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Hakase
2020-04-15 18:45:34 +09:00
parent be29e7bcc6
commit 2015c00c43
573 changed files with 22943 additions and 6714 deletions
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crypto/cmp/cmp_vfy.c
+107 -67
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@@ -167,6 +167,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *trusted_store,
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_POTENTIALLY_INVALID_CERTIFICATE);
err:
/* directly output any fresh errors, needed for check_msg_find_cert() */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
X509_STORE_CTX_free(csc);
return valid;
}
@@ -250,17 +252,22 @@ static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
X509_STORE *ts = ctx->trusted;
char *sub, *iss;
int self_issued = X509_check_issued(cert, cert) == X509_V_OK;
char *str;
X509_VERIFY_PARAM *vpm = ts != NULL ? X509_STORE_get0_param(ts) : NULL;
int time_cmp;
ossl_cmp_log2(INFO, ctx, " considering %s %s with..", desc1, desc2);
if ((sub = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", sub);
if ((iss = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", iss);
OPENSSL_free(iss);
OPENSSL_free(sub);
ossl_cmp_log3(INFO, ctx, " considering %s%s %s with..",
self_issued ? "self-issued ": "", desc1, desc2);
if ((str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(cert), NULL, 0)) != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " subject = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
if (!self_issued) {
str = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_issuer_name(cert), NULL, 0);
if (str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, " issuer = %s", str);
OPENSSL_free(str);
}
if (already_checked(cert, already_checked1)
|| already_checked(cert, already_checked2)) {
@@ -284,7 +291,7 @@ static int cert_acceptable(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
if (!check_kid(ctx, cert, msg->header->senderKID))
return 0;
/* acceptable also if there is no senderKID in msg header */
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert is acceptable");
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, " cert seems acceptable");
return 1;
}
@@ -295,38 +302,49 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509_STORE *store,
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "msg signature verification failed");
return 0;
}
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt)) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx, "cert path validation failed");
return 0;
}
return 1;
if (OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt))
return 1;
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"msg signature validates but cert path validation failed");
return 0;
}
/*
* Exceptional handling for 3GPP TS 33.310 [3G/LTE Network Domain Security
* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP and if the ctx
* option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates from extraCerts as
* trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* (NDS); Authentication Framework (AF)], only to use for IP messages
* and if the ctx option is explicitly set: use self-issued certificates
* from extraCerts as trust anchor to validate sender cert and msg -
* provided it also can validate the newly enrolled certificate
*/
static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
int valid = 0;
X509_STORE *store = X509_STORE_new();
X509_STORE *store;
if (store != NULL /* store does not include CRLs */
&& ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
1 /* self-issued only */))
valid = check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, store, scrt, msg);
if (valid) {
if (!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR)
return 0;
if ((store = X509_STORE_new()) == NULL
|| !ossl_cmp_X509_STORE_add1_certs(store, msg->extraCerts,
1 /* self-issued only */))
goto err;
/* store does not include CRLs */
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, scrt);
if (!valid) {
ossl_cmp_warn(ctx,
"also exceptional 3GPP mode cert path validation failed");
} else {
/*
* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which is assumed to have
* rid == 0) can also be validated with the same trusted store
* verify that the newly enrolled certificate (which assumed rid ==
* OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID) can also be validated with the same trusted store
*/
EVP_PKEY *privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep =
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip, 0);
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(msg->body->value.ip,
OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID);
X509 *newcrt = ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(privkey, crep);
/*
* maybe better use get_cert_status() from cmp_client.c, which catches
@@ -335,6 +353,8 @@ static int check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *scrt,
valid = OSSL_CMP_validate_cert_path(ctx, store, newcrt);
X509_free(newcrt);
}
err:
X509_STORE_free(store);
return valid;
}
@@ -393,8 +413,13 @@ static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
{
int ret = 0;
if (mode_3gpp
&& ((!ctx->permitTAInExtraCertsForIR
|| ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg) != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP)))
return 0;
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
mode_3gpp ? "failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
mode_3gpp ? "normal mode failed; trying now 3GPP mode trusting extraCerts"
: "trying first normal mode using trust store");
if (check_msg_with_certs(ctx, msg->extraCerts, "extraCerts",
NULL, NULL, msg, mode_3gpp))
@@ -418,6 +443,12 @@ static int check_msg_all_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
return ret;
}
static int no_log_cb(const char *func, const char *file, int line,
OSSL_CMP_severity level, const char *msg)
{
return 1;
}
/* verify message signature with any acceptable and valid candidate cert */
static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
@@ -426,7 +457,7 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
char *sname = NULL;
char *skid_str = NULL;
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *skid = msg->header->senderKID;
OSSL_cmp_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
OSSL_CMP_log_cb_t backup_log_cb = ctx->log_cb;
int res = 0;
if (sender == NULL || msg->body == NULL)
@@ -436,49 +467,52 @@ static int check_msg_find_cert(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
return 0;
}
/* dump any hitherto errors to avoid confusion when printing further ones */
OSSL_CMP_CTX_print_errors(ctx);
/*
* try first cached scrt, used successfully earlier in same transaction,
* for validating this and any further msgs where extraCerts may be left out
*/
(void)ERR_set_mark();
if (scrt != NULL
&& cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
if (scrt != NULL) {
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ossl_cmp_info(ctx,
"trying to verify msg signature with previously validated cert");
if (cert_acceptable(ctx, "previously validated", "sender cert", scrt,
NULL, NULL, msg)
&& (check_msg_valid_cert(ctx, ctx->trusted, scrt, msg)
|| check_msg_valid_cert_3gpp(ctx, scrt, msg))) {
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
return 1;
/* cached sender cert has shown to be no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
}
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
/* release any cached sender cert that proved no more successfully usable */
(void)ossl_cmp_ctx_set0_validatedSrvCert(ctx, NULL);
/* enable clearing irrelevant errors in attempts to validate sender certs */
(void)ERR_set_mark();
ctx->log_cb = NULL; /* temporarily disable logging diagnostic info */
if (check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */)) {
/* discard any diagnostic info on trying to use certs */
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
ctx->log_cb = no_log_cb; /* temporarily disable logging */
res = check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 0 /* using ctx->trusted */)
|| check_msg_all_certs(ctx, msg, 1 /* 3gpp */);
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb;
if (res) {
/* discard any diagnostic information on trying to use certs */
(void)ERR_pop_to_mark();
res = 1;
goto end;
}
/* failed finding a sender cert that verifies the message signature */
ctx->log_cb = backup_log_cb; /* restore any logging */
(void)ERR_clear_last_mark();
sname = X509_NAME_oneline(sender->d.directoryName, NULL, 0);
skid_str = skid == NULL ? NULL
: OPENSSL_buf2hexstr(skid->data, skid->length);
if (ctx->log_cb != NULL) {
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "verifying msg signature with valid cert that..");
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "trying to verify msg signature with a valid cert that..");
if (sname != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender name = %s", sname);
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg sender = %s", sname);
if (skid_str != NULL)
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
ossl_cmp_log1(INFO, ctx, "matches msg senderKID = %s", skid_str);
else
ossl_cmp_info(ctx, "while msg header does not contain senderKID");
/* re-do the above checks (just) for adding diagnostic information */
@@ -543,6 +577,11 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
switch (nid) {
/* 5.1.3.1. Shared Secret Information */
case NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC:
if (ctx->secretValue == 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CHECKING_PBM_NO_SECRET_AVAILABLE);
break;
}
if (verify_PBMAC(msg, ctx->secretValue)) {
/*
* RFC 4210, 5.3.2: 'Note that if the PKI Message Protection is
@@ -633,8 +672,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
*
* Ensures that:
* it has a valid body type
* its protection is valid or absent (allowed only if callback function is
* present and function yields non-zero result using also supplied argument)
* its protection is valid (or invalid/absent, but only if a callback function
* is present and yields a positive result using also the supplied argument)
* its transaction ID matches the previous transaction ID stored in ctx (if any)
* its recipNonce matches the previous senderNonce stored in the ctx (if any)
*
@@ -660,35 +699,29 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
if (msg->header->protectionAlg != 0) {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for invalid protection */
if (!OSSL_CMP_validate_msg(ctx, msg)
&& (cb == NULL || !(*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg))) {
&& (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 1, cb_arg) <= 0)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_VALIDATING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
}
} else {
/* detect explicitly permitted exceptions for missing protection */
if (cb == NULL || !(*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg)) {
if (cb == NULL || (*cb)(ctx, msg, 0, cb_arg) <= 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PROTECTION);
return -1;
}
}
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return -1;
/* check CMP version number in header */
if (ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(msg)) != OSSL_CMP_PVNO) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PVNO);
return -1;
}
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
return -1;
}
/* compare received transactionID with the expected one in previous msg */
if (ctx->transactionID != NULL
&& (msg->header->transactionID == NULL
@@ -720,10 +753,17 @@ int ossl_cmp_msg_check_received(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_transactionID(ctx, msg->header->transactionID))
return -1;
if ((rcvd_type = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg)) < 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKIBODY_ERROR);
/*
* Store any provided extraCerts in ctx for future use,
* such that they are available to ctx->certConf_cb and
* the peer does not need to send them again in the same transaction.
* For efficiency, the extraCerts are prepended so they get used first.
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, msg->extraCerts,
0 /* this allows self-issued certs */,
1 /* no_dups */, 1 /* prepend */))
return -1;
}
return rcvd_type;
}