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Hakase
2019-09-21 00:43:47 +09:00
parent 2e57f602ae
commit 62515c7d8d
1131 changed files with 47556 additions and 24957 deletions
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providers/common/kdfs/build.info
+13
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$COMMON=tls1_prf.c hkdf.c pbkdf2.c sskdf.c
LIBS=../../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../../libcrypto]=$COMMON
INCLUDE[../../../libcrypto]=. ../../../crypto
IF[{- !$disabled{fips} -}]
MODULES=../../fips
SOURCE[../../fips]=$COMMON
INCLUDE[../../fips]=. ../../../crypto
ENDIF
providers/common/kdfs/hkdf.c
+463
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/*
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
#include "internal/provider_util.h"
#include "e_os.h"
#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_hkdf_new;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_hkdf_free;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_hkdf_reset;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_hkdf_derive;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params;
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
int mode;
PROV_DIGEST digest;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
unsigned char *key;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
size_t info_len;
} KDF_HKDF;
static void *kdf_hkdf_new(void *provctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx;
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
else
ctx->provctx = provctx;
return ctx;
}
static void kdf_hkdf_free(void *vctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
kdf_hkdf_reset(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static void kdf_hkdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(KDF_HKDF *ctx)
{
int sz;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (ctx->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
return SIZE_MAX;
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
sz = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
return sz;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->key == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_KEY);
return 0;
}
switch (ctx->mode) {
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
return HKDF(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
ctx->key_len, ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key,
keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
return HKDF_Extract(md, ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->key,
ctx->key_len, key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
return HKDF_Expand(md, ctx->key, ctx->key_len, ctx->info,
ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
default:
return 0;
}
}
static int kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
KDF_HKDF *ctx = vctx;
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
int n;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE)) != NULL) {
if (p->data_type == OSSL_PARAM_UTF8_STRING) {
if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
} else if (strcasecmp(p->data, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0) {
ctx->mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
} else if (OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &n)) {
if (n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND
&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY
&& n != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
ctx->mode = n;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_MODE);
return 0;
}
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->key, ctx->key_len);
ctx->key = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->key, 0,
&ctx->key_len))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
if (p->data_size != 0 && p->data != NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
ctx->salt = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->salt, 0,
&ctx->salt_len))
return 0;
}
}
/* The info fields concatenate, so process them all */
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL) {
ctx->info_len = 0;
for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) {
const void *q = ctx->info + ctx->info_len;
size_t sz = 0;
if (p->data_size != 0
&& p->data != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
HKDF_MAXBUF - ctx->info_len,
&sz))
return 0;
ctx->info_len += sz;
}
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MODE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_HKDF *ctx = (KDF_HKDF *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, kdf_hkdf_size(ctx));
return -2;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_hkdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_hkdf_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
* Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
*
* From the paper:
* The scheme HKDF is specified as:
* HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
*
* where:
* SKM is source key material
* XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
* CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
* L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
* k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
* t = ceil(L/k)
* the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
*
* From RFC 5869:
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*/
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int ret, sz;
size_t prk_len;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
prk_len = (size_t)sz;
/* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
return 0;
/* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
return ret;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
*
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
*
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
* if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
* IKM input keying material
*
* Output:
* PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
*
* The output PRK is calculated as follows:
*
* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
*/
static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
{
int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
*
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
*
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
* (usually, the output from the extract step)
* info optional context and application specific information
* (can be a zero-length string)
* L length of output keying material in octets
* (<= 255*HashLen)
*
* Output:
* OKM output keying material (of L octets)
*
* The output OKM is calculated as follows:
*
* N = ceil(L/HashLen)
* T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
* OKM = first L octets of T
*
* where:
* T(0) = empty string (zero length)
* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
* T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
* T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
* ...
*
* (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
* single octet.)
*/
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
int ret = 0, sz;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz <= 0)
return 0;
dig_len = (size_t)sz;
/* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
n = okm_len / dig_len;
if (okm_len % dig_len)
n++;
if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
return 0;
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
size_t copy_len;
const unsigned char ctr = i;
/* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
if (i > 1) {
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
goto err;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
goto err;
copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
okm_len - done_len :
dig_len;
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
done_len += copy_len;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
providers/common/kdfs/pbkdf2.c
+344
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@@ -0,0 +1,344 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
#include "internal/provider_util.h"
/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
/*
* For backwards compatibility reasons,
* Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
*/
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 1
#else
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_new;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_pbkdf2_free;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_pbkdf2_reset;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_pbkdf2_derive;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params;
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
unsigned char *pass;
size_t pass_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
uint64_t iter;
PROV_DIGEST digest;
int lower_bound_checks;
} KDF_PBKDF2;
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx);
static void *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void *provctx)
{
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx;
ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
ctx->provctx = provctx;
kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
return ctx;
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
{
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->salt);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(void *vctx)
{
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
kdf_pbkdf2_cleanup(ctx);
kdf_pbkdf2_init(ctx);
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2] = { OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST,
SN_sha1, 0);
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
/* This is an error, but there is no way to indicate such directly */
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
ctx->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
ctx->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
}
static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
if (p->data_size == 0) {
if ((*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
} else if (p->data != NULL) {
*buffer = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)buffer, 0, buflen))
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = (KDF_PBKDF2 *)vctx;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (ctx->pass == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_PASS);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SALT);
return 0;
}
return pbkdf2_derive((char *)ctx->pass, ctx->pass_len,
ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len, ctx->iter,
md, key, keylen, ctx->lower_bound_checks);
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
KDF_PBKDF2 *ctx = vctx;
OPENSSL_CTX *provctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
int pkcs5;
uint64_t iter, min_iter;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, provctx))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5)) != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_int(p, &pkcs5))
return 0;
ctx->lower_bound_checks = pkcs5 == 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD)) != NULL)
if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->pass, &ctx->pass_len, p))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL) {
if (ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0
&& p->data_size < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (!pbkdf2_set_membuf(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len,p))
return 0;
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER)) != NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_uint64(p, &iter))
return 0;
min_iter = ctx->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
if (iter < min_iter) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
ctx->iter = iter;
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PASSWORD, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_uint64(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_ITER, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_int(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PKCS5, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
return -2;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_pbkdf2_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))kdf_pbkdf2_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/*
* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
* derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
* posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
*
* The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
* - Check the range of the key length.
* - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
* - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
*/
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, uint64_t iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
int cplen, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
uint64_t j;
unsigned long i = 1;
HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (mdlen <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
* results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
*/
if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (lower_bound_checks) {
if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_SALT_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
}
hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
return 0;
p = key;
tkeylen = keylen;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
goto err;
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
goto err;
while (tkeylen) {
if (tkeylen > mdlen)
cplen = mdlen;
else
cplen = tkeylen;
/*
* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
* just in case...
*/
itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
|| !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
goto err;
memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
goto err;
for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
}
tkeylen -= cplen;
i++;
p += cplen;
}
ret = 1;
err:
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
return ret;
}
providers/common/kdfs/sskdf.c
+538
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,538 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4.1.
*
* The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by:
*
* Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
* For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
* Increment counter by 1.
* Result(i) = Result(i - 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
* DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
*
* NOTES:
* Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material.
* counter is a 4 byte buffer.
* FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data.
* DKM is the output derived key material.
* L is the required size of the DKM.
* reps = [L / H_outputBits]
* H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC.
* H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x).
*
* Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this
* algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC.
* Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
#include "internal/provider_util.h"
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
EVP_MAC_CTX *macctx; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
PROV_DIGEST digest; /* H(x) = hash(x) */
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
unsigned char *info;
size_t info_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
} KDF_SSKDF;
#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
#define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
#define SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (136 - 4)
/* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn sskdf_new;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn sskdf_free;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn sskdf_reset;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn sskdf_derive;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn x963kdf_derive;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn sskdf_set_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_gettable_ctx_params_fn sskdf_gettable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_get_ctx_params_fn sskdf_get_ctx_params;
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
* Note: X9.63 also uses this code with the only difference being that the
* counter is appended to the secret 'z'.
* i.e.
* result[i] = Hash(counter || z || info) for One Step OR
* result[i] = Hash(z || counter || info) for X9.63.
*/
static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned int append_ctr,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0, hlen;
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
unsigned char c[4];
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0)
return 0;
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
if (hlen <= 0)
return 0;
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
goto end;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
&& (append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
&& (!append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len)))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init);
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
return ret;
}
static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom,
size_t custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
size_t derived_key_len, unsigned char **out)
{
OSSL_PARAM params[2];
/* Only KMAC has custom data - so return if not KMAC */
if (custom == NULL)
return 1;
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_CUSTOM,
(void *)custom, custom_len);
params[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params))
return 0;
/* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
if (kmac_out_len == 0)
kmac_out_len = derived_key_len;
/* otherwise check the size is valid */
else if (!(kmac_out_len == derived_key_len
|| kmac_out_len == 20
|| kmac_out_len == 28
|| kmac_out_len == 32
|| kmac_out_len == 48
|| kmac_out_len == 64))
return 0;
params[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_size_t(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_SIZE,
&kmac_out_len);
if (EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx, params) <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* For kmac the output buffer can be larger than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE: so
* alloc a buffer for this case.
*/
if (kmac_out_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
*out = OPENSSL_zalloc(kmac_out_len);
if (*out == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using MAC: i.e either
* H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR
* H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF')
*/
static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
const unsigned char *kmac_custom,
size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t counter, out_len, len;
unsigned char c[4];
unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL;
unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0)
return 0;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
(void *)salt, salt_len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
goto end;
if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
derived_key_len, &kmac_buffer))
goto end;
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
mac = kmac_buffer;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
goto end;
out_len = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); /* output size */
if (out_len <= 0)
goto end;
len = derived_key_len;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (!(ctx != NULL
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, len))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, mac, NULL, len))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
OPENSSL_clear_free(kmac_buffer, kmac_out_len);
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
return ret;
}
static void *sskdf_new(void *provctx)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx;
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->provctx = provctx;
return ctx;
}
static void sskdf_reset(void *vctx)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->macctx);
ossl_prov_digest_reset(&ctx->digest);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->info, ctx->info_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
static void sskdf_free(void *vctx)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
sskdf_reset(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static int sskdf_set_buffer(unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len,
const OSSL_PARAM *p)
{
if (p->data == NULL || p->data_size == 0)
return 1;
OPENSSL_free(*out);
*out = NULL;
return OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)out, 0, out_len);
}
static size_t sskdf_size(KDF_SSKDF *ctx)
{
int len;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
len = EVP_MD_size(md);
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
static int sskdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
int ret;
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
size_t custom_len = 0;
int default_salt_len;
EVP_MAC *mac = EVP_MAC_CTX_mac(ctx->macctx);
/*
* TODO(3.0) investigate the necessity to have all these controls.
* Why does KMAC require a salt length that's shorter than the MD
* block size?
*/
if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC)) {
/* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
default_salt_len = EVP_MD_size(md);
if (default_salt_len <= 0)
return 0;
} else if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128)
|| EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC256)) {
/* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */
custom = kmac_custom_str;
custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str);
if (EVP_MAC_is_a(mac, OSSL_MAC_NAME_KMAC128))
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
else
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
} else {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
if (ctx->salt == NULL || ctx->salt_len <= 0) {
ctx->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
if (ctx->salt == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
ctx->salt_len = default_salt_len;
}
ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(ctx->macctx,
custom, custom_len, ctx->out_len,
ctx->salt, ctx->salt_len,
ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, key, keylen);
return ret;
} else {
/* H(x) = hash */
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
}
}
static int x963kdf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
const EVP_MD *md = ossl_prov_digest_md(&ctx->digest);
if (ctx->secret == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->macctx != NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
}
/* H(x) = hash */
if (md == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(md, ctx->secret, ctx->secret_len,
ctx->info, ctx->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
}
static int sskdf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = vctx;
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
size_t sz;
if (!ossl_prov_digest_load_from_params(&ctx->digest, params, libctx))
return 0;
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->macctx, params,
NULL, NULL, NULL, libctx))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL
|| (p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY)) != NULL)
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->secret, &ctx->secret_len, p))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO)) != NULL)
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->info, &ctx->info_len, p))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT)) != NULL)
if (!sskdf_set_buffer(&ctx->salt, &ctx->salt_len, p))
return 0;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE))
!= NULL) {
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_size_t(p, &sz) || sz == 0)
return 0;
ctx->out_len = sz;
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_KEY, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_INFO, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SALT, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_MAC_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int sskdf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
KDF_SSKDF *ctx = (KDF_SSKDF *)vctx;
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, sskdf_size(ctx));
return -2;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *sskdf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_sskdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))sskdf_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_x963_kdf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))sskdf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))sskdf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))x963kdf_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))sskdf_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))sskdf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS, (void(*)(void))sskdf_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
providers/common/kdfs/tls1_prf.c
+396
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,396 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
*
* where P_MD5 and P_SHA-1 are defined by P_<hash>, below, and S1 and S2 are
* two halves of the secret (with the possibility of one shared byte, in the
* case where the length of the original secret is odd). S1 is taken from the
* first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
*
* For TLS v1.2 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
*
* where hash is SHA-256 for all cipher suites defined in RFC 5246 as well as
* those published prior to TLS v1.2 while the TLS v1.2 protocol is in effect,
* unless defined otherwise by the cipher suite.
*
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
*
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
*
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
*
* A(i) is defined as:
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/core_names.h>
#include <openssl/params.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/provider_ctx.h"
#include "internal/providercommonerr.h"
#include "internal/provider_algs.h"
#include "internal/provider_util.h"
#include "e_os.h"
static OSSL_OP_kdf_newctx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_new;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_freectx_fn kdf_tls1_prf_free;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_reset_fn kdf_tls1_prf_reset;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_derive_fn kdf_tls1_prf_derive;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_settable_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params;
static OSSL_OP_kdf_set_ctx_params_fn kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params;
static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
typedef struct {
void *provctx;
/* MAC context for the main digest */
EVP_MAC_CTX *P_hash;
/* MAC context for SHA1 for the MD5/SHA-1 combined PRF */
EVP_MAC_CTX *P_sha1;
/* Secret value to use for PRF */
unsigned char *sec;
size_t seclen;
/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
size_t seedlen;
} TLS1_PRF;
static void *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void *provctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx;
if ((ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx))) == NULL)
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
ctx->provctx = provctx;
return ctx;
}
static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(void *vctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
kdf_tls1_prf_reset(ctx);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
}
static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(void *vctx)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_hash);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(void *vctx, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
TLS1_PRF *ctx = (TLS1_PRF *)vctx;
if (ctx->P_hash == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->sec == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->seedlen == 0) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, PROV_R_MISSING_SEED);
return 0;
}
return tls1_prf_alg(ctx->P_hash, ctx->P_sha1,
ctx->sec, ctx->seclen,
ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen,
key, keylen);
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params(void *vctx, const OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
const OSSL_PARAM *p;
TLS1_PRF *ctx = vctx;
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx = PROV_LIBRARY_CONTEXT_OF(ctx->provctx);
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST)) != NULL) {
if (strcasecmp(p->data, SN_md5_sha1) == 0) {
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, SN_md5, libctx)
|| !ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_sha1, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, SN_sha1, libctx))
return 0;
} else {
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx->P_sha1);
if (!ossl_prov_macctx_load_from_params(&ctx->P_hash, params,
OSSL_MAC_NAME_HMAC,
NULL, NULL, libctx))
return 0;
}
}
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(ctx->sec, ctx->seclen);
ctx->sec = NULL;
if (!OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&ctx->sec, 0, &ctx->seclen))
return 0;
}
/* The seed fields concatenate, so process them all */
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->seed, ctx->seedlen);
ctx->seedlen = 0;
for (; p != NULL; p = OSSL_PARAM_locate_const(p + 1,
OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED)) {
const void *q = ctx->seed + ctx->seedlen;
size_t sz = 0;
if (p->data_size != 0
&& p->data != NULL
&& !OSSL_PARAM_get_octet_string(p, (void **)&q,
TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - ctx->seedlen,
&sz))
return 0;
ctx->seedlen += sz;
}
}
return 1;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_settable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_PROPERTIES, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_utf8_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_DIGEST, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SECRET, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_octet_string(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SEED, NULL, 0),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_settable_ctx_params;
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params(void *vctx, OSSL_PARAM params[])
{
OSSL_PARAM *p;
if ((p = OSSL_PARAM_locate(params, OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE)) != NULL)
return OSSL_PARAM_set_size_t(p, SIZE_MAX);
return -2;
}
static const OSSL_PARAM *kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params(void)
{
static const OSSL_PARAM known_gettable_ctx_params[] = {
OSSL_PARAM_size_t(OSSL_KDF_PARAM_SIZE, NULL),
OSSL_PARAM_END
};
return known_gettable_ctx_params;
}
const OSSL_DISPATCH kdf_tls1_prf_functions[] = {
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_NEWCTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_new },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_FREECTX, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_free },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_RESET, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_reset },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_DERIVE, (void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_derive },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_settable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_SET_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_set_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GETTABLE_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_gettable_ctx_params },
{ OSSL_FUNC_KDF_GET_CTX_PARAMS,
(void(*)(void))kdf_tls1_prf_get_ctx_params },
{ 0, NULL }
};
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
*
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
*
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
*
* A(i) is defined as:
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
static int tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx_init,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
size_t chunk;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_Ai = NULL;
unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t Ai_len;
int ret = 0;
OSSL_PARAM params[2], *p = params;
*p++ = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
(void *)sec, sec_len);
*p = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(ctx_init, params))
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
goto err;
chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init);
if (chunk == 0)
goto err;
/* A(0) = seed */
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
for (;;) {
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
ctx_Ai = NULL;
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
goto err;
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
if (olen > chunk) {
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
if (olen <= chunk) {
/* last chunk - use Ai as temp bounce buffer */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, Ai, &Ai_len, sizeof(Ai)))
goto err;
memcpy(out, Ai, olen);
break;
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL, olen))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
out += chunk;
olen -= chunk;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
return ret;
}
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
*
* S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
*
* L_S = length in bytes of secret;
* L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2);
*
* For TLS v1.2:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
*/
static int tls1_prf_alg(EVP_MAC_CTX *mdctx, EVP_MAC_CTX *sha1ctx,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
if (sha1ctx != NULL) {
/* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */
size_t i;
unsigned char *tmp;
/* calc: L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2) */
size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2;
size_t L_S2 = L_S1;
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(mdctx, sec, L_S1,
seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_PROV, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(sha1ctx, sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
out[i] ^= tmp[i];
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
return 1;
}
/* TLS v1.2 */
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(mdctx, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
return 1;
}