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Hakase
2019-09-21 00:43:47 +09:00
parent 2e57f602ae
commit 62515c7d8d
1131 changed files with 47556 additions and 24957 deletions
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crypto/rand/rand_lib.c
+120 -21
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@@ -30,8 +30,6 @@ static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
static int rand_inited = 0;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
int rand_fork_count;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
* IMPORTANT NOTE: It is not currently possible to use this code
@@ -69,8 +67,6 @@ size_t rand_acquire_entropy_from_tsc(RAND_POOL *pool)
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdseed_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
size_t OPENSSL_ia32_rdrand_bytes(unsigned char *buf, size_t len);
extern unsigned int OPENSSL_ia32cap_P[];
/*
* Acquire entropy using Intel-specific cpu instructions
*
@@ -149,7 +145,7 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
pool = drbg->seed_pool;
pool->entropy_requested = entropy;
} else {
pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len);
pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, drbg->secure, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
}
@@ -162,7 +158,9 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
size_t bytes = 0;
/*
* Get random from parent, include our state as additional input.
* Get random data from parent. Include our address as additional input,
* in order to provide some additional distinction between different
* DRBG child instances.
* Our lock is already held, but we need to lock our parent before
* generating bits from it. (Note: taking the lock will be a no-op
* if locking if drbg->parent->lock == NULL.)
@@ -171,7 +169,7 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
if (RAND_DRBG_generate(drbg->parent,
buffer, bytes_needed,
prediction_resistance,
NULL, 0) != 0)
(unsigned char *)&drbg, sizeof(drbg)) != 0)
bytes = bytes_needed;
drbg->reseed_next_counter
= tsan_load(&drbg->parent->reseed_prop_counter);
@@ -203,8 +201,12 @@ size_t rand_drbg_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
if (drbg->seed_pool == NULL) {
if (drbg->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
else
OPENSSL_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
}
/*
@@ -236,11 +238,6 @@ void rand_drbg_cleanup_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned char *out)
rand_pool_reattach(pool, out);
}
void rand_fork(void)
{
rand_fork_count++;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
@@ -331,7 +328,7 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH, 1,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH);
if (pool == NULL)
@@ -360,9 +357,11 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
*/
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, int secure,
size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
RAND_POOL *pool = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*pool));
size_t min_alloc_size = RAND_POOL_MIN_ALLOCATION(secure);
if (pool == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -372,14 +371,22 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_new(int entropy_requested, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
pool->min_len = min_len;
pool->max_len = (max_len > RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH) ?
RAND_POOL_MAX_LENGTH : max_len;
pool->alloc_len = min_len < min_alloc_size ? min_alloc_size : min_len;
if (pool->alloc_len > pool->max_len)
pool->alloc_len = pool->max_len;
if (secure)
pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
else
pool->buffer = OPENSSL_zalloc(pool->alloc_len);
pool->buffer = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(pool->max_len);
if (pool->buffer == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
pool->entropy_requested = entropy_requested;
pool->secure = secure;
return pool;
@@ -414,7 +421,7 @@ RAND_POOL *rand_pool_attach(const unsigned char *buffer, size_t len,
pool->attached = 1;
pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->len;
pool->min_len = pool->max_len = pool->alloc_len = pool->len;
pool->entropy = entropy;
return pool;
@@ -434,8 +441,13 @@ void rand_pool_free(RAND_POOL *pool)
* to rand_pool_attach() as `const unsigned char*`.
* (see corresponding comment in rand_pool_attach()).
*/
if (!pool->attached)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->max_len);
if (!pool->attached) {
if (pool->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
else
OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
}
OPENSSL_free(pool);
}
@@ -528,6 +540,42 @@ size_t rand_pool_entropy_needed(RAND_POOL *pool)
return 0;
}
/* Increase the allocation size -- not usable for an attached pool */
static int rand_pool_grow(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
{
if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
unsigned char *p;
const size_t limit = pool->max_len / 2;
size_t newlen = pool->alloc_len;
if (pool->attached || len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
do
newlen = newlen < limit ? newlen * 2 : pool->max_len;
while (len > newlen - pool->len);
if (pool->secure)
p = OPENSSL_secure_zalloc(newlen);
else
p = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen);
if (p == NULL) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_GROW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
memcpy(p, pool->buffer, pool->len);
if (pool->secure)
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
else
OPENSSL_clear_free(pool->buffer, pool->alloc_len);
pool->buffer = p;
pool->alloc_len = newlen;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Returns the number of bytes needed to fill the pool, assuming
* the input has 1 / |entropy_factor| entropy bits per data bit.
@@ -557,6 +605,24 @@ size_t rand_pool_bytes_needed(RAND_POOL *pool, unsigned int entropy_factor)
/* to meet the min_len requirement */
bytes_needed = pool->min_len - pool->len;
/*
* Make sure the buffer is large enough for the requested amount
* of data. This guarantees that existing code patterns where
* rand_pool_add_begin, rand_pool_add_end or rand_pool_add
* are used to collect entropy data without any error handling
* whatsoever, continue to be valid.
* Furthermore if the allocation here fails once, make sure that
* we don't fall back to a less secure or even blocking random source,
* as that could happen by the existing code patterns.
* This is not a concern for additional data, therefore that
* is not needed if rand_pool_grow fails in other places.
*/
if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, bytes_needed)) {
/* persistent error for this pool */
pool->max_len = pool->len = 0;
return 0;
}
return bytes_needed;
}
@@ -589,6 +655,27 @@ int rand_pool_add(RAND_POOL *pool,
}
if (len > 0) {
/*
* This is to protect us from accidentally passing the buffer
* returned from rand_pool_add_begin.
* The check for alloc_len makes sure we do not compare the
* address of the end of the allocated memory to something
* different, since that comparison would have an
* indeterminate result.
*/
if (pool->alloc_len > pool->len && pool->buffer + pool->len == buffer) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
return 0;
}
/*
* We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
* additional data.
* For entropy data, as long as the allocation request stays within
* the limits given by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow
* below is guaranteed to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
*/
if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
return 0;
memcpy(pool->buffer + pool->len, buffer, len);
pool->len += len;
pool->entropy += entropy;
@@ -624,6 +711,18 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
return NULL;
}
/*
* As long as the allocation request stays within the limits given
* by rand_pool_bytes_needed this rand_pool_grow below is guaranteed
* to succeed, thus no allocation happens.
* We have that only for cases when a pool is used to collect
* additional data. Then the buffer might need to grow here,
* and of course the caller is responsible to check the return
* value of this function.
*/
if (!rand_pool_grow(pool, len))
return NULL;
return pool->buffer + pool->len;
}
@@ -638,7 +737,7 @@ unsigned char *rand_pool_add_begin(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len)
*/
int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
{
if (len > pool->max_len - pool->len) {
if (len > pool->alloc_len - pool->len) {
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_POOL_ADD_END, RAND_R_RANDOM_POOL_OVERFLOW);
return 0;
}