Hakase/openssl-custom
1
0 Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Wiki Activity

Latest update

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
Hakase
2019-07-13 19:13:22 +09:00
parent 9a23f88dc2
commit 2e57f602ae
542 changed files with 17287 additions and 6184 deletions
Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files
crypto/kdf/build.info
+1 -1
View File
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
tls1_prf.c kdf_err.c kdf_util.c hkdf.c scrypt.c pbkdf2.c sshkdf.c \
sskdf.c
sskdf.c x942kdf.c
crypto/kdf/kdf_err.c
+17
View File
@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_NEW, 0), "kdf_hkdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_HKDF_SIZE, 0), "kdf_hkdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_MD2CTRL, 0), "kdf_md2ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, 0), "kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL_STR, 0),
"kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_DERIVE, 0), "kdf_pbkdf2_derive"},
@@ -41,6 +42,7 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_DERIVE, 0),
"kdf_tls1_prf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_KDF_TLS1_PRF_NEW, 0), "kdf_tls1_prf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, 0), "pbkdf2_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PBKDF2_SET_MEMBUF, 0), "pbkdf2_set_membuf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_CTRL_STR, 0), "pkey_hkdf_ctrl_str"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_PKEY_HKDF_DERIVE, 0), "pkey_hkdf_derive"},
@@ -65,13 +67,26 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_functs[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_NEW, 0), "sskdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_SSKDF_SIZE, 0), "sskdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_TLS1_PRF_ALG, 0), "tls1_prf_alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, 0), "x942kdf_ctrl"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, 0), "x942kdf_derive"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, 0), "x942kdf_hash_kdm"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, 0), "x942kdf_new"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, 0), "x942kdf_size"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, KDF_F_X963KDF_DERIVE, 0), "x963kdf_derive"},
{0, NULL}
};
static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING), "bad encoding"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH), "bad length"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN), "inavlid ukm len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_DIGEST), "invalid digest"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT),
"invalid iteration count"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN), "invalid key len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_MAC_TYPE), "invalid mac type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN), "invalid salt len"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG), "missing cek alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_ITERATION_COUNT),
"missing iteration count"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_MISSING_KEY), "missing key"},
@@ -88,6 +103,8 @@ static const ERR_STRING_DATA KDF_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_NOT_SUPPORTED), "not supported"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE),
"unknown parameter type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG),
"unsupported cek alg"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_MAC_TYPE),
"unsupported mac type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_KDF, 0, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR), "value error"},
crypto/kdf/pbkdf2.c
+78 -18
View File
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -17,12 +17,27 @@
#include "internal/evp_int.h"
#include "kdf_local.h"
/* Constants specified in SP800-132 */
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS 112
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO 0xFFFFFFFF
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS 1000
#define KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN (128 / 8)
/*
* For backwards compatibility reasons,
* Extra checks are done by default in fips mode only.
*/
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 1
#else
# define KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS 0
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
static void kdf_pbkdf2_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen);
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int extra_checks);
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
unsigned char *pass;
@@ -31,6 +46,7 @@ struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
size_t salt_len;
int iter;
const EVP_MD *md;
int lower_bound_checks;
};
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_pbkdf2_new(void)
@@ -64,6 +80,7 @@ static void kdf_pbkdf2_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
impl->iter = PKCS5_DEFAULT_ITER;
impl->md = EVP_sha1();
impl->lower_bound_checks = KDF_PBKDF2_DEFAULT_CHECKS;
}
static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
@@ -91,12 +108,16 @@ static int pbkdf2_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
int iter;
int iter, pkcs5, min_iter;
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
const EVP_MD *md;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE:
pkcs5 = va_arg(args, int);
impl->lower_bound_checks = (pkcs5 == 0) ? 1 : 0;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
@@ -105,20 +126,28 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 && len < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
return 0;
}
return pbkdf2_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_ITER:
iter = va_arg(args, int);
if (iter < 1)
min_iter = impl->lower_bound_checks != 0 ? KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS : 1;
if (iter < min_iter) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
impl->iter = iter;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
if (md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_PBKDF2_CTRL, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
return 0;
}
impl->md = md;
return 1;
@@ -159,6 +188,9 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "pkcs5") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_pbkdf2_ctrl,
EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PBKDF2_PKCS5_MODE, value);
return -2;
}
@@ -175,9 +207,9 @@ static int kdf_pbkdf2_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
return 0;
}
return pkcs5_pbkdf2_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
impl->md, key, keylen);
return pbkdf2_derive((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len,
impl->salt, impl->salt_len, impl->iter,
impl->md, key, keylen, impl->lower_bound_checks);
}
const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
@@ -195,12 +227,16 @@ const EVP_KDF pbkdf2_kdf_meth = {
* This is an implementation of PKCS#5 v2.0 password based encryption key
* derivation function PBKDF2. SHA1 version verified against test vectors
* posted by Peter Gutmann to the PKCS-TNG mailing list.
*
* The constraints specified by SP800-132 have been added i.e.
* - Check the range of the key length.
* - Minimum iteration count of 1000.
* - Randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
*/
static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen)
static int pbkdf2_derive(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
const unsigned char *salt, int saltlen, int iter,
const EVP_MD *digest, unsigned char *key,
size_t keylen, int lower_bound_checks)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char digtmp[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE], *p, itmp[4];
@@ -209,9 +245,33 @@ static int pkcs5_pbkdf2_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
HMAC_CTX *hctx_tpl = NULL, *hctx = NULL;
mdlen = EVP_MD_size(digest);
if (mdlen < 0)
if (mdlen <= 0)
return 0;
/*
* This check should always be done because keylen / mdlen >= (2^32 - 1)
* results in an overflow of the loop counter 'i'.
*/
if ((keylen / mdlen) >= KDF_PBKDF2_MAX_KEY_LEN_DIGEST_RATIO) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (lower_bound_checks) {
if ((keylen * 8) < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_KEY_LEN_BITS) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_KEY_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (saltlen < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_SALT_LEN) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_SALT_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (iter < KDF_PBKDF2_MIN_ITERATIONS) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_PBKDF2_DERIVE, KDF_R_INVALID_ITERATION_COUNT);
return 0;
}
}
hctx_tpl = HMAC_CTX_new();
if (hctx_tpl == NULL)
return 0;
crypto/kdf/sskdf.c
+6 -4
View File
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@
* Result(0) = empty bit string (i.e., the null string).
* For i = 1 to reps, do the following:
* Increment counter by 1.
* Result(i) = Result(i – 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
* Result(i) = Result(i - 1) || H(counter || Z || FixedInfo).
* DKM = LeftmostBits(Result(reps), L))
*
* NOTES:
@@ -202,9 +202,8 @@ static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(const EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md,
|| derived_key_len == 0)
return 0;
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac);
ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(kdf_mac);
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
if (ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (hmac_md != NULL &&
EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_MD, hmac_md) <= 0)
@@ -233,7 +232,8 @@ static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(const EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md,
c[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
c[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
if (!(EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init)
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (!(ctx != NULL
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, c, sizeof(c))
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, z, z_len)
&& EVP_MAC_update(ctx, info, info_len)))
@@ -251,6 +251,8 @@ static int SSKDF_mac_kdm(const EVP_MAC *kdf_mac, const EVP_MD *hmac_md,
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
}
ret = 1;
end:
crypto/kdf/tls1_prf.c
+14 -7
View File
@@ -237,10 +237,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
size_t Ai_len;
int ret = 0;
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
ctx_init = EVP_MAC_CTX_new_id(EVP_MAC_HMAC);
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_Ai == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
if (ctx_init == NULL)
goto err;
if (EVP_MAC_ctrl(ctx_init, EVP_MAC_CTRL_SET_FLAGS, EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW) != 1)
goto err;
@@ -254,7 +252,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
if (chunk == 0)
goto err;
/* A(0) = seed */
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx_init))
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx_Ai, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
@@ -263,15 +262,21 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
/* calc: A(i) = HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i-1)) */
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx_Ai, Ai, &Ai_len))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx_Ai);
ctx_Ai = NULL;
/* calc next chunk: HMAC_<hash>(secret, A(i) + seed) */
if (!EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx, ctx_init))
ctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx_init);
if (ctx == NULL)
goto err;
if (!EVP_MAC_update(ctx, Ai, Ai_len))
goto err;
/* save state for calculating next A(i) value */
if (olen > chunk && !EVP_MAC_CTX_copy(ctx_Ai, ctx))
goto err;
if (olen > chunk) {
ctx_Ai = EVP_MAC_CTX_dup(ctx);
if (ctx_Ai == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (seed != NULL && !EVP_MAC_update(ctx, seed, seed_len))
goto err;
if (olen <= chunk) {
@@ -283,6 +288,8 @@ static int tls1_prf_P_hash(const EVP_MD *md,
}
if (!EVP_MAC_final(ctx, out, NULL))
goto err;
EVP_MAC_CTX_free(ctx);
ctx = NULL;
out += chunk;
olen -= chunk;
}
crypto/kdf/x942kdf.c
+407
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,407 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2019, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "e_os.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_CMS
# include <stdlib.h>
# include <stdarg.h>
# include <string.h>
# include <openssl/hmac.h>
# include <openssl/cms.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/kdf.h>
# include <openssl/x509.h>
# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
# include "internal/evp_int.h"
# include "kdf_local.h"
# define X942KDF_MAX_INLEN (1 << 30)
struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
const EVP_MD *md;
unsigned char *secret;
size_t secret_len;
int cek_nid;
unsigned char *ukm;
size_t ukm_len;
size_t dkm_len;
};
/* A table of allowed wrapping algorithms and the associated output lengths */
static const struct {
int nid;
size_t keklen; /* size in bytes */
} kek_algs[] = {
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMS3DESwrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_smime_alg_CMSRC2wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_aes128_wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_aes192_wrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_aes256_wrap, 32 },
{ NID_id_camellia128_wrap, 16 },
{ NID_id_camellia192_wrap, 24 },
{ NID_id_camellia256_wrap, 32 }
};
/* Skip past an ASN1 structure: for OBJECT skip content octets too */
static int skip_asn1(unsigned char **pp, long *plen, int exptag)
{
int i, tag, xclass;
long tmplen;
const unsigned char *q = *pp;
i = ASN1_get_object(&q, &tmplen, &tag, &xclass, *plen);
if ((i & 0x80) != 0 || tag != exptag || xclass != V_ASN1_UNIVERSAL)
return 0;
if (tag == V_ASN1_OBJECT)
q += tmplen;
*pp = (unsigned char *)q;
*plen -= q - *pp;
return 1;
}
/*
* Encode the other info structure.
*
* RFC2631 Section 2.1.2 Contains the following definition for otherinfo
*
* OtherInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* keyInfo KeySpecificInfo,
* partyAInfo [0] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
* suppPubInfo [2] OCTET STRING
* }
*
* KeySpecificInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
* algorithm OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
* counter OCTET STRING SIZE (4..4)
* }
*
* |nid| is the algorithm object identifier.
* |keylen| is the length (in bytes) of the generated KEK. It is stored into
* suppPubInfo (in bits).
* |ukm| is the optional user keying material that is stored into partyAInfo. It
* can be NULL.
* |ukmlen| is the user keying material length (in bytes).
* |der| is the returned encoded data. It must be freed by the caller.
* |der_len| is the returned size of the encoded data.
* |out_ctr| returns a pointer to the counter data which is embedded inside the
* encoded data. This allows the counter bytes to be updated without re-encoding.
*
* Returns: 1 if successfully encoded, or 0 otherwise.
* Assumptions: |der|, |der_len| & |out_ctr| are not NULL.
*/
static int x942_encode_otherinfo(int nid, size_t keylen,
const unsigned char *ukm, size_t ukmlen,
unsigned char **der, size_t *der_len,
unsigned char **out_ctr)
{
unsigned char *p, *encoded = NULL;
int ret = 0, encoded_len;
long tlen;
/* "magic" value to check offset is sane */
static unsigned char ctr[4] = { 0x00, 0x00, 0x00, 0x01 };
X509_ALGOR *ksi = NULL;
ASN1_OBJECT *alg_oid = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ctr_oct = NULL, *ukm_oct = NULL;
/* set the KeySpecificInfo - which contains an algorithm oid and counter */
ksi = X509_ALGOR_new();
alg_oid = OBJ_dup(OBJ_nid2obj(nid));
ctr_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (ksi == NULL
|| alg_oid == NULL
|| ctr_oct == NULL
|| !ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ctr_oct, ctr, sizeof(ctr))
|| !X509_ALGOR_set0(ksi, alg_oid, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ctr_oct))
goto err;
/* NULL these as they now belong to ksi */
alg_oid = NULL;
ctr_oct = NULL;
/* Set the optional partyAInfo */
if (ukm != NULL) {
ukm_oct = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
if (ukm_oct == NULL)
goto err;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_set(ukm_oct, (unsigned char *)ukm, ukmlen);
}
/* Generate the OtherInfo DER data */
encoded_len = CMS_SharedInfo_encode(&encoded, ksi, ukm_oct, keylen);
if (encoded_len <= 0)
goto err;
/* Parse the encoded data to find the offset of the counter data */
p = encoded;
tlen = (long)encoded_len;
if (skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_SEQUENCE)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OBJECT)
&& skip_asn1(&p, &tlen, V_ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
&& CRYPTO_memcmp(p, ctr, 4) == 0) {
*out_ctr = p;
*der = encoded;
*der_len = (size_t)encoded_len;
ret = 1;
}
err:
if (ret != 1)
OPENSSL_free(encoded);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctr_oct);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ukm_oct);
ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg_oid);
X509_ALGOR_free(ksi);
return ret;
}
static int x942kdf_hash_kdm(const EVP_MD *kdf_md,
const unsigned char *z, size_t z_len,
const unsigned char *other, size_t other_len,
unsigned char *ctr,
unsigned char *derived_key, size_t derived_key_len)
{
int ret = 0, hlen;
size_t counter, out_len, len = derived_key_len;
unsigned char mac[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
unsigned char *out = derived_key;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctx = NULL, *ctx_init = NULL;
if (z_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN || other_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len > X942KDF_MAX_INLEN
|| derived_key_len == 0) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_HASH_KDM, KDF_R_BAD_LENGTH);
return 0;
}
hlen = EVP_MD_size(kdf_md);
if (hlen <= 0)
return 0;
out_len = (size_t)hlen;
ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
ctx_init = EVP_MD_CTX_create();
if (ctx == NULL || ctx_init == NULL)
goto end;
if (!EVP_DigestInit(ctx_init, kdf_md))
goto end;
for (counter = 1;; counter++) {
/* updating the ctr modifies 4 bytes in the 'other' buffer */
ctr[0] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 24) & 0xff);
ctr[1] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 16) & 0xff);
ctr[2] = (unsigned char)((counter >> 8) & 0xff);
ctr[3] = (unsigned char)(counter & 0xff);
if (!EVP_MD_CTX_copy_ex(ctx, ctx_init)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, z, z_len)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctx, other, other_len))
goto end;
if (len >= out_len) {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, out, NULL))
goto end;
out += out_len;
len -= out_len;
if (len == 0)
break;
} else {
if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctx, mac, NULL))
goto end;
memcpy(out, mac, len);
break;
}
}
ret = 1;
end:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctx_init);
OPENSSL_cleanse(mac, sizeof(mac));
return ret;
}
static EVP_KDF_IMPL *x942kdf_new(void)
{
EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
if ((impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl))) == NULL)
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
return impl;
}
static void x942kdf_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->secret, impl->secret_len);
OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len);
memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
}
static void x942kdf_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
x942kdf_reset(impl);
OPENSSL_free(impl);
}
static int x942kdf_set_buffer(va_list args, unsigned char **out, size_t *out_len)
{
const unsigned char *p;
size_t len;
p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
len = va_arg(args, size_t);
if (len == 0 || p == NULL)
return 1;
OPENSSL_free(*out);
*out = OPENSSL_memdup(p, len);
if (*out == NULL)
return 0;
*out_len = len;
return 1;
}
static int x942kdf_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
{
const EVP_MD *md;
char *alg_str = NULL;
size_t i;
switch (cmd) {
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD:
md = va_arg(args, const EVP_MD *);
if (md == NULL)
return 0;
impl->md = md;
return 1;
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY:
return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->secret, &impl->secret_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM:
return x942kdf_set_buffer(args, &impl->ukm, &impl->ukm_len);
case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG:
alg_str = va_arg(args, char *);
if (alg_str == NULL)
return 0;
impl->cek_nid = OBJ_sn2nid(alg_str);
for (i = 0; i < (size_t)OSSL_NELEM(kek_algs); ++i) {
if (kek_algs[i].nid == impl->cek_nid) {
impl->dkm_len = kek_algs[i].keklen;
return 1;
}
}
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_CTRL, KDF_R_UNSUPPORTED_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
default:
return -2;
}
}
static int x942kdf_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
const char *value)
{
if (strcmp(type, "digest") == 0)
return kdf_md2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MD, value);
if (strcmp(type, "secret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "key") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexsecret") == 0 || strcmp(type, "hexkey") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_KEY,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "ukm") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "hexukm") == 0)
return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_UKM,
value);
if (strcmp(type, "cekalg") == 0)
return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, x942kdf_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_CEK_ALG,
value);
return -2;
}
static size_t x942kdf_size(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
{
int len;
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_SIZE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
len = EVP_MD_size(impl->md);
return (len <= 0) ? 0 : (size_t)len;
}
static int x942kdf_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
{
int ret = 0;
unsigned char *ctr;
unsigned char *der = NULL;
size_t der_len = 0;
if (impl->secret == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SECRET);
return 0;
}
if (impl->md == NULL) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_MESSAGE_DIGEST);
return 0;
}
if (impl->cek_nid == NID_undef) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
if (impl->ukm != NULL && impl->ukm_len >= X942KDF_MAX_INLEN) {
/*
* Note the ukm length MUST be 512 bits.
* For backwards compatibility the old check is being done.
*/
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_INAVLID_UKM_LEN);
return 0;
}
if (keylen != impl->dkm_len) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_CEK_ALG);
return 0;
}
/* generate the otherinfo der */
if (!x942_encode_otherinfo(impl->cek_nid, impl->dkm_len,
impl->ukm, impl->ukm_len,
&der, &der_len, &ctr)) {
KDFerr(KDF_F_X942KDF_DERIVE, KDF_R_BAD_ENCODING);
return 0;
}
ret = x942kdf_hash_kdm(impl->md, impl->secret, impl->secret_len,
der, der_len, ctr, key, keylen);
OPENSSL_free(der);
return ret;
}
const EVP_KDF x942_kdf_meth = {
EVP_KDF_X942,
x942kdf_new,
x942kdf_free,
x942kdf_reset,
x942kdf_ctrl,
x942kdf_ctrl_str,
x942kdf_size,
x942kdf_derive
};
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_CMS */