Latest update

This commit is contained in:
2019-07-13 19:13:22 +09:00
parent 9a23f88dc2
commit 2e57f602ae
542 changed files with 17287 additions and 6184 deletions
+1 -1
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@@ -1301,7 +1301,7 @@ ecp_nistz256_ord_mul_montx:
################################# reduction
mulx 8*0+128(%r14), $t0, $t1
adcx $t0, $acc3 # guranteed to be zero
adcx $t0, $acc3 # guaranteed to be zero
adox $t1, $acc4
mulx 8*1+128(%r14), $t0, $t1
+2 -2
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@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes:
and $t0,$t0,$t1
sldi $a3,$a3,1
add $t0,$t0,$t1 # compare to modulus in the same go
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared
addc $a0,$a0,$t0
addze $a1,$a1
@@ -462,7 +462,7 @@ x25519_fe64_tobytes:
sradi $t0,$a3,63 # most significant bit -> mask
sldi $a3,$a3,1
andc $t0,$t1,$t0
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most signifcant bit cleared
srdi $a3,$a3,1 # most significant bit cleared
subi $rp,$rp,1
subfc $a0,$t0,$a0
+46 -1
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@@ -1,3 +1,47 @@
$ECASM=
IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
$ECASM_x86=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86.s
$ECDEF_x86=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
$ECASM_x86_64=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-x86_64.s x25519-x86_64.s
$ECDEF_x86_64=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM X25519_ASM
$ECASM_ia64=
$ECASM_sparcv9=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-sparcv9.S
$ECDEF_sparcv9=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
$ECASM_sparcv8=
$ECASM_alpha=
$ECASM_mips32=
$ECASM_mips64=
$ECASM_s390x=
$ECASM_armv4=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv4.S
$ECDEF_armv4=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
$ECASM_aarch64=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-armv8.S
$ECDEF_aarch64=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM
$ECASM_parisc11=
$ECASM_parisc20_64=
$ECASM_ppc32=
$ECASM_ppc64=ecp_nistz256.c ecp_nistz256-ppc64.s x25519-ppc64.s
$ECDEF_ppc64=ECP_NISTZ256_ASM X25519_ASM
$ECASM_c64xplus=
# Now that we have defined all the arch specific variables, use the
# appropriate one, and define the appropriate macros
IF[$ECASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}]
$ECASM=$ECASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
$ECDEF=$ECDEF_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
ENDIF
ENDIF
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
ec_lib.c ecp_smpl.c ecp_mont.c ecp_nist.c ec_cvt.c ec_mult.c \
@@ -8,7 +52,8 @@ SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
ecdsa_ossl.c ecdsa_sign.c ecdsa_vrf.c curve25519.c ecx_meth.c \
curve448/arch_32/f_impl.c curve448/f_generic.c curve448/scalar.c \
curve448/curve448_tables.c curve448/eddsa.c curve448/curve448.c \
{- $target{ec_asm_src} -}
$ECASM
DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$ECDEF
GENERATE[ecp_nistz256-x86.s]=asm/ecp_nistz256-x86.pl \
$(PERLASM_SCHEME) $(LIB_CFLAGS) $(LIB_CPPFLAGS) $(PROCESSOR)
+8
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@@ -22,6 +22,13 @@ int EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(const EC_GROUP *group, int nist_only)
int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
/*
* ECC domain parameter validation.
* See SP800-56A R3 5.5.2 "Assurances of Domain-Parameter Validity" Part 1b.
*/
return EC_GROUP_check_named_curve(group, 1) >= 0 ? 1 : 0;
#else
int ret = 0;
const BIGNUM *order;
BN_CTX *new_ctx = NULL;
@@ -84,4 +91,5 @@ int EC_GROUP_check(const EC_GROUP *group, BN_CTX *ctx)
BN_CTX_free(new_ctx);
EC_POINT_free(point);
return ret;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
}
+96 -23
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@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
/*
* Copyright 2002-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2002-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright (c) 2002, Oracle and/or its affiliates. All rights reserved
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@
#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/o_str.h"
typedef struct {
int field_type, /* either NID_X9_62_prime_field or
@@ -2801,6 +2800,70 @@ typedef struct _ec_list_element_st {
const char *comment;
} ec_list_element;
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
/* prime field curves */
/* secg curves */
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
{NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
# else
{NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
# endif
/* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
{NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
{NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
# else
{NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
# endif
/* X9.62 curves */
{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_192.h, 0,
"NIST/X9.62/SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
# if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
# else
0,
# endif
"X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
/* characteristic two field curves */
/* NIST/SECG curves */
{NID_sect163k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect163r2, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_163B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect233k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect233r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect283k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect283r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_283B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 283 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect409k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect409r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_409B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 409 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect571k1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"},
{NID_sect571r1, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_571B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 571 bit binary field"},
# endif
};
#else
static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
/* prime field curves */
/* secg curves */
@@ -2823,25 +2886,25 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
{NID_secp224k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_224K1.h, 0,
"SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
{NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, EC_GFp_nistp224_method,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
#else
# else
{NID_secp224r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_224.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
#endif
# endif
{NID_secp256k1, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_256K1.h, 0,
"SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
/* SECG secp256r1 is the same as X9.62 prime256v1 and hence omitted */
{NID_secp384r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_384.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 384 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128
{NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, EC_GFp_nistp521_method,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
#else
# else
{NID_secp521r1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_521.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG curve over a 521 bit prime field"},
#endif
# endif
/* X9.62 curves */
{NID_X9_62_prime192v1, &_EC_NIST_PRIME_192.h, 0,
"NIST/X9.62/SECG curve over a 192 bit prime field"},
@@ -2856,15 +2919,15 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
{NID_X9_62_prime239v3, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_239V3.h, 0,
"X9.62 curve over a 239 bit prime field"},
{NID_X9_62_prime256v1, &_EC_X9_62_PRIME_256V1.h,
#if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
# if defined(ECP_NISTZ256_ASM)
EC_GFp_nistz256_method,
#elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
# elif !defined(OPENSSL_NO_EC_NISTP_64_GCC_128)
EC_GFp_nistp256_method,
#else
# else
0,
#endif
# endif
"X9.62/SECG curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
/* characteristic two field curves */
/* NIST/SECG curves */
{NID_sect113r1, &_EC_SECG_CHAR2_113R1.h, 0,
@@ -2948,7 +3011,7 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"SECG curve over a 113 bit binary field"},
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls5, &_EC_X9_62_CHAR2_163V1.h, 0,
"X9.62 curve over a 163 bit binary field"},
#endif
# endif
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls6, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_112R1.h, 0,
"SECG/WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls7, &_EC_SECG_PRIME_160R2.h, 0,
@@ -2957,15 +3020,15 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"WTLS curve over a 112 bit prime field"},
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls9, &_EC_WTLS_9.h, 0,
"WTLS curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls10, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233K.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls11, &_EC_NIST_CHAR2_233B.h, 0,
"NIST/SECG/WTLS curve over a 233 bit binary field"},
#endif
# endif
{NID_wap_wsg_idm_ecid_wtls12, &_EC_WTLS_12.h, 0,
"WTLS curve over a 224 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
/* IPSec curves */
{NID_ipsec3, &_EC_IPSEC_155_ID3.h, 0,
"\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #3 over a 155 bit binary field.\n"
@@ -2973,7 +3036,7 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
{NID_ipsec4, &_EC_IPSEC_185_ID4.h, 0,
"\n\tIPSec/IKE/Oakley curve #4 over a 185 bit binary field.\n"
"\tNot suitable for ECDSA.\n\tQuestionable extension field!"},
#endif
# endif
/* brainpool curves */
{NID_brainpoolP160r1, &_EC_brainpoolP160r1.h, 0,
"RFC 5639 curve over a 160 bit prime field"},
@@ -3003,11 +3066,12 @@ static const ec_list_element curve_list[] = {
"RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"},
{NID_brainpoolP512t1, &_EC_brainpoolP512t1.h, 0,
"RFC 5639 curve over a 512 bit prime field"},
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SM2
{NID_sm2, &_EC_sm2p256v1.h, 0,
"SM2 curve over a 256 bit prime field"},
#endif
# endif
};
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
#define curve_list_length OSSL_NELEM(curve_list)
@@ -3126,6 +3190,15 @@ EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_by_curve_name(int nid)
if (nid <= 0)
return NULL;
#ifdef FIPS_MODE
/*
* Only use approved NIST curves in FIPS.
* NOTE: "B-163", "K-163" & "P-192" can only be used for legacy use
* (i.e- ECDSA signature verification).
*/
if (EC_curve_nid2nist(nid) == NULL)
return NULL;
#endif /* FIPS_MODE */
for (i = 0; i < curve_list_length; i++)
if (curve_list[i].nid == nid) {
ret = ec_group_new_from_data(curve_list[i]);
@@ -3302,10 +3375,10 @@ int ec_curve_nid_from_params(const EC_GROUP *group)
/* Check the optional seed (ignore if its not set) */
&& (data->seed_len == 0 || seed_len == 0
|| ((size_t)data->seed_len == seed_len
&& OPENSSL_memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
&& memcmp(params_seed, seed, seed_len) == 0))
/* Check that the groups params match the built-in curve params */
&& OPENSSL_memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
== 0) {
&& memcmp(param_bytes, params, param_len * NUM_BN_FIELDS)
== 0) {
ret = curve.nid;
goto end;
}
+1 -1
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@@ -303,7 +303,7 @@ int EC_KEY_check_key(const EC_KEY *eckey)
* See SP800-56A R3 Section 5.6.2.3.3 (Part 2)
* i.e.
* - If q = odd prime p: Verify that xQ and yQ are integers in the
* interval[0, p 1], OR
* interval[0, p - 1], OR
* - If q = 2m: Verify that xQ and yQ are bit strings of length m bits.
* Returns 1 if the public key has a valid range, otherwise it returns 0.
*/
+1 -1
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@@ -154,7 +154,7 @@ struct ec_method_st {
int (*field_div) (const EC_GROUP *, BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *);
/*-
* 'field_inv' computes the multipicative inverse of a in the field,
* 'field_inv' computes the multiplicative inverse of a in the field,
* storing the result in r.
*
* If 'a' is zero (or equivalent), you'll get an EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
+2 -1
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@@ -327,7 +327,8 @@ static int pkey_ec_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_224 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_256 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_384 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_512) {
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sha3_512 &&
EVP_MD_type((const EVP_MD *)p2) != NID_sm3) {
ECerr(EC_F_PKEY_EC_CTRL, EC_R_INVALID_DIGEST_TYPE);
return 0;
}
+1 -1
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@@ -1269,7 +1269,7 @@ static void point_add(felem x3, felem y3, felem z3,
* ffffffa51868783bf2f966b7fcc0148f709a5d03bb5c9b8899c47aebb6fb
* 71e913863f7, in that case the penultimate intermediate is -9G and
* the final digit is also -9G. Since this only happens for a single
* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevent. (Any attacker who wanted to
* scalar, the timing leak is irrelevant. (Any attacker who wanted to
* check whether a secret scalar was that exact value, can already do
* so.)
*/
+12 -12
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@@ -158,13 +158,13 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
* of a nonnegative integer (b_k in {0, 1}), rewrite it in digits 0, 1, -1
* by using bit-wise subtraction as follows:
*
* b_k b_(k-1) ... b_2 b_1 b_0
* - b_k ... b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0
* -------------------------------------
* s_k b_(k-1) ... s_3 s_2 s_1 s_0
* b_k b_(k-1) ... b_2 b_1 b_0
* - b_k ... b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0
* -----------------------------------------
* s_(k+1) s_k ... s_3 s_2 s_1 s_0
*
* A left-shift followed by subtraction of the original value yields a new
* representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i+1) - b_i.
* representation of the same value, using signed bits s_i = b_(i-1) - b_i.
* This representation from Booth's paper has since appeared in the
* literature under a variety of different names including "reversed binary
* form", "alternating greedy expansion", "mutual opposite form", and
@@ -188,7 +188,7 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
* (1961), pp. 67-91), in a radix-2^5 setting. That is, we always combine five
* signed bits into a signed digit:
*
* s_(4j + 4) s_(4j + 3) s_(4j + 2) s_(4j + 1) s_(4j)
* s_(5j + 4) s_(5j + 3) s_(5j + 2) s_(5j + 1) s_(5j)
*
* The sign-alternating property implies that the resulting digit values are
* integers from -16 to 16.
@@ -196,14 +196,14 @@ void ec_GFp_nistp_points_make_affine_internal(size_t num, void *point_array,
* Of course, we don't actually need to compute the signed digits s_i as an
* intermediate step (that's just a nice way to see how this scheme relates
* to the wNAF): a direct computation obtains the recoded digit from the
* six bits b_(4j + 4) ... b_(4j - 1).
* six bits b_(5j + 4) ... b_(5j - 1).
*
* This function takes those five bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the
* This function takes those six bits as an integer (0 .. 63), writing the
* recoded digit to *sign (0 for positive, 1 for negative) and *digit (absolute
* value, in the range 0 .. 8). Note that this integer essentially provides the
* input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input to
* compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit b_-1,
* has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0.
* value, in the range 0 .. 16). Note that this integer essentially provides
* the input bits "shifted to the left" by one position: for example, the input
* to compute the least significant recoded digit, given that there's no bit
* b_-1, has to be b_4 b_3 b_2 b_1 b_0 0.
*
*/
void ec_GFp_nistp_recode_scalar_bits(unsigned char *sign,
+1 -1
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@@ -532,7 +532,7 @@ static int ecd_item_sign25519(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const ASN1_ITEM *it, void *asn,
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg1, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
if (alg2)
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg2, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_ED25519), V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL);
/* Algorithm idetifiers set: carry on as normal */
/* Algorithm identifiers set: carry on as normal */
return 3;
}