Latest update. (3.0.0-dev)

This commit is contained in:
2018-12-06 23:51:02 +09:00
parent 5fd41967fd
commit 3aaee0f8f9
2113 changed files with 3892 additions and 3218 deletions
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2000-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1999-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+2 -2
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT >= 0x00908000L
#if OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2016-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2017 BaishanCloud. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+53 -33
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1999-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const EVP_MD *mgf1md)
{
int i, dblen = 0, mlen = -1, one_index = 0, msg_index;
unsigned int good, found_one_byte;
unsigned int good = 0, found_one_byte, mask;
const unsigned char *maskedseed, *maskeddb;
/*
* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes: em =
@@ -147,8 +147,11 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* the ciphertext, see PKCS #1 v2.2, section 7.1.2.
* This does not leak any side-channel information.
*/
if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2)
goto decoding_err;
if (num < flen || num < 2 * mdlen + 2) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
return -1;
}
dblen = num - mdlen - 1;
db = OPENSSL_malloc(dblen);
@@ -157,26 +160,27 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
goto cleanup;
}
if (flen != num) {
em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
* to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
* side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
* memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
* |from|.
*/
memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
from = em;
em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto cleanup;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
* bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
* in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
*/
for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
flen -= 1 & mask;
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
from = em;
/*
* The first byte must be zero, however we must not leak if this is
* true. See James H. Manger, "A Chosen Ciphertext Attack on RSA
@@ -222,32 +226,48 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_OAEP_mgf1(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* so plaintext-awareness ensures timing side-channels are no longer a
* concern.
*/
if (!good)
goto decoding_err;
msg_index = one_index + 1;
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
if (tlen < mlen) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
mlen = -1;
} else {
memcpy(to, db + msg_index, mlen);
goto cleanup;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant tine as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
/*
* Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
* |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |dblen|
* bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
* where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
* about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
* memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(dblen, tlen), dblen, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, dblen - tlen);
mlen = dblen - msg_index;
for (from = db + msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
from -= dblen & equals; /* if (i == dblen) rewind */
mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == dblen) mask = 0 */
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
}
decoding_err:
/*
* To avoid chosen ciphertext attacks, the error message should not
* reveal which kind of decoding error happened.
*/
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_OAEP_MGF1,
RSA_R_OAEP_DECODING_ERROR);
err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
cleanup:
OPENSSL_cleanse(seed, sizeof(seed));
OPENSSL_clear_free(db, dblen);
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
return mlen;
return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
int PKCS1_MGF1(unsigned char *mask, long len,
+4 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "internal/bn_int.h"
#include "rsa_locl.h"
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
static int rsa_ossl_public_encrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
unsigned char *to, RSA *rsa, int padding);
@@ -479,8 +480,8 @@ static int rsa_ossl_private_decrypt(int flen, const unsigned char *from,
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_UNKNOWN_PADDING_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if (r < 0)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_OSSL_PRIVATE_DECRYPT, RSA_R_PADDING_CHECK_FAILED);
err_clear_last_constant_time(r >= 0);
err:
if (ctx != NULL)
+53 -44
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
@@ -158,7 +158,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
int i;
/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
unsigned char *em = NULL;
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte;
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask;
int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1;
if (tlen < 0 || flen < 0)
@@ -169,39 +169,41 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* section 7.2.2.
*/
if (flen > num)
goto err;
if (num < 11)
goto err;
if (flen != num) {
em = OPENSSL_zalloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad, but if it doesn't, we do this zero-padding copy
* to avoid leaking that information. The copy still leaks some
* side-channel information, but it's impossible to have a fixed
* memory access pattern since we can't read out of the bounds of
* |from|.
*/
memcpy(em + num - flen, from, flen);
from = em;
if (flen > num || num < 11) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
return -1;
}
em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
* bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
* in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
*/
for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
flen -= 1 & mask;
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
from = em;
good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
/* scan over padding data */
found_zero_byte = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
zero_index =
constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0, i,
zero_index);
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
found_zero_byte |= equals0;
}
@@ -210,7 +212,7 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(zero_index), 2 + 8);
good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
/*
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
@@ -220,27 +222,34 @@ int RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
mlen = num - msg_index;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well; it could
* leak something if |tlen| was assuming valid padding.
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge((unsigned int)(tlen), (unsigned int)(mlen));
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
/*
* We can't continue in constant-time because we need to copy the result
* and we cannot fake its length. This unavoidably leaks timing
* information at the API boundary.
* Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
* |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
* bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
* where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
* about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
* memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
if (!good) {
mlen = -1;
goto err;
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
mlen = num - msg_index;
for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
}
memcpy(to, from + msg_index, mlen);
err:
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
if (mlen == -1)
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2,
RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
return mlen;
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_PKCS1_TYPE_2, RSA_R_PKCS_DECODING_ERROR);
err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2006-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+97 -38
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include <openssl/rsa.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/constant_time_locl.h"
int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen)
@@ -52,57 +53,115 @@ int RSA_padding_add_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
return 1;
}
/*
* Copy of RSA_padding_check_PKCS1_type_2 with a twist that rejects padding
* if nul delimiter is preceded by 8 consecutive 0x03 bytes. It also
* preserves error code reporting for backward compatibility.
*/
int RSA_padding_check_SSLv23(unsigned char *to, int tlen,
const unsigned char *from, int flen, int num)
{
int i, j, k;
const unsigned char *p;
int i;
/* |em| is the encoded message, zero-padded to exactly |num| bytes */
unsigned char *em = NULL;
unsigned int good, found_zero_byte, mask, threes_in_row;
int zero_index = 0, msg_index, mlen = -1, err;
p = from;
if (flen < 10) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_SMALL);
return -1;
}
/* Accept even zero-padded input */
if (flen == num) {
if (*(p++) != 0) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
return -1;
}
flen--;
}
if ((num != (flen + 1)) || (*(p++) != 02)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
em = OPENSSL_malloc(num);
if (em == NULL) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return -1;
}
/*
* Caller is encouraged to pass zero-padded message created with
* BN_bn2binpad. Trouble is that since we can't read out of |from|'s
* bounds, it's impossible to have an invariant memory access pattern
* in case |from| was not zero-padded in advance.
*/
for (from += flen, em += num, i = 0; i < num; i++) {
mask = ~constant_time_is_zero(flen);
flen -= 1 & mask;
from -= 1 & mask;
*--em = *from & mask;
}
from = em;
good = constant_time_is_zero(from[0]);
good &= constant_time_eq(from[1], 2);
err = constant_time_select_int(good, 0, RSA_R_BLOCK_TYPE_IS_NOT_02);
mask = ~good;
/* scan over padding data */
j = flen - 1; /* one for type */
for (i = 0; i < j; i++)
if (*(p++) == 0)
break;
found_zero_byte = 0;
threes_in_row = 0;
for (i = 2; i < num; i++) {
unsigned int equals0 = constant_time_is_zero(from[i]);
if ((i == j) || (i < 8)) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23,
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
return -1;
}
for (k = -9; k < -1; k++) {
if (p[k] != 0x03)
break;
}
if (k == -1) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
return -1;
zero_index = constant_time_select_int(~found_zero_byte & equals0,
i, zero_index);
found_zero_byte |= equals0;
threes_in_row += 1 & ~found_zero_byte;
threes_in_row &= found_zero_byte | constant_time_eq(from[i], 3);
}
i++; /* Skip over the '\0' */
j -= i;
if (j > tlen) {
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
return -1;
}
memcpy(to, p, (unsigned int)j);
/*
* PS must be at least 8 bytes long, and it starts two bytes into |from|.
* If we never found a 0-byte, then |zero_index| is 0 and the check
* also fails.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(zero_index, 2 + 8);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
RSA_R_NULL_BEFORE_BLOCK_MISSING);
mask = ~good;
return j;
good &= constant_time_lt(threes_in_row, 8);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err,
RSA_R_SSLV3_ROLLBACK_ATTACK);
mask = ~good;
/*
* Skip the zero byte. This is incorrect if we never found a zero-byte
* but in this case we also do not copy the message out.
*/
msg_index = zero_index + 1;
mlen = num - msg_index;
/*
* For good measure, do this check in constant time as well.
*/
good &= constant_time_ge(tlen, mlen);
err = constant_time_select_int(mask | good, err, RSA_R_DATA_TOO_LARGE);
/*
* Even though we can't fake result's length, we can pretend copying
* |tlen| bytes where |mlen| bytes would be real. Last |tlen| of |num|
* bytes are viewed as circular buffer with start at |tlen|-|mlen'|,
* where |mlen'| is "saturated" |mlen| value. Deducing information
* about failure or |mlen| would take attacker's ability to observe
* memory access pattern with byte granularity *as it occurs*. It
* should be noted that failure is indistinguishable from normal
* operation if |tlen| is fixed by protocol.
*/
tlen = constant_time_select_int(constant_time_lt(num, tlen), num, tlen);
msg_index = constant_time_select_int(good, msg_index, num - tlen);
mlen = num - msg_index;
for (from += msg_index, mask = good, i = 0; i < tlen; i++) {
unsigned int equals = constant_time_eq(i, mlen);
from -= tlen & equals; /* if (i == mlen) rewind */
mask &= mask ^ equals; /* if (i == mlen) mask = 0 */
to[i] = constant_time_select_8(mask, from[i], to[i]);
}
OPENSSL_clear_free(em, num);
RSAerr(RSA_F_RSA_PADDING_CHECK_SSLV23, err);
err_clear_last_constant_time(1 & good);
return constant_time_select_int(good, mlen, -1);
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 2005-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Copyright 1995-2017 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html