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Hakase
2020-04-15 18:45:34 +09:00
parent be29e7bcc6
commit 2015c00c43
573 changed files with 22943 additions and 6714 deletions
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ssl/t1_lib.c
+47 -36
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@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include <openssl/dh.h>
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#include "internal/evp.h"
#include "ssl_local.h"
#include <openssl/ct.h>
@@ -583,7 +584,7 @@ static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
size_t i;
/* If not an EC key nothing to check */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return 1;
ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
@@ -624,13 +625,11 @@ static int tls1_check_pkey_comp(SSL *s, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
/* Return group id of a key */
static uint16_t tls1_get_group_id(EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
const EC_GROUP *grp;
int curve_nid = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
if (ec == NULL)
if (curve_nid == NID_undef)
return 0;
grp = EC_KEY_get0_group(ec);
return tls1_nid2group_id(EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(grp));
return tls1_nid2group_id(curve_nid);
}
/*
@@ -645,7 +644,7 @@ static int tls1_check_cert_param(SSL *s, X509 *x, int check_ee_md)
if (pkey == NULL)
return 0;
/* If not EC nothing to do */
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) != EVP_PKEY_EC)
if (!EVP_PKEY_is_a(pkey, "EC"))
return 1;
/* Check compression */
if (!tls1_check_pkey_comp(s, pkey))
@@ -1085,9 +1084,21 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
char sigalgstr[2];
size_t sent_sigslen, i, cidx;
int pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
int pkeyid = -1;
const SIGALG_LOOKUP *lu;
/*
* TODO(3.0) Remove this when we adapted this function for provider
* side keys. We know that EVP_PKEY_get0() downgrades an EVP_PKEY
* to contain a legacy key.
*
* THIS IS TEMPORARY
*/
EVP_PKEY_get0(pkey);
if (EVP_PKEY_id(pkey) == EVP_PKEY_NONE)
return 0;
pkeyid = EVP_PKEY_id(pkey);
/* Should never happen */
if (pkeyid == -1)
return -1;
@@ -1136,8 +1147,7 @@ int tls12_check_peer_sigalg(SSL *s, uint16_t sig, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
/* For TLS 1.3 or Suite B check curve matches signature algorithm */
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s) || tls1_suiteb(s)) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(pkey);
int curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
int curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(pkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve) {
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_ILLEGAL_PARAMETER,
@@ -1494,21 +1504,29 @@ SSL_TICKET_STATUS tls_decrypt_ticket(SSL *s, const unsigned char *etick,
if (rv == 2)
renew_ticket = 1;
} else {
EVP_CIPHER *aes256cbc = NULL;
/* Check key name matches */
if (memcmp(etick, tctx->ext.tick_key_name,
TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) != 0) {
ret = SSL_TICKET_NO_DECRYPT;
goto end;
}
if (ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
"SHA256") <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL,
aes256cbc = EVP_CIPHER_fetch(s->ctx->libctx, "AES-256-CBC",
s->ctx->propq);
if (aes256cbc == NULL
|| ssl_hmac_init(hctx, tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key,
sizeof(tctx->ext.secure->tick_hmac_key),
"SHA256") <= 0
|| EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, aes256cbc, NULL,
tctx->ext.secure->tick_aes_key,
etick + TLSEXT_KEYNAME_LENGTH) <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
ret = SSL_TICKET_FATAL_ERR_OTHER;
goto end;
}
EVP_CIPHER_free(aes256cbc);
if (SSL_IS_TLS13(s))
renew_ticket = 1;
}
@@ -2216,7 +2234,7 @@ static int tls1_check_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, int default_nid)
/* Check to see if a certificate issuer name matches list of CA names */
static int ssl_check_ca_name(STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *names, X509 *x)
{
X509_NAME *nm;
const X509_NAME *nm;
int i;
nm = X509_get_issuer_name(x);
for (i = 0; i < sk_X509_NAME_num(names); i++) {
@@ -2417,17 +2435,14 @@ int tls1_check_chain(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pk, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
if (!s->server && strict_mode) {
STACK_OF(X509_NAME) *ca_dn;
int check_type = 0;
switch (EVP_PKEY_id(pk)) {
case EVP_PKEY_RSA:
if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "RSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_RSA_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_DSA:
else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "DSA"))
check_type = TLS_CT_DSS_SIGN;
break;
case EVP_PKEY_EC:
else if (EVP_PKEY_is_a(pk, "EC"))
check_type = TLS_CT_ECDSA_SIGN;
break;
}
if (check_type) {
const uint8_t *ctypes = s->s3.tmp.ctype;
size_t j;
@@ -2788,10 +2803,8 @@ static const SIGALG_LOOKUP *find_sig_alg(SSL *s, X509 *x, EVP_PKEY *pkey)
if (lu->sig == EVP_PKEY_EC) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
if (curve == -1) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(tmppkey);
curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
}
if (curve == -1)
curve = evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(tmppkey);
if (lu->curve != NID_undef && curve != lu->curve)
continue;
#else
@@ -2850,15 +2863,13 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
size_t i;
if (s->s3.tmp.peer_sigalgs != NULL) {
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC
int curve;
int curve = -1;
/* For Suite B need to match signature algorithm to curve */
if (tls1_suiteb(s)) {
EC_KEY *ec = EVP_PKEY_get0_EC_KEY(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC].privatekey);
curve = EC_GROUP_get_curve_name(EC_KEY_get0_group(ec));
} else {
curve = -1;
}
if (tls1_suiteb(s))
curve =
evp_pkey_get_EC_KEY_curve_nid(s->cert->pkeys[SSL_PKEY_ECC]
.privatekey);
#endif
/*
@@ -2932,7 +2943,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
@@ -2957,7 +2968,7 @@ int tls_choose_sigalg(SSL *s, int fatalerrs)
if (!fatalerrs)
return 1;
SSLfatal(s, SSL_AD_INTERNAL_ERROR, SSL_F_TLS_CHOOSE_SIGALG,
ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR);
SSL_R_NO_SUITABLE_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
}