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Hakase
2019-09-21 00:43:47 +09:00
parent 2e57f602ae
commit 62515c7d8d
1131 changed files with 47556 additions and 24957 deletions
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crypto/kdf/build.info
-4
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LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c kdf_util.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sshkdf.c \
sskdf.c x942kdf.c
crypto/kdf/hkdf.c
-440
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@@ -1,440 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
#define HKDF_MAXBUF 1024
static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len);
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len);
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
int mode;
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
unsigned char *key;
size_t key_len;
unsigned char info[HKDF_MAXBUF];
size_t info_len;
};
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_hkdf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void kdf_hkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
kdf_hkdf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static void kdf_hkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
const EVP_MD *md;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
impl->md = md;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE:
impl->mode = va_arg(args, int);
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
impl->salt = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (impl->salt == NULL)
return 0;
impl->salt_len = len;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
impl->key = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (impl->key == NULL)
return 0;
impl->key_len = len;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_HKDF_INFO:
OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->info, impl->info_len);
impl->info_len = 0;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
if (len > (HKDF_MAXBUF - impl->info_len))
return 0;
memcpy(impl->info + impl->info_len, p, len);
impl->info_len += len;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (strcmp(type, "mode") == 0) {
int mode;
if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND") == 0)
mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND;
else if (strcmp(value, "EXTRACT_ONLY") == 0)
mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY;
else if (strcmp(value, "EXPAND_ONLY") == 0)
mode = EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY;
else
return 0;
return call_ctrl(kdf_hkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_HKDF_MODE, mode);
}
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_hkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_HKDF_INFO,
value);
return -2;
}
static size_t kdf_hkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
int sz;
if (impl->mode != EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY)
return SIZE_MAX;
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
sz = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
return sz;
}
static int kdf_hkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (impl->key == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
return 0;
}
switch (impl->mode) {
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_AND_EXPAND:
return HKDF(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
impl->key_len, impl->info, impl->info_len, key,
keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXTRACT_ONLY:
return HKDF_Extract(impl->md, impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->key,
impl->key_len, key, keylen);
case EVP_KDF_HKDF_MODE_EXPAND_ONLY:
return HKDF_Expand(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len, impl->info,
impl->info_len, key, keylen);
default:
return 0;
}
}
const EVP_KDF hkdf_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_HKDF,
kdf_hkdf_new,
kdf_hkdf_free,
kdf_hkdf_reset,
kdf_hkdf_ctrl,
kdf_hkdf_ctrl_str,
kdf_hkdf_size,
kdf_hkdf_derive
};
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2) and
* "Cryptographic Extraction and Key Derivation: The HKDF Scheme"
* Section 4.2 (https://eprint.iacr.org/2010/264.pdf).
*
* From the paper:
* The scheme HKDF is specified as:
* HKDF(XTS, SKM, CTXinfo, L) = K(1) | K(2) | ... | K(t)
*
* where:
* SKM is source key material
* XTS is extractor salt (which may be null or constant)
* CTXinfo is context information (may be null)
* L is the number of key bits to be produced by KDF
* k is the output length in bits of the hash function used with HMAC
* t = ceil(L/k)
* the value K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod k bits.
*
* From RFC 5869:
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*/
static int HKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
unsigned char prk[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int ret, sz;
size_t prk_len;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
prk_len = (size_t)sz;
/* Step 1: HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK */
if (!HKDF_Extract(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, prk_len))
return 0;
/* Step 2: HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM */
ret = HKDF_Expand(evp_md, prk, prk_len, info, info_len, okm, okm_len);
OPENSSL_cleanse(prk, sizeof(prk));
return ret;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.2 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.2).
*
* 2.2. Step 1: Extract
*
* HKDF-Extract(salt, IKM) -> PRK
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* salt optional salt value (a non-secret random value);
* if not provided, it is set to a string of HashLen zeros.
* IKM input keying material
*
* Output:
* PRK a pseudorandom key (of HashLen octets)
*
* The output PRK is calculated as follows:
*
* PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM)
*/
static int HKDF_Extract(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *ikm, size_t ikm_len,
unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len)
{
int sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz < 0)
return 0;
if (prk_len != (size_t)sz) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE);
return 0;
}
/* calc: PRK = HMAC-Hash(salt, IKM) */
return HMAC(evp_md, salt, salt_len, ikm, ikm_len, prk, NULL) != NULL;
}
/*
* Refer to "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"
* Section 2.3 (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5869#section-2.3).
*
* 2.3. Step 2: Expand
*
* HKDF-Expand(PRK, info, L) -> OKM
*
* Options:
* Hash a hash function; HashLen denotes the length of the
* hash function output in octets
*
* Inputs:
* PRK a pseudorandom key of at least HashLen octets
* (usually, the output from the extract step)
* info optional context and application specific information
* (can be a zero-length string)
* L length of output keying material in octets
* (<= 255*HashLen)
*
* Output:
* OKM output keying material (of L octets)
*
* The output OKM is calculated as follows:
*
* N = ceil(L/HashLen)
* T = T(1) | T(2) | T(3) | ... | T(N)
* OKM = first L octets of T
*
* where:
* T(0) = empty string (zero length)
* T(1) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(0) | info | 0x01)
* T(2) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(1) | info | 0x02)
* T(3) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(2) | info | 0x03)
* ...
*
* (where the constant concatenated to the end of each T(n) is a
* single octet.)
*/
static int HKDF_Expand(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *prk, size_t prk_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *okm, size_t okm_len)
{
HMAC_CTX *hmac;
int ret = 0, sz;
unsigned int i;
unsigned char prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t done_len = 0, dig_len, n;
sz = EVP_MD_size(evp_md);
if (sz <= 0)
return 0;
dig_len = (size_t)sz;
/* calc: N = ceil(L/HashLen) */
n = okm_len / dig_len;
if (okm_len % dig_len)
n++;
if (n > 255 || okm == NULL)
return 0;
if ((hmac = HMAC_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, prk, prk_len, evp_md, NULL))
goto err;
for (i = 1; i <= n; i++) {
size_t copy_len;
const unsigned char ctr = i;
/* calc: T(i) = HMAC-Hash(PRK, T(i - 1) | info | i) */
if (i > 1) {
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hmac, NULL, 0, NULL, NULL))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, prev, dig_len))
goto err;
}
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, info, info_len))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hmac, &ctr, 1))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Final(hmac, prev, NULL))
goto err;
copy_len = (done_len + dig_len > okm_len) ?
okm_len - done_len :
dig_len;
memcpy(okm + done_len, prev, copy_len);
done_len += copy_len;
}
ret = 1;
err:
OPENSSL_cleanse(prev, sizeof(prev));
HMAC_CTX_free(hmac);
return ret;
}
crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
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/*
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/kdferr.h>
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_HKDF_EXTRACT, 0), "HKDF_Extract"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_hkdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, 0), "kdf_hkdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, 0), "kdf_hkdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_MD2CTRL, 0), "kdf_md2ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, 0), "kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, 0),
"kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_pbkdf2_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, 0), "kdf_pbkdf2_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, 0),
"kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, 0),
"kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, 0),
"kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_scrypt_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, 0), "kdf_scrypt_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL, 0), "kdf_sshkdf_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, 0),
"kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_sshkdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_NEW, 0), "kdf_sshkdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, 0),
"kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, 0),
"kdf_tls1_prf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, 0), "kdf_tls1_prf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, 0), "pbkdf2_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, 0), "pbkdf2_set_membuf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_hkdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_INIT, 0), "pkey_hkdf_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, 0),
"pkey_scrypt_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, 0),
"pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_scrypt_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_INIT, 0), "pkey_scrypt_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, 0),
"pkey_scrypt_set_membuf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, 0),
"pkey_tls1_prf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, 0),
"pkey_tls1_prf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_TLS1_PRF_INIT, 0), "pkey_tls1_prf_init"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, 0), "scrypt_set_membuf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_CTRL_STR, 0), "sskdf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, 0), "sskdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_MAC2CTRL, 0), "sskdf_mac2ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, 0), "sskdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, 0), "sskdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, 0), "tls1_prf_alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, 0), "x942kdf_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, 0), "x942kdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, 0), "x942kdf_hash_kdm"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, 0), "x942kdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, 0), "x942kdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, 0), "x963kdf_derive"},
{0, NULL}
};
static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING), "bad encoding"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN), "inavlid ukm len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT),
"invalid iteration count"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN), "invalid key len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_MAC_TYPE), "invalid mac type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN), "invalid salt len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG), "missing cek alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT),
"missing iteration count"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY), "missing key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST),
"missing message digest"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_PARAMETER), "missing parameter"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS), "missing pass"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT), "missing salt"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET), "missing secret"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED), "missing seed"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID), "missing session id"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_TYPE), "missing type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_XCGHASH), "missing xcghash"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_NOT_SUPPORTED), "not supported"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE),
"unknown parameter type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG),
"unsupported cek alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE),
"unsupported mac type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR), "value error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING), "value missing"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_WRONG_OUTPUT_BUFFER_SIZE),
"wrong output buffer size"},
{0, NULL}
};
#endif
int ERR_load_KDF_strings(void)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
if (ERR_func_error_string(KDF_str_functs[0].error) == NULL) {
ERR_load_strings_const(KDF_str_functs);
ERR_load_strings_const(KDF_str_reasons);
}
#endif
return 1;
}
crypto/kdf/kdf_local.h
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@@ -1,22 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
int call_ctrl(int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, ...);
int kdf_str2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *str);
int kdf_hex2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *hex);
int kdf_md2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *md_name);
crypto/kdf/kdf_util.c
-73
View File
@@ -1,73 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2018, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <string.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
int call_ctrl(int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, ...)
{
int ret;
va_list args;
va_start(args, cmd);
ret = ctrl(impl, cmd, args);
va_end(args);
return ret;
}
/* Utility functions to send a string or hex string to a ctrl */
int kdf_str2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *str)
{
return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, (const unsigned char *)str, strlen(str));
}
int kdf_hex2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *hex)
{
unsigned char *bin;
long binlen;
int ret = -1;
bin = OPENSSL_hexstr2buf(hex, &binlen);
if (bin == NULL)
return 0;
if (binlen <= INT_MAX)
ret = call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, bin, (size_t)binlen);
OPENSSL_free(bin);
return ret;
}
/* Pass a message digest to a ctrl */
int kdf_md2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *md_name)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
if (md_name == NULL || (md = EVP_get_digestbyname(md_name)) == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_MD2CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, md);
}
crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
-324
View File
@@ -1,324 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
/*
* For backwards compatibility reasons,
* Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
*/
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 1
#else
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
unsigned char *pass;
size_t pass_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
int iter;
const EVP_MD *md;
int lower_bound_checks;
};
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
if (impl == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
return impl;
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
kdf_pbkdf2_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
kdf_pbkdf2_init(impl);
}
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
impl->md = EVP_sha1();
impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
}
static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
const unsigned char *new_buffer,
size_t new_buflen)
{
if (new_buffer == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
if (new_buflen > 0) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
}
if (*buffer == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
*buflen = new_buflen;
return 1;
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
const EVP_MD *md;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
return 0;
}
return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
iter = va_arg(args, int);
min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
if (iter < min_iter) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
impl->iter = iter;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
impl->md = md;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (value == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "iter") == 0)
return call_ctrl(kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER,
atoi(value));
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
return -2;
}
static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->pass == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
return 0;
}
if (impl->salt == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
return 0;
}
return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
}
const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_PBKDF2,
kdf_pbkdf2_new,
kdf_pbkdf2_free,
kdf_pbkdf2_reset,
kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str,
NULL,
kdf_pbkdf2_derive
};
/*
* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
* derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
* posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
*
* The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
* - Check the range of the key length.
* - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
* - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
*/
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
int cplen, j, k, tkeylen, mdlen;
unsigned long i = 1;
HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (mdlen <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
* results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
*/
if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (lower_bound_checks) {
if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
}
hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
return 0;
p = key;
tkeylen = keylen;
if (!HMAC_Init_ex(hctx_tpl, pass, passlen, digest, NULL))
goto err;
hctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx == NULL)
goto err;
while (tkeylen) {
if (tkeylen > mdlen)
cplen = mdlen;
else
cplen = tkeylen;
/*
* We are unlikely to ever use more than 256 blocks (5120 bits!) but
* just in case...
*/
itmp[0] = (unsigned char)((i >> 24) & 0xff);
itmp[1] = (unsigned char)((i >> 16) & 0xff);
itmp[2] = (unsigned char)((i >> 8) & 0xff);
itmp[3] = (unsigned char)(i & 0xff);
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, salt, saltlen)
|| !HMAC_Update(hctx, itmp, 4)
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
goto err;
memcpy(p, digtmp, cplen);
for (j = 1; j < iter; j++) {
if (!HMAC_CTX_copy(hctx, hctx_tpl))
goto err;
if (!HMAC_Update(hctx, digtmp, mdlen)
|| !HMAC_Final(hctx, digtmp, NULL))
goto err;
for (k = 0; k < cplen; k++)
p[k] ^= digtmp[k];
}
tkeylen -= cplen;
i++;
p += cplen;
}
ret = 1;
err:
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx);
HMAC_CTX_free(hctx_tpl);
return ret;
}
crypto/kdf/scrypt.c
-506
View File
@@ -1,506 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
unsigned char *pass;
size_t pass_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
uint64_t N;
uint32_t r, p;
uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
};
/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
{
uint64_t value = 0;
while (*nptr) {
unsigned int digit;
uint64_t new_value;
if ((*nptr < '0') || (*nptr > '9')) {
return 0;
}
digit = (unsigned int)(*nptr - '0');
new_value = (value * 10) + digit;
if ((new_value < digit) || ((new_value - digit) / 10 != value)) {
/* Overflow */
return 0;
}
value = new_value;
nptr++;
}
*result = value;
return 1;
}
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
if (impl == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return NULL;
}
kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
return impl;
}
static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
}
static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
/* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
* original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
* for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
*/
impl->N = 1 << 20;
impl->r = 8;
impl->p = 1;
impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
}
static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
const unsigned char *new_buffer,
size_t new_buflen)
{
if (new_buffer == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
if (new_buflen > 0) {
*buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
} else {
*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
}
if (*buffer == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
*buflen = new_buflen;
return 1;
}
static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
{
return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
}
static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
uint64_t u64_value;
uint32_t value;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
return 0;
impl->N = u64_value;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
if (value < 1)
return 0;
impl->r = value;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
if (value < 1)
return 0;
impl->p = value;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
if (u64_value < 1)
return 0;
impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
const char *value)
{
int int_value = atoi(value);
if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
}
static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
const char *value)
{
uint64_t u64_value;
if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
}
static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (value == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
value);
return -2;
}
static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->pass == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
return 0;
}
if (impl->salt == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
return 0;
}
return scrypt_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len, impl->salt,
impl->salt_len, impl->N, impl->r, impl->p,
impl->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen);
}
const EVP_KDF scrypt_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_SCRYPT,
kdf_scrypt_new,
kdf_scrypt_free,
kdf_scrypt_reset,
kdf_scrypt_ctrl,
kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str,
NULL,
kdf_scrypt_derive
};
#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
{
int i;
uint32_t x[16];
memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
}
for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
inout[i] += x[i];
OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
}
static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
{
uint64_t i, j;
uint32_t X[16], *pB;
memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
pB = B;
for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
X[j] ^= *pB++;
salsa208_word_specification(X);
memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
}
OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
}
static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
{
unsigned char *pB;
uint32_t *pV;
uint64_t i, k;
/* Convert from little endian input */
for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
*pV = *pB++;
*pV |= *pB++ << 8;
*pV |= *pB++ << 16;
*pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
}
for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
uint32_t j;
j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
pV = V + 32 * r * j;
for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
}
/* Convert output to little endian */
for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
*pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
}
}
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
#endif
/*
* Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
* most (all?) platforms.
*/
#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
/*
* Maximum value of p * r:
* p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
* p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
* p * r <= (2^30-1)
*/
#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int rv = 0;
unsigned char *B;
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
/* Sanity check parameters */
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
return 0;
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
*/
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
}
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
/*
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
*/
Blen = p * 128 * r;
/*
* Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
* have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
*/
if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
*/
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
if (N + 2 > i / r) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
return 0;
}
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
if (key == NULL)
return 1;
B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
if (B == NULL) {
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
T = X + 32 * r;
V = T + 32 * r;
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
(int)Blen, B) == 0)
goto err;
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
keylen, key) == 0)
goto err;
rv = 1;
err:
if (rv == 0)
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
return rv;
}
#endif
crypto/kdf/sshkdf.c
-292
View File
@@ -1,292 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/numbers.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
/* See RFC 4253, Section 7.2 */
static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len);
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *key; /* K */
size_t key_len;
unsigned char *xcghash; /* H */
size_t xcghash_len;
char type; /* X */
unsigned char *session_id;
size_t session_id_len;
};
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_sshkdf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void kdf_sshkdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
kdf_sshkdf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static void kdf_sshkdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->key, impl->key_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static int kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(unsigned char **dst, size_t *dst_len,
va_list args)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
OPENSSL_clear_free(*dst, *dst_len);
*dst = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (*dst == NULL)
return 0;
*dst_len = len;
return 1;
}
static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
int t;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
impl->md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (impl->md == NULL)
return 0;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->key,
&impl->key_len, args);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH:
return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->xcghash,
&impl->xcghash_len, args);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID:
return kdf_sshkdf_parse_buffer_arg(&impl->session_id,
&impl->session_id_len, args);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE:
t = va_arg(args, int);
if (t < 65 || t > 70) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
impl->type = (char)t;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (value == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
/* alias, for historical reasons */
if (strcmp(type, "md") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY, value);
if (strcmp(type, "xcghash") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexxcghash") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_XCGHASH, value);
if (strcmp(type, "session_id") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsession_id") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_SESSION_ID, value);
if (strcmp(type, "type") == 0) {
if (strlen(value) != 1) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(kdf_sshkdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSHKDF_TYPE,
(int)value[0]);
}
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
return -2;
}
static size_t kdf_sshkdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
return SIZE_MAX;
}
static int kdf_sshkdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (impl->key == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (impl->xcghash == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_XCGHASH);
return 0;
}
if (impl->session_id == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SESSION_ID);
return 0;
}
if (impl->type == 0) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SSHKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_TYPE);
return 0;
}
return SSHKDF(impl->md, impl->key, impl->key_len,
impl->xcghash, impl->xcghash_len,
impl->session_id, impl->session_id_len,
impl->type, key, keylen);
}
const EVP_KDF sshkdf_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_SSHKDF,
kdf_sshkdf_new,
kdf_sshkdf_free,
kdf_sshkdf_reset,
kdf_sshkdf_ctrl,
kdf_sshkdf_ctrl_str,
kdf_sshkdf_size,
kdf_sshkdf_derive,
};
static int SSHKDF(const EVP_MD *evp_md,
const unsigned char *key, size_t key_len,
const unsigned char *xcghash, size_t xcghash_len,
const unsigned char *session_id, size_t session_id_len,
char type, unsigned char *okey, size_t okey_len)
{
EVP_MD_CTX *md = NULL;
unsigned char digest[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned int dsize = 0;
size_t cursize = 0;
int ret = 0;
md = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, &type, 1))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, session_id, session_id_len))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
goto out;
if (okey_len < dsize) {
memcpy(okey, digest, okey_len);
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
memcpy(okey, digest, dsize);
for (cursize = dsize; cursize < okey_len; cursize += dsize) {
if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(md, evp_md, NULL))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, key, key_len))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, xcghash, xcghash_len))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(md, okey, cursize))
goto out;
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(md, digest, &dsize))
goto out;
if (okey_len < cursize + dsize) {
memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, okey_len - cursize);
ret = 1;
goto out;
}
memcpy(okey + cursize, digest, dsize);
}
ret = 1;
out:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(md);
OPENSSL_cleanse(digest, EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE);
return ret;
}
crypto/kdf/sskdf.c
-525
View File
@@ -1,525 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4.1.
*
* The Single Step KDF algorithm is given by:
*
* Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
* For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
* Increment counter by 1.
* Result(i) = Result(i - 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
* DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
*
* NOTES:
* Z is a shared secret required to produce the derived key material.
* counter is a 4 byte buffer.
* FixedInfo is a bit string containing context specific data.
* DKM is the output derived key material.
* L is the required size of the DKM.
* reps = [L / H_outputBits]
* H(x) is the auxiliary function that can be either a hash, HMAC or KMAC.
* H_outputBits is the length of the output of the auxiliary function H(x).
*
* Currently there is not a comprehensive list of test vectors for this
* algorithm, especially for H(x) = HMAC and H(x) = KMAC.
* Test vectors for H(x) = Hash are indirectly used by CAVS KAS tests.
*/
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/hmac.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
const EVP_MAC *mac; /* H(x) = HMAC_hash OR H(x) = KMAC */
const EVP_MD *md; /* H(x) = hash OR when H(x) = HMAC_hash */
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
unsigned char *info;
size_t info_len;
unsigned char *salt;
size_t salt_len;
size_t out_len; /* optional KMAC parameter */
};
#define SSKDF_MAX_INLEN (1<<30)
#define SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (168 - 4)
#define SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE (136 - 4)
/* KMAC uses a Customisation string of 'KDF' */
static const unsigned char kmac_custom_str[] = { 0x4B, 0x44, 0x46 };
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using H(x) = hash(x)
* Note: X9.63 also uses this code with the only difference being that the
* counter is appended to the secret 'z'.
* i.e.
* result[i] = Hash(counter || z || info) for One Step OR
* result[i] = Hash(z || counter || info) for X9.63.
*/
static int SSKDF_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned int append_ctr,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0, hlen;
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
unsigned char c[4];
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0)
return 0;
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
if (hlen <= 0)
return 0;
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
goto end;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
if (!(EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
&& (append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
&& (!append_ctr || EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, c, sizeof(c)))
&& EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, info, info_len)))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_destroy(ctx_init);
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
return ret;
}
static int kmac_init(EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *custom,
size_t custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
size_t derived_key_len, unsigned char **out)
{
/* Only KMAC has custom data - so return if not KMAC */
if (custom == NULL)
return 1;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_CUSTOM, custom, custom_len) <= 0)
return 0;
/* By default only do one iteration if kmac_out_len is not specified */
if (kmac_out_len == 0)
kmac_out_len = derived_key_len;
/* otherwise check the size is valid */
else if (!(kmac_out_len == derived_key_len
|| kmac_out_len == 20
|| kmac_out_len == 28
|| kmac_out_len == 32
|| kmac_out_len == 48
|| kmac_out_len == 64))
return 0;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_SIZE, kmac_out_len) <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* For kmac the output buffer can be larger than EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE: so
* alloc a buffer for this case.
*/
if (kmac_out_len > EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE) {
*out = OPENSSL_zalloc(kmac_out_len);
if (*out == NULL)
return 0;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Refer to https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-56c/rev-1/final
* Section 4. One-Step Key Derivation using MAC: i.e either
* H(x) = HMAC-hash(salt, x) OR
* H(x) = KMAC#(salt, x, outbits, CustomString='KDF')
*/
static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(const EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md,
const unsigned char *kmac_custom,
size_t kmac_custom_len, size_t kmac_out_len,
const unsigned char *salt, size_t salt_len,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *info, size_t info_len,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0;
size_t counter, out_len, len;
unsigned char c[4];
unsigned char mac_buf[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
unsigned char *mac = mac_buf, *kmac_buffer = NULL;
if (z_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN || info_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > SSKDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0)
return 0;
ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac);
if (ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (hmac_md != NULL &&
EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, hmac_md) <= 0)
goto end;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, salt, salt_len) <= 0)
goto end;
if (!kmac_init(ctx_init, kmac_custom, kmac_custom_len, kmac_out_len,
derived_key_len, &kmac_buffer))
goto end;
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
mac = kmac_buffer;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
goto end;
out_len = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init); /* output size */
if (out_len <= 0)
goto end;
len = derived_key_len;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
c[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
c[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (!(ctx != NULL
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, mac, NULL))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
end:
if (kmac_buffer != NULL)
OPENSSL_clear_free(kmac_buffer, kmac_out_len);
else
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac_buf, sizeof(mac_buf));
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init);
return ret;
}
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *sskdf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void sskdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->info, impl->info_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->salt, impl->salt_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static void sskdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
sskdf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static int sskdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_free(*out);
*out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (*out == NULL)
return 0;
*out_len = len;
return 1;
}
static int sskdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
const EVP_MAC *mac;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO:
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->info, &impl->info_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
impl->md = md;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC:
mac = va_arg(args, const EVP_MAC *);
if (mac == NULL)
return 0;
impl->mac = mac;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
return sskdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->salt, &impl->salt_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE:
impl->out_len = va_arg(args, size_t);
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
/* Pass a mac to a ctrl */
static int sskdf_mac2ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
int (*ctrl)(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args),
int cmd, const char *mac_name)
{
const EVP_MAC *mac;
if (mac_name == NULL || (mac = EVP_get_macbyname(mac_name)) == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_MAC2CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_MAC_TYPE);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(ctrl, impl, cmd, mac);
}
static int sskdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "info") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexinfo") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SSKDF_INFO,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "mac") == 0)
return sskdf_mac2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC, value);
if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, sskdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, value);
if (strcmp(type, "maclen") == 0) {
int val = atoi(value);
if (val < 0) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
return 0;
}
return call_ctrl(sskdf_ctrl, impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAC_SIZE,
(size_t)val);
}
return -2;
}
static size_t sskdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
int len;
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
static int sskdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->secret == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (impl->mac != NULL) {
/* H(x) = KMAC or H(x) = HMAC */
int ret;
const unsigned char *custom = NULL;
size_t custom_len = 0;
int nid;
int default_salt_len;
nid = EVP_MAC_nid(impl->mac);
if (nid == EVP_MAC_HMAC) {
/* H(x) = HMAC(x, salt, hash) */
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
default_salt_len = EVP_MD_block_size(impl->md);
if (default_salt_len <= 0)
return 0;
} else if (nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC128 || nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC256) {
/* H(x) = KMACzzz(x, salt, custom) */
custom = kmac_custom_str;
custom_len = sizeof(kmac_custom_str);
if (nid == EVP_MAC_KMAC128)
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC128_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
else
default_salt_len = SSKDF_KMAC256_DEFAULT_SALT_SIZE;
} else {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE);
return 0;
}
/* If no salt is set then use a default_salt of zeros */
if (impl->salt == NULL || impl->salt_len <= 0) {
impl->salt = OPENSSL_zalloc(default_salt_len);
if (impl->salt == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
impl->salt_len = default_salt_len;
}
ret = SSKDF_mac_kdm(impl->mac, impl->md,
custom, custom_len, impl->out_len,
impl->salt, impl->salt_len,
impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
impl->info, impl->info_len, key, keylen);
return ret;
} else {
/* H(x) = hash */
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_SSKDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
impl->info, impl->info_len, 0, key, keylen);
}
}
static int x963kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->secret == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (impl->mac != NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_NOT_SUPPORTED);
return 0;
} else {
/* H(x) = hash */
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
return SSKDF_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
impl->info, impl->info_len, 1, key, keylen);
}
}
const EVP_KDF ss_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_SS,
sskdf_new,
sskdf_free,
sskdf_reset,
sskdf_ctrl,
sskdf_ctrl_str,
sskdf_size,
sskdf_derive
};
const EVP_KDF x963_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_X963,
sskdf_new,
sskdf_free,
sskdf_reset,
sskdf_ctrl,
sskdf_ctrl_str,
sskdf_size,
x963kdf_derive
};
crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
-362
View File
@@ -1,362 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
*
* where P_MD5 and P_SHA-1 are defined by P_<hash>, below, and S1 and S2 are
* two halves of the secret (with the possibility of one shared byte, in the
* case where the length of the original secret is odd). S1 is taken from the
* first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
*
* For TLS v1.2 the TLS PRF algorithm is given by:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
*
* where hash is SHA-256 for all cipher suites defined in RFC 5246 as well as
* those published prior to TLS v1.2 while the TLS v1.2 protocol is in effect,
* unless defined otherwise by the cipher suite.
*
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
*
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
*
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
*
* A(i) is defined as:
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdarg.h>
#include <string.h>
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen);
#define TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF 1024
/* TLS KDF kdf context structure */
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
/* Digest to use for PRF */
const EVP_MD *md;
/* Secret value to use for PRF */
unsigned char *sec;
size_t seclen;
/* Buffer of concatenated seed data */
unsigned char seed[TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF];
size_t seedlen;
};
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_tls1_prf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void kdf_tls1_prf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
kdf_tls1_prf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static void kdf_tls1_prf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
const EVP_MD *md;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
impl->md = md;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->sec, impl->seclen);
impl->sec = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (impl->sec == NULL)
return 0;
impl->seclen = len;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_RESET_TLS_SEED:
OPENSSL_cleanse(impl->seed, impl->seedlen);
impl->seedlen = 0;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
if (len > (TLS1_PRF_MAXBUF - impl->seedlen))
return 0;
memcpy(impl->seed + impl->seedlen, p, len);
impl->seedlen += len;
return 1;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl,
const char *type, const char *value)
{
if (value == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_TLS_SECRET, value);
if (strcmp(type, "seed") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexseed") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_ADD_TLS_SEED,
value);
return -2;
}
static int kdf_tls1_prf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
{
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (impl->sec == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (impl->seedlen == 0) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SEED);
return 0;
}
return tls1_prf_alg(impl->md, impl->sec, impl->seclen,
impl->seed, impl->seedlen,
key, keylen);
}
const EVP_KDF tls1_prf_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_TLS1_PRF,
kdf_tls1_prf_new,
kdf_tls1_prf_free,
kdf_tls1_prf_reset,
kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl,
kdf_tls1_prf_ctrl_str,
NULL,
kdf_tls1_prf_derive
};
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* P_<hash> is an expansion function that uses a single hash function to expand
* a secret and seed into an arbitrary quantity of output:
*
* P_<hash>(secret, seed) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(1) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(2) + seed) +
* HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(3) + seed) + ...
*
* where + indicates concatenation. P_<hash> can be iterated as many times as
* is necessary to produce the required quantity of data.
*
* A(i) is defined as:
* A(0) = seed
* A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1))
*/
static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t sec_len,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
size_t chunk;
EVP_MAC_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_Ai = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
unsigned char Ai[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
size_t Ai_len;
int ret = 0;
ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
if (ctx_init == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) != 1)
goto err;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, md) != 1)
goto err;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_KEY, sec, sec_len) != 1)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_init(ctx_init))
goto err;
chunk = EVP_MAC_size(ctx_init);
if (chunk == 0)
goto err;
/* A(0) = seed */
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
for (;;) {
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
ctx_Ai = NULL;
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
goto err;
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
if (olen > chunk) {
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
if (olen <= chunk) {
/* last chunk - use Ai as temp bounce buffer */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, Ai, &Ai_len))
goto err;
memcpy(out, Ai, olen);
break;
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
out += chunk;
olen -= chunk;
}
ret = 1;
err:
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_init);
OPENSSL_cleanse(Ai, sizeof(Ai));
return ret;
}
/*
* Refer to "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2246#section-5) and
* "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2" Section 5
* (https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5246#section-5).
*
* For TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_MD5(S1, label + seed) XOR
* P_SHA-1(S2, label + seed)
*
* S1 is taken from the first half of the secret, S2 from the second half.
*
* L_S = length in bytes of secret;
* L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2);
*
* For TLS v1.2:
*
* PRF(secret, label, seed) = P_<hash>(secret, label + seed)
*/
static int tls1_prf_alg(const EVP_MD *md,
const unsigned char *sec, size_t slen,
const unsigned char *seed, size_t seed_len,
unsigned char *out, size_t olen)
{
if (EVP_MD_type(md) == NID_md5_sha1) {
/* TLS v1.0 and TLS v1.1 */
size_t i;
unsigned char *tmp;
/* calc: L_S1 = L_S2 = ceil(L_S / 2) */
size_t L_S1 = (slen + 1) / 2;
size_t L_S2 = L_S1;
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_md5(), sec, L_S1,
seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
if ((tmp = OPENSSL_malloc(olen)) == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return 0;
}
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(EVP_sha1(), sec + slen - L_S2, L_S2,
seed, seed_len, tmp, olen)) {
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
return 0;
}
for (i = 0; i < olen; i++)
out[i] ^= tmp[i];
OPENSSL_clear_free(tmp, olen);
return 1;
}
/* TLS v1.2 */
if (!tls1_prf_P_hash(md, sec, slen, seed, seed_len, out, olen))
return 0;
return 1;
}
crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c
-407
View File
@@ -1,407 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stdarg.h>
# include <string.h>
# include <openssl/hmac.h>
# include <openssl/cms.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/kdf.h>
# include <openssl/x509.h>
# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
# include "internal/evp_int.h"
# include "kdf_local.h"
# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
int cek_nid;
unsigned char *ukm;
size_t ukm_len;
size_t dkm_len;
};
/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
static const struct {
int nid;
size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
} kek_algs[] = {
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
{ NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
};
/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
{
int i, tag, xclass;
long tmplen;
const unsigned char *q = *pp;
i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
return 0;
if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
q += tmplen;
*pp = (unsigned char *)q;
*plen -= q - *pp;
return 1;
}
/*
* Encode the other info structure.
*
* RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
*
* OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
* partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
* suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
* }
*
* KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
* }
*
* |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
* |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
* suppPubInfo (in bits).
* |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
* can be NULL.
* |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
* |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
* |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
* |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
* encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
*
* Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
* Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
*/
static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
unsigned char **out_ctr)
{
unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
int ret = 0, encoded_len;
long tlen;
/* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
/* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (ksi == NULL
|| alg_oid == NULL
|| ctr_oct == NULL
|| !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
|| !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
goto err;
/* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
alg_oid = NULL;
ctr_oct = NULL;
/* Set the optional partyAInfo */
if (ukm != NULL) {
ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (ukm_oct == NULL)
goto err;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
}
/* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
if (encoded_len <= 0)
goto err;
/* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
p = encoded;
tlen = (long)encoded_len;
if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
*out_ctr = p;
*der = encoded;
*der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (ret != 1)
OPENSSL_free(encoded);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
return ret;
}
static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
unsigned char *ctr,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0, hlen;
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
if (hlen <= 0)
return 0;
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
goto end;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
/* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
return ret;
}
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *x942kdf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void x942kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static void x942kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
x942kdf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static int x942kdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_free(*out);
*out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (*out == NULL)
return 0;
*out_len = len;
return 1;
}
static int x942kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
char *alg_str = NULL;
size_t i;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
impl->md = md;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM:
return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->ukm, &impl->ukm_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG:
alg_str = va_arg(args, char *);
if (alg_str == NULL)
return 0;
impl->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(alg_str);
for (i = 0; i < (size_t)OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); ++i) {
if (kek_algs[i].nid == impl->cek_nid) {
impl->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
return 1;
}
}
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int x942kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "ukm") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexukm") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "cekalg") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG,
value);
return -2;
}
static size_t x942kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
int len;
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
static int x942kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *ctr;
unsigned char *der = NULL;
size_t der_len = 0;
if (impl->secret == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (impl->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
if (impl->ukm != NULL && impl->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
/*
* Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
* For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
*/
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (keylen != impl->dkm_len) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
/* generate the otherinfo der */
if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(impl->cek_nid, impl->dkm_len,
impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len,
&der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
OPENSSL_free(der);
return ret;
}
const EVP_KDF x942_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_X942,
x942kdf_new,
x942kdf_free,
x942kdf_reset,
x942kdf_ctrl,
x942kdf_ctrl_str,
x942kdf_size,
x942kdf_derive
};
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */