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Hakase
2019-02-22 12:53:31 +09:00
parent 6523a76e2e
commit 25fbda8e8b
186 changed files with 9758 additions and 1640 deletions
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crypto/ec/ec2_smpl.c
+17 -1
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@@ -810,7 +810,7 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_ladder_post(const EC_GROUP *group,
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, t2, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t1, t2, t1)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t2, p->X, t0, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_mod_inv(t2, t2, group->field, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_inv(group, t2, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, t1, t1, t2, ctx)
|| !group->meth->field_mul(group, r->X, r->Z, t2, ctx)
|| !BN_GF2m_add(t2, p->X, r->X)
@@ -889,6 +889,21 @@ int ec_GF2m_simple_points_mul(const EC_GROUP *group, EC_POINT *r,
return ret;
}
/*-
* Computes the multiplicative inverse of a in GF(2^m), storing the result in r.
* If a is zero (or equivalent), you'll get a EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT error.
* SCA hardening is with blinding: BN_GF2m_mod_inv does that.
*/
static int ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv(const EC_GROUP *group, BIGNUM *r,
const BIGNUM *a, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
int ret;
if (!(ret = BN_GF2m_mod_inv(r, a, group->field, ctx)))
ECerr(EC_F_EC_GF2M_SIMPLE_FIELD_INV, EC_R_CANNOT_INVERT);
return ret;
}
const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
{
static const EC_METHOD ret = {
@@ -929,6 +944,7 @@ const EC_METHOD *EC_GF2m_simple_method(void)
ec_GF2m_simple_field_mul,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_sqr,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_div,
ec_GF2m_simple_field_inv,
0, /* field_encode */
0, /* field_decode */
0, /* field_set_to_one */