Latest update
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@@ -9,6 +9,26 @@
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Changes between 1.1.1 and 3.0.0 [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Added property based algorithm implementation selection framework to
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the core.
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[Paul Dale]
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*) Added SCA hardening for modular field inversion in EC_GROUP through
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a new dedicated field_inv() pointer in EC_METHOD.
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This also addresses a leakage affecting conversions from projective
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to affine coordinates.
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[Billy Bob Brumley, Nicola Tuveri]
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*) Added EVP_KDF, an EVP layer KDF API, to simplify adding KDF and PRF
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implementations. This includes an EVP_PKEY to EVP_KDF bridge for
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those algorithms that were already supported through the EVP_PKEY API
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(scrypt, TLS1 PRF and HKDF). The low-level KDF functions for PBKDF2
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and scrypt are now wrappers that call EVP_KDF.
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[David Makepeace]
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*) Build devcrypto engine as a dynamic engine.
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[Eneas U de Queiroz]
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*) Add keyed BLAKE2 to EVP_MAC.
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[Antoine Salon]
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@@ -109,6 +129,19 @@
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applications with zero-copy system calls such as sendfile and splice.
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[Boris Pismenny]
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Changes between 1.1.1a and 1.1.1b [xx XXX xxxx]
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*) Change the info callback signals for the start and end of a post-handshake
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message exchange in TLSv1.3. In 1.1.1/1.1.1a we used SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_START
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and SSL_CB_HANDSHAKE_DONE. Experience has shown that many applications get
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confused by this and assume that a TLSv1.2 renegotiation has started. This
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can break KeyUpdate handling. Instead we no longer signal the start and end
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of a post handshake message exchange (although the messages themselves are
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still signalled). This could break some applications that were expecting
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the old signals. However without this KeyUpdate is not usable for many
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applications.
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[Matt Caswell]
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Changes between 1.1.1 and 1.1.1a [20 Nov 2018]
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*) Timing vulnerability in DSA signature generation
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