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=pod
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=head1 NAME
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EVP_KDF_SCRYPT - The scrypt EVP_KDF implementation
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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Support for computing the B<scrypt> password-based KDF through the B<EVP_KDF>
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API.
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The EVP_KDF_SCRYPT algorithm implements the scrypt password-based key
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derivation function, as described in RFC 7914. It is memory-hard in the sense
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that it deliberately requires a significant amount of RAM for efficient
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computation. The intention of this is to render brute forcing of passwords on
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systems that lack large amounts of main memory (such as GPUs or ASICs)
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computationally infeasible.
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scrypt provides three work factors that can be customized: N, r and p. N, which
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has to be a positive power of two, is the general work factor and scales CPU
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time in an approximately linear fashion. r is the block size of the internally
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used hash function and p is the parallelization factor. Both r and p need to be
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greater than zero. The amount of RAM that scrypt requires for its computation
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is roughly (128 * N * r * p) bytes.
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In the original paper of Colin Percival ("Stronger Key Derivation via
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Sequential Memory-Hard Functions", 2009), the suggested values that give a
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computation time of less than 5 seconds on a 2.5 GHz Intel Core 2 Duo are N =
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2^20 = 1048576, r = 8, p = 1. Consequently, the required amount of memory for
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this computation is roughly 1 GiB. On a more recent CPU (Intel i7-5930K at 3.5
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GHz), this computation takes about 3 seconds. When N, r or p are not specified,
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they default to 1048576, 8, and 1, respectively. The maximum amount of RAM that
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may be used by scrypt defaults to 1025 MiB.
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=head2 Numeric identity
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B<EVP_KDF_SCRYPT> is the numeric identity for this implementation; it
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can be used with the EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id() function.
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=head2 Supported controls
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The supported controls are:
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=over 4
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=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS>
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=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT>
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These controls work as described in L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS>.
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=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N>
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=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R>
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=item B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P>
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B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N> expects one argument: C<uint64_t N>
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B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R> expects one argument: C<uint32_t r>
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B<EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P> expects one argument: C<uint32_t p>
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These controls configure the scrypt work factors N, r and p.
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EVP_KDF_ctrl_str() type strings: "N", "r" and "p", respectively.
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The corresponding value strings are expected to be decimal numbers.
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=back
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=head1 NOTES
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A context for scrypt can be obtained by calling:
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EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SCRYPT);
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The output length of an scrypt key derivation is specified via the
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B<keylen> parameter to the L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)> function.
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=head1 EXAMPLE
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This example derives a 64-byte long test vector using scrypt with the password
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"password", salt "NaCl" and N = 1024, r = 8, p = 16.
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EVP_KDF_CTX *kctx;
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unsigned char out[64];
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kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(EVP_KDF_SCRYPT);
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if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS, "password", (size_t)8) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS");
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}
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if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT, "NaCl", (size_t)4) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT");
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}
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if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, (uint64_t)1024) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N");
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}
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if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, (uint32_t)8) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R");
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}
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if (EVP_KDF_ctrl(kctx, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, (uint32_t)16) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P");
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}
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if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, out, sizeof(out)) <= 0) {
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error("EVP_KDF_derive");
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}
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{
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const unsigned char expected[sizeof(out)] = {
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0xfd, 0xba, 0xbe, 0x1c, 0x9d, 0x34, 0x72, 0x00,
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0x78, 0x56, 0xe7, 0x19, 0x0d, 0x01, 0xe9, 0xfe,
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0x7c, 0x6a, 0xd7, 0xcb, 0xc8, 0x23, 0x78, 0x30,
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0xe7, 0x73, 0x76, 0x63, 0x4b, 0x37, 0x31, 0x62,
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0x2e, 0xaf, 0x30, 0xd9, 0x2e, 0x22, 0xa3, 0x88,
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0x6f, 0xf1, 0x09, 0x27, 0x9d, 0x98, 0x30, 0xda,
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0xc7, 0x27, 0xaf, 0xb9, 0x4a, 0x83, 0xee, 0x6d,
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0x83, 0x60, 0xcb, 0xdf, 0xa2, 0xcc, 0x06, 0x40
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};
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assert(!memcmp(out, expected, sizeof(out)));
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}
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EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
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=head1 CONFORMING TO
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RFC 7914
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=head1 SEE ALSO
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L<EVP_KDF_CTX>,
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L<EVP_KDF_CTX_new_id(3)>,
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L<EVP_KDF_CTX_free(3)>,
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L<EVP_KDF_ctrl(3)>,
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L<EVP_KDF_derive(3)>,
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L<EVP_KDF_CTX(3)/CONTROLS>
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=head1 COPYRIGHT
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Copyright 2017-2018 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
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this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
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=cut
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