Latest update

This commit is contained in:
2019-07-13 19:13:22 +09:00
parent 9a23f88dc2
commit 2e57f602ae
542 changed files with 17287 additions and 6184 deletions
+6 -4
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,7 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
randfile.c rand_lib.c rand_err.c rand_crng_test.c rand_egd.c \
rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c rand_vxworks.c \
drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c
$COMMON=rand_lib.c rand_crng_test.c rand_win.c rand_unix.c rand_vms.c \
drbg_lib.c drbg_ctr.c rand_vxworks.c drbg_hash.c drbg_hmac.c
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=$COMMON randfile.c rand_err.c rand_egd.c
SOURCE[../../providers/fips]=$COMMON
+10 -3
View File
@@ -354,6 +354,7 @@ static int drbg_ctr_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx);
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(drbg->data.ctr.ctx_df);
EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(drbg->data.ctr.cipher);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.ctr, sizeof(drbg->data.ctr));
return 1;
}
@@ -369,6 +370,7 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
RAND_DRBG_CTR *ctr = &drbg->data.ctr;
size_t keylen;
EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
switch (drbg->type) {
default:
@@ -376,17 +378,22 @@ int drbg_ctr_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
return 0;
case NID_aes_128_ctr:
keylen = 16;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_128_ecb();
cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-128-ECB", "");
break;
case NID_aes_192_ctr:
keylen = 24;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_192_ecb();
cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-192-ECB", "");
break;
case NID_aes_256_ctr:
keylen = 32;
ctr->cipher = EVP_aes_256_ecb();
cipher = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(drbg->libctx, "AES-256-ECB", "");
break;
}
if (cipher == NULL)
return 0;
EVP_CIPHER_meth_free(ctr->cipher);
ctr->cipher = cipher;
drbg->meth = &drbg_ctr_meth;
+39 -5
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "internal/providercommon.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
/* 440 bits from SP800-90Ar1 10.1 table 2 */
@@ -289,6 +290,7 @@ static int drbg_hash_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
static int drbg_hash_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
EVP_MD_meth_free(drbg->data.hash.md);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(drbg->data.hash.ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hash, sizeof(drbg->data.hash));
return 1;
@@ -303,23 +305,55 @@ static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hash_meth = {
int drbg_hash_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD *md;
RAND_DRBG_HASH *hash = &drbg->data.hash;
/* Any approved digest is allowed */
md = EVP_get_digestbynid(drbg->type);
/*
* Confirm digest is allowed. Outside FIPS_MODE we allow all non-legacy
* digests. Inside FIPS_MODE we only allow approved digests. Also no XOF
* digests (such as SHAKE).
*/
switch (drbg->type) {
default:
return 0;
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha224:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
case NID_sha512:
case NID_sha512_224:
case NID_sha512_256:
case NID_sha3_224:
case NID_sha3_256:
case NID_sha3_384:
case NID_sha3_512:
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
case NID_blake2b512:
case NID_blake2s256:
case NID_sm3:
#endif
break;
}
md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), "");
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
drbg->meth = &drbg_hash_meth;
hash->md = md;
if (hash->ctx == NULL) {
hash->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (hash->ctx == NULL)
if (hash->ctx == NULL) {
EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
return 0;
}
}
EVP_MD_meth_free(hash->md);
hash->md = md;
/* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
hash->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
+36 -4
View File
@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/rand.h>
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "internal/providercommon.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
/*
@@ -183,6 +184,7 @@ static int drbg_hmac_generate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
static int drbg_hmac_uninstantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
EVP_MD_meth_free(drbg->data.hmac.md);
HMAC_CTX_free(drbg->data.hmac.ctx);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&drbg->data.hmac, sizeof(drbg->data.hmac));
return 1;
@@ -197,11 +199,38 @@ static RAND_DRBG_METHOD drbg_hmac_meth = {
int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
{
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
EVP_MD *md = NULL;
RAND_DRBG_HMAC *hmac = &drbg->data.hmac;
/* Any approved digest is allowed - assume we pass digest (not NID_hmac*) */
md = EVP_get_digestbynid(drbg->type);
/*
* Confirm digest is allowed. Outside FIPS_MODE we allow all non-legacy
* digests. Inside FIPS_MODE we only allow approved digests. Also no XOF
* digests (such as SHAKE).
*/
switch (drbg->type) {
default:
return 0;
case NID_sha1:
case NID_sha224:
case NID_sha256:
case NID_sha384:
case NID_sha512:
case NID_sha512_224:
case NID_sha512_256:
case NID_sha3_224:
case NID_sha3_256:
case NID_sha3_384:
case NID_sha3_512:
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
case NID_blake2b512:
case NID_blake2s256:
case NID_sm3:
#endif
break;
}
md = EVP_MD_fetch(drbg->libctx, ossl_prov_util_nid_to_name(drbg->type), "");
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -209,11 +238,14 @@ int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg)
if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
hmac->ctx = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hmac->ctx == NULL)
if (hmac->ctx == NULL) {
EVP_MD_meth_free(md);
return 0;
}
}
/* These are taken from SP 800-90 10.1 Table 2 */
EVP_MD_meth_free(hmac->md);
hmac->md = md;
hmac->blocklen = EVP_MD_size(md);
/* See SP800-57 Part1 Rev4 5.6.1 Table 3 */
+265 -110
View File
@@ -29,49 +29,54 @@
* a much bigger deal than just re-setting an allocated resource.)
*/
/*
* The three shared DRBG instances
*
* There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
*/
/*
* The <master> DRBG
*
* Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
* DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
* sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
*
* The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
* all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
* DRBG instances during reseeding.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
/*
* The <public> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
*
* The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
*/
static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
/*
* The <private> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
*
* The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per thread.
*/
static CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
typedef struct drbg_global_st {
/*
* The three shared DRBG instances
*
* There are three shared DRBG instances: <master>, <public>, and <private>.
*/
/*
* The <master> DRBG
*
* Not used directly by the application, only for reseeding the two other
* DRBGs. It reseeds itself by pulling either randomness from os entropy
* sources or by consuming randomness which was added by RAND_add().
*
* The <master> DRBG is a global instance which is accessed concurrently by
* all threads. The necessary locking is managed automatically by its child
* DRBG instances during reseeding.
*/
RAND_DRBG *master_drbg;
/*
* The <public> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating random bytes using RAND_bytes().
*
* The <public> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
* thread.
*/
CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL public_drbg;
/*
* The <private> DRBG
*
* Used by default for generating private keys using RAND_priv_bytes()
*
* The <private> DRBG is thread-local, i.e., there is one instance per
* thread.
*/
CRYPTO_THREAD_LOCAL private_drbg;
} DRBG_GLOBAL;
typedef struct drbg_nonce_global_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
int rand_nonce_count;
} DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL;
/* NIST SP 800-90A DRBG recommends the use of a personalization string. */
static const char ossl_pers_string[] = DRBG_DEFAULT_PERS_STRING;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_drbg_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
#define RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS ( \
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_MASTER | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PUBLIC | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_PRIVATE )
@@ -102,9 +107,10 @@ static const unsigned int rand_drbg_used_flags =
RAND_DRBG_FLAG_CTR_NO_DF | RAND_DRBG_FLAG_HMAC | RAND_DRBG_TYPE_FLAGS;
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type);
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent);
@@ -141,6 +147,157 @@ static int is_digest(int type)
}
}
/*
* Initialize the OPENSSL_CTX global DRBGs on first use.
* Returns the allocated global data on success or NULL on failure.
*/
static void *drbg_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dgbl));
if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
/*
* We need to ensure that base libcrypto thread handling has been
* initialised.
*/
OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL);
#endif
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL))
goto err1;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL))
goto err2;
dgbl->master_drbg = drbg_setup(libctx, NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
if (dgbl->master_drbg == NULL)
goto err3;
return dgbl;
err3:
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
err2:
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
err1:
OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
return NULL;
}
static void drbg_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdgbl)
{
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = vdgbl;
RAND_DRBG_free(dgbl->master_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
OPENSSL_free(dgbl);
}
static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_ossl_ctx_method = {
drbg_ossl_ctx_new,
drbg_ossl_ctx_free,
};
/*
* drbg_ossl_ctx_new() calls drgb_setup() which calls rand_drbg_get_nonce()
* which needs to get the rand_nonce_lock out of the OPENSSL_CTX...but since
* drbg_ossl_ctx_new() hasn't finished running yet we need the rand_nonce_lock
* to be in a different global data object. Otherwise we will go into an
* infinite recursion loop.
*/
static void *drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*dngbl));
if (dngbl == NULL)
return NULL;
dngbl->rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (dngbl->rand_nonce_lock == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
return NULL;
}
return dngbl;
}
static void drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free(void *vdngbl)
{
DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl = vdngbl;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
OPENSSL_free(dngbl);
}
static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method = {
drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_new,
drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_free,
};
static DRBG_GLOBAL *drbg_get_global(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_INDEX,
&drbg_ossl_ctx_method);
}
/* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks()) */
size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
size_t ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool;
DRBG_NONCE_GLOBAL *dngbl
= openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_DRBG_NONCE_INDEX,
&drbg_nonce_ossl_ctx_method);
struct {
void *instance;
int count;
} data;
if (dngbl == NULL)
return 0;
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
goto err;
data.instance = drbg;
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&dngbl->rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count,
dngbl->rand_nonce_lock);
if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
goto err;
ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
/*
* Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
*/
void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
/*
* Set/initialize |drbg| to be of type |type|, with optional |flags|.
*
@@ -236,7 +393,8 @@ int RAND_DRBG_set_defaults(int type, unsigned int flags)
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
int secure,
int type,
unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
@@ -249,6 +407,7 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
return NULL;
}
drbg->libctx = ctx;
drbg->secure = secure && CRYPTO_secure_allocated(drbg);
drbg->fork_count = rand_fork_count;
drbg->parent = parent;
@@ -305,16 +464,27 @@ static RAND_DRBG *rand_drbg_new(int secure,
return NULL;
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type, unsigned int flags,
RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 0, type, flags, parent);
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
return rand_drbg_new(0, type, flags, parent);
return RAND_DRBG_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, int type,
unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
return rand_drbg_new(ctx, 1, type, flags, parent);
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_secure_new(int type, unsigned int flags, RAND_DRBG *parent)
{
return rand_drbg_new(1, type, flags, parent);
return RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(NULL, type, flags, parent);
}
/*
* Uninstantiate |drbg| and free all memory.
*/
@@ -376,7 +546,7 @@ int RAND_DRBG_instantiate(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
/*
* NIST SP800-90Ar1 section 9.1 says you can combine getting the entropy
* and nonce in 1 call by increasing the entropy with 50% and increasing
* the minimum length to accomadate the length of the nonce.
* the minimum length to accommodate the length of the nonce.
* We do this in case a nonce is require and get_nonce is NULL.
*/
if (drbg->min_noncelen > 0 && drbg->get_nonce == NULL) {
@@ -943,12 +1113,12 @@ void *RAND_DRBG_get_ex_data(const RAND_DRBG *drbg, int idx)
*
* Returns a pointer to the new DRBG instance on success, NULL on failure.
*/
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
static RAND_DRBG *drbg_setup(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_DRBG *parent, int drbg_type)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new(rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
drbg = RAND_DRBG_secure_new_ex(ctx, rand_drbg_type[drbg_type],
rand_drbg_flags[drbg_type], parent);
if (drbg == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -975,60 +1145,20 @@ err:
return NULL;
}
/*
* Initialize the global DRBGs on first use.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on failure.
*/
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_drbg_init)
{
/*
* ensure that libcrypto is initialized, otherwise the
* DRBG locks are not cleaned up properly
*/
if (!OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL))
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&private_drbg, NULL))
return 0;
if (!CRYPTO_THREAD_init_local(&public_drbg, NULL))
goto err1;
master_drbg = drbg_setup(NULL, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_MASTER);
if (master_drbg == NULL)
goto err2;
return 1;
err2:
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
err1:
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
return 0;
}
/* Clean up the global DRBGs before exit */
void rand_drbg_cleanup_int(void)
{
if (master_drbg != NULL) {
RAND_DRBG_free(master_drbg);
master_drbg = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&private_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_cleanup_local(&public_drbg);
}
}
void drbg_delete_thread_state(void)
static void drbg_delete_thread_state(void *arg)
{
OPENSSL_CTX *ctx = arg;
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, NULL);
if (dgbl == NULL)
return;
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, NULL);
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, NULL);
RAND_DRBG_free(drbg);
}
@@ -1180,56 +1310,77 @@ static int drbg_status(void)
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
return master_drbg;
return dgbl->master_drbg;
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_master(void)
{
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_master_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the public DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&public_drbg);
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->public_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&public_drbg, drbg);
drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PUBLIC);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->public_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_public(void)
{
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(NULL);
}
/*
* Get the private DRBG.
* Returns pointer to the DRBG on success, NULL on failure.
*/
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
RAND_DRBG *OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
DRBG_GLOBAL *dgbl = drbg_get_global(ctx);
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_drbg_init, do_rand_drbg_init))
if (dgbl == NULL)
return NULL;
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&private_drbg);
drbg = CRYPTO_THREAD_get_local(&dgbl->private_drbg);
if (drbg == NULL) {
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(OPENSSL_INIT_THREAD_RAND))
ctx = openssl_ctx_get_concrete(ctx);
if (!ossl_init_thread_start(NULL, ctx, drbg_delete_thread_state))
return NULL;
drbg = drbg_setup(master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&private_drbg, drbg);
drbg = drbg_setup(ctx, dgbl->master_drbg, RAND_DRBG_TYPE_PRIVATE);
CRYPTO_THREAD_set_local(&dgbl->private_drbg, drbg);
}
return drbg;
}
RAND_DRBG *RAND_DRBG_get0_private(void)
{
return OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(NULL);
}
RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
drbg_seed,
drbg_bytes,
@@ -1241,5 +1392,9 @@ RAND_METHOD rand_meth = {
RAND_METHOD *RAND_OpenSSL(void)
{
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
return &rand_meth;
#else
return NULL;
#endif
}
+66 -45
View File
@@ -16,66 +16,83 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "internal/rand_int.h"
#include "internal/thread_once.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include "rand_lcl.h"
static RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
static unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
typedef struct crng_test_global_st {
unsigned char crngt_prev[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
RAND_POOL *crngt_pool;
} CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL;
int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *, unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *, RAND_POOL *, unsigned char *,
unsigned char *, unsigned int *)
= &rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb;
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
static void rand_crng_ossl_ctx_free(void *vcrngt_glob)
{
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob = vcrngt_glob;
rand_pool_free(crngt_glob->crngt_pool);
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
}
static void *rand_crng_ossl_ctx_new(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx)
{
unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*crngt_glob));
if (crngt_glob == NULL)
return NULL;
if ((crngt_glob->crngt_pool
= rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
return NULL;
}
if (crngt_get_entropy(ctx, crngt_glob->crngt_pool, buf,
crngt_glob->crngt_prev, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
return crngt_glob;
}
rand_pool_free(crngt_glob->crngt_pool);
OPENSSL_free(crngt_glob);
return NULL;
}
static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD rand_crng_ossl_ctx_method = {
rand_crng_ossl_ctx_new,
rand_crng_ossl_ctx_free,
};
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx,
RAND_POOL *pool,
unsigned char *buf,
unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_size)
{
int r;
size_t n;
unsigned char *p;
n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(crngt_pool);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
n = rand_pool_acquire_entropy(pool);
if (n >= CRNGT_BUFSIZ) {
p = rand_pool_detach(crngt_pool);
r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, EVP_sha256(), NULL);
EVP_MD *fmd = EVP_MD_fetch(ctx, "SHA256", "");
if (fmd == NULL)
return 0;
p = rand_pool_detach(pool);
r = EVP_Digest(p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, md, md_size, fmd, NULL);
if (r != 0)
memcpy(buf, p, CRNGT_BUFSIZ);
rand_pool_reattach(crngt_pool, p);
rand_pool_reattach(pool, p);
EVP_MD_meth_free(fmd);
return r;
}
return 0;
}
void rand_crngt_cleanup(void)
{
rand_pool_free(crngt_pool);
crngt_pool = NULL;
}
int rand_crngt_init(void)
{
unsigned char buf[CRNGT_BUFSIZ];
if ((crngt_pool = rand_pool_new(0, CRNGT_BUFSIZ, CRNGT_BUFSIZ)) == NULL)
return 0;
if (crngt_get_entropy(buf, crngt_prev, NULL)) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(buf, sizeof(buf));
return 1;
}
rand_crngt_cleanup();
return 0;
}
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_crngt_init_flag = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_crngt_init)
{
return OPENSSL_init_crypto(0, NULL)
&& rand_crngt_init()
&& OPENSSL_atexit(&rand_crngt_cleanup);
}
int rand_crngt_single_init(void)
{
return RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init);
}
size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len,
@@ -86,8 +103,11 @@ size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
RAND_POOL *pool;
size_t q, r = 0, s, t = 0;
int attempts = 3;
CRNG_TEST_GLOBAL *crngt_glob
= openssl_ctx_get_data(drbg->libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_RAND_CRNGT_INDEX,
&rand_crng_ossl_ctx_method);
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_crngt_init_flag, do_rand_crngt_init))
if (crngt_glob == NULL)
return 0;
if ((pool = rand_pool_new(entropy, min_len, max_len)) == NULL)
@@ -95,11 +115,12 @@ size_t rand_crngt_get_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
while ((q = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1)) > 0 && attempts-- > 0) {
s = q > sizeof(buf) ? sizeof(buf) : q;
if (!crngt_get_entropy(buf, md, &sz)
|| memcmp(crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
if (!crngt_get_entropy(drbg->libctx, crngt_glob->crngt_pool, buf, md,
&sz)
|| memcmp(crngt_glob->crngt_prev, md, sz) == 0
|| !rand_pool_add(pool, buf, s, s * 8))
goto err;
memcpy(crngt_prev, md, sz);
memcpy(crngt_glob->crngt_prev, md, sz);
t += s;
attempts++;
}
+1 -1
View File
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ int RAND_egd_bytes(const char *path, int bytes)
# else
# include OPENSSL_UNISTD
# include <unistd.h>
# include <stddef.h>
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/socket.h>
+1
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA RAND_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_DRBG_SETUP, 0), "drbg_setup"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_GET_ENTROPY, 0), "get_entropy"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, 0), "RAND_bytes"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, 0), "rand_bytes_ex"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_ENABLE_LOCKING, 0),
"rand_drbg_enable_locking"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_RAND, RAND_F_RAND_DRBG_GENERATE, 0),
+10 -14
View File
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@
# include <openssl/ec.h>
# include <openssl/rand_drbg.h>
# include "internal/tsan_assist.h"
# include "internal/rand_int.h"
# include "internal/numbers.h"
@@ -129,7 +130,7 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_method_st {
#define HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN (888/8)
typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st {
const EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx;
size_t blocklen;
unsigned char V[HASH_PRNG_MAX_SEEDLEN];
@@ -139,7 +140,7 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_hash_st {
} RAND_DRBG_HASH;
typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
const EVP_MD *md;
EVP_MD *md;
HMAC_CTX *ctx;
size_t blocklen;
unsigned char K[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
@@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ typedef struct rand_drbg_hmac_st {
typedef struct rand_drbg_ctr_st {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx_df;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
size_t keylen;
unsigned char K[32];
unsigned char V[16];
@@ -192,6 +193,8 @@ struct rand_pool_st {
*/
struct rand_drbg_st {
CRYPTO_RWLOCK *lock;
/* The library context this DRBG is associated with, if any */
OPENSSL_CTX *libctx;
RAND_DRBG *parent;
int secure; /* 1: allocated on the secure heap, 0: otherwise */
int type; /* the nid of the underlying algorithm */
@@ -334,18 +337,11 @@ int drbg_hmac_init(RAND_DRBG *drbg);
* Entropy call back for the FIPS 140-2 section 4.9.2 Conditional Tests.
* These need to be exposed for the unit tests.
*/
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
int rand_crngt_get_entropy_cb(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_size);
extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
extern int (*crngt_get_entropy)(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, RAND_POOL *pool,
unsigned char *buf, unsigned char *md,
unsigned int *md_size);
int rand_crngt_init(void);
void rand_crngt_cleanup(void);
/*
* Expose the run once initialisation function for the unit tests because.
* they need to restart from scratch to validate the first block is skipped
* properly.
*/
int rand_crngt_single_init(void);
#endif
+68 -98
View File
@@ -17,21 +17,20 @@
#include "rand_lcl.h"
#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
/* non-NULL if default_RAND_meth is ENGINE-provided */
static ENGINE *funct_ref;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_engine_lock;
#endif
# endif
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_meth_lock;
static const RAND_METHOD *default_RAND_meth;
static CRYPTO_ONCE rand_init = CRYPTO_ONCE_STATIC_INIT;
int rand_fork_count;
static CRYPTO_RWLOCK *rand_nonce_lock;
static int rand_nonce_count;
static int rand_inited = 0;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
int rand_fork_count;
#ifdef OPENSSL_RAND_SEED_RDTSC
/*
@@ -208,56 +207,6 @@ void rand_drbg_cleanup_entropy(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
/*
* Implements the get_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
*/
size_t rand_drbg_get_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char **pout,
int entropy, size_t min_len, size_t max_len)
{
size_t ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool;
struct {
void * instance;
int count;
} data;
memset(&data, 0, sizeof(data));
pool = rand_pool_new(0, min_len, max_len);
if (pool == NULL)
return 0;
if (rand_pool_add_nonce_data(pool) == 0)
goto err;
data.instance = drbg;
CRYPTO_atomic_add(&rand_nonce_count, 1, &data.count, rand_nonce_lock);
if (rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0) == 0)
goto err;
ret = rand_pool_length(pool);
*pout = rand_pool_detach(pool);
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
/*
* Implements the cleanup_nonce() callback (see RAND_DRBG_set_callbacks())
*
*/
void rand_drbg_cleanup_nonce(RAND_DRBG *drbg,
unsigned char *out, size_t outlen)
{
OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(out, outlen);
}
/*
* Generate additional data that can be used for the drbg. The data does
* not need to contain entropy, but it's useful if it contains at least
@@ -292,39 +241,32 @@ void rand_fork(void)
rand_fork_count++;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
DEFINE_RUN_ONCE_STATIC(do_rand_init)
{
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
rand_engine_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_engine_lock == NULL)
return 0;
#endif
# endif
rand_meth_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_meth_lock == NULL)
goto err1;
rand_nonce_lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new();
if (rand_nonce_lock == NULL)
goto err2;
goto err;
if (!rand_pool_init())
goto err3;
goto err;
rand_inited = 1;
return 1;
err3:
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
err2:
err:
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
err1:
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
#endif
# endif
return 0;
}
@@ -339,19 +281,18 @@ void rand_cleanup_int(void)
meth->cleanup();
RAND_set_rand_method(NULL);
rand_pool_cleanup();
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_engine_lock);
rand_engine_lock = NULL;
#endif
# endif
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_meth_lock);
rand_meth_lock = NULL;
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(rand_nonce_lock);
rand_nonce_lock = NULL;
rand_inited = 0;
}
/* TODO(3.0): Do we need to handle this somehow in the FIPS module? */
/*
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file decriptors are
* RAND_close_seed_files() ensures that any seed file descriptors are
* closed after use.
*/
void RAND_keep_random_devices_open(int keep)
@@ -371,8 +312,6 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
{
int ret = 0;
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth == RAND_OpenSSL()) {
@@ -389,6 +328,8 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
return ret;
} else {
RAND_POOL *pool = NULL;
/* fill random pool and seed the current legacy RNG */
pool = rand_pool_new(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH,
(RAND_DRBG_STRENGTH + 7) / 8,
@@ -406,12 +347,14 @@ int RAND_poll(void)
goto err;
ret = 1;
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
}
err:
rand_pool_free(pool);
return ret;
}
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
/*
* Allocate memory and initialize a new random pool
@@ -708,23 +651,28 @@ int rand_pool_add_end(RAND_POOL *pool, size_t len, size_t entropy)
return 1;
}
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
int RAND_set_rand_method(const RAND_METHOD *meth)
{
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
return 0;
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE_finish(funct_ref);
funct_ref = NULL;
#endif
# endif
default_RAND_meth = meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return 1;
}
#endif
const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
return NULL;
#else
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
if (!RUN_ONCE(&rand_init, do_rand_init))
@@ -732,7 +680,7 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
CRYPTO_THREAD_write_lock(rand_meth_lock);
if (default_RAND_meth == NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
ENGINE *e;
/* If we have an engine that can do RAND, use it. */
@@ -744,16 +692,17 @@ const RAND_METHOD *RAND_get_rand_method(void)
ENGINE_finish(e);
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
}
#else
# else
default_RAND_meth = &rand_meth;
#endif
# endif
}
tmp_meth = default_RAND_meth;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(rand_meth_lock);
return tmp_meth;
#endif
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE
#if !defined(OPENSSL_NO_ENGINE) && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
int RAND_set_rand_engine(ENGINE *engine)
{
const RAND_METHOD *tmp_meth = NULL;
@@ -800,16 +749,42 @@ void RAND_add(const void *buf, int num, double randomness)
* the default method, then just call RAND_bytes(). Otherwise make
* sure we're instantiated and use the private DRBG.
*/
int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
int rand_priv_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
int ret;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL())
return RAND_bytes(buf, num);
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
drbg = RAND_DRBG_get0_private();
drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_private_drbg(ctx);
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
ret = RAND_DRBG_bytes(drbg, buf, num);
return ret;
}
int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
return rand_priv_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
int rand_bytes_ex(OPENSSL_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
RAND_DRBG *drbg;
int ret;
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth != RAND_OpenSSL()) {
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES_EX, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return -1;
}
drbg = OPENSSL_CTX_get0_public_drbg(ctx);
if (drbg == NULL)
return 0;
@@ -819,15 +794,10 @@ int RAND_priv_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
int RAND_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
if (meth->bytes != NULL)
return meth->bytes(buf, num);
RANDerr(RAND_F_RAND_BYTES, RAND_R_FUNC_NOT_IMPLEMENTED);
return -1;
return rand_bytes_ex(NULL, buf, num);
}
#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0 && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
int RAND_pseudo_bytes(unsigned char *buf, int num)
{
const RAND_METHOD *meth = RAND_get_rand_method();
+2 -25
View File
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#if defined(__linux)
# include <asm/unistd.h>
#endif
#if defined(__FreeBSD__)
#if defined(__FreeBSD__) && !defined(OPENSSL_SYS_UEFI)
# include <sys/types.h>
# include <sys/sysctl.h>
# include <sys/param.h>
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ static ssize_t syscall_random(void *buf, size_t buflen)
if (getentropy != NULL)
return getentropy(buf, buflen) == 0 ? (ssize_t)buflen : -1;
# else
# elif !defined(FIPS_MODE)
union {
void *p;
int (*f)(void *buffer, size_t length);
@@ -489,29 +489,6 @@ size_t rand_pool_acquire_entropy(RAND_POOL *pool)
bytes_needed = rand_pool_bytes_needed(pool, 1 /*entropy_factor*/);
{
size_t i;
#ifdef DEVRANDOM_WAIT
static int wait_done = 0;
/*
* On some implementations reading from /dev/urandom is possible
* before it is initialized. Therefore we wait for /dev/random
* to be readable to make sure /dev/urandom is initialized.
*/
if (!wait_done && bytes_needed > 0) {
int f = open(DEVRANDOM_WAIT, O_RDONLY);
if (f >= 0) {
fd_set fds;
FD_ZERO(&fds);
FD_SET(f, &fds);
while (select(f+1, &fds, NULL, NULL, NULL) < 0
&& errno == EINTR);
close(f);
}
wait_done = 1;
}
#endif
for (i = 0; bytes_needed > 0 && i < OSSL_NELEM(random_device_paths); i++) {
ssize_t bytes = 0;
+1 -1
View File
@@ -162,7 +162,7 @@ int rand_pool_add_additional_data(RAND_POOL *pool)
return rand_pool_add(pool, (unsigned char *)&data, sizeof(data), 0);
}
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0 && !defined(FIPS_MODE)
int RAND_event(UINT iMsg, WPARAM wParam, LPARAM lParam)
{
RAND_poll();