Latest update
This commit is contained in:
+359
-119
@@ -8,25 +8,34 @@
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*/
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#include <stdlib.h>
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#include <stdarg.h>
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#include <string.h>
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#include <openssl/hmac.h>
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
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#include <openssl/kdf.h>
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#include <openssl/err.h>
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#include "internal/numbers.h"
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#include "kdf_local.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SCRYPT
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static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
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static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl);
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static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result);
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static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
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const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
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uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
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unsigned char *key, size_t keylen);
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typedef struct {
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struct evp_kdf_impl_st {
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unsigned char *pass;
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size_t pass_len;
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unsigned char *salt;
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size_t salt_len;
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uint64_t N, r, p;
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uint64_t N;
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uint32_t r, p;
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uint64_t maxmem_bytes;
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} SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX;
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};
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/* Custom uint64_t parser since we do not have strtoull */
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static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
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@@ -53,51 +62,53 @@ static int atou64(const char *nptr, uint64_t *result)
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return 1;
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_init(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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static EVP_KDF_IMPL *kdf_scrypt_new(void)
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{
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SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx;
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EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl;
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kctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*kctx));
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if (kctx == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_INIT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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impl = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*impl));
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if (impl == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_NEW, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return NULL;
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}
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kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
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return impl;
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}
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static void kdf_scrypt_free(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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kdf_scrypt_reset(impl);
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OPENSSL_free(impl);
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}
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static void kdf_scrypt_reset(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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OPENSSL_free(impl->salt);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(impl->pass, impl->pass_len);
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memset(impl, 0, sizeof(*impl));
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kdf_scrypt_init(impl);
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}
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static void kdf_scrypt_init(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl)
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{
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/* Default values are the most conservative recommendation given in the
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* original paper of C. Percival. Derivation uses roughly 1 GiB of memory
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* for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * (N + p) bytes).
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* for this parameter choice (approx. 128 * r * N * p bytes).
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*/
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kctx->N = 1 << 20;
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kctx->r = 8;
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kctx->p = 1;
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kctx->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
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ctx->data = kctx;
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return 1;
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impl->N = 1 << 20;
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impl->r = 8;
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impl->p = 1;
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impl->maxmem_bytes = 1025 * 1024 * 1024;
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}
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static void pkey_scrypt_cleanup(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx)
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{
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SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->salt, kctx->salt_len);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(kctx->pass, kctx->pass_len);
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OPENSSL_free(kctx);
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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const unsigned char *new_buffer,
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const int new_buflen)
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static int scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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const unsigned char *new_buffer,
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size_t new_buflen)
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{
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if (new_buffer == NULL)
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return 1;
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if (new_buflen < 0)
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return 0;
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if (*buffer != NULL)
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OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
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OPENSSL_clear_free(*buffer, *buflen);
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if (new_buflen > 0) {
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*buffer = OPENSSL_memdup(new_buffer, new_buflen);
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@@ -105,7 +116,7 @@ static int pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(unsigned char **buffer, size_t *buflen,
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*buffer = OPENSSL_malloc(1);
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}
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if (*buffer == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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KDFerr(KDF_F_SCRYPT_SET_MEMBUF, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
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return 0;
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}
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@@ -118,149 +129,378 @@ static int is_power_of_two(uint64_t value)
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return (value != 0) && ((value & (value - 1)) == 0);
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type, int p1, void *p2)
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static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd, va_list args)
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{
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SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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uint64_t u64_value;
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uint32_t value;
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const unsigned char *p;
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size_t len;
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS:
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return pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(&kctx->pass, &kctx->pass_len, p2, p1);
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switch (cmd) {
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS:
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p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->pass, &impl->pass_len, p, len);
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT:
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return pkey_scrypt_set_membuf(&kctx->salt, &kctx->salt_len, p2, p1);
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT:
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p = va_arg(args, const unsigned char *);
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len = va_arg(args, size_t);
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return scrypt_set_membuf(&impl->salt, &impl->salt_len, p, len);
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_N:
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u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N:
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u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
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if ((u64_value <= 1) || !is_power_of_two(u64_value))
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return 0;
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kctx->N = u64_value;
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impl->N = u64_value;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_R:
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u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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if (u64_value < 1)
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R:
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value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
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if (value < 1)
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return 0;
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kctx->r = u64_value;
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impl->r = value;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_P:
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u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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if (u64_value < 1)
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P:
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value = va_arg(args, uint32_t);
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if (value < 1)
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return 0;
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kctx->p = u64_value;
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impl->p = value;
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return 1;
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case EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_MAXMEM_BYTES:
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u64_value = *((uint64_t *)p2);
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case EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES:
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u64_value = va_arg(args, uint64_t);
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if (u64_value < 1)
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return 0;
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kctx->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
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impl->maxmem_bytes = u64_value;
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return 1;
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default:
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return -2;
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}
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, int type,
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const char *value)
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static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
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const char *value)
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{
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uint64_t int_value;
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int int_value = atoi(value);
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if (!atou64(value, &int_value)) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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if (int_value < 0 || (uint64_t)int_value > UINT32_MAX) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT32, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return pkey_scrypt_ctrl(ctx, type, 0, &int_value);
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return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, (uint32_t)int_value);
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, const char *type,
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const char *value)
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static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, int cmd,
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const char *value)
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{
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uint64_t u64_value;
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if (!atou64(value, &u64_value)) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_UINT64, KDF_R_VALUE_ERROR);
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return 0;
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}
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return call_ctrl(kdf_scrypt_ctrl, impl, cmd, u64_value);
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}
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static int kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, const char *type,
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const char *value)
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{
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if (value == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_VALUE_MISSING);
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return 0;
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}
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if (strcmp(type, "pass") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS, value);
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return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
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value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexpass") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_PASS, value);
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return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_PASS,
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value);
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if (strcmp(type, "salt") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_str2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT, value);
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return kdf_str2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
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value);
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if (strcmp(type, "hexsalt") == 0)
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return EVP_PKEY_CTX_hex2ctrl(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_SALT, value);
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return kdf_hex2ctrl(impl, kdf_scrypt_ctrl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SALT,
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value);
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if (strcmp(type, "N") == 0)
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return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_N, value);
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return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_N, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "r") == 0)
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return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_R, value);
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return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_R, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "p") == 0)
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return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_P, value);
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return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint32(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_SCRYPT_P, value);
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if (strcmp(type, "maxmem_bytes") == 0)
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return pkey_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(ctx, EVP_PKEY_CTRL_SCRYPT_MAXMEM_BYTES,
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value);
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return kdf_scrypt_ctrl_uint64(impl, EVP_KDF_CTRL_SET_MAXMEM_BYTES,
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value);
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_CTRL_STR, KDF_R_UNKNOWN_PARAMETER_TYPE);
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return -2;
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}
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static int pkey_scrypt_derive(EVP_PKEY_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *key,
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size_t *keylen)
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static int kdf_scrypt_derive(EVP_KDF_IMPL *impl, unsigned char *key,
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size_t keylen)
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{
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SCRYPT_PKEY_CTX *kctx = ctx->data;
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if (kctx->pass == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
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if (impl->pass == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_PASS);
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return 0;
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}
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if (kctx->salt == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_PKEY_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
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if (impl->salt == NULL) {
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KDFerr(KDF_F_KDF_SCRYPT_DERIVE, KDF_R_MISSING_SALT);
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return 0;
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}
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return EVP_PBE_scrypt((char *)kctx->pass, kctx->pass_len, kctx->salt,
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kctx->salt_len, kctx->N, kctx->r, kctx->p,
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kctx->maxmem_bytes, key, *keylen);
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return scrypt_alg((char *)impl->pass, impl->pass_len, impl->salt,
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impl->salt_len, impl->N, impl->r, impl->p,
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impl->maxmem_bytes, key, keylen);
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}
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const EVP_PKEY_METHOD scrypt_pkey_meth = {
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EVP_PKEY_SCRYPT,
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0,
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pkey_scrypt_init,
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0,
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pkey_scrypt_cleanup,
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0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0,
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0,
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0,
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0,
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0, 0,
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0, 0, 0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0, 0,
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0,
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pkey_scrypt_derive,
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pkey_scrypt_ctrl,
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pkey_scrypt_ctrl_str
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const EVP_KDF_METHOD scrypt_kdf_meth = {
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EVP_KDF_SCRYPT,
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kdf_scrypt_new,
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kdf_scrypt_free,
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kdf_scrypt_reset,
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kdf_scrypt_ctrl,
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kdf_scrypt_ctrl_str,
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NULL,
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kdf_scrypt_derive
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};
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#define R(a,b) (((a) << (b)) | ((a) >> (32 - (b))))
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static void salsa208_word_specification(uint32_t inout[16])
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{
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int i;
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uint32_t x[16];
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memcpy(x, inout, sizeof(x));
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for (i = 8; i > 0; i -= 2) {
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x[4] ^= R(x[0] + x[12], 7);
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x[8] ^= R(x[4] + x[0], 9);
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x[12] ^= R(x[8] + x[4], 13);
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x[0] ^= R(x[12] + x[8], 18);
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x[9] ^= R(x[5] + x[1], 7);
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x[13] ^= R(x[9] + x[5], 9);
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x[1] ^= R(x[13] + x[9], 13);
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x[5] ^= R(x[1] + x[13], 18);
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x[14] ^= R(x[10] + x[6], 7);
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x[2] ^= R(x[14] + x[10], 9);
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x[6] ^= R(x[2] + x[14], 13);
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x[10] ^= R(x[6] + x[2], 18);
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x[3] ^= R(x[15] + x[11], 7);
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x[7] ^= R(x[3] + x[15], 9);
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x[11] ^= R(x[7] + x[3], 13);
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x[15] ^= R(x[11] + x[7], 18);
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x[1] ^= R(x[0] + x[3], 7);
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x[2] ^= R(x[1] + x[0], 9);
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x[3] ^= R(x[2] + x[1], 13);
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x[0] ^= R(x[3] + x[2], 18);
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x[6] ^= R(x[5] + x[4], 7);
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x[7] ^= R(x[6] + x[5], 9);
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x[4] ^= R(x[7] + x[6], 13);
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x[5] ^= R(x[4] + x[7], 18);
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x[11] ^= R(x[10] + x[9], 7);
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x[8] ^= R(x[11] + x[10], 9);
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x[9] ^= R(x[8] + x[11], 13);
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x[10] ^= R(x[9] + x[8], 18);
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x[12] ^= R(x[15] + x[14], 7);
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x[13] ^= R(x[12] + x[15], 9);
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x[14] ^= R(x[13] + x[12], 13);
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x[15] ^= R(x[14] + x[13], 18);
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}
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for (i = 0; i < 16; ++i)
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inout[i] += x[i];
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OPENSSL_cleanse(x, sizeof(x));
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}
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static void scryptBlockMix(uint32_t *B_, uint32_t *B, uint64_t r)
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{
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uint64_t i, j;
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uint32_t X[16], *pB;
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memcpy(X, B + (r * 2 - 1) * 16, sizeof(X));
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pB = B;
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < r * 2; i++) {
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < 16; j++)
|
||||
X[j] ^= *pB++;
|
||||
salsa208_word_specification(X);
|
||||
memcpy(B_ + (i / 2 + (i & 1) * r) * 16, X, sizeof(X));
|
||||
}
|
||||
OPENSSL_cleanse(X, sizeof(X));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
static void scryptROMix(unsigned char *B, uint64_t r, uint64_t N,
|
||||
uint32_t *X, uint32_t *T, uint32_t *V)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned char *pB;
|
||||
uint32_t *pV;
|
||||
uint64_t i, k;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Convert from little endian input */
|
||||
for (pV = V, i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++, pV++) {
|
||||
*pV = *pB++;
|
||||
*pV |= *pB++ << 8;
|
||||
*pV |= *pB++ << 16;
|
||||
*pV |= (uint32_t)*pB++ << 24;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 1; i < N; i++, pV += 32 * r)
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(pV, pV - 32 * r, r);
|
||||
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(X, V + (N - 1) * 32 * r, r);
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < N; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t j;
|
||||
j = X[16 * (2 * r - 1)] % N;
|
||||
pV = V + 32 * r * j;
|
||||
for (k = 0; k < 32 * r; k++)
|
||||
T[k] = X[k] ^ *pV++;
|
||||
scryptBlockMix(X, T, r);
|
||||
}
|
||||
/* Convert output to little endian */
|
||||
for (i = 0, pB = B; i < 32 * r; i++) {
|
||||
uint32_t xtmp = X[i];
|
||||
*pB++ = xtmp & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 8) & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 16) & 0xff;
|
||||
*pB++ = (xtmp >> 24) & 0xff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef SIZE_MAX
|
||||
# define SIZE_MAX ((size_t)-1)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Maximum power of two that will fit in uint64_t: this should work on
|
||||
* most (all?) platforms.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define LOG2_UINT64_MAX (sizeof(uint64_t) * 8 - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Maximum value of p * r:
|
||||
* p <= ((2^32-1) * hLen) / MFLen =>
|
||||
* p <= ((2^32-1) * 32) / (128 * r) =>
|
||||
* p * r <= (2^30-1)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
#define SCRYPT_PR_MAX ((1 << 30) - 1)
|
||||
|
||||
static int scrypt_alg(const char *pass, size_t passlen,
|
||||
const unsigned char *salt, size_t saltlen,
|
||||
uint64_t N, uint64_t r, uint64_t p, uint64_t maxmem,
|
||||
unsigned char *key, size_t keylen)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int rv = 0;
|
||||
unsigned char *B;
|
||||
uint32_t *X, *V, *T;
|
||||
uint64_t i, Blen, Vlen;
|
||||
|
||||
/* Sanity check parameters */
|
||||
/* initial check, r,p must be non zero, N >= 2 and a power of 2 */
|
||||
if (r == 0 || p == 0 || N < 2 || (N & (N - 1)))
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
/* Check p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX avoiding overflow */
|
||||
if (p > SCRYPT_PR_MAX / r) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Need to check N: if 2^(128 * r / 8) overflows limit this is
|
||||
* automatically satisfied since N <= UINT64_MAX.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
if (16 * r <= LOG2_UINT64_MAX) {
|
||||
if (N >= (((uint64_t)1) << (16 * r))) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Memory checks: check total allocated buffer size fits in uint64_t */
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* B size in section 5 step 1.S
|
||||
* Note: we know p * 128 * r < UINT64_MAX because we already checked
|
||||
* p * r < SCRYPT_PR_MAX
|
||||
*/
|
||||
Blen = p * 128 * r;
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Yet we pass it as integer to PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC... [This would
|
||||
* have to be revised when/if PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC accepts size_t.]
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (Blen > INT_MAX) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Check 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t) fits in uint64_t
|
||||
* This is combined size V, X and T (section 4)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
i = UINT64_MAX / (32 * sizeof(uint32_t));
|
||||
if (N + 2 > i / r) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
Vlen = 32 * r * (N + 2) * sizeof(uint32_t);
|
||||
|
||||
/* check total allocated size fits in uint64_t */
|
||||
if (Blen > UINT64_MAX - Vlen) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* Check that the maximum memory doesn't exceed a size_t limits */
|
||||
if (maxmem > SIZE_MAX)
|
||||
maxmem = SIZE_MAX;
|
||||
|
||||
if (Blen + Vlen > maxmem) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_MEMORY_LIMIT_EXCEEDED);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* If no key return to indicate parameters are OK */
|
||||
if (key == NULL)
|
||||
return 1;
|
||||
|
||||
B = OPENSSL_malloc((size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
||||
if (B == NULL) {
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
|
||||
return 0;
|
||||
}
|
||||
X = (uint32_t *)(B + Blen);
|
||||
T = X + 32 * r;
|
||||
V = T + 32 * r;
|
||||
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, salt, saltlen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
|
||||
(int)Blen, B) == 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < p; i++)
|
||||
scryptROMix(B + 128 * r * i, r, N, X, T, V);
|
||||
|
||||
if (PKCS5_PBKDF2_HMAC(pass, passlen, B, (int)Blen, 1, EVP_sha256(),
|
||||
keylen, key) == 0)
|
||||
goto err;
|
||||
rv = 1;
|
||||
err:
|
||||
if (rv == 0)
|
||||
EVPerr(EVP_F_SCRYPT_ALG, EVP_R_PBKDF2_ERROR);
|
||||
|
||||
OPENSSL_clear_free(B, (size_t)(Blen + Vlen));
|
||||
return rv;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user