:00
parent a7bf77581f
commit 64d458de91
185 changed files with 5859 additions and 2853 deletions
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crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c
+27 -18
View File
@@ -13,45 +13,52 @@
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
static unsigned char *crngt_prev;
static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *) = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
= &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf)
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_size)
{
int r;
size_t n;
unsigned char *p;
while ((n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool)) != 0)
if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool);
if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
if (r != 0)
memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
return 1;
}
rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
{
rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
OPENSSL_secure_free(crngt_prev);
crngt_pool = NULL;
crngt_prev = NULL;
}
int rand_crngt_init(void)
{
unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
return 0;
if ((crngt_prev = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) != NULL
&& crngt_get_entropy(crngt_prev))
if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
return 1;
}
rand_crngt_cleanup();
return 0;
}
@@ -74,7 +81,8 @@ size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
int prediction_resistance)
{
unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ], md[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int sz;
RAND_POOL *pool;
size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
int attempts = 3;
@@ -87,17 +95,18 @@ size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf)
|| memcmp(crngt_prev, buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ) == 0
if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz)
|| memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
|| !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
goto err;
memcpy(crngt_prev, buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz);
t += s;
attempts++;
}
r = t;
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
rand_pool_free(pool);
return r;
}