Latest update

crypto/rand/rand_crng_test.c

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+/*
+ * Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates.  All rights reserved.
+ *
+ * Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License").  You may not use
+ * this file except in compliance with the License.  You can obtain a copy
+ * in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
+ * https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Implementation of the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
+ */
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include "internal/rand_int.h"
+#include "internal/thread_once.h"
+#include "rand_lcl.h"
+
+static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
+static unsigned char *crngt_prev;
+
+int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *) = &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
+
+int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf)
+{
+    size_t n;
+    unsigned char *p;
+
+    while ((n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool)) != 0)
+        if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
+            p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
+            memcpy(crngt_prev, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
+            rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
+            return 1;
+        }
+    return 0;
+
+}
+void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
+{
+    rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
+    OPENSSL_secure_free(crngt_prev);
+    crngt_pool = NULL;
+    crngt_prev = NULL;
+}
+
+int rand_crngt_init(void)
+{
+    if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+    if ((crngt_prev = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) != NULL
+        && crngt_get_entropy(crngt_prev))
+        return 1;
+    rand_crngt_cleanup();
+    return 0;
+}
+
+static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
+DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init)
+{
+    return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)
+        && rand_crngt_init()
+        && OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup);
+}
+
+int rand_crngt_single_init(void)
+{
+    return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init);
+}
+
+size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                              unsigned char **pout,
+                              int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
+                              int prediction_resistance)
+{
+    unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
+    RAND_POOL *pool;
+    size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
+    int attempts = 3;
+
+    if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init))
+        return 0;
+
+    if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
+        return 0;
+
+    while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
+        s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
+        if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf)
+            || memcmp(crngt_prev, buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ) == 0
+            || !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
+            goto err;
+        memcpy(crngt_prev, buf, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
+        t += s;
+        attempts++;
+    }
+    r = t;
+    *pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
+err:
+    rand_pool_free(pool);
+    return r;
+}
+
+void rand_crngt_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
+                                unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
+{
+    OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
+}