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Hakase
2020-01-17 19:45:12 +09:00
parent 016df9f433
commit 0f7abb4eb6
1100 changed files with 47785 additions and 16292 deletions
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crypto/LPdir_unix.c
+2 -3
View File
@@ -131,9 +131,8 @@ const char *LP_find_file(LP_DIR_CTX **ctx, const char *directory)
return 0;
}
strncpy((*ctx)->entry_name, direntry->d_name,
sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1);
(*ctx)->entry_name[sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name) - 1] = '\0';
OPENSSL_strlcpy((*ctx)->entry_name, direntry->d_name,
sizeof((*ctx)->entry_name));
#ifdef __VMS
if ((*ctx)->expect_file_generations) {
char *p = (*ctx)->entry_name + strlen((*ctx)->entry_name);
crypto/aes/aes_cbc.c
+7
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,13 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* AES low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use where we're using them to implement the higher level EVP interface, as is
* the case here.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/aes/aes_cfb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* AES_encrypt is deprecated - but we need to use it to implement these other
* deprecated APIs.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/aes/aes_core.c
+7
View File
@@ -36,6 +36,13 @@
/* Note: rewritten a little bit to provide error control and an OpenSSL-
compatible API */
/*
* AES low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use where we're using them to implement the higher level EVP interface, as is
* the case here.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
crypto/aes/aes_ecb.c
+6
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@@ -9,6 +9,12 @@
#include <assert.h>
/*
* AES_encrypt/AES_decrypt are deprecated - but we need to use them to implement
* AES_ecb_encrypt
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "aes_local.h"
crypto/aes/aes_ige.c
+7 -1
View File
@@ -7,9 +7,15 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* AES_encrypt/AES_decrypt are deprecated - but we need to use them to implement
* these functions
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#if OPENSSL_API_3
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
crypto/aes/aes_misc.c
+5 -3
View File
@@ -11,11 +11,13 @@
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include "aes_local.h"
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
const char *AES_options(void)
{
#ifdef FULL_UNROLL
# ifdef FULL_UNROLL
return "aes(full)";
#else
# else
return "aes(partial)";
#endif
# endif
}
#endif
crypto/aes/aes_ofb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* AES_encrypt is deprecated - but we need to use it to implement
* AES_ofb128_encrypt
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/aes/aes_wrap.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* AES_encrypt/AES_decrypt are deprecated - but we need to use them to implement
* these functions
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/aes/asm/aes-x86_64.pl
+4
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@@ -328,6 +328,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _x86_64_AES_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_AES_encrypt:
.cfi_startproc
xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key
xor 4($key),$s1
xor 8($key),$s2
@@ -363,6 +364,7 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_AES_encrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_encrypt
___
@@ -912,6 +914,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type _x86_64_AES_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_AES_decrypt:
.cfi_startproc
xor 0($key),$s0 # xor with key
xor 4($key),$s1
xor 8($key),$s2
@@ -954,6 +957,7 @@ ___
}
$code.=<<___;
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_AES_decrypt,.-_x86_64_AES_decrypt
___
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-mb-x86_64.pl
+1 -1
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@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha1-x86_64.pl
+7 -1
View File
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ $avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /nasm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /nasm/) &&
$avx=1 if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
`ml64 2>&1` =~ /Version ([0-9]+)\./ &&
$1>=10);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$avx=1 if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ && $2>=3.0);
$shaext=1; ### set to zero if compiling for 1.0.1
@@ -135,6 +135,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
aesni_cbc_sha1_enc:
.cfi_startproc
# caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11
@@ -153,6 +154,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
jmp aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_ssse3
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc
___
@@ -842,6 +844,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec:
.cfi_startproc
# caller should check for SSSE3 and AES-NI bits
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+0(%rip),%r10d
mov OPENSSL_ia32cap_P+4(%rip),%r11d
@@ -856,6 +859,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
jmp aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec,.-aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec
.type aesni256_cbc_sha1_dec_ssse3,\@function,6
@@ -1762,6 +1766,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,\@function,6
.align 32
aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext:
.cfi_startproc
mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
@@ -1913,6 +1918,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext,.-aesni_cbc_sha1_enc_shaext
___
}}}
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-sha256-x86_64.pl
+47 -15
View File
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=12);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ $code=<<___;
.type $func,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
$func:
.cfi_startproc
___
if ($avx) {
$code.=<<___;
@@ -164,6 +165,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ud2
.Lprobe:
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size $func,.-$func
.align 64
@@ -1086,7 +1088,23 @@ $code.=<<___;
vmovdqa $t0,0x00(%rsp)
xor $a1,$a1
vmovdqa $t1,0x20(%rsp)
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
# temporarily use %rsi as frame pointer
mov $_rsp,%rsi
.cfi_def_cfa %rsi,8
___
$code.=<<___;
lea -$PUSH8(%rsp),%rsp
___
$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
# the frame info is at $_rsp, but the stack is moving...
# so a second frame pointer is saved at -8(%rsp)
# that is in the red zone
mov %rsi,-8(%rsp)
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp-8,deref,+8
___
$code.=<<___;
mov $B,$a3
vmovdqa $t2,0x00(%rsp)
xor $C,$a3 # magic
@@ -1108,7 +1126,17 @@ my @X = @_;
my @insns = (&$body,&$body,&$body,&$body); # 96 instructions
my $base = "+2*$PUSH8(%rsp)";
&lea ("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)") if (($j%2)==0);
if (($j%2)==0) {
&lea ("%rsp","-$PUSH8(%rsp)");
$code.=<<___ if (!$win64);
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp+`$PUSH8-8`,deref,+8
# copy secondary frame pointer to new location again at -8(%rsp)
pushq $PUSH8-8(%rsp)
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp,deref,+8
lea 8(%rsp),%rsp
.cfi_cfa_expression %rsp-8,deref,+8
___
}
foreach (Xupdate_256_AVX()) { # 29 instructions
eval;
eval(shift(@insns));
@@ -1234,26 +1262,28 @@ $code.=<<___;
jbe .Loop_avx2
lea (%rsp),$Tbl
# temporarily use $Tbl as index to $_rsp
# this avoids the need to save a secondary frame pointer at -8(%rsp)
.cfi_cfa_expression $Tbl+`16*$SZ+7*8`,deref,+8
.Ldone_avx2:
lea ($Tbl),%rsp
mov $_ivp,$ivp
mov $_rsp,%rsi
mov 16*$SZ+4*8($Tbl),$ivp
mov 16*$SZ+7*8($Tbl),%rsi
.cfi_def_cfa %rsi,8
vmovdqu $iv,($ivp) # output IV
vzeroall
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
movaps `$framesz+16*0`(%rsp),%xmm6
movaps `$framesz+16*1`(%rsp),%xmm7
movaps `$framesz+16*2`(%rsp),%xmm8
movaps `$framesz+16*3`(%rsp),%xmm9
movaps `$framesz+16*4`(%rsp),%xmm10
movaps `$framesz+16*5`(%rsp),%xmm11
movaps `$framesz+16*6`(%rsp),%xmm12
movaps `$framesz+16*7`(%rsp),%xmm13
movaps `$framesz+16*8`(%rsp),%xmm14
movaps `$framesz+16*9`(%rsp),%xmm15
movaps `$framesz+16*0`($Tbl),%xmm6
movaps `$framesz+16*1`($Tbl),%xmm7
movaps `$framesz+16*2`($Tbl),%xmm8
movaps `$framesz+16*3`($Tbl),%xmm9
movaps `$framesz+16*4`($Tbl),%xmm10
movaps `$framesz+16*5`($Tbl),%xmm11
movaps `$framesz+16*6`($Tbl),%xmm12
movaps `$framesz+16*7`($Tbl),%xmm13
movaps `$framesz+16*8`($Tbl),%xmm14
movaps `$framesz+16*9`($Tbl),%xmm15
___
$code.=<<___;
mov -48(%rsi),%r15
@@ -1341,6 +1371,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type ${func}_shaext,\@function,6
.align 32
${func}_shaext:
.cfi_startproc
mov `($win64?56:8)`(%rsp),$inp # load 7th argument
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
@@ -1557,6 +1588,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size ${func}_shaext,.-${func}_shaext
___
}
crypto/aes/asm/aesni-x86_64.pl
+18 -2
View File
@@ -59,7 +59,7 @@
# nothing one can do and the result appears optimal. CCM result is
# identical to CBC, because CBC-MAC is essentially CBC encrypt without
# saving output. CCM CTR "stays invisible," because it's neatly
# interleaved wih CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
# interleaved with CBC-MAC. This provides ~30% improvement over
# "straightforward" CCM implementation with CTR and CBC-MAC performed
# disjointly. Parallelizable modes practically achieve the theoretical
# limit.
@@ -986,6 +986,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,\@function,6
.align 16
aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks:
.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -1068,6 +1069,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_encrypt_blocks
___
######################################################################
@@ -1076,6 +1078,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,\@function,6
.align 16
aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks:
.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
lea -0x58(%rsp),%rsp
@@ -1175,6 +1178,7 @@ $code.=<<___ if ($win64);
___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks,.-aesni_ccm64_decrypt_blocks
___
}
@@ -3033,6 +3037,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ocb_encrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_encrypt6:
.cfi_startproc
pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0]
movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2]
@@ -3130,11 +3135,13 @@ __ocb_encrypt6:
aesenclast @offset[4],$inout4
aesenclast @offset[5],$inout5
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_encrypt6,.-__ocb_encrypt6
.type __ocb_encrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_encrypt4:
.cfi_startproc
pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0]
movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2]
@@ -3199,11 +3206,13 @@ __ocb_encrypt4:
aesenclast @offset[2],$inout2
aesenclast @offset[3],$inout3
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_encrypt4,.-__ocb_encrypt4
.type __ocb_encrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_encrypt1:
.cfi_startproc
pxor @offset[5],$inout5 # offset_i
pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[0]
pxor $inout0,$checksum # accumulate checksum
@@ -3234,6 +3243,7 @@ __ocb_encrypt1:
aesenclast $inout5,$inout0
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_encrypt1,.-__ocb_encrypt1
.globl aesni_ocb_decrypt
@@ -3515,6 +3525,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __ocb_decrypt6,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_decrypt6:
.cfi_startproc
pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0]
movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2]
@@ -3606,11 +3617,13 @@ __ocb_decrypt6:
aesdeclast @offset[4],$inout4
aesdeclast @offset[5],$inout5
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_decrypt6,.-__ocb_decrypt6
.type __ocb_decrypt4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_decrypt4:
.cfi_startproc
pxor $rndkey0l,@offset[5] # offset_i ^ round[0]
movdqu ($L_p,$i1),@offset[1]
movdqa @offset[0],@offset[2]
@@ -3671,11 +3684,13 @@ __ocb_decrypt4:
aesdeclast @offset[2],$inout2
aesdeclast @offset[3],$inout3
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_decrypt4,.-__ocb_decrypt4
.type __ocb_decrypt1,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__ocb_decrypt1:
.cfi_startproc
pxor @offset[5],$inout5 # offset_i
pxor $rndkey0l,$inout5 # offset_i ^ round[0]
pxor $inout5,$inout0 # input ^ round[0] ^ offset_i
@@ -3705,6 +3720,7 @@ __ocb_decrypt1:
aesdeclast $inout5,$inout0
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __ocb_decrypt1,.-__ocb_decrypt1
___
} }}
@@ -4639,7 +4655,6 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
add \$8,%rsp
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset -8
ret
.cfi_endproc
.LSEH_end_set_encrypt_key:
.align 16
@@ -4710,6 +4725,7 @@ __aesni_set_encrypt_key:
shufps \$0b10101010,%xmm1,%xmm1 # critical path
xorps %xmm1,%xmm2
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size ${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key,.-${PREFIX}_set_encrypt_key
.size __aesni_set_encrypt_key,.-__aesni_set_encrypt_key
___
crypto/aes/asm/aesv8-armx.pl
+830
View File
@@ -384,6 +384,836 @@ ___
&gen_block("en");
&gen_block("de");
}}}
# Performance in cycles per byte.
# Processed with AES-ECB different key size.
# It shows the value before and after optimization as below:
# (before/after):
#
# AES-128-ECB AES-192-ECB AES-256-ECB
# Cortex-A57 1.85/0.82 2.16/0.96 2.47/1.10
# Cortex-A72 1.64/0.85 1.82/0.99 2.13/1.14
# Optimization is implemented by loop unrolling and interleaving.
# Commonly, we choose the unrolling factor as 5, if the input
# data size smaller than 5 blocks, but not smaller than 3 blocks,
# choose 3 as the unrolling factor.
# If the input data size dsize >= 5*16 bytes, then take 5 blocks
# as one iteration, every loop the left size lsize -= 5*16.
# If 5*16 > lsize >= 3*16 bytes, take 3 blocks as one iteration,
# every loop lsize -=3*16.
# If lsize < 3*16 bytes, treat them as the tail, interleave the
# two blocks AES instructions.
# There is one special case, if the original input data size dsize
# = 16 bytes, we will treat it seperately to improve the
# performance: one independent code block without LR, FP load and
# store, just looks like what the original ECB implementation does.
{{{
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key)=map("x$_",(0..3));
my ($enc,$rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step)=("w4","w5","w6","x7","x8");
my ($dat0,$dat1,$in0,$in1,$tmp0,$tmp1,$tmp2,$rndlast)=map("q$_",(0..7));
my ($dat,$tmp,$rndzero_n_last)=($dat0,$tmp0,$tmp1);
### q7 last round key
### q10-q15 q7 Last 7 round keys
### q8-q9 preloaded round keys except last 7 keys for big size
### q5, q6, q8-q9 preloaded round keys except last 7 keys for only 16 byte
{
my ($dat2,$in2,$tmp2)=map("q$_",(10,11,9));
my ($dat3,$in3,$tmp3); # used only in 64-bit mode
my ($dat4,$in4,$tmp4);
if ($flavour =~ /64/) {
($dat2,$dat3,$dat4,$in2,$in3,$in4,$tmp3,$tmp4)=map("q$_",(16..23));
}
$code.=<<___;
.globl ${prefix}_ecb_encrypt
.type ${prefix}_ecb_encrypt,%function
.align 5
${prefix}_ecb_encrypt:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
subs $len,$len,#16
// Original input data size bigger than 16, jump to big size processing.
b.ne .Lecb_big_size
vld1.8 {$dat0},[$inp]
cmp $enc,#0 // en- or decrypting?
ldr $rounds,[$key,#240]
vld1.32 {q5-q6},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
b.eq .Lecb_small_dec
aese $dat0,q5
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aese $dat0,q6
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
subs $rounds,$rounds,#10 // if rounds==10, jump to aes-128-ecb processing
b.eq .Lecb_128_enc
.Lecb_round_loop:
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key],#16 // load key schedule...
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q9},[$key],#16 // load key schedule...
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2 // bias
b.gt .Lecb_round_loop
.Lecb_128_enc:
vld1.32 {q10-q11},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aese $dat0,q10
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat0,q11
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aese $dat0,q12
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat0,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key]
aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat0,q15
veor $dat0,$dat0,$rndlast
vst1.8 {$dat0},[$out]
b .Lecb_Final_abort
.Lecb_small_dec:
aesd $dat0,q5
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aesd $dat0,q6
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
subs $rounds,$rounds,#10 // bias
b.eq .Lecb_128_dec
.Lecb_dec_round_loop:
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q8},[$key],#16 // load key schedule...
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q9},[$key],#16 // load key schedule...
subs $rounds,$rounds,#2 // bias
b.gt .Lecb_dec_round_loop
.Lecb_128_dec:
vld1.32 {q10-q11},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aesd $dat0,q10
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat0,q11
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key],#32 // load key schedule...
aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key]
aesd $dat0,q14
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat0,q15
veor $dat0,$dat0,$rndlast
vst1.8 {$dat0},[$out]
b .Lecb_Final_abort
.Lecb_big_size:
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
stp x29,x30,[sp,#-16]!
add x29,sp,#0
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
mov ip,sp
stmdb sp!,{r4-r8,lr}
vstmdb sp!,{d8-d15} @ ABI specification says so
ldmia ip,{r4-r5} @ load remaining args
subs $len,$len,#16
___
$code.=<<___;
mov $step,#16
b.lo .Lecb_done
cclr $step,eq
cmp $enc,#0 // en- or decrypting?
ldr $rounds,[$key,#240]
and $len,$len,#-16
vld1.8 {$dat},[$inp],$step
vld1.32 {q8-q9},[$key] // load key schedule...
sub $rounds,$rounds,#6
add $key_,$key,x5,lsl#4 // pointer to last 7 round keys
sub $rounds,$rounds,#2
vld1.32 {q10-q11},[$key_],#32
vld1.32 {q12-q13},[$key_],#32
vld1.32 {q14-q15},[$key_],#32
vld1.32 {$rndlast},[$key_]
add $key_,$key,#32
mov $cnt,$rounds
b.eq .Lecb_dec
vld1.8 {$dat1},[$inp],#16
subs $len,$len,#32 // bias
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
vorr $in1,$dat1,$dat1
vorr $dat2,$dat1,$dat1
vorr $dat1,$dat,$dat
b.lo .Lecb_enc_tail
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
cmp $len,#32
b.lo .Loop3x_ecb_enc
vld1.8 {$dat3},[$inp],#16
vld1.8 {$dat4},[$inp],#16
sub $len,$len,#32 // bias
mov $cnt,$rounds
.Loop5x_ecb_enc:
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q8
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q8
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q9
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q9
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop5x_ecb_enc
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q8
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q8
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
cmp $len,#0x40 // because .Lecb_enc_tail4x
sub $len,$len,#0x50
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q9
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q9
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
csel x6,xzr,$len,gt // borrow x6, $cnt, "gt" is not typo
mov $key_,$key
aese $dat0,q10
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q10
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q10
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q10
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q10
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat4
// are loaded with last "words"
add x6,$len,#0x60 // because .Lecb_enc_tail4x
aese $dat0,q11
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q11
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q11
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q11
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q11
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
aese $dat0,q12
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q12
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q12
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q12
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
aese $dat0,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q13
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q13
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q13
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q14
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat3,q14
aesmc $dat3,$dat3
aese $dat4,q14
aesmc $dat4,$dat4
aese $dat0,q15
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aese $dat1,q15
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aese $dat2,q15
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aese $dat3,q15
vld1.8 {$in3},[$inp],#16
aese $dat4,q15
vld1.8 {$in4},[$inp],#16
cbz x6,.Lecb_enc_tail4x
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
veor $tmp0,$rndlast,$dat0
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
veor $tmp3,$rndlast,$dat3
vorr $dat3,$in3,$in3
veor $tmp4,$rndlast,$dat4
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat4,$in4,$in4
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
mov $cnt,$rounds
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$tmp3},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp4},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop5x_ecb_enc
add $len,$len,#0x50
cbz $len,.Lecb_done
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
subs $len,$len,#0x30
vorr $dat0,$in2,$in2
vorr $dat1,$in3,$in3
vorr $dat2,$in4,$in4
b.lo .Lecb_enc_tail
b .Loop3x_ecb_enc
.align 4
.Lecb_enc_tail4x:
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
veor $tmp3,$rndlast,$dat3
veor $tmp4,$rndlast,$dat4
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp3},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp4},[$out],#16
b .Lecb_done
.align 4
___
$code.=<<___;
.Loop3x_ecb_enc:
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_ecb_enc
aese $dat0,q8
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
subs $len,$len,#0x30
mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
aese $dat0,q9
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
// are loaded with last "words"
mov $key_,$key
aese $dat0,q12
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q12
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aese $dat0,q13
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q13
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aese $dat0,q14
aesmc $dat0,$dat0
aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q14
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aese $dat0,q15
aese $dat1,q15
aese $dat2,q15
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
veor $tmp0,$rndlast,$dat0
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $dat2,$dat2,$rndlast
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
b.hs .Loop3x_ecb_enc
cmn $len,#0x30
b.eq .Lecb_done
nop
.Lecb_enc_tail:
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lecb_enc_tail
aese $dat1,q8
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q8
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat1,q9
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q9
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat1,q12
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q12
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
cmn $len,#0x20
aese $dat1,q13
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q13
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat1,q14
aesmc $dat1,$dat1
aese $dat2,q14
aesmc $dat2,$dat2
aese $dat1,q15
aese $dat2,q15
b.eq .Lecb_enc_one
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
b .Lecb_done
.Lecb_enc_one:
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat2
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
b .Lecb_done
___
$code.=<<___;
.align 5
.Lecb_dec:
vld1.8 {$dat1},[$inp],#16
subs $len,$len,#32 // bias
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
vorr $in1,$dat1,$dat1
vorr $dat2,$dat1,$dat1
vorr $dat1,$dat,$dat
b.lo .Lecb_dec_tail
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vld1.8 {$dat2},[$inp],#16
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
cmp $len,#32
b.lo .Loop3x_ecb_dec
vld1.8 {$dat3},[$inp],#16
vld1.8 {$dat4},[$inp],#16
sub $len,$len,#32 // bias
mov $cnt,$rounds
.Loop5x_ecb_dec:
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q8
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q8
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q9
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q9
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop5x_ecb_dec
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q8
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q8
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
cmp $len,#0x40 // because .Lecb_tail4x
sub $len,$len,#0x50
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q9
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q9
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
csel x6,xzr,$len,gt // borrow x6, $cnt, "gt" is not typo
mov $key_,$key
aesd $dat0,q10
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q10
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q10
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q10
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q10
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat4
// are loaded with last "words"
add x6,$len,#0x60 // because .Lecb_tail4x
aesd $dat0,q11
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q11
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q11
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q11
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q11
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q12
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q12
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q13
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q13
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
aesd $dat0,q14
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat3,q14
aesimc $dat3,$dat3
aesd $dat4,q14
aesimc $dat4,$dat4
aesd $dat0,q15
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat1,q15
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat2,q15
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat3,q15
vld1.8 {$in3},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat4,q15
vld1.8 {$in4},[$inp],#16
cbz x6,.Lecb_tail4x
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
veor $tmp0,$rndlast,$dat0
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
veor $tmp3,$rndlast,$dat3
vorr $dat3,$in3,$in3
veor $tmp4,$rndlast,$dat4
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat4,$in4,$in4
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
mov $cnt,$rounds
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$tmp3},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp4},[$out],#16
b.hs .Loop5x_ecb_dec
add $len,$len,#0x50
cbz $len,.Lecb_done
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
subs $len,$len,#0x30
vorr $dat0,$in2,$in2
vorr $dat1,$in3,$in3
vorr $dat2,$in4,$in4
b.lo .Lecb_dec_tail
b .Loop3x_ecb_dec
.align 4
.Lecb_tail4x:
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
veor $tmp3,$rndlast,$dat3
veor $tmp4,$rndlast,$dat4
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp3},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp4},[$out],#16
b .Lecb_done
.align 4
___
$code.=<<___;
.Loop3x_ecb_dec:
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Loop3x_ecb_dec
aesd $dat0,q8
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
subs $len,$len,#0x30
mov.lo x6,$len // x6, $cnt, is zero at this point
aesd $dat0,q9
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
add $inp,$inp,x6 // $inp is adjusted in such way that
// at exit from the loop $dat1-$dat2
// are loaded with last "words"
mov $key_,$key
aesd $dat0,q12
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in0},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q13
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in1},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q14
aesimc $dat0,$dat0
aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.8 {$in2},[$inp],#16
aesd $dat0,q15
aesd $dat1,q15
aesd $dat2,q15
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[0]
add $cnt,$rounds,#2
veor $tmp0,$rndlast,$dat0
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $dat2,$dat2,$rndlast
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16 // re-pre-load rndkey[1]
vst1.8 {$tmp0},[$out],#16
vorr $dat0,$in0,$in0
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vorr $dat1,$in1,$in1
vst1.8 {$dat2},[$out],#16
vorr $dat2,$in2,$in2
b.hs .Loop3x_ecb_dec
cmn $len,#0x30
b.eq .Lecb_done
nop
.Lecb_dec_tail:
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q8},[$key_],#16
subs $cnt,$cnt,#2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
vld1.32 {q9},[$key_],#16
b.gt .Lecb_dec_tail
aesd $dat1,q8
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q8
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q9
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q9
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q12
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q12
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
cmn $len,#0x20
aesd $dat1,q13
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q13
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q14
aesimc $dat1,$dat1
aesd $dat2,q14
aesimc $dat2,$dat2
aesd $dat1,q15
aesd $dat2,q15
b.eq .Lecb_dec_one
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat1
veor $tmp2,$rndlast,$dat2
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
vst1.8 {$tmp2},[$out],#16
b .Lecb_done
.Lecb_dec_one:
veor $tmp1,$rndlast,$dat2
vst1.8 {$tmp1},[$out],#16
.Lecb_done:
___
}
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour !~ /64/);
vldmia sp!,{d8-d15}
ldmia sp!,{r4-r8,pc}
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
ldr x29,[sp],#16
___
$code.=<<___ if ($flavour =~ /64/);
.Lecb_Final_abort:
ret
___
$code.=<<___;
.size ${prefix}_ecb_encrypt,.-${prefix}_ecb_encrypt
___
}}}
{{{
my ($inp,$out,$len,$key,$ivp)=map("x$_",(0..4)); my $enc="w5";
my ($rounds,$cnt,$key_,$step,$step1)=($enc,"w6","x7","x8","x12");
crypto/aes/asm/bsaes-x86_64.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
# - code was made position-independent;
# - rounds were folded into a loop resulting in >5x size reduction
# from 12.5KB to 2.2KB;
# - above was possibile thanks to mixcolumns() modification that
# - above was possible thanks to mixcolumns() modification that
# allowed to feed its output back to aesenc[last], this was
# achieved at cost of two additional inter-registers moves;
# - some instruction reordering and interleaving;
crypto/aes/build.info
-2
View File
@@ -68,8 +68,6 @@ SOURCE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$COMMON
DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$AESDEF
DEFINE[../../providers/libfips.a]=$AESDEF
DEFINE[../../providers/libimplementations.a]=$AESDEF
# fipsprov.c needs access to AESNI.
DEFINE[../../providers/fips]=$AESDEF
GENERATE[aes-ia64.s]=asm/aes-ia64.S
crypto/asn1/a_gentm.c
+3
View File
@@ -16,6 +16,9 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include "asn1_local.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME)
/* This is the primary function used to parse ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME */
int asn1_generalizedtime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME *d)
crypto/asn1/a_time.c
+1
View File
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_MSTRING(ASN1_TIME, B_ASN1_TIME)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(ASN1_TIME)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ASN1_TIME)
static int is_utc(const int year)
{
crypto/asn1/a_utctm.c
+3
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,9 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1.h>
#include "asn1_local.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(ASN1_UTCTIME)
/* This is the primary function used to parse ASN1_UTCTIME */
int asn1_utctime_to_tm(struct tm *tm, const ASN1_UTCTIME *d)
crypto/asn1/asn1_item_list.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *asn1_item_list[] = {
ASN1_ITEM_ref(IPAddressRange),
#endif
ASN1_ITEM_ref(ISSUING_DIST_POINT),
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
ASN1_ITEM_ref(LONG),
#endif
ASN1_ITEM_ref(NAME_CONSTRAINTS),
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ static ASN1_ITEM_EXP *asn1_item_list[] = {
ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_SIG),
ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509_VAL),
ASN1_ITEM_ref(X509),
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
ASN1_ITEM_ref(ZLONG),
#endif
ASN1_ITEM_ref(INT32),
crypto/asn1/asn1_lib.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -383,7 +383,7 @@ const unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_get0_data(const ASN1_STRING *x)
return x->data;
}
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
unsigned char *ASN1_STRING_data(ASN1_STRING *x)
{
return x->data;
crypto/asn1/asn1_par.c
+58 -40
View File
@@ -17,25 +17,44 @@
#define ASN1_PARSE_MAXDEPTH 128
#endif
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
int indent);
static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
int offset, int depth, int indent, int dump);
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
int indent)
static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, long offset, int depth, int hl, long len,
int tag, int xclass, int constructed, int indent)
{
static const char fmt[] = "%-18s";
char str[128];
const char *p;
int pop_f_prefix = 0;
long saved_indent = -1;
int i = 0;
if (constructed & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED)
p = "cons: ";
else
p = "prim: ";
if (BIO_write(bp, p, 6) < 6)
if (constructed != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) {
if (BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%5ld:d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld %s",
offset, depth, (long)hl, len, p) <= 0)
goto err;
} else {
if (BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%5ld:d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf %s",
offset, depth, (long)hl, p) <= 0)
goto err;
}
if (BIO_set_prefix(bp, str) <= 0) {
if ((bp = BIO_push(BIO_new(BIO_f_prefix()), bp)) == NULL)
goto err;
pop_f_prefix = 1;
}
saved_indent = BIO_get_indent(bp);
if (BIO_set_prefix(bp, str) <= 0
|| BIO_set_indent(bp, indent) < 0)
goto err;
BIO_indent(bp, indent, 128);
/*
* BIO_set_prefix made a copy of |str|, so we can safely use it for
* something else, ASN.1 tag printout.
*/
p = str;
if ((xclass & V_ASN1_PRIVATE) == V_ASN1_PRIVATE)
BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "priv [ %d ] ", tag);
@@ -48,11 +67,17 @@ static int asn1_print_info(BIO *bp, int tag, int xclass, int constructed,
else
p = ASN1_tag2str(tag);
if (BIO_printf(bp, fmt, p) <= 0)
goto err;
return 1;
i = (BIO_printf(bp, "%-18s", p) > 0);
err:
return 0;
if (saved_indent >= 0)
BIO_set_indent(bp, saved_indent);
if (pop_f_prefix) {
BIO *next = BIO_pop(bp);
BIO_free(bp);
bp = next;
}
return i;
}
int ASN1_parse(BIO *bp, const unsigned char *pp, long len, int indent)
@@ -75,6 +100,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
int nl, hl, j, r;
ASN1_OBJECT *o = NULL;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *os = NULL;
ASN1_INTEGER *ai = NULL;
ASN1_ENUMERATED *ae = NULL;
/* ASN1_BMPSTRING *bmp=NULL; */
int dump_indent, dump_cont = 0;
@@ -100,19 +127,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
/*
* if j == 0x21 it is a constructed indefinite length object
*/
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%5ld:", (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp))
<= 0)
goto end;
if (j != (V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED | 1)) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=%4ld ",
depth, (long)hl, len) <= 0)
goto end;
} else {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "d=%-2d hl=%ld l=inf ", depth, (long)hl) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if (!asn1_print_info(bp, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
if (!asn1_print_info(bp, (long)offset + (long)(op - *pp), depth,
hl, len, tag, xclass, j, (indent) ? depth : 0))
goto end;
if (j & V_ASN1_CONSTRUCTED) {
const unsigned char *sp = p;
@@ -250,22 +266,21 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
os = NULL;
} else if (tag == V_ASN1_INTEGER) {
ASN1_INTEGER *bs;
int i;
opp = op;
bs = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
if (bs != NULL) {
ai = d2i_ASN1_INTEGER(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
if (ai != NULL) {
if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
if (ai->type == V_ASN1_NEG_INTEGER)
if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
for (i = 0; i < ai->length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", ai->data[i]) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if (bs->length == 0) {
if (ai->length == 0) {
if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
goto end;
}
@@ -274,24 +289,24 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
dump_cont = 1;
}
ASN1_INTEGER_free(bs);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
ai = NULL;
} else if (tag == V_ASN1_ENUMERATED) {
ASN1_ENUMERATED *bs;
int i;
opp = op;
bs = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
if (bs != NULL) {
ae = d2i_ASN1_ENUMERATED(NULL, &opp, len + hl);
if (ae != NULL) {
if (BIO_write(bp, ":", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
if (bs->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)
if (ae->type == V_ASN1_NEG_ENUMERATED)
if (BIO_write(bp, "-", 1) <= 0)
goto end;
for (i = 0; i < bs->length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", bs->data[i]) <= 0)
for (i = 0; i < ae->length; i++) {
if (BIO_printf(bp, "%02X", ae->data[i]) <= 0)
goto end;
}
if (bs->length == 0) {
if (ae->length == 0) {
if (BIO_write(bp, "00", 2) <= 0)
goto end;
}
@@ -300,7 +315,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
goto end;
dump_cont = 1;
}
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(bs);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ae);
ae = NULL;
} else if (len > 0 && dump) {
if (!nl) {
if (BIO_write(bp, "\n", 1) <= 0)
@@ -341,6 +357,8 @@ static int asn1_parse2(BIO *bp, const unsigned char **pp, long length,
end:
ASN1_OBJECT_free(o);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(os);
ASN1_INTEGER_free(ai);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(ae);
*pp = p;
return ret;
}
crypto/asn1/charmap.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
*
* Copyright 2000-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 2000-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
crypto/asn1/charmap.pl
+2 -2
View File
@@ -82,8 +82,8 @@ $arr[ord("?")] |= $PSTRING_CHAR;
# Now generate the C code
# Output year depends on the year of the script.
my $YEAR = [localtime([stat($0)]->[9])]->[5] + 1900;
# Year the file was generated.
my $YEAR = [localtime()]->[5] + 1900;
print <<EOF;
/*
* WARNING: do not edit!
crypto/asn1/x_long.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
#include "internal/cryptlib.h"
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#if OPENSSL_API_3
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
crypto/asn1_dsa.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,7 @@ int encode_der_integer(WPACKET *pkt, const BIGNUM *n)
/*
* Outputs the DER encoding of a DSA-Sig-Value or ECDSA-Sig-Value to pkt. pkt
* may be initialised with a NULL buffer which enables pkt to be used to
* calulate how many bytes would be needed.
* calculate how many bytes would be needed.
*
* Returns 1 on success or 0 on error.
*/
crypto/bf/bf_cfb64.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* BF low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
#include "bf_local.h"
crypto/bf/bf_ecb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* BF low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
#include "bf_local.h"
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
crypto/bf/bf_enc.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* BF low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
#include "bf_local.h"
crypto/bf/bf_ofb64.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* BF low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
#include "bf_local.h"
crypto/bf/bf_skey.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* BF low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for internal
* use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <openssl/blowfish.h>
crypto/bio/b_sock.c
+3 -3
View File
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@
static int wsa_init_done = 0;
# endif
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
int BIO_get_host_ip(const char *str, unsigned char *ip)
{
BIO_ADDRINFO *res = NULL;
@@ -103,7 +103,7 @@ int BIO_sock_error(int sock)
return j;
}
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
struct hostent *BIO_gethostbyname(const char *name)
{
/*
@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ int BIO_socket_ioctl(int fd, long type, void *arg)
return i;
}
# if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
int BIO_get_accept_socket(char *host, int bind_mode)
{
int s = INVALID_SOCKET;
crypto/bio/bf_prefix.c
+207
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,207 @@
/*
* Copyright 2018-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <errno.h>
#include "bio_local.h"
static int prefix_write(BIO *b, const char *out, size_t outl,
size_t *numwritten);
static int prefix_read(BIO *b, char *buf, size_t size, size_t *numread);
static int prefix_puts(BIO *b, const char *str);
static int prefix_gets(BIO *b, char *str, int size);
static long prefix_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long arg1, void *arg2);
static int prefix_create(BIO *b);
static int prefix_destroy(BIO *b);
static long prefix_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp);
static const BIO_METHOD prefix_meth = {
BIO_TYPE_BUFFER,
"prefix",
prefix_write,
NULL,
prefix_read,
NULL,
prefix_puts,
prefix_gets,
prefix_ctrl,
prefix_create,
prefix_destroy,
prefix_callback_ctrl,
};
const BIO_METHOD *BIO_f_prefix(void)
{
return &prefix_meth;
}
typedef struct prefix_ctx_st {
char *prefix; /* Text prefix, given by user */
unsigned int indent; /* Indentation amount, given by user */
int linestart; /* flag to indicate we're at the line start */
} PREFIX_CTX;
static int prefix_create(BIO *b)
{
PREFIX_CTX *ctx = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*ctx));
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
ctx->prefix = NULL;
ctx->indent = 0;
ctx->linestart = 1;
BIO_set_data(b, ctx);
BIO_set_init(b, 1);
return 1;
}
static int prefix_destroy(BIO *b)
{
PREFIX_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
OPENSSL_free(ctx);
return 1;
}
static int prefix_read(BIO *b, char *in, size_t size, size_t *numread)
{
return BIO_read_ex(BIO_next(b), in, size, numread);
}
static int prefix_write(BIO *b, const char *out, size_t outl,
size_t *numwritten)
{
PREFIX_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
if (ctx == NULL)
return 0;
/*
* If no prefix is set or if it's empty, and no indentation amount is set,
* we've got nothing to do here
*/
if ((ctx->prefix == NULL || *ctx->prefix == '\0')
&& ctx->indent == 0) {
/*
* We do note if what comes next will be a new line, though, so we're
* prepared to handle prefix and indentation the next time around.
*/
if (outl > 0)
ctx->linestart = (out[outl-1] == '\n');
return BIO_write_ex(BIO_next(b), out, outl, numwritten);
}
*numwritten = 0;
while (outl > 0) {
size_t i;
char c;
/*
* If we know that we're at the start of the line, output prefix and
* indentation.
*/
if (ctx->linestart) {
size_t dontcare;
if (ctx->prefix != NULL
&& !BIO_write_ex(BIO_next(b), ctx->prefix, strlen(ctx->prefix),
&dontcare))
return 0;
BIO_printf(BIO_next(b), "%*s", ctx->indent, "");
ctx->linestart = 0;
}
/* Now, go look for the next LF, or the end of the string */
for (i = 0, c = '\0'; i < outl && (c = out[i]) != '\n'; i++)
continue;
if (c == '\n')
i++;
/* Output what we found so far */
while (i > 0) {
size_t num = 0;
if (!BIO_write_ex(BIO_next(b), out, i, &num))
return 0;
out += num;
outl -= num;
*numwritten += num;
i -= num;
}
/* If we found a LF, what follows is a new line, so take note */
if (c == '\n')
ctx->linestart = 1;
}
return 1;
}
static long prefix_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
{
long ret = 0;
PREFIX_CTX *ctx = BIO_get_data(b);
if (ctx == NULL)
return -1;
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_CTRL_SET_PREFIX:
OPENSSL_free(ctx->prefix);
if (ptr == NULL) {
ctx->prefix = NULL;
ret = 1;
} else {
ctx->prefix = OPENSSL_strdup((const char *)ptr);
ret = ctx->prefix != NULL;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_SET_INDENT:
if (num >= 0) {
ctx->indent = (unsigned int)num;
ret = 1;
}
break;
case BIO_CTRL_GET_INDENT:
ret = (long)ctx->indent;
break;
default:
/* Commands that we intercept before passing them along */
switch (cmd) {
case BIO_C_FILE_SEEK:
case BIO_CTRL_RESET:
ctx->linestart = 1;
break;
}
if (BIO_next(b) != NULL)
ret = BIO_ctrl(BIO_next(b), cmd, num, ptr);
break;
}
return ret;
}
static long prefix_callback_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, BIO_info_cb *fp)
{
return BIO_callback_ctrl(BIO_next(b), cmd, fp);
}
static int prefix_gets(BIO *b, char *buf, int size)
{
return BIO_gets(BIO_next(b), buf, size);
}
static int prefix_puts(BIO *b, const char *str)
{
return BIO_write(b, str, strlen(str));
}
crypto/bio/bss_acpt.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -432,7 +432,7 @@ static long acpt_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
b->init = 1;
} else if (num == 1) {
OPENSSL_free(data->param_serv);
data->param_serv = BUF_strdup(ptr);
data->param_serv = OPENSSL_strdup(ptr);
b->init = 1;
} else if (num == 2) {
data->bind_mode |= BIO_SOCK_NONBLOCK;
crypto/bio/bss_conn.c
+9 -2
View File
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@ void BIO_CONNECT_free(BIO_CONNECT *a);
#define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT 4
#define BIO_CONN_S_OK 5
#define BIO_CONN_S_BLOCKED_CONNECT 6
#define BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT_ERROR 7
static const BIO_METHOD methods_connectp = {
BIO_TYPE_CONNECT,
@@ -172,7 +173,8 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c)
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_SYS, get_last_socket_error(),
"calling connect(%s, %s)",
c->param_hostname, c->param_service);
BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
c->state = BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT_ERROR;
break;
}
goto exit_loop;
} else {
@@ -194,6 +196,11 @@ static int conn_state(BIO *b, BIO_CONNECT *c)
c->state = BIO_CONN_S_OK;
break;
case BIO_CONN_S_CONNECT_ERROR:
BIOerr(BIO_F_CONN_STATE, BIO_R_CONNECT_ERROR);
ret = 0;
goto exit_loop;
case BIO_CONN_S_OK:
ret = 1;
goto exit_loop;
@@ -411,7 +418,7 @@ static long conn_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
OPENSSL_free(hold_service);
} else if (num == 1) {
OPENSSL_free(data->param_service);
data->param_service = BUF_strdup(ptr);
data->param_service = OPENSSL_strdup(ptr);
} else if (num == 2) {
const BIO_ADDR *addr = (const BIO_ADDR *)ptr;
if (ret) {
crypto/bio/bss_dgram.c
+9 -6
View File
@@ -1009,7 +1009,6 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
int ret = 0, n = 0, i, optval;
socklen_t optlen;
bio_dgram_sctp_data *data = (bio_dgram_sctp_data *) b->ptr;
union sctp_notification *snp;
struct msghdr msg;
struct iovec iov;
struct cmsghdr *cmsg;
@@ -1075,8 +1074,10 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
}
if (msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) {
snp = (union sctp_notification *)out;
if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) {
union sctp_notification snp;
memcpy(&snp, out, sizeof(snp));
if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_SENDER_DRY_EVENT) {
# ifdef SCTP_EVENT
struct sctp_event event;
# else
@@ -1116,17 +1117,19 @@ static int dgram_sctp_read(BIO *b, char *out, int outl)
# endif
}
# ifdef SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT
if (snp->sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT)
dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, snp);
if (snp.sn_header.sn_type == SCTP_AUTHENTICATION_EVENT)
dgram_sctp_handle_auth_free_key_event(b, &snp);
# endif
if (data->handle_notifications != NULL)
data->handle_notifications(b, data->notification_context,
(void *)out);
memset(&snp, 0, sizeof(snp));
memset(out, 0, outl);
} else
} else {
ret += n;
}
}
while ((msg.msg_flags & MSG_NOTIFICATION) && (msg.msg_flags & MSG_EOR)
&& (ret < outl));
crypto/bio/bss_sock.c
+8
View File
@@ -152,7 +152,11 @@ static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
long ret = 1;
int *ip;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
# ifdef __FreeBSD__
struct tls_enable *crypto_info;
# else
struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *crypto_info;
# endif
# endif
switch (cmd) {
@@ -183,7 +187,11 @@ static long sock_ctrl(BIO *b, int cmd, long num, void *ptr)
break;
# ifndef OPENSSL_NO_KTLS
case BIO_CTRL_SET_KTLS:
# ifdef __FreeBSD__
crypto_info = (struct tls_enable *)ptr;
# else
crypto_info = (struct tls12_crypto_info_aes_gcm_128 *)ptr;
# endif
ret = ktls_start(b->num, crypto_info, sizeof(*crypto_info), num);
if (ret)
BIO_set_ktls_flag(b, num);
crypto/bio/build.info
+15 -5
View File
@@ -1,8 +1,18 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
# Base library
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
bio_lib.c bio_cb.c bio_err.c \
bss_mem.c bss_null.c bss_fd.c \
bss_file.c bss_sock.c bss_conn.c \
bf_null.c bf_buff.c b_print.c b_dump.c b_addr.c \
b_sock.c b_sock2.c bss_acpt.c bf_nbio.c bss_log.c bss_bio.c \
bss_dgram.c bio_meth.c bf_lbuf.c
b_print.c b_dump.c b_addr.c \
b_sock.c b_sock2.c \
bio_meth.c
# Source / sink implementations
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
bss_null.c bss_mem.c bss_bio.c bss_fd.c bss_file.c \
bss_sock.c bss_conn.c bss_acpt.c bss_dgram.c \
bss_log.c
# Filters
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=\
bf_null.c bf_buff.c bf_lbuf.c bf_nbio.c bf_prefix.c
crypto/blake2/build.info
-2
View File
@@ -1,2 +0,0 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=m_blake2b.c m_blake2s.c
crypto/blake2/m_blake2b.c
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
# include <stddef.h>
# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
# include "crypto/evp.h"
# include "prov/blake2.h"
static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
return blake2b512_init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
}
static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
return blake2b_update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
}
static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
{
return blake2b_final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
}
static const EVP_MD blake2b_md = {
NID_blake2b512,
0,
BLAKE2B_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
init,
update,
final,
NULL,
NULL,
BLAKE2B_BLOCKBYTES,
sizeof(BLAKE2B_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2b512(void)
{
return &blake2b_md;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 */
crypto/blake2/m_blake2s.c
-50
View File
@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
/*
* Copyright 2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2
# include <stddef.h>
# include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
# include "crypto/evp.h"
# include "prov/blake2.h"
static int init(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx)
{
return blake2s256_init(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
}
static int update(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
return blake2s_update(EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx), data, count);
}
static int final(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *md)
{
return blake2s_final(md, EVP_MD_CTX_md_data(ctx));
}
static const EVP_MD blake2s_md = {
NID_blake2s256,
0,
BLAKE2S_DIGEST_LENGTH,
0,
init,
update,
final,
NULL,
NULL,
BLAKE2S_BLOCKBYTES,
sizeof(BLAKE2S_CTX),
};
const EVP_MD *EVP_blake2s256(void)
{
return &blake2s_md;
}
#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_BLAKE2 */
crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-avx2.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$avx = ($ver>=3.0) + ($ver>=3.01);
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
crypto/bn/asm/rsaz-x86_64.pl
+216 -189
View File
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ rsaz_512_sqr: # 25-29% faster than rsaz_512_mul
subq \$128+24, %rsp
.cfi_adjust_cfa_offset 128+24
.Lsqr_body:
movq $mod, %rbp # common argument
movq $mod, %xmm1 # common off-load
movq ($inp), %rdx
movq 8($inp), %rax
movq $n0, 128(%rsp)
@@ -136,7 +136,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop_sqr:
movl $times,128+8(%rsp)
#first iteration
movq %rdx, %rbx
movq %rdx, %rbx # 0($inp)
mov %rax, %rbp # 8($inp)
mulq %rdx
movq %rax, %r8
movq 16($inp), %rax
@@ -175,31 +176,29 @@ $code.=<<___;
mulq %rbx
addq %rax, %r14
movq %rbx, %rax
movq %rdx, %r15
adcq \$0, %r15
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %r8, %r8 #shlq \$1, %r8
movq %r9, %rcx
adcq %r9, %r9 #shld \$1, %r8, %r9
xorq %rcx,%rcx # rcx:r8 = r8 << 1
addq %r8, %r8
movq %rdx, %r15
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %rax
movq %rax, (%rsp)
addq %rdx, %r8
adcq \$0, %r9
addq %r8, %rdx
adcq \$0, %rcx
movq %r8, 8(%rsp)
shrq \$63, %rcx
movq %rax, (%rsp)
movq %rdx, 8(%rsp)
#second iteration
movq 8($inp), %r8
movq 16($inp), %rax
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r10
movq 24($inp), %rax
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r11
movq 32($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -207,7 +206,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r12
movq 40($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -215,7 +214,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r13
movq 48($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -223,7 +222,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r14
movq 56($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -231,39 +230,39 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r8
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r15
movq %r8, %rax
movq %rbp, %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %rbx, %r15
movq %rdx, %r8
movq %r10, %rdx
adcq \$0, %r8
adcq \$0, %rdx
add %rdx, %rdx
lea (%rcx,%r10,2), %r10 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r10
movq %r11, %rbx
adcq %r11, %r11 #shld \$1, %r10, %r11
xorq %rbx, %rbx # rbx:r10:r9 = r10:r9 << 1
addq %r9, %r9
movq %rdx, %r8
adcq %r10, %r10
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %rax
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rcx, %rax
movq 16($inp), %rbp
addq %rax, %r9
movq 24($inp), %rax
adcq %rdx, %r10
adcq \$0, %r11
adcq \$0, %rbx
movq %r9, 16(%rsp)
movq %r10, 24(%rsp)
shrq \$63, %rbx
#third iteration
movq 16($inp), %r9
movq 24($inp), %rax
mulq %r9
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r12
movq 32($inp), %rax
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %r9
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r13
movq 40($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -271,7 +270,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %r9
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r14
movq 48($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -279,9 +278,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %r9
movq %r12, %r10
lea (%rbx,%r12,2), %r12 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r12
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r15
movq 56($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -289,36 +286,40 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %r9
shrq \$63, %r10
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r8
movq %r9, %rax
movq %rbp, %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %rcx, %r8
movq %rdx, %r9
adcq \$0, %r9
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %r13, %rcx
leaq (%r10,%r13,2), %r13 #shld \$1, %r12, %r13
xorq %rcx, %rcx # rcx:r12:r11 = r12:r11 << 1
addq %r11, %r11
movq %rdx, %r9
adcq %r12, %r12
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %rax
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rbx, %rax
movq 24($inp), %r10
addq %rax, %r11
movq 32($inp), %rax
adcq %rdx, %r12
adcq \$0, %r13
adcq \$0, %rcx
movq %r11, 32(%rsp)
movq %r12, 40(%rsp)
shrq \$63, %rcx
#fourth iteration
movq 24($inp), %r10
movq 32($inp), %rax
mov %rax, %r11 # 32($inp)
mulq %r10
addq %rax, %r14
movq 40($inp), %rax
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mov %rax, %r12 # 40($inp)
mulq %r10
addq %rax, %r15
movq 48($inp), %rax
@@ -327,9 +328,8 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mov %rax, %rbp # 48($inp)
mulq %r10
movq %r14, %r12
leaq (%rcx,%r14,2), %r14 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r14
addq %rax, %r8
movq 56($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
@@ -338,32 +338,33 @@ $code.=<<___;
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r10
shrq \$63, %r12
addq %rax, %r9
movq %r10, %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %rbx, %r9
movq %rdx, %r10
adcq \$0, %r10
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %r15, %rbx
leaq (%r12,%r15,2),%r15 #shld \$1, %r14, %r15
xorq %rbx, %rbx # rbx:r13:r14 = r13:r14 << 1
addq %r13, %r13
movq %rdx, %r10
adcq %r14, %r14
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %rax
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rcx, %rax
addq %rax, %r13
movq %r12, %rax # 40($inp)
adcq %rdx, %r14
adcq \$0, %r15
adcq \$0, %rbx
movq %r13, 48(%rsp)
movq %r14, 56(%rsp)
shrq \$63, %rbx
#fifth iteration
movq 32($inp), %r11
movq 40($inp), %rax
mulq %r11
addq %rax, %r8
movq 48($inp), %rax
movq %rbp, %rax # 48($inp)
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
@@ -371,97 +372,99 @@ $code.=<<___;
addq %rax, %r9
movq 56($inp), %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %r8, %r12
leaq (%rbx,%r8,2), %r8 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r8
addq %rcx, %r9
movq %rdx, %rcx
adcq \$0, %rcx
mov %rax, %r14 # 56($inp)
mulq %r11
shrq \$63, %r12
addq %rax, %r10
movq %r11, %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %rcx, %r10
movq %rdx, %r11
adcq \$0, %r11
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %r9, %rcx
leaq (%r12,%r9,2), %r9 #shld \$1, %r8, %r9
xorq %rcx, %rcx # rcx:r8:r15 = r8:r15 << 1
addq %r15, %r15
movq %rdx, %r11
adcq %r8, %r8
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %rax
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rbx, %rax
addq %rax, %r15
movq %rbp, %rax # 48($inp)
adcq %rdx, %r8
adcq \$0, %r9
adcq \$0, %rcx
movq %r15, 64(%rsp)
movq %r8, 72(%rsp)
shrq \$63, %rcx
#sixth iteration
movq 40($inp), %r12
movq 48($inp), %rax
mulq %r12
addq %rax, %r10
movq 56($inp), %rax
movq %r14, %rax # 56($inp)
movq %rdx, %rbx
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %r12
addq %rax, %r11
movq %r12, %rax
movq %r10, %r15
leaq (%rcx,%r10,2), %r10 #shld \$1, %rcx, %r10
adcq \$0, %rdx
shrq \$63, %r15
addq %rbx, %r11
movq %rdx, %r12
adcq \$0, %r12
adcq \$0, %rdx
movq %r11, %rbx
leaq (%r15,%r11,2), %r11 #shld \$1, %r10, %r11
xorq %rbx, %rbx # rbx:r10:r9 = r10:r9 << 1
addq %r9, %r9
movq %rdx, %r12
adcq %r10, %r10
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %rax
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rcx, %rax
addq %rax, %r9
movq %r14, %rax # 56($inp)
adcq %rdx, %r10
adcq \$0, %r11
adcq \$0, %rbx
movq %r9, 80(%rsp)
movq %r10, 88(%rsp)
#seventh iteration
movq 48($inp), %r13
movq 56($inp), %rax
mulq %r13
mulq %rbp
addq %rax, %r12
movq %r13, %rax
movq %rdx, %r13
adcq \$0, %r13
movq %rbp, %rax
adcq \$0, %rdx
xorq %r14, %r14
shlq \$1, %rbx
adcq %r12, %r12 #shld \$1, %rbx, %r12
adcq %r13, %r13 #shld \$1, %r12, %r13
adcq %r14, %r14 #shld \$1, %r13, %r14
xorq %rcx, %rcx # rcx:r12:r11 = r12:r11 << 1
addq %r11, %r11
movq %rdx, %r13
adcq %r12, %r12
adcq \$0, %rcx
mulq %rax
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rbx, %rax
addq %rax, %r11
movq %r14, %rax # 56($inp)
adcq %rdx, %r12
adcq \$0, %r13
adcq \$0, %rcx
movq %r11, 96(%rsp)
movq %r12, 104(%rsp)
#eighth iteration
movq 56($inp), %rax
xorq %rbx, %rbx # rbx:r13 = r13 << 1
addq %r13, %r13
adcq \$0, %rbx
mulq %rax
addq %rax, %r13
adcq \$0, %rdx
addq %rdx, %r14
movq %r13, 112(%rsp)
movq %r14, 120(%rsp)
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
addq %rcx, %rax
addq %r13, %rax
adcq %rbx, %rdx
movq (%rsp), %r8
movq 8(%rsp), %r9
@@ -471,6 +474,10 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq 40(%rsp), %r13
movq 48(%rsp), %r14
movq 56(%rsp), %r15
movq %xmm1, %rbp
movq %rax, 112(%rsp)
movq %rdx, 120(%rsp)
call __rsaz_512_reduce
@@ -502,9 +509,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
.Loop_sqrx:
movl $times,128+8(%rsp)
movq $out, %xmm0 # off-load
movq %rbp, %xmm1 # off-load
#first iteration
mulx %rax, %r8, %r9
mov %rax, %rbx
mulx 16($inp), %rcx, %r10
xor %rbp, %rbp # cf=0, of=0
@@ -512,40 +519,39 @@ $code.=<<___;
mulx 24($inp), %rax, %r11
adcx %rcx, %r9
mulx 32($inp), %rcx, %r12
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xf3,0xf6,0xa6,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 32($inp), %rcx, %r12
adcx %rax, %r10
mulx 40($inp), %rax, %r13
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xae,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 40($inp), %rax, %r13
adcx %rcx, %r11
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xf3,0xf6,0xb6,0x30,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 48($inp), %rcx, %r14
mulx 48($inp), %rcx, %r14
adcx %rax, %r12
adcx %rcx, %r13
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xfb,0xf6,0xbe,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), %rax, %r15
mulx 56($inp), %rax, %r15
adcx %rax, %r14
adcx %rbp, %r15 # %rbp is 0
mov %r9, %rcx
shld \$1, %r8, %r9
shl \$1, %r8
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adcx %rdx, %r8
mov 8($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r9
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
mov %rbx, %rdx # 8($inp)
xor %rcx, %rcx
adox %r8, %r8
adcx $out, %r8
adox %rbp, %rcx
adcx %rbp, %rcx
mov %rax, (%rsp)
mov %r8, 8(%rsp)
#second iteration
mulx 16($inp), %rax, %rbx
.byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 16($inp), %rax, %rbx
adox %rax, %r10
adcx %rbx, %r11
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($inp), $out, %r8
mulx 24($inp), $out, %r8
adox $out, %r11
.byte 0x66
adcx %r8, %r12
mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rbx
@@ -563,24 +569,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x86,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r8
adox $out, %r15
adcx %rbp, %r8
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
adox %rbp, %r8
.byte 0x48,0x8b,0x96,0x10,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov 16($inp), %rdx
mov %r11, %rbx
shld \$1, %r10, %r11
shld \$1, %rcx, %r10
xor %ebp,%ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rcx
mov 16($inp), %rdx
xor %rbx, %rbx
adox %r9, %r9
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rcx, %rax
adox %r10, %r10
adcx %rax, %r9
adcx %rcx, %r10
adcx %rbp, %r11
adox %rbp, %rbx
adcx $out, %r10
adcx %rbp, %rbx
mov %r9, 16(%rsp)
.byte 0x4c,0x89,0x94,0x24,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r10, 24(%rsp)
#third iteration
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x18,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 24($inp), $out, %r9
mulx 24($inp), $out, %r9
adox $out, %r12
adcx %r9, %r13
@@ -588,7 +595,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
adox %rax, %r13
adcx %rcx, %r14
mulx 40($inp), $out, %r9
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 40($inp), $out, %r9
adox $out, %r14
adcx %r9, %r15
@@ -596,27 +603,28 @@ $code.=<<___;
adox %rax, %r15
adcx %rcx, %r8
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x8e,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r9
mulx 56($inp), $out, %r9
adox $out, %r8
adcx %rbp, %r9
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
adox %rbp, %r9
mov %r13, %rcx
shld \$1, %r12, %r13
shld \$1, %rbx, %r12
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adcx %rax, %r11
adcx %rdx, %r12
mov 24($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r13
xor %rcx, %rcx
adox %r11, %r11
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rbx, %rax
adox %r12, %r12
adcx %rax, %r11
adox %rbp, %rcx
adcx $out, %r12
adcx %rbp, %rcx
mov %r11, 32(%rsp)
.byte 0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r12, 40(%rsp)
mov %r12, 40(%rsp)
#fourth iteration
.byte 0xc4,0xe2,0xfb,0xf6,0x9e,0x20,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rbx
mulx 32($inp), %rax, %rbx
adox %rax, %r14
adcx %rbx, %r15
@@ -631,25 +639,25 @@ $code.=<<___;
mulx 56($inp), $out, %r10
adox $out, %r9
adcx %rbp, %r10
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
adox %rbp, %r10
.byte 0x66
mov %r15, %rbx
shld \$1, %r14, %r15
shld \$1, %rcx, %r14
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adcx %rax, %r13
adcx %rdx, %r14
mov 32($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r15
xor %rbx, %rbx
adox %r13, %r13
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rcx, %rax
adox %r14, %r14
adcx %rax, %r13
adox %rbp, %rbx
adcx $out, %r14
adcx %rbp, %rbx
mov %r13, 48(%rsp)
mov %r14, 56(%rsp)
#fifth iteration
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0x9e,0x28,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 40($inp), $out, %r11
mulx 40($inp), $out, %r11
adox $out, %r8
adcx %r11, %r9
@@ -660,18 +668,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
mulx 56($inp), $out, %r11
adox $out, %r10
adcx %rbp, %r11
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
mov 40($inp), %rdx
adox %rbp, %r11
mov %r9, %rcx
shld \$1, %r8, %r9
shld \$1, %rbx, %r8
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
xor %rcx, %rcx
adox %r15, %r15
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rbx, %rax
adox %r8, %r8
adcx %rax, %r15
adcx %rdx, %r8
mov 40($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r9
adox %rbp, %rcx
adcx $out, %r8
adcx %rbp, %rcx
mov %r15, 64(%rsp)
mov %r8, 72(%rsp)
@@ -684,18 +693,19 @@ $code.=<<___;
.byte 0xc4,0x62,0xc3,0xf6,0xa6,0x38,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mulx 56($inp), $out, %r12
adox $out, %r11
adcx %rbp, %r12
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
adox %rbp, %r12
mov %r11, %rbx
shld \$1, %r10, %r11
shld \$1, %rcx, %r10
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adcx %rax, %r9
adcx %rdx, %r10
mov 48($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r11
xor %rbx, %rbx
adox %r9, %r9
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rcx, %rax
adox %r10, %r10
adcx %rax, %r9
adcx $out, %r10
adox %rbp, %rbx
adcx %rbp, %rbx
mov %r9, 80(%rsp)
mov %r10, 88(%rsp)
@@ -705,31 +715,31 @@ $code.=<<___;
adox %rax, %r12
adox %rbp, %r13
xor %r14, %r14
shld \$1, %r13, %r14
shld \$1, %r12, %r13
shld \$1, %rbx, %r12
xor %ebp, %ebp
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adcx %rax, %r11
adcx %rdx, %r12
mulx %rdx, %rax, $out
xor %rcx, %rcx
mov 56($inp), %rdx
adcx %rbp, %r13
adox %r11, %r11
# rbx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rbx, %rax
adox %r12, %r12
adcx %rax, %r11
adox %rbp, %rcx
adcx $out, %r12
adcx %rbp, %rcx
.byte 0x4c,0x89,0x9c,0x24,0x60,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r11, 96(%rsp)
.byte 0x4c,0x89,0xa4,0x24,0x68,0x00,0x00,0x00 # mov %r12, 104(%rsp)
#eighth iteration
mulx %rdx, %rax, %rdx
adox %rax, %r13
adox %rbp, %rdx
xor %rbx, %rbx
adox %r13, %r13
# rcx <= 2 and rax <= 0xFFFF..F9, so carry must be zero here
adcx %rcx, %rax
adox %rbp, %rbx
adcx %r13, %rax
adcx %rdx, %rbx
.byte 0x66
add %rdx, %r14
movq %r13, 112(%rsp)
movq %r14, 120(%rsp)
movq %xmm0, $out
movq %xmm1, %rbp
@@ -743,6 +753,9 @@ $code.=<<___;
movq 48(%rsp), %r14
movq 56(%rsp), %r15
movq %rax, 112(%rsp)
movq %rbx, 120(%rsp)
call __rsaz_512_reducex
addq 64(%rsp), %r8
@@ -1608,6 +1621,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __rsaz_512_reduce,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__rsaz_512_reduce:
.cfi_startproc
movq %r8, %rbx
imulq 128+8(%rsp), %rbx
movq 0(%rbp), %rax
@@ -1687,6 +1701,7 @@ __rsaz_512_reduce:
jne .Lreduction_loop
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __rsaz_512_reduce,.-__rsaz_512_reduce
___
}
@@ -1700,6 +1715,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __rsaz_512_reducex,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__rsaz_512_reducex:
.cfi_startproc
#movq 128+8(%rsp), %rdx # pull $n0
imulq %r8, %rdx
xorq %rsi, %rsi # cf=0,of=0
@@ -1752,6 +1768,7 @@ __rsaz_512_reducex:
jne .Lreduction_loopx
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __rsaz_512_reducex,.-__rsaz_512_reducex
___
}
@@ -1763,6 +1780,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __rsaz_512_subtract,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__rsaz_512_subtract:
.cfi_startproc
movq %r8, ($out)
movq %r9, 8($out)
movq %r10, 16($out)
@@ -1816,6 +1834,7 @@ __rsaz_512_subtract:
movq %r15, 56($out)
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __rsaz_512_subtract,.-__rsaz_512_subtract
___
}
@@ -1829,6 +1848,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __rsaz_512_mul,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__rsaz_512_mul:
.cfi_startproc
leaq 8(%rsp), %rdi
movq ($ap), %rax
@@ -1967,6 +1987,7 @@ __rsaz_512_mul:
movq %r15, 56(%rdi)
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __rsaz_512_mul,.-__rsaz_512_mul
___
}
@@ -1981,6 +2002,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __rsaz_512_mulx,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__rsaz_512_mulx:
.cfi_startproc
mulx ($ap), %rbx, %r8 # initial %rdx preloaded by caller
mov \$-6, %rcx
@@ -2097,6 +2119,7 @@ __rsaz_512_mulx:
mov %r15, 8+64+56(%rsp)
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __rsaz_512_mulx,.-__rsaz_512_mulx
___
}
@@ -2107,6 +2130,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type rsaz_512_scatter4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_scatter4:
.cfi_startproc
leaq ($out,$power,8), $out
movl \$8, %r9d
jmp .Loop_scatter
@@ -2119,12 +2143,14 @@ rsaz_512_scatter4:
decl %r9d
jnz .Loop_scatter
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size rsaz_512_scatter4,.-rsaz_512_scatter4
.globl rsaz_512_gather4
.type rsaz_512_gather4,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
rsaz_512_gather4:
.cfi_startproc
___
$code.=<<___ if ($win64);
.LSEH_begin_rsaz_512_gather4:
@@ -2219,6 +2245,7 @@ ___
$code.=<<___;
ret
.LSEH_end_rsaz_512_gather4:
.cfi_endproc
.size rsaz_512_gather4,.-rsaz_512_gather4
.align 64
crypto/bn/asm/s390x-mont.pl
+4 -4
View File
@@ -147,7 +147,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi $NHI,0
alcgr $NHI,$nhi
la $j,8(%r0) # j=1
la $j,8 # j=1
lr $count,$num
.align 16
@@ -199,7 +199,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi $NHI,0
alcgr $NHI,$nhi
la $j,8(%r0) # j=1
la $j,8 # j=1
lr $count,$num
.align 16
@@ -243,7 +243,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
la $ap,$stdframe($sp)
ahi $num,1 # restore $num, incidentally clears "borrow"
la $j,0(%r0)
la $j,0
lr $count,$num
.Lsub: lg $alo,0($j,$ap)
lg $nlo,0($j,$np)
@@ -257,7 +257,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lghi $NHI,-1
xgr $NHI,$AHI
la $j,0(%r0)
la $j,0
lgr $count,$num
.Lcopy: lg $ahi,$stdframe($j,$sp) # conditional copy
lg $alo,0($j,$rp)
crypto/bn/asm/s390x.S
+1 -1
View File
@@ -511,7 +511,7 @@ bn_mul_comba4:
lghi zero,0
mul_add_c(0,0,c1,c2,c3);
stg c1,0*8(%r3)
stg c1,0*8(%r2)
lghi c1,0
mul_add_c(0,1,c2,c3,c1);
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
crypto/bn/asm/x86_64-mont5.pl
+19 -1
View File
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ if (!$addx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$addx = ($1>=12);
}
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9])\.([0-9]+)/) {
if (!$addx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+)\.([0-9]+)/) {
my $ver = $2 + $3/100.0; # 3.1->3.01, 3.10->3.10
$addx = ($ver>=3.03);
}
@@ -582,6 +582,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type mul4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
mul4x_internal:
.cfi_startproc
shl \$5,$num # $num was in bytes
movd `($win64?56:8)`(%rax),%xmm5 # load 7th argument, index
lea .Linc(%rip),%rax
@@ -1076,6 +1077,7 @@ $code.=<<___
___
}
$code.=<<___;
.cfi_endproc
.size mul4x_internal,.-mul4x_internal
___
}}}
@@ -1241,6 +1243,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.align 32
bn_sqr8x_internal:
__bn_sqr8x_internal:
.cfi_startproc
##############################################################
# Squaring part:
#
@@ -2032,6 +2035,7 @@ __bn_sqr8x_reduction:
cmp %rdx,$tptr # end of t[]?
jb .L8x_reduction_loop
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size bn_sqr8x_internal,.-bn_sqr8x_internal
___
}
@@ -2044,6 +2048,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type __bn_post4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
__bn_post4x_internal:
.cfi_startproc
mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
lea (%rdi,$num),$tptr # %rdi was $tptr above
mov $num,%rcx
@@ -2094,6 +2099,7 @@ __bn_post4x_internal:
mov $num,%r10 # prepare for back-to-back call
neg $num # restore $num
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __bn_post4x_internal,.-__bn_post4x_internal
___
}
@@ -2103,10 +2109,12 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_from_montgomery,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
bn_from_montgomery:
.cfi_startproc
testl \$7,`($win64?"48(%rsp)":"%r9d")`
jz bn_from_mont8x
xor %eax,%eax
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size bn_from_montgomery,.-bn_from_montgomery
.type bn_from_mont8x,\@function,6
@@ -2402,6 +2410,7 @@ bn_mulx4x_mont_gather5:
.type mulx4x_internal,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 32
mulx4x_internal:
.cfi_startproc
mov $num,8(%rsp) # save -$num (it was in bytes)
mov $num,%r10
neg $num # restore $num
@@ -2752,6 +2761,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov 8*2(%rbp),%r14
mov 8*3(%rbp),%r15
jmp .Lsqrx4x_sub_entry # common post-condition
.cfi_endproc
.size mulx4x_internal,.-mulx4x_internal
___
} {
@@ -3557,6 +3567,7 @@ my ($rptr,$nptr)=("%rdx","%rbp");
$code.=<<___;
.align 32
__bn_postx4x_internal:
.cfi_startproc
mov 8*0($nptr),%r12
mov %rcx,%r10 # -$num
mov %rcx,%r9 # -$num
@@ -3604,6 +3615,7 @@ __bn_postx4x_internal:
neg %r9 # restore $num
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size __bn_postx4x_internal,.-__bn_postx4x_internal
___
}
@@ -3620,6 +3632,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type bn_get_bits5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_get_bits5:
.cfi_startproc
lea 0($inp),%r10
lea 1($inp),%r11
mov $num,%ecx
@@ -3633,12 +3646,14 @@ bn_get_bits5:
shrl %cl,%eax
and \$31,%eax
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size bn_get_bits5,.-bn_get_bits5
.globl bn_scatter5
.type bn_scatter5,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
bn_scatter5:
.cfi_startproc
cmp \$0, $num
jz .Lscatter_epilogue
lea ($tbl,$idx,8),$tbl
@@ -3651,6 +3666,7 @@ bn_scatter5:
jnz .Lscatter
.Lscatter_epilogue:
ret
.cfi_endproc
.size bn_scatter5,.-bn_scatter5
.globl bn_gather5
@@ -3658,6 +3674,7 @@ bn_scatter5:
.align 32
bn_gather5:
.LSEH_begin_bn_gather5: # Win64 thing, but harmless in other cases
.cfi_startproc
# I can't trust assembler to use specific encoding:-(
.byte 0x4c,0x8d,0x14,0x24 #lea (%rsp),%r10
.byte 0x48,0x81,0xec,0x08,0x01,0x00,0x00 #sub $0x108,%rsp
@@ -3742,6 +3759,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
lea (%r10),%rsp
ret
.LSEH_end_bn_gather5:
.cfi_endproc
.size bn_gather5,.-bn_gather5
___
}
crypto/bn/bn_depr.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
*/
#include <openssl/opensslconf.h>
#if OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
#ifdef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_0_9_8
NON_EMPTY_TRANSLATION_UNIT
#else
crypto/bn/bn_gcd.c
+7 -2
View File
@@ -593,7 +593,9 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx)
for (i = 0; i < m; i++) {
/* conditionally flip signs if delta is positive and g is odd */
cond = (-delta >> (8 * sizeof(delta) - 1)) & g->d[0] & 1;
cond = (-delta >> (8 * sizeof(delta) - 1)) & g->d[0] & 1
/* make sure g->top > 0 (i.e. if top == 0 then g == 0 always) */
& (~((g->top - 1) >> (sizeof(g->top) * 8 - 1)));
delta = (-cond & -delta) | ((cond - 1) & delta);
r->neg ^= cond;
/* swap */
@@ -603,7 +605,10 @@ int BN_gcd(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *in_a, const BIGNUM *in_b, BN_CTX *ctx)
delta++;
if (!BN_add(temp, g, r))
goto err;
BN_consttime_swap(g->d[0] & 1, g, temp, top);
BN_consttime_swap(g->d[0] & 1 /* g is odd */
/* make sure g->top > 0 (i.e. if top == 0 then g == 0 always) */
& (~((g->top - 1) >> (sizeof(g->top) * 8 - 1))),
g, temp, top);
if (!BN_rshift1(g, g))
goto err;
}
crypto/bn/bn_lib.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@
#include "internal/constant_time.h"
/* This stuff appears to be completely unused, so is deprecated */
#if !OPENSSL_API_0_9_8
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_0_9_8
/*-
* For a 32 bit machine
* 2 - 4 == 128
crypto/bn/bn_prime.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ int BN_generate_prime_ex(BIGNUM *ret, int bits, int safe,
}
#endif
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
int BN_is_prime_ex(const BIGNUM *a, int checks, BN_CTX *ctx_passed,
BN_GENCB *cb)
{
crypto/bn/bn_prime.h
+1 -1
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
*
* Copyright 1998-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1998-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
crypto/bn/bn_prime.pl
+2 -2
View File
@@ -6,8 +6,8 @@
# in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
# https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
# Output year depends on the year of the script.
my $YEAR = [localtime([stat($0)]->[9])]->[5] + 1900;
# The year the output file is generated.
my $YEAR = [localtime()]->[5] + 1900;
print <<"EOF";
/*
* WARNING: do not edit!
crypto/bn/bn_rsa_fips186_4.c
+44 -9
View File
@@ -31,6 +31,27 @@
#include <openssl/bn.h>
#include "bn_local.h"
#include "crypto/bn.h"
#include "internal/nelem.h"
#if BN_BITS2 == 64
# define BN_DEF(lo, hi) (BN_ULONG)hi<<32|lo
#else
# define BN_DEF(lo, hi) lo, hi
#endif
/* 1 / sqrt(2) * 2^256, rounded up */
static const BN_ULONG inv_sqrt_2_val[] = {
BN_DEF(0x83339916UL, 0xED17AC85UL), BN_DEF(0x893BA84CUL, 0x1D6F60BAUL),
BN_DEF(0x754ABE9FUL, 0x597D89B3UL), BN_DEF(0xF9DE6484UL, 0xB504F333UL)
};
const BIGNUM bn_inv_sqrt_2 = {
(BN_ULONG *)inv_sqrt_2_val,
OSSL_NELEM(inv_sqrt_2_val),
OSSL_NELEM(inv_sqrt_2_val),
0,
BN_FLG_STATIC_DATA
};
/*
* FIPS 186-4 Table B.1. "Min length of auxiliary primes p1, p2, q1, q2".
@@ -221,9 +242,12 @@ int bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
int i, imax;
int bits = nlen >> 1;
BIGNUM *tmp, *R, *r1r2x2, *y1, *r1x2;
BIGNUM *base, *range;
BN_CTX_start(ctx);
base = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
range = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
R = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
tmp = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
r1r2x2 = BN_CTX_get(ctx);
@@ -235,6 +259,24 @@ int bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
if (Xin != NULL && BN_copy(X, Xin) == NULL)
goto err;
/*
* We need to generate a random number X in the range
* 1/sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2) <= X < 2^(nlen/2).
* We can rewrite that as:
* base = 1/sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2)
* range = ((2^(nlen/2))) - (1/sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2))
* X = base + random(range)
* We only have the first 256 bit of 1/sqrt(2)
*/
if (Xin == NULL) {
if (bits < BN_num_bits(&bn_inv_sqrt_2))
goto err;
if (!BN_lshift(base, &bn_inv_sqrt_2, bits - BN_num_bits(&bn_inv_sqrt_2))
|| !BN_lshift(range, BN_value_one(), bits)
|| !BN_sub(range, range, base))
goto err;
}
if (!(BN_lshift1(r1x2, r1)
/* (Step 1) GCD(2r1, r2) = 1 */
&& BN_gcd(tmp, r1x2, r2, ctx)
@@ -257,16 +299,9 @@ int bn_rsa_fips186_4_derive_prime(BIGNUM *Y, BIGNUM *X, const BIGNUM *Xin,
if (Xin == NULL) {
/*
* (Step 3) Choose Random X such that
* sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2-1) < Random X < (2^(nlen/2)) - 1.
*
* For the lower bound:
* sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2 - 1) == sqrt(2)/2 * 2^(nlen/2)
* where sqrt(2)/2 = 0.70710678.. = 0.B504FC33F9DE...
* so largest number will have B5... as the top byte
* Setting the top 2 bits gives 0xC0.
* sqrt(2) * 2^(nlen/2-1) <= Random X <= (2^(nlen/2)) - 1.
*/
if (!BN_priv_rand_ex(X, bits, BN_RAND_TOP_TWO, BN_RAND_BOTTOM_ANY,
ctx))
if (!BN_priv_rand_range_ex(X, range, ctx) || !BN_add(X, X, base))
goto end;
}
/* (Step 4) Y = X + ((R - X) mod 2r1r2) */
crypto/bn/bn_shift.c
+10 -13
View File
@@ -34,12 +34,10 @@ int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
for (i = 0; i < a->top; i++) {
t = *(ap++);
*(rp++) = ((t << 1) | c) & BN_MASK2;
c = (t & BN_TBIT) ? 1 : 0;
}
if (c) {
*rp = 1;
r->top++;
c = t >> (BN_BITS2 - 1);
}
*rp = c;
r->top += c;
bn_check_top(r);
return 1;
}
@@ -47,7 +45,7 @@ int BN_lshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
{
BN_ULONG *ap, *rp, t, c;
int i, j;
int i;
bn_check_top(r);
bn_check_top(a);
@@ -58,23 +56,22 @@ int BN_rshift1(BIGNUM *r, const BIGNUM *a)
}
i = a->top;
ap = a->d;
j = i - (ap[i - 1] == 1);
if (a != r) {
if (bn_wexpand(r, j) == NULL)
if (bn_wexpand(r, i) == NULL)
return 0;
r->neg = a->neg;
}
rp = r->d;
r->top = i;
t = ap[--i];
c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0;
if (t >>= 1)
rp[i] = t;
rp[i] = t >> 1;
c = t << (BN_BITS2 - 1);
r->top -= (t == 1);
while (i > 0) {
t = ap[--i];
rp[i] = ((t >> 1) & BN_MASK2) | c;
c = (t & 1) ? BN_TBIT : 0;
c = t << (BN_BITS2 - 1);
}
r->top = j;
if (!r->top)
r->neg = 0; /* don't allow negative zero */
bn_check_top(r);
crypto/build.info
+6 -5
View File
@@ -1,11 +1,11 @@
# Note that these directories are filtered in Configure. Look for %skipdir
# there for further explanations.
SUBDIRS=objects buffer bio stack lhash rand evp asn1 pem x509 conf \
txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 ui store property \
md2 md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool poly1305 blake2 \
txt_db pkcs7 pkcs12 ui kdf store property \
md2 md4 md5 sha mdc2 hmac ripemd whrlpool poly1305 \
siphash sm3 des aes rc2 rc4 rc5 idea aria bf cast camellia \
seed sm4 chacha modes bn ec rsa dsa dh sm2 dso engine \
err comp ocsp cms ts srp cmac ct async ess crmf cmp
err comp ocsp cms ts srp cmac ct async ess crmf cmp serializer
LIBS=../libcrypto
@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ ENDIF
$CORE_COMMON=provider_core.c provider_predefined.c \
core_fetch.c core_algorithm.c core_namemap.c
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=$CORE_COMMON provider_conf.c
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=$CORE_COMMON provider_conf.c self_test_core.c
SOURCE[../providers/libfips.a]=$CORE_COMMON
# Central utilities
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ $UTIL_COMMON=\
$UTIL_DEFINE=$CPUIDDEF
SOURCE[../libcrypto]=$UTIL_COMMON \
mem.c mem_sec.c mem_dbg.c \
mem.c mem_sec.c \
cversion.c info.c cpt_err.c ebcdic.c uid.c o_time.c o_dir.c \
o_fopen.c getenv.c o_init.c o_fips.c init.c trace.c provider.c \
$UPLINKSRC
@@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ DEFINE[../libcrypto]=$UTIL_DEFINE $UPLINKDEF
DEFINE[../providers/libfips.a]=$UTIL_DEFINE
DEFINE[../providers/fips]=$UTIL_DEFINE
DEFINE[../providers/libimplementations.a]=$UTIL_DEFINE
DEFINE[../providers/libcommon.a]=$UTIL_DEFINE
DEPEND[info.o]=buildinf.h
DEPEND[cversion.o]=buildinf.h
crypto/camellia/asm/cmll-x86_64.pl
+8
View File
@@ -127,11 +127,13 @@ $code=<<___;
.type Camellia_EncryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
Camellia_EncryptBlock:
.cfi_startproc
movl \$128,%eax
subl $arg0d,%eax
movl \$3,$arg0d
adcl \$0,$arg0d # keyBitLength==128?3:4
jmp .Lenc_rounds
.cfi_endproc
.size Camellia_EncryptBlock,.-Camellia_EncryptBlock
# V2
.globl Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds
@@ -200,6 +202,7 @@ Camellia_EncryptBlock_Rounds:
.type _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt:
.cfi_startproc
xor 0($key),@S[1]
xor 4($key),@S[0] # ^=key[0-3]
xor 8($key),@S[3]
@@ -243,6 +246,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $t3,@S[3]
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_Camellia_encrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_encrypt
# V1.x API
@@ -250,11 +254,13 @@ $code.=<<___;
.type Camellia_DecryptBlock,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
Camellia_DecryptBlock:
.cfi_startproc
movl \$128,%eax
subl $arg0d,%eax
movl \$3,$arg0d
adcl \$0,$arg0d # keyBitLength==128?3:4
jmp .Ldec_rounds
.cfi_endproc
.size Camellia_DecryptBlock,.-Camellia_DecryptBlock
# V2
.globl Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds
@@ -323,6 +329,7 @@ Camellia_DecryptBlock_Rounds:
.type _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,\@abi-omnipotent
.align 16
_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt:
.cfi_startproc
xor 0($key),@S[1]
xor 4($key),@S[0] # ^=key[0-3]
xor 8($key),@S[3]
@@ -367,6 +374,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
mov $t1,@S[3]
.byte 0xf3,0xc3 # rep ret
.cfi_endproc
.size _x86_64_Camellia_decrypt,.-_x86_64_Camellia_decrypt
___
crypto/camellia/build.info
+2
View File
@@ -10,10 +10,12 @@ IF[{- !$disabled{asm} -}]
# appropriate one
IF[$CMLLASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}]
$CMLLASM=$CMLLASM_{- $target{asm_arch} -}
$CMLLDEF=CMLL_ASM
ENDIF
ENDIF
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]=cmll_ecb.c cmll_ofb.c cmll_cfb.c cmll_ctr.c $CMLLASM
DEFINE[../../libcrypto]=$CMLLDEF
GENERATE[cmll-x86.s]=asm/cmll-x86.pl
DEPEND[cmll-x86.s]=../perlasm/x86asm.pl
crypto/camellia/camellia.c
+6
View File
@@ -39,6 +39,12 @@
* words reasonable performance even with not so modern compilers.
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include "cmll_local.h"
#include <string.h>
crypto/camellia/cmll_cbc.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/camellia/cmll_cfb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/camellia/cmll_ctr.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/camellia/cmll_ecb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include "cmll_local.h"
crypto/camellia/cmll_misc.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include "cmll_local.h"
crypto/camellia/cmll_ofb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* Camellia low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/camellia.h>
#include <openssl/modes.h>
crypto/cast/c_cfb64.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* CAST low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/cast.h>
#include "cast_local.h"
crypto/cast/c_ecb.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* CAST low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/cast.h>
#include "cast_local.h"
#include <openssl/opensslv.h>
crypto/cast/c_enc.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* CAST low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/cast.h>
#include "cast_local.h"
crypto/cast/c_ofb64.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* CAST low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/cast.h>
#include "cast_local.h"
crypto/cast/c_skey.c
+6
View File
@@ -7,6 +7,12 @@
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/*
* CAST low level APIs are deprecated for public use, but still ok for
* internal use.
*/
#include "internal/deprecated.h"
#include <openssl/cast.h>
#include "cast_local.h"
#include "cast_s.h"
crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-armv8.pl
+3 -2
View File
@@ -1232,8 +1232,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
adds $len,$len,#512
ushr $ONE,$ONE,#1 // 4 -> 2
ldp d8,d9,[sp,#128+0] // meet ABI requirements
ldp d10,d11,[sp,#128+16]
ldp d10,d11,[sp,#128+16] // meet ABI requirements
ldp d12,d13,[sp,#128+32]
ldp d14,d15,[sp,#128+48]
@@ -1250,6 +1249,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
ld1 {$CTR,$ROT24},[$key]
b.hs .Loop_outer_neon
ldp d8,d9,[sp,#0] // meet ABI requirements
eor @K[1],@K[1],@K[1]
eor @K[2],@K[2],@K[2]
eor @K[3],@K[3],@K[3]
@@ -1259,6 +1259,7 @@ $code.=<<___;
b .Loop_outer
.Ldone_512_neon:
ldp d8,d9,[sp,#128+0] // meet ABI requirements
ldp x19,x20,[x29,#16]
add sp,sp,#128+64
ldp x21,x22,[x29,#32]
crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-s390x.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
use strict;
use FindBin qw($Bin);
use lib "$Bin/../..";
use perlasm::s390x qw(:DEFAULT :VX :LD AUTOLOAD LABEL INCLUDE);
use perlasm::s390x qw(:DEFAULT :VX :EI AUTOLOAD LABEL INCLUDE);
# $output is the last argument if it looks like a file (it has an extension)
# $flavour is the first argument if it doesn't look like a file
crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ $ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm && $ARGV[0] eq "win32" &&
$1>=10); # first version supporting AVX
$ymm=1 if ($xmm && !$ymm &&
`$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/ &&
`$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/ &&
$2>=3.0); # first version supporting AVX
$a="eax";
crypto/chacha/asm/chacha-x86_64.pl
+1 -1
View File
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ if (!$avx && $win64 && ($flavour =~ /masm/ || $ENV{ASM} =~ /ml64/) &&
$avx = ($1>=10) + ($1>=11);
}
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([3-9]\.[0-9]+)/) {
if (!$avx && `$ENV{CC} -v 2>&1` =~ /((?:^clang|LLVM) version|.*based on LLVM) ([0-9]+\.[0-9]+)/) {
$avx = ($2>=3.0) + ($2>3.0);
}
crypto/chacha/chacha_enc.c
+13 -4
View File
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
#include <string.h>
#include "crypto/chacha.h"
#include "crypto/ctype.h"
typedef unsigned int u32;
typedef unsigned char u8;
@@ -78,10 +79,18 @@ void ChaCha20_ctr32(unsigned char *out, const unsigned char *inp,
size_t todo, i;
/* sigma constant "expand 32-byte k" in little-endian encoding */
input[0] = ((u32)'e') | ((u32)'x'<<8) | ((u32)'p'<<16) | ((u32)'a'<<24);
input[1] = ((u32)'n') | ((u32)'d'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'3'<<24);
input[2] = ((u32)'2') | ((u32)'-'<<8) | ((u32)'b'<<16) | ((u32)'y'<<24);
input[3] = ((u32)'t') | ((u32)'e'<<8) | ((u32)' '<<16) | ((u32)'k'<<24);
input[0] = ((u32)ossl_toascii('e')) | ((u32)ossl_toascii('x') << 8)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('p') << 16)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('a') << 24);
input[1] = ((u32)ossl_toascii('n')) | ((u32)ossl_toascii('d') << 8)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii(' ') << 16)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('3') << 24);
input[2] = ((u32)ossl_toascii('2')) | ((u32)ossl_toascii('-') << 8)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('b') << 16)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('y') << 24);
input[3] = ((u32)ossl_toascii('t')) | ((u32)ossl_toascii('e') << 8)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii(' ') << 16)
| ((u32)ossl_toascii('k') << 24);
input[4] = key[0];
input[5] = key[1];
crypto/cmp/build.info
+2 -1
View File
@@ -1,2 +1,3 @@
LIBS=../../libcrypto
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= cmp_asn.c cmp_ctx.c cmp_err.c cmp_util.c
SOURCE[../../libcrypto]= cmp_asn.c cmp_ctx.c cmp_err.c cmp_util.c \
cmp_status.c cmp_hdr.c cmp_protect.c cmp_msg.c
crypto/cmp/cmp_asn.c
+4 -5
View File
@@ -164,7 +164,7 @@ int OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) **itav_sk_p,
{
int created = 0;
if (itav_sk_p == NULL) {
if (itav_sk_p == NULL || itav == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
goto err;
}
@@ -174,11 +174,10 @@ int OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) **itav_sk_p,
goto err;
created = 1;
}
if (itav != NULL) {
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push(*itav_sk_p, itav))
goto err;
}
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push(*itav_sk_p, itav))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
if (created != 0) {
sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(*itav_sk_p);
crypto/cmp/cmp_ctx.c
+23 -8
View File
@@ -68,14 +68,21 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_untrusted_certs(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_untrusted_certs(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, STACK_OF(X509) *certs)
{
STACK_OF(X509) *untrusted_certs;
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->untrusted_certs, X509_free);
if ((ctx->untrusted_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
if ((untrusted_certs = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
return ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(ctx->untrusted_certs, certs, 0, 1, 0);
if (ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(untrusted_certs, certs, 0, 1, 0) != 1)
goto err;
sk_X509_pop_free(ctx->untrusted_certs, X509_free);
ctx->untrusted_certs = untrusted_certs;
return 1;
err:
sk_X509_pop_free(untrusted_certs, X509_free);
return 0;
}
/*
@@ -195,7 +202,7 @@ void OSSL_CMP_CTX_free(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set_status(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int status)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return 0;
return 0;
ctx->status = status;
return 1;
}
@@ -373,13 +380,19 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_referenceValue(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_secretValue(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *sec,
const int len)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secretValue = NULL;
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (ctx->secretValue != NULL)
if (ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1_bytes(&secretValue, sec, len) != 1)
return 0;
if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
OPENSSL_cleanse(ctx->secretValue->data, ctx->secretValue->length);
return ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1_bytes(&ctx->secretValue, sec, len);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(ctx->secretValue);
}
ctx->secretValue = secretValue;
return 1;
}
/*
@@ -933,7 +946,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_failInfoCode(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
* Sets a Boolean or integer option of the context to the "val" arg.
* Returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val) {
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val)
{
int min_val;
if (ctx == NULL) {
@@ -1036,7 +1050,8 @@ int OSSL_CMP_CTX_set_option(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt, int val) {
* Reads a Boolean or integer option value from the context.
* Returns -1 on error (which is the default OSSL_CMP_OPT_REVOCATION_REASON)
*/
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_option(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt) {
int OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_option(const OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int opt)
{
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return -1;
crypto/cmp/cmp_err.c
+60 -3
View File
@@ -1,7 +1,6 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
* Generated by util/mkerr.pl DO NOT EDIT
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
@@ -15,11 +14,69 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
static const ERR_STRING_DATA CMP_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID), "bad request id"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTID_NOT_FOUND), "certid not found"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND),
"certificate not found"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND),
"certresponse not found"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH),
"cert and key do not match"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION),
"error calculating protection"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTCONF),
"error creating certconf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTREP),
"error creating certrep"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_ERROR),
"error creating error"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENM),
"error creating genm"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP),
"error creating genp"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_P10CR),
"error creating p10cr"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_PKICONF),
"error creating pkiconf"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREP),
"error creating pollrep"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREQ),
"error creating pollreq"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RP), "error creating rp"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RR), "error creating rr"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_PARSING_PKISTATUS),
"error parsing pkistatus"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE),
"error protecting message"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_ERROR_SETTING_CERTHASH),
"error setting certhash"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM),
"failure obtaining random"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_FAIL_INFO_OUT_OF_RANGE),
"fail info out of range"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS), "invalid args"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION),
"missing key input for creating protection"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY),
"missing private key"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION),
"missing sender identification"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_MULTIPLE_SAN_SOURCES),
"multiple san sources"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_NO_STDIO), "no stdio"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT), "null argument"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_PKISTATUSINFO_NOT_FOUND),
"pkistatusinfo not found"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY), "unexpected pkibody"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID),
"unknown algorithm id"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_TYPE), "unknown cert type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM),
"unsupported algorithm"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE),
"unsupported key type"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CMP, 0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID),
"wrong algorithm oid"},
{0, NULL}
};
crypto/cmp/cmp_hdr.c
+377
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,377 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* CMP functions for PKIHeader handling */
#include "cmp_local.h"
#include <openssl/rand.h>
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set_pvno(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, int pvno)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
return ASN1_INTEGER_set(hdr->pvno, pvno);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
int64_t pvno;
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return -1;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_get_int64(&pvno, hdr->pvno) || pvno < 0 || pvno > INT_MAX)
return -1;
return (int)pvno;
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OSSL_CMP_HDR_get0_transactionID(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
if (hdr == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
return hdr->transactionID;
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ossl_cmp_hdr_get0_senderNonce(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return NULL;
return hdr->senderNonce;
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *OSSL_CMP_HDR_get0_recipNonce(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
if (hdr == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
return hdr->recipNonce;
}
/* assign to *tgt a copy of src (which may be NULL to indicate an empty DN) */
static int set1_general_name(GENERAL_NAME **tgt, const X509_NAME *src)
{
GENERAL_NAME *gen;
if (!ossl_assert(tgt != NULL))
return 0;
if ((gen = GENERAL_NAME_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
gen->type = GEN_DIRNAME;
if (src == NULL) { /* NULL-DN */
if ((gen->d.directoryName = X509_NAME_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
} else if (!X509_NAME_set(&gen->d.directoryName, src)) {
goto err;
}
GENERAL_NAME_free(*tgt);
*tgt = gen;
return 1;
err:
GENERAL_NAME_free(gen);
return 0;
}
/*
* Set the sender name in PKIHeader.
* when nm is NULL, sender is set to an empty string
* returns 1 on success, 0 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_sender(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, const X509_NAME *nm)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
return set1_general_name(&hdr->sender, nm);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_recipient(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, const X509_NAME *nm)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
return set1_general_name(&hdr->recipient, nm);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_update_messageTime(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
if (hdr->messageTime == NULL
&& (hdr->messageTime = ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
return ASN1_GENERALIZEDTIME_set(hdr->messageTime, time(NULL)) != NULL;
}
/* assign to *tgt a copy of src (or if NULL a random byte array of given len) */
static int set1_aostr_else_random(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **tgt,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src, size_t len)
{
unsigned char *bytes = NULL;
int res = 0;
if (src == NULL) { /* generate a random value if src == NULL */
if ((bytes = OPENSSL_malloc(len)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (RAND_bytes(bytes, len) <= 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAILURE_OBTAINING_RANDOM);
goto err;
}
res = ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1_bytes(tgt, bytes, len);
} else {
res = ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(tgt, src);
}
err:
OPENSSL_free(bytes);
return res;
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *senderKID)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
return ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&hdr->senderKID, senderKID);
}
/* push the given text string to the given PKIFREETEXT ft */
int ossl_cmp_pkifreetext_push_str(OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ft, const char *text)
{
ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8string;
if (!ossl_assert(ft != NULL && text != NULL))
return 0;
if ((utf8string = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(utf8string, text, -1))
goto err;
if (!sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(ft, utf8string))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(utf8string);
return 0;
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_push0_freeText(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, ASN1_UTF8STRING *text)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL && text != NULL))
return 0;
if (hdr->freeText == NULL
&& (hdr->freeText = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
return sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(hdr->freeText, text);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_push1_freeText(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, ASN1_UTF8STRING *text)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL && text != NULL))
return 0;
if (hdr->freeText == NULL
&& (hdr->freeText = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
return ossl_cmp_pkifreetext_push_str(hdr->freeText, (char *)text->data);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push0_item(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
{
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL && itav != NULL))
return 0;
return OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(&hdr->generalInfo, itav);
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push1_items(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs)
{
int i;
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav;
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_num(itavs); i++) {
itav = OSSL_CMP_ITAV_dup(sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_value(itavs, i));
if (itav == NULL)
return 0;
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push0_item(hdr, itav)) {
OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(itav);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav;
ASN1_TYPE *asn1null;
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
asn1null = (ASN1_TYPE *)ASN1_NULL_new();
if (asn1null == NULL)
return 0;
if ((itav = OSSL_CMP_ITAV_create(OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_it_implicitConfirm),
asn1null)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push0_item(hdr, itav))
goto err;
return 1;
err:
ASN1_TYPE_free(asn1null);
OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(itav);
return 0;
}
/* return 1 if implicitConfirm in the generalInfo field of the header is set */
int ossl_cmp_hdr_check_implicitConfirm(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
int itavCount;
int i;
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav;
if (!ossl_assert(hdr != NULL))
return 0;
itavCount = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_num(hdr->generalInfo);
for (i = 0; i < itavCount; i++) {
itav = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_value(hdr->generalInfo, i);
if (itav != NULL
&& OBJ_obj2nid(itav->infoType) == NID_id_it_implicitConfirm)
return 1;
}
return 0;
}
/* fill in all fields of the hdr according to the info given in ctx */
int ossl_cmp_hdr_init(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr)
{
X509_NAME *sender;
X509_NAME *rcp = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && hdr != NULL))
return 0;
/* set the CMP version */
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set_pvno(hdr, OSSL_CMP_PVNO))
return 0;
sender = ctx->clCert != NULL ?
X509_get_subject_name(ctx->clCert) : ctx->subjectName;
/*
* The sender name is copied from the subject of the client cert, if any,
* or else from the the subject name provided for certification requests.
* As required by RFC 4210 section 5.1.1., if the sender name is not known
* to the client it set to NULL-DN. In this case for identification at least
* the senderKID must be set, which we take from any referenceValue given.
*/
if (sender == NULL && ctx->referenceValue == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_SENDER_IDENTIFICATION);
return 0;
}
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_sender(hdr, sender))
return 0;
/* determine recipient entry in PKIHeader */
if (ctx->srvCert != NULL) {
rcp = X509_get_subject_name(ctx->srvCert);
/* set also as expected_sender of responses unless set explicitly */
if (ctx->expected_sender == NULL && rcp != NULL
&& !OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_expected_sender(ctx, rcp))
return 0;
} else if (ctx->recipient != NULL) {
rcp = ctx->recipient;
} else if (ctx->issuer != NULL) {
rcp = ctx->issuer;
} else if (ctx->oldCert != NULL) {
rcp = X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert);
} else if (ctx->clCert != NULL) {
rcp = X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->clCert);
}
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_recipient(hdr, rcp))
return 0;
/* set current time as message time */
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_update_messageTime(hdr))
return 0;
if (ctx->recipNonce != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&hdr->recipNonce,
ctx->recipNonce))
return 0;
/*
* set ctx->transactionID in CMP header
* if ctx->transactionID is NULL, a random one is created with 128 bit
* according to section 5.1.1:
*
* It is RECOMMENDED that the clients fill the transactionID field with
* 128 bits of (pseudo-) random data for the start of a transaction to
* reduce the probability of having the transactionID in use at the server.
*/
if (ctx->transactionID == NULL
&& !set1_aostr_else_random(&ctx->transactionID, NULL,
OSSL_CMP_TRANSACTIONID_LENGTH))
return 0;
if (!ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(&hdr->transactionID,
ctx->transactionID))
return 0;
/*-
* set random senderNonce
* according to section 5.1.1:
*
* senderNonce present
* -- 128 (pseudo-)random bits
* The senderNonce and recipNonce fields protect the PKIMessage against
* replay attacks. The senderNonce will typically be 128 bits of
* (pseudo-) random data generated by the sender, whereas the recipNonce
* is copied from the senderNonce of the previous message in the
* transaction.
*/
if (!set1_aostr_else_random(&hdr->senderNonce, NULL,
OSSL_CMP_SENDERNONCE_LENGTH))
return 0;
/* store senderNonce - for cmp with recipNonce in next outgoing msg */
if (!OSSL_CMP_CTX_set1_senderNonce(ctx, hdr->senderNonce))
return 0;
/*-
* freeText [7] PKIFreeText OPTIONAL,
* -- this may be used to indicate context-specific instructions
* -- (this field is intended for human consumption)
*/
if (ctx->freeText != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_push1_freeText(hdr, ctx->freeText))
return 0;
return 1;
}
crypto/cmp/cmp_local.h
+128 -2
View File
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ struct ossl_cmp_ctx_st {
int proxyPort;
int msgtimeout; /* max seconds to wait for each CMP message round trip */
int totaltimeout; /* maximum number seconds an enrollment may take, incl. */
/* attempts polling for a response if a 'waiting' PKIStatus is received */
/* attempts polling for a response if a 'waiting' PKIStatus is received */
time_t end_time; /* session start time + totaltimeout */
OSSL_cmp_http_cb_t http_cb;
void *http_cb_arg; /* allows to store optional argument to cb */
@@ -77,6 +77,7 @@ struct ossl_cmp_ctx_st {
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *transactionID; /* the current transaction ID */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *senderNonce; /* last nonce sent */
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *recipNonce; /* last nonce received */
ASN1_UTF8STRING *freeText; /* optional string to include each msg */
STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *geninfo_ITAVs;
int implicitConfirm; /* set implicitConfirm in IR/KUR/CR messages */
int disableConfirm; /* disable certConf in IR/KUR/CR for broken servers */
@@ -278,6 +279,7 @@ struct ossl_cmp_pkisi_st {
} /* OSSL_CMP_PKISI */;
DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CMP_PKISI)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CMP_PKISI)
DECLARE_ASN1_DUP_FUNCTION(OSSL_CRMF_CERTID)
/*-
* RevReqContent ::= SEQUENCE OF RevDetails
@@ -525,6 +527,7 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CMP_GENREPCONTENT)
* certConf [24] CertConfirmContent, --Certificate confirm
* pollReq [25] PollReqContent, --Polling request
* pollRep [26] PollRepContent --Polling response
* }
*/
typedef struct ossl_cmp_pkibody_st {
int type;
@@ -678,6 +681,13 @@ DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(CMP_PROTECTEDPART)
* }
*/
/*
* constants
*/
/* certReqId for the first - and so far only - certificate request */
# define OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID 0
/* sequence id for the first - and so far only - revocation request */
# define OSSL_CMP_REVREQSID 0
/*
* functions
*/
@@ -720,6 +730,122 @@ int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_extraCertsIn(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
int ossl_cmp_ctx_set1_recipNonce(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *nonce);
# define OSSL_CMP_TRANSACTIONID_LENGTH 16
/* from cmp_status.c */
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *
ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(int status, int fail_info, const char *text);
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *statusInfo);
const char *ossl_cmp_PKIStatus_to_string(int status);
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ossl_cmp_pkisi_get0_statusstring(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si);
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkifailureinfo(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si);
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_pkifailureinfo_check(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si, int bit_index);
/* from cmp_hdr.c */
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set_pvno(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, int pvno);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_get_pvno(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *ossl_cmp_hdr_get0_senderNonce(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_sender(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, const X509_NAME *nm);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_recipient(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, const X509_NAME *nm);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_update_messageTime(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *senderKID);
int ossl_cmp_pkifreetext_push_str(OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ft, const char *text);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_push0_freeText(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, ASN1_UTF8STRING *text);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_push1_freeText(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr, ASN1_UTF8STRING *text);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push0_item(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push1_items(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr,
STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
int ossl_cmp_hdr_check_implicitConfirm(const OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
# define OSSL_CMP_TRANSACTIONID_LENGTH 16
# define OSSL_CMP_SENDERNONCE_LENGTH 16
int ossl_cmp_hdr_init(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *hdr);
/* from cmp_msg.c */
/* OSSL_CMP_MSG bodytype ASN.1 choice IDs */
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR 0
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP 1
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR 2
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP 3
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR 4
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POPDECC 5
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POPDECR 6
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR 7
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP 8
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KRR 9
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KRP 10
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR 11
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP 12
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCR 13
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CCP 14
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CKUANN 15
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CANN 16
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RANN 17
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CRLANN 18
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF 19
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_NESTED 20
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM 21
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP 22
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR 23
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF 24
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ 25
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP 26
# define OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_TYPE_MAX OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP
const char *ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(int type);
int ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int type);
int ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_create(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
int err_code);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
int certReqId, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs, int encrypted,
int unprotectedErrors);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rr_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *certId, int unprot_err);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pkiconf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav);
int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
int errorCode,
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *errorDetails,
int unprotected);
int ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus,
const X509 *cert);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info,
const char *text);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid,
int64_t poll_after);
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *
ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkistatusinfo(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid);
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_CertId(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep,
int rsid);
OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *
ossl_cmp_pollrepcontent_get0_pollrep(const OSSL_CMP_POLLREPCONTENT *prc,
int rid);
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(const OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crepmsg,
int rid);
X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(EVP_PKEY *privkey,
const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep);
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_load(const char *file);
/* BIO definitions */
# define OSSL_d2i_CMP_MSG_bio(bp, p) \
ASN1_d2i_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, OSSL_CMP_MSG_new, d2i_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bp, p)
# define OSSL_i2d_CMP_MSG_bio(bp, o) \
ASN1_i2d_bio_of(OSSL_CMP_MSG, i2d_OSSL_CMP_MSG, bp, o)
/* from cmp_protect.c */
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
EVP_PKEY *pkey);
int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg);
#endif /* !defined OSSL_CRYPTO_CMP_LOCAL_H */
crypto/cmp/cmp_msg.c
+996
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,996 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* CMP functions for PKIMessage construction */
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
OSSL_CMP_PKIHEADER *OSSL_CMP_MSG_get0_header(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (msg == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return NULL;
}
return msg->header;
}
const char *ossl_cmp_bodytype_to_string(int type)
{
static const char *type_names[] = {
"IR", "IP", "CR", "CP", "P10CR",
"POPDECC", "POPDECR", "KUR", "KUP",
"KRR", "KRP", "RR", "RP", "CCR", "CCP",
"CKUANN", "CANN", "RANN", "CRLANN", "PKICONF", "NESTED",
"GENM", "GENP", "ERROR", "CERTCONF", "POLLREQ", "POLLREP",
};
if (type < 0 || type > OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_TYPE_MAX)
return "illegal body type";
return type_names[type];
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, int type)
{
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
return 0;
msg->body->type = type;
return 1;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && msg->body != NULL))
return -1;
return msg->body->type;
}
/* Add an extension to the referenced extension stack, which may be NULL */
static int add1_extension(X509_EXTENSIONS **pexts, int nid, int crit, void *ex)
{
X509_EXTENSION *ext;
int res;
if (!ossl_assert(pexts != NULL)) /* pointer to var must not be NULL */
return 0;
if ((ext = X509V3_EXT_i2d(nid, crit, ex)) == NULL)
return 0;
res = X509v3_add_ext(pexts, ext, 0) != NULL;
X509_EXTENSION_free(ext);
return res;
}
/* Add a CRL revocation reason code to extension stack, which may be NULL */
static int add_crl_reason_extension(X509_EXTENSIONS **pexts, int reason_code)
{
ASN1_ENUMERATED *val = ASN1_ENUMERATED_new();
int res = 0;
if (val != NULL && ASN1_ENUMERATED_set(val, reason_code))
res = add1_extension(pexts, NID_crl_reason, 0 /* non-critical */, val);
ASN1_ENUMERATED_free(val);
return res;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_create(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = OSSL_CMP_MSG_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!ossl_cmp_hdr_init(ctx, msg->header)
|| !ossl_cmp_msg_set_bodytype(msg, bodytype))
goto err;
if (ctx->geninfo_ITAVs != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_generalInfo_push1_items(msg->header,
ctx->geninfo_ITAVs))
goto err;
switch (bodytype) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR:
if ((msg->body->value.ir = OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR:
if (ctx->p10CSR == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_P10CR);
goto err;
}
if ((msg->body->value.p10cr = X509_REQ_dup(ctx->p10CSR)) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CP:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUP:
if ((msg->body->value.ip = OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR:
if ((msg->body->value.rr = sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP:
if ((msg->body->value.rp = OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF:
if ((msg->body->value.certConf =
sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF:
if ((msg->body->value.pkiconf = ASN1_TYPE_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
ASN1_TYPE_set(msg->body->value.pkiconf, V_ASN1_NULL, NULL);
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ:
if ((msg->body->value.pollReq = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP:
if ((msg->body->value.pollRep = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM:
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP:
if ((msg->body->value.genm = sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
case OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR:
if ((msg->body->value.error = OSSL_CMP_ERRORMSGCONTENT_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
return msg;
default:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNEXPECTED_PKIBODY);
goto err;
}
err:
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
#define HAS_SAN(ctx) \
(sk_GENERAL_NAME_num((ctx)->subjectAltNames) > 0 \
|| OSSL_CMP_CTX_reqExtensions_have_SAN(ctx) == 1)
static X509_NAME *determine_subj(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, X509 *refcert,
int bodytype)
{
if (ctx->subjectName != NULL)
return ctx->subjectName;
if (refcert != NULL
&& (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR || !HAS_SAN(ctx)))
/*
* For KUR, copy subjectName from reference certificate.
* For IR or CR, do the same only if there is no subjectAltName.
*/
return X509_get_subject_name(refcert);
return NULL;
}
/*
* Create CRMF certificate request message for IR/CR/KUR
* returns a pointer to the OSSL_CRMF_MSG on success, NULL on error
*/
static OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
int rid, EVP_PKEY *rkey)
{
OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm = NULL;
X509 *refcert = ctx->oldCert != NULL ? ctx->oldCert : ctx->clCert;
/* refcert defaults to current client cert */
STACK_OF(GENERAL_NAME) *default_sans = NULL;
X509_NAME *subject = determine_subj(ctx, refcert, bodytype);
int crit = ctx->setSubjectAltNameCritical || subject == NULL;
/* RFC5280: subjectAltName MUST be critical if subject is null */
X509_EXTENSIONS *exts = NULL;
if (rkey == NULL
|| (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR && refcert == NULL)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
if ((crm = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_new()) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_certReqId(crm, rid)
/*
* fill certTemplate, corresponding to CertificationRequestInfo
* of PKCS#10. The rkey param cannot be NULL so far -
* it could be NULL if centralized key creation was supported
*/
|| !OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(OSSL_CRMF_MSG_get0_tmpl(crm), rkey,
subject, ctx->issuer,
NULL/* serial */))
goto err;
if (ctx->days != 0) {
time_t notBefore, notAfter;
notBefore = time(NULL);
notAfter = notBefore + 60 * 60 * 24 * ctx->days;
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_validity(crm, notBefore, notAfter))
goto err;
}
/* extensions */
if (refcert != NULL && !ctx->SubjectAltName_nodefault)
default_sans = X509V3_get_d2i(X509_get0_extensions(refcert),
NID_subject_alt_name, NULL, NULL);
/* exts are copied from ctx to allow reuse */
if (ctx->reqExtensions != NULL) {
exts = sk_X509_EXTENSION_deep_copy(ctx->reqExtensions,
X509_EXTENSION_dup,
X509_EXTENSION_free);
if (exts == NULL)
goto err;
}
if (sk_GENERAL_NAME_num(ctx->subjectAltNames) > 0
&& !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name,
crit, ctx->subjectAltNames))
goto err;
if (!HAS_SAN(ctx) && default_sans != NULL
&& !add1_extension(&exts, NID_subject_alt_name, crit, default_sans))
goto err;
if (ctx->policies != NULL
&& !add1_extension(&exts, NID_certificate_policies,
ctx->setPoliciesCritical, ctx->policies))
goto err;
if (!OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set0_extensions(crm, exts))
goto err;
exts = NULL;
/* end fill certTemplate, now set any controls */
/* for KUR, set OldCertId according to D.6 */
if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR) {
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid =
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(X509_get_issuer_name(refcert),
X509_get_serialNumber(refcert));
int ret;
if (cid == NULL)
goto err;
ret = OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set1_regCtrl_oldCertID(crm, cid);
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_free(cid);
if (ret == 0)
goto err;
}
goto end;
err:
OSSL_CRMF_MSG_free(crm);
crm = NULL;
end:
sk_X509_EXTENSION_pop_free(exts, X509_EXTENSION_free);
sk_GENERAL_NAME_pop_free(default_sans, GENERAL_NAME_free);
return crm;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int type, int err_code)
{
EVP_PKEY *rkey;
EVP_PKEY *privkey;
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
rkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 0);
if (rkey == NULL)
return NULL;
privkey = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_newPkey(ctx, 1);
if (type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IR && type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CR
&& type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_KUR && type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
return NULL;
}
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, type)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* header */
if (ctx->implicitConfirm && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(msg->header))
goto err;
/* body */
/* For P10CR the content has already been set in OSSL_CMP_MSG_create */
if (type != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_P10CR) {
if (ctx->popoMethod == OSSL_CRMF_POPO_SIGNATURE && privkey == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
goto err;
}
if ((crm = crm_new(ctx, type, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID, rkey)) == NULL
|| !OSSL_CRMF_MSG_create_popo(crm, privkey, ctx->digest,
ctx->popoMethod)
/* value.ir is same for cr and kur */
|| !sk_OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push(msg->body->value.ir, crm))
goto err;
crm = NULL;
/* TODO: here optional 2nd certreqmsg could be pushed to the stack */
}
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, err_code);
OSSL_CRMF_MSG_free(crm);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int bodytype,
int certReqId, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
X509 *cert, STACK_OF(X509) *chain,
STACK_OF(X509) *caPubs, int encrypted,
int unprotectedErrors)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *repMsg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *resp = NULL;
int status = -1;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, bodytype)) == NULL)
goto err;
repMsg = msg->body->value.ip; /* value.ip is same for cp and kup */
/* header */
if (ctx->implicitConfirm && !ossl_cmp_hdr_set_implicitConfirm(msg->header))
goto err;
/* body */
if ((resp = OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(resp->status);
if ((resp->status = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si)) == NULL
|| !ASN1_INTEGER_set(resp->certReqId, certReqId))
goto err;
status = ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(resp->status);
if (status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection
&& status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting && cert != NULL) {
if (encrypted) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
goto err;
}
if ((resp->certifiedKeyPair = OSSL_CMP_CERTIFIEDKEYPAIR_new())
== NULL)
goto err;
resp->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert->type =
OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_CERTIFICATE;
if (!X509_up_ref(cert))
goto err;
resp->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert->value.certificate = cert;
}
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_push(repMsg->response, resp))
goto err;
resp = NULL;
/* TODO: here optional 2nd certrep could be pushed to the stack */
if (bodytype == OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_IP && caPubs != NULL
&& (repMsg->caPubs = X509_chain_up_ref(caPubs)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (chain != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain, 0, 1, 0))
goto err;
if (!unprotectedErrors
|| ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTREP);
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_free(resp);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rr_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS *rd;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->oldCert != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((rd = OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* Fill the template from the contents of the certificate to be revoked */
if (!OSSL_CRMF_CERTTEMPLATE_fill(rd->certDetails,
NULL/* pubkey would be redundant */,
NULL/* subject would be redundant */,
X509_get_issuer_name(ctx->oldCert),
X509_get_serialNumber(ctx->oldCert)))
goto err;
/* revocation reason code is optional */
if (ctx->revocationReason != CRL_REASON_NONE
&& !add_crl_reason_extension(&rd->crlEntryDetails,
ctx->revocationReason))
goto err;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RR)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_push(msg->body->value.rr, rd))
goto err;
rd = NULL;
/*
* TODO: the Revocation Passphrase according to section 5.3.19.9 could be
* set here if set in ctx
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RR);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
OSSL_CMP_REVDETAILS_free(rd);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_rp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid, int unprot_err)
{
OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rep = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si1 = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid_copy = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL && cid != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_RP)) == NULL)
goto err;
rep = msg->body->value.rp;
if ((si1 = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_push(rep->status, si1)) {
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si1);
goto err;
}
if ((rep->revCerts = sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((cid_copy = OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_dup(cid)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_push(rep->revCerts, cid_copy)) {
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_free(cid_copy);
goto err;
}
if (!unprot_err
|| ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(si) != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection)
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_RP);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pkiconf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_PKICONF)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_PKICONF);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg, OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav)
{
int bodytype;
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL && itav != NULL))
return 0;
bodytype = ossl_cmp_msg_get_bodytype(msg);
if (bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM
&& bodytype != OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
return 0;
}
/* value.genp has the same structure, so this works for genp as well */
return OSSL_CMP_ITAV_push0_stack_item(&msg->body->value.genm, itav);
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
STACK_OF(OSSL_CMP_ITAV) *itavs)
{
int i;
OSSL_CMP_ITAV *itav = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_num(itavs); i++) {
if ((itav = OSSL_CMP_ITAV_dup(sk_OSSL_CMP_ITAV_value(itavs,i))) == NULL)
return 0;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push0_ITAV(msg, itav)) {
OSSL_CMP_ITAV_free(itav);
return 0;
}
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Creates a new General Message/Response with an empty itav stack
* returns a pointer to the PKIMessage on success, NULL on error
*/
static OSSL_CMP_MSG *gen_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int body_type, int err_code)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, body_type)) == NULL)
return NULL;
if (ctx->genm_ITAVs != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_msg_gen_push1_ITAVs(msg, ctx->genm_ITAVs))
goto err;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, err_code);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genm_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
return gen_new(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENM, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENM);
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_genp_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
return gen_new(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_GENP, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_GENP);
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_error_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si,
int errorCode,
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *errorDetails,
int unprotected)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && si != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_ERROR)) == NULL)
goto err;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo);
if ((msg->body->value.error->pKIStatusInfo = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_dup(si))
== NULL)
goto err;
if (errorCode >= 0) {
if ((msg->body->value.error->errorCode = ASN1_INTEGER_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(msg->body->value.error->errorCode, errorCode))
goto err;
}
if (errorDetails != NULL)
if ((msg->body->value.error->errorDetails =
sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_deep_copy(errorDetails, ASN1_STRING_dup,
ASN1_STRING_free)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!unprotected && !ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_ERROR);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
/*
* OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_set_certHash() calculates a hash of the certificate,
* using the same hash algorithm as is used to create and verify the
* certificate signature, and places the hash into the certHash field of a
* OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS structure. This is used in the certConf message,
* for example, to confirm that the certificate was received successfully.
*/
int ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus,
const X509 *cert)
{
unsigned int len;
unsigned char hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
int md_NID;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(certStatus != NULL && cert != NULL))
return 0;
/*-
* select hash algorithm, as stated in Appendix F. Compilable ASN.1 defs:
* the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
* as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
*/
if (OBJ_find_sigid_algs(X509_get_signature_nid(cert), &md_NID, NULL)
&& (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) != NULL) {
if (!X509_digest(cert, md, hash, &len))
goto err;
if (!ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1_bytes(&certStatus->certHash, hash,
len))
goto err;
} else {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
return 0;
}
return 1;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_SETTING_CERTHASH);
return 0;
}
/*
* TODO: handle potential 2nd certificate when signing and encrypting
* certificates have been requested/received
*/
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_certConf_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int fail_info,
const char *text)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS *certStatus = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *sinfo;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && ctx->newCert != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((unsigned)fail_info > OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX_BIT_PATTERN) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_FAIL_INFO_OUT_OF_RANGE);
return NULL;
}
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_CERTCONF)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((certStatus = OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
/* consume certStatus into msg right away so it gets deallocated with msg */
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTSTATUS_push(msg->body->value.certConf, certStatus))
goto err;
/* set the ID of the certReq */
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(certStatus->certReqId, OSSL_CMP_CERTREQID))
goto err;
/*
* the hash of the certificate, using the same hash algorithm
* as is used to create and verify the certificate signature
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_certstatus_set_certHash(certStatus, ctx->newCert))
goto err;
/*
* For any particular CertStatus, omission of the statusInfo field
* indicates ACCEPTANCE of the specified certificate. Alternatively,
* explicit status details (with respect to acceptance or rejection) MAY
* be provided in the statusInfo field, perhaps for auditing purposes at
* the CA/RA.
*/
sinfo = fail_info != 0 ?
ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection, fail_info, text) :
ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted, 0, text);
if (sinfo == NULL)
goto err;
certStatus->statusInfo = sinfo;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_CERTCONF);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollReq_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ *preq = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREQ)) == NULL)
goto err;
/* TODO: support multiple cert request IDs to poll */
if ((preq = OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_new()) == NULL
|| !ASN1_INTEGER_set(preq->certReqId, crid)
|| !sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_push(msg->body->value.pollReq, preq))
goto err;
preq = NULL;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREQ);
OSSL_CMP_POLLREQ_free(preq);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_pollRep_new(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, int crid,
int64_t poll_after)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg;
OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *prep;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((msg = ossl_cmp_msg_create(ctx, OSSL_CMP_PKIBODY_POLLREP)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((prep = OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_push(msg->body->value.pollRep, prep))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(prep->certReqId, crid))
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set_int64(prep->checkAfter, poll_after))
goto err;
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_protect(ctx, msg))
goto err;
return msg;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CREATING_POLLREP);
OSSL_CMP_MSG_free(msg);
return NULL;
}
/*-
* returns the status field of the RevRepContent with the given
* request/sequence id inside a revocation response.
* RevRepContent has the revocation statuses in same order as they were sent in
* RevReqContent.
* returns NULL on error
*/
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *
ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_pkistatusinfo(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid)
{
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *status;
if (!ossl_assert(rrep != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((status = sk_OSSL_CMP_PKISI_value(rrep->status, rsid)) != NULL)
return status;
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_PKISTATUSINFO_NOT_FOUND);
return NULL;
}
/*
* returns the CertId field in the revCerts part of the RevRepContent
* with the given request/sequence id inside a revocation response.
* RevRepContent has the CertIds in same order as they were sent in
* RevReqContent.
* returns NULL on error
*/
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *
ossl_cmp_revrepcontent_get_CertId(OSSL_CMP_REVREPCONTENT *rrep, int rsid)
{
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *cid = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(rrep != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((cid = sk_OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_value(rrep->revCerts, rsid)) != NULL)
return cid;
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTID_NOT_FOUND);
return NULL;
}
static int suitable_rid(const ASN1_INTEGER *certReqId, int rid)
{
int trid;
if (rid == -1)
return 1;
trid = ossl_cmp_asn1_get_int(certReqId);
if (trid == -1) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_BAD_REQUEST_ID);
return 0;
}
return rid == trid;
}
static void add_expected_rid(int rid)
{
char str[DECIMAL_SIZE(rid) + 1];
BIO_snprintf(str, sizeof(str), "%d", rid);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "expected certReqId = ", str);
}
/*
* returns a pointer to the PollResponse with the given CertReqId
* (or the first one in case -1) inside a PollRepContent
* returns NULL on error or if no suitable PollResponse available
*/
OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *
ossl_cmp_pollrepcontent_get0_pollrep(const OSSL_CMP_POLLREPCONTENT *prc,
int rid)
{
OSSL_CMP_POLLREP *pollRep = NULL;
int i;
if (!ossl_assert(prc != NULL))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_num(prc); i++) {
pollRep = sk_OSSL_CMP_POLLREP_value(prc, i);
if (suitable_rid(pollRep->certReqId, rid))
return pollRep;
}
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND);
add_expected_rid(rid);
return NULL;
}
/*
* returns a pointer to the CertResponse with the given CertReqId
* (or the first one in case -1) inside a CertRepMessage
* returns NULL on error or if no suitable CertResponse available
*/
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *
ossl_cmp_certrepmessage_get0_certresponse(const OSSL_CMP_CERTREPMESSAGE *crm,
int rid)
{
OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep = NULL;
int i;
if (!ossl_assert(crm != NULL && crm->response != NULL))
return NULL;
for (i = 0; i < sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_num(crm->response); i++) {
crep = sk_OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE_value(crm->response, i);
if (suitable_rid(crep->certReqId, rid))
return crep;
}
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTRESPONSE_NOT_FOUND);
add_expected_rid(rid);
return NULL;
}
/*
* CMP_CERTRESPONSE_get1_certificate() attempts to retrieve the returned
* certificate from the given certResponse B<crep>.
* Uses the privkey in case of indirect POP from B<ctx>.
* Returns a pointer to a copy of the found certificate, or NULL if not found.
*/
X509 *ossl_cmp_certresponse_get1_certificate(EVP_PKEY *privkey,
const OSSL_CMP_CERTRESPONSE *crep)
{
OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT *coec;
X509 *crt = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(crep != NULL))
return NULL;
if (crep->certifiedKeyPair
&& (coec = crep->certifiedKeyPair->certOrEncCert) != NULL) {
switch (coec->type) {
case OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_CERTIFICATE:
crt = X509_dup(coec->value.certificate);
break;
case OSSL_CMP_CERTORENCCERT_ENCRYPTEDCERT:
/* cert encrypted for indirect PoP; RFC 4210, 5.2.8.2 */
if (privkey == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_PRIVATE_KEY);
return NULL;
}
crt =
OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert(coec->value.encryptedCert,
privkey);
break;
default:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_CERT_TYPE);
return NULL;
}
}
if (crt == NULL)
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERTIFICATE_NOT_FOUND);
return crt;
}
OSSL_CMP_MSG *ossl_cmp_msg_load(const char *file)
{
OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg = NULL;
BIO *bio = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(file != NULL))
return NULL;
if ((bio = BIO_new_file(file, "rb")) == NULL)
return NULL;
msg = OSSL_d2i_CMP_MSG_bio(bio, NULL);
BIO_free(bio);
return msg;
}
crypto/cmp/cmp_protect.c
+313
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,313 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
/*
* This function is also used for verification from cmp_vfy.
*
* Calculate protection for given PKImessage utilizing the given credentials
* and the algorithm parameters set inside the message header's protectionAlg.
*
* Either secret or pkey must be set, the other must be NULL. Attempts doing
* PBMAC in case 'secret' is set and signature if 'pkey' is set - but will only
* do the protection already marked in msg->header->protectionAlg.
*
* returns ptr to ASN1_BIT_STRING containing protection on success, else NULL
*/
ASN1_BIT_STRING *ossl_cmp_calc_protection(const OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *secret,
EVP_PKEY *pkey)
{
ASN1_BIT_STRING *prot = NULL;
CMP_PROTECTEDPART prot_part;
const ASN1_OBJECT *algorOID = NULL;
int len;
size_t prot_part_der_len;
unsigned char *prot_part_der = NULL;
size_t sig_len;
unsigned char *protection = NULL;
const void *ppval = NULL;
int pptype = 0;
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
const unsigned char *pbm_str_uc = NULL;
EVP_MD_CTX *evp_ctx = NULL;
int md_NID;
const EVP_MD *md = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(msg != NULL))
return NULL;
/* construct data to be signed */
prot_part.header = msg->header;
prot_part.body = msg->body;
len = i2d_CMP_PROTECTEDPART(&prot_part, &prot_part_der);
if (len < 0 || prot_part_der == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
prot_part_der_len = (size_t) len;
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
goto end;
}
X509_ALGOR_get0(&algorOID, &pptype, &ppval, msg->header->protectionAlg);
if (secret != NULL && pkey == NULL) {
if (ppval == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
if (NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC != OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto end;
}
pbm_str = (ASN1_STRING *)ppval;
pbm_str_uc = pbm_str->data;
pbm = d2i_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(NULL, &pbm_str_uc, pbm_str->length);
if (pbm == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_WRONG_ALGORITHM_OID);
goto end;
}
if (!OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(pbm, prot_part_der, prot_part_der_len,
secret->data, secret->length,
&protection, &sig_len))
goto end;
} else if (secret == NULL && pkey != NULL) {
/* TODO combine this with large parts of CRMF_poposigningkey_init() */
/* EVP_DigestSignInit() checks that pkey type is correct for the alg */
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_algs(OBJ_obj2nid(algorOID), &md_NID, NULL)
|| (md = EVP_get_digestbynid(md_NID)) == NULL
|| (evp_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNKNOWN_ALGORITHM_ID);
goto end;
}
if (EVP_DigestSignInit(evp_ctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkey) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignUpdate(evp_ctx, prot_part_der,
prot_part_der_len) <= 0
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, NULL, &sig_len) <= 0
|| (protection = OPENSSL_malloc(sig_len)) == NULL
|| EVP_DigestSignFinal(evp_ctx, protection, &sig_len) <= 0) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_CALCULATING_PROTECTION);
goto end;
}
} else {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
goto end;
}
if ((prot = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto end;
/* OpenSSL defaults all bit strings to be encoded as ASN.1 NamedBitList */
prot->flags &= ~(ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT | 0x07);
prot->flags |= ASN1_STRING_FLAG_BITS_LEFT;
if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set(prot, protection, sig_len)) {
ASN1_BIT_STRING_free(prot);
prot = NULL;
}
end:
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
EVP_MD_CTX_free(evp_ctx);
OPENSSL_free(protection);
OPENSSL_free(prot_part_der);
return prot;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
if (msg->extraCerts == NULL
&& (msg->extraCerts = sk_X509_new_null()) == NULL)
return 0;
if (ctx->clCert != NULL) {
/* Make sure that our own cert gets sent, in the first position */
if (!X509_up_ref(ctx->clCert))
return 0;
if (!sk_X509_push(msg->extraCerts, ctx->clCert)) {
X509_free(ctx->clCert);
return 0;
}
/* if we have untrusted store, try to add intermediate certs */
if (ctx->untrusted_certs != NULL) {
STACK_OF(X509) *chain =
ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(ctx->untrusted_certs, ctx->clCert);
int res = ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, chain,
1 /* no self-signed */,
1 /* no duplicates */, 0);
sk_X509_pop_free(chain, X509_free);
if (res == 0)
return 0;
}
}
/* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut */
if (!ossl_cmp_sk_X509_add1_certs(msg->extraCerts, ctx->extraCertsOut, 0,
1 /* no duplicates */, 0))
return 0;
/* if none was found avoid empty ASN.1 sequence */
if (sk_X509_num(msg->extraCerts) == 0) {
sk_X509_free(msg->extraCerts);
msg->extraCerts = NULL;
}
return 1;
}
/*
* Create an X509_ALGOR structure for PasswordBasedMAC protection based on
* the pbm settings in the context
* returns pointer to X509_ALGOR on success, NULL on error
*/
static X509_ALGOR *create_pbmac_algor(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx)
{
X509_ALGOR *alg = NULL;
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbm = NULL;
unsigned char *pbm_der = NULL;
int pbm_der_len;
ASN1_STRING *pbm_str = NULL;
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL))
return NULL;
alg = X509_ALGOR_new();
pbm = OSSL_CRMF_pbmp_new(ctx->pbm_slen, ctx->pbm_owf, ctx->pbm_itercnt,
ctx->pbm_mac);
pbm_str = ASN1_STRING_new();
if (alg == NULL || pbm == NULL || pbm_str == NULL)
goto err;
if ((pbm_der_len = i2d_OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER(pbm, &pbm_der)) < 0)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_STRING_set(pbm_str, pbm_der, pbm_der_len))
goto err;
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
X509_ALGOR_set0(alg, OBJ_nid2obj(NID_id_PasswordBasedMAC),
V_ASN1_SEQUENCE, pbm_str);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return alg;
err:
ASN1_STRING_free(pbm_str);
X509_ALGOR_free(alg);
OPENSSL_free(pbm_der);
OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER_free(pbm);
return NULL;
}
int ossl_cmp_msg_protect(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, OSSL_CMP_MSG *msg)
{
if (!ossl_assert(ctx != NULL && msg != NULL))
return 0;
if (ctx->unprotectedSend)
return 1;
/* use PasswordBasedMac according to 5.1.3.1 if secretValue is given */
if (ctx->secretValue != NULL) {
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = create_pbmac_algor(ctx)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (ctx->referenceValue != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header,
ctx->referenceValue))
goto err;
/*
* add any additional certificates from ctx->extraCertsOut
* while not needed to validate the signing cert, the option to do
* this might be handy for certain use cases
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
goto err;
if ((msg->protection =
ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, ctx->secretValue, NULL)) == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
/*
* use MSG_SIG_ALG according to 5.1.3.3 if client Certificate and
* private key is given
*/
if (ctx->clCert != NULL && ctx->pkey != NULL) {
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *subjKeyIDStr = NULL;
int algNID = 0;
ASN1_OBJECT *alg = NULL;
/* make sure that key and certificate match */
if (!X509_check_private_key(ctx->clCert, ctx->pkey)) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_CERT_AND_KEY_DO_NOT_MATCH);
goto err;
}
if (msg->header->protectionAlg == NULL)
if ((msg->header->protectionAlg = X509_ALGOR_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!OBJ_find_sigid_by_algs(&algNID, ctx->digest,
EVP_PKEY_id(ctx->pkey))) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_UNSUPPORTED_KEY_TYPE);
goto err;
}
if ((alg = OBJ_nid2obj(algNID)) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!X509_ALGOR_set0(msg->header->protectionAlg,
alg, V_ASN1_UNDEF, NULL)) {
ASN1_OBJECT_free(alg);
goto err;
}
/*
* set senderKID to keyIdentifier of the used certificate according
* to section 5.1.1
*/
subjKeyIDStr = X509_get0_subject_key_id(ctx->clCert);
if (subjKeyIDStr != NULL
&& !ossl_cmp_hdr_set1_senderKID(msg->header, subjKeyIDStr))
goto err;
/*
* Add ctx->clCert followed, if possible, by its chain built
* from ctx->untrusted_certs, and then ctx->extraCertsOut
*/
if (!ossl_cmp_msg_add_extraCerts(ctx, msg))
goto err;
if ((msg->protection =
ossl_cmp_calc_protection(msg, NULL, ctx->pkey)) == NULL)
goto err;
} else {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_MISSING_KEY_INPUT_FOR_CREATING_PROTECTION);
goto err;
}
}
return 1;
err:
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PROTECTING_MESSAGE);
return 0;
}
crypto/cmp/cmp_status.c
+301
View File
@@ -0,0 +1,301 @@
/*
* Copyright 2007-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright Nokia 2007-2019
* Copyright Siemens AG 2015-2019
*
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
/* CMP functions for PKIStatusInfo handling and PKIMessage decomposition */
#include <string.h>
#include "cmp_local.h"
/* explicit #includes not strictly needed since implied by the above: */
#include <time.h>
#include <openssl/cmp.h>
#include <openssl/crmf.h>
#include <openssl/err.h> /* needed in case config no-deprecated */
#include <openssl/engine.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/objects.h>
#include <openssl/x509.h>
#include <openssl/asn1err.h> /* for ASN1_R_TOO_SMALL and ASN1_R_TOO_LARGE */
/* CMP functions related to PKIStatus */
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkistatus(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si)
{
if (!ossl_assert(si != NULL && si->status != NULL))
return -1;
return ossl_cmp_asn1_get_int(si->status);
}
/*
* return the declared identifier and a short explanation for the PKIStatus
* value as specified in RFC4210, Appendix F.
*/
const char *ossl_cmp_PKIStatus_to_string(int status)
{
switch (status) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted:
return "PKIStatus: accepted";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_grantedWithMods:
return "PKIStatus: granted with modifications";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_rejection:
return "PKIStatus: rejection";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_waiting:
return "PKIStatus: waiting";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationWarning:
return "PKIStatus: revocation warning - a revocation of the cert is imminent";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_revocationNotification:
return "PKIStatus: revocation notification - a revocation of the cert has occurred";
case OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_keyUpdateWarning:
return "PKIStatus: key update warning - update already done for the cert";
default:
{
char buf[40];
BIO_snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "PKIStatus: invalid=%d", status);
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_ERROR_PARSING_PKISTATUS);
ossl_cmp_add_error_data(buf);
return NULL;
}
}
}
/*
* returns a pointer to the statusString contained in a PKIStatusInfo
* returns NULL on error
*/
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *ossl_cmp_pkisi_get0_statusstring(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si)
{
if (!ossl_assert(si != NULL))
return NULL;
return si->statusString;
}
/*
* returns the FailureInfo bits of the given PKIStatusInfo
* returns -1 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_get_pkifailureinfo(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si)
{
int i;
int res = 0;
if (!ossl_assert(si != NULL && si->failInfo != NULL))
return -1;
for (i = 0; i <= OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX; i++)
if (ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(si->failInfo, i))
res |= 1 << i;
return res;
}
/*
* internal function
* convert PKIFailureInfo number to human-readable string
*
* returns pointer to static string
* returns NULL on error
*/
static const char *CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_to_string(int number)
{
switch (number) {
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badAlg:
return "badAlg";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badMessageCheck:
return "badMessageCheck";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badRequest:
return "badRequest";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badTime:
return "badTime";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badCertId:
return "badCertId";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badDataFormat:
return "badDataFormat";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_wrongAuthority:
return "wrongAuthority";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_incorrectData:
return "incorrectData";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_missingTimeStamp:
return "missingTimeStamp";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badPOP:
return "badPOP";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_certRevoked:
return "certRevoked";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_certConfirmed:
return "certConfirmed";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_wrongIntegrity:
return "wrongIntegrity";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badRecipientNonce:
return "badRecipientNonce";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_timeNotAvailable:
return "timeNotAvailable";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_unacceptedPolicy:
return "unacceptedPolicy";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_unacceptedExtension:
return "unacceptedExtension";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_addInfoNotAvailable:
return "addInfoNotAvailable";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badSenderNonce:
return "badSenderNonce";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_badCertTemplate:
return "badCertTemplate";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_signerNotTrusted:
return "signerNotTrusted";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_transactionIdInUse:
return "transactionIdInUse";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_unsupportedVersion:
return "unsupportedVersion";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_notAuthorized:
return "notAuthorized";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_systemUnavail:
return "systemUnavail";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_systemFailure:
return "systemFailure";
case OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_duplicateCertReq:
return "duplicateCertReq";
default:
return NULL; /* illegal failure number */
}
}
/*
* checks PKIFailureInfo bits in a given PKIStatusInfo
* returns 1 if a given bit is set, 0 if not, -1 on error
*/
int ossl_cmp_pkisi_pkifailureinfo_check(const OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si, int bit_index)
{
if (!ossl_assert(si != NULL && si->failInfo != NULL))
return -1;
if (bit_index < 0 || bit_index > OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_INVALID_ARGS);
return -1;
}
return ASN1_BIT_STRING_get_bit(si->failInfo, bit_index);
}
/*
* place human-readable error string created from PKIStatusInfo in given buffer
* returns pointer to the same buffer containing the string, or NULL on error
*/
char *OSSL_CMP_CTX_snprint_PKIStatus(OSSL_CMP_CTX *ctx, char *buf,
size_t bufsize)
{
int status, failure, fail_info;
const char *status_string, *failure_string;
OSSL_CMP_PKIFREETEXT *status_strings;
ASN1_UTF8STRING *text;
int i;
int printed_chars;
int failinfo_found = 0;
int n_status_strings;
char* write_ptr = buf;
#define ADVANCE_BUFFER \
if (printed_chars < 0 || (size_t)printed_chars >= bufsize) \
return NULL; \
write_ptr += printed_chars; \
bufsize -= printed_chars;
if (ctx == NULL
|| buf == NULL
|| (status = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_status(ctx)) < 0
|| (status_string = ossl_cmp_PKIStatus_to_string(status)) == NULL)
return NULL;
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "%s", status_string);
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
/* failInfo is optional and may be empty */
if ((fail_info = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get_failInfoCode(ctx)) > 0) {
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "; PKIFailureInfo: ");
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
for (failure = 0; failure <= OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX; failure++) {
if ((fail_info & (1 << failure)) != 0) {
failure_string = CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_to_string(failure);
if (failure_string != NULL) {
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "%s%s",
failure > 0 ? ", " : "",
failure_string);
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
failinfo_found = 1;
}
}
}
}
if (!failinfo_found && status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_accepted
&& status != OSSL_CMP_PKISTATUS_grantedWithMods) {
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "; <no failure info>");
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
}
/* statusString sequence is optional and may be empty */
status_strings = OSSL_CMP_CTX_get0_statusString(ctx);
n_status_strings = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_num(status_strings);
if (n_status_strings > 0) {
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "; StatusString%s: ",
n_status_strings > 1 ? "s" : "");
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
for (i = 0; i < n_status_strings; i++) {
text = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_value(status_strings, i);
printed_chars = BIO_snprintf(write_ptr, bufsize, "\"%s\"%s",
ASN1_STRING_get0_data(text),
i < n_status_strings - 1 ? ", " : "");
ADVANCE_BUFFER;
}
}
#undef ADVANCE_BUFFER
return buf;
}
/*
* Creates a new PKIStatusInfo structure and fills it in
* returns a pointer to the structure on success, NULL on error
* note: strongly overlaps with TS_RESP_CTX_set_status_info()
* and TS_RESP_CTX_add_failure_info() in ../ts/ts_rsp_sign.c
*/
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *ossl_cmp_statusinfo_new(int status, int fail_info,
const char *text)
{
OSSL_CMP_PKISI *si = OSSL_CMP_PKISI_new();
ASN1_UTF8STRING *utf8_text = NULL;
int failure;
if (si == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_INTEGER_set(si->status, status))
goto err;
if (text != NULL) {
if ((utf8_text = ASN1_UTF8STRING_new()) == NULL
|| !ASN1_STRING_set(utf8_text, text, -1))
goto err;
if ((si->statusString = sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_new_null()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!sk_ASN1_UTF8STRING_push(si->statusString, utf8_text))
goto err;
/* Ownership is lost. */
utf8_text = NULL;
}
for (failure = 0; failure <= OSSL_CMP_PKIFAILUREINFO_MAX; failure++) {
if ((fail_info & (1 << failure)) != 0) {
if (si->failInfo == NULL
&& (si->failInfo = ASN1_BIT_STRING_new()) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!ASN1_BIT_STRING_set_bit(si->failInfo, failure, 1))
goto err;
}
}
return si;
err:
OSSL_CMP_PKISI_free(si);
ASN1_UTF8STRING_free(utf8_text);
return NULL;
}
crypto/cmp/cmp_util.c
+5 -3
View File
@@ -408,21 +408,23 @@ STACK_OF(X509) *ossl_cmp_build_cert_chain(STACK_OF(X509) *certs, X509 *cert)
int ossl_cmp_asn1_octet_string_set1(ASN1_OCTET_STRING **tgt,
const ASN1_OCTET_STRING *src)
{
ASN1_OCTET_STRING *new;
if (tgt == NULL) {
CMPerr(0, CMP_R_NULL_ARGUMENT);
return 0;
}
if (*tgt == src) /* self-assignment */
return 1;
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*tgt);
if (src != NULL) {
if ((*tgt = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(src)) == NULL)
if ((new = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_dup(src)) == NULL)
return 0;
} else {
*tgt = NULL;
new = NULL;
}
ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free(*tgt);
*tgt = new;
return 1;
}
crypto/cms/cms_env.c
+59 -22
View File
@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include <openssl/cms.h>
#include <openssl/aes.h>
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include "cms_local.h"
#include "crypto/asn1.h"
#include "crypto/evp.h"
@@ -625,6 +625,23 @@ int CMS_RecipientInfo_set0_key(CMS_RecipientInfo *ri,
return 1;
}
static const EVP_CIPHER *cms_get_key_wrap_cipher(size_t keylen)
{
switch(keylen) {
case 16:
return EVP_aes_128_wrap();
case 24:
return EVP_aes_192_wrap();
case 32:
return EVP_aes_256_wrap();
}
return NULL;
}
/* Encrypt content key in KEK recipient info */
static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
@@ -632,36 +649,50 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
{
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
AES_KEY actx;
unsigned char *wkey = NULL;
int wkeylen;
int r = 0;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int outlen = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
kekri = ri->d.kekri;
if (!kekri->key) {
if (kekri->key == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_NO_KEY);
return 0;
}
if (AES_set_encrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT,
CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY);
cipher = cms_get_key_wrap_cipher(kekri->keylen);
if (cipher == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
/* 8 byte prefix for AES wrap ciphers */
wkey = OPENSSL_malloc(ec->keylen + 8);
if (wkey == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
wkeylen = AES_wrap_key(&actx, NULL, wkey, ec->key, ec->keylen);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (wkeylen <= 0) {
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_set_flags(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_FLAG_WRAP_ALLOW);
if (!EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, kekri->key, NULL)
|| !EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, wkey, &wkeylen, ec->key, ec->keylen)
|| !EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, wkey + wkeylen, &outlen)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
wkeylen += outlen;
if (!ossl_assert((size_t)wkeylen == ec->keylen + 8)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_ENCRYPT, CMS_R_WRAP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
@@ -671,10 +702,9 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_encrypt(const CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
r = 1;
err:
if (!r)
OPENSSL_free(wkey);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
@@ -687,10 +717,12 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
{
CMS_EncryptedContentInfo *ec;
CMS_KEKRecipientInfo *kekri;
AES_KEY actx;
unsigned char *ukey = NULL;
int ukeylen;
int r = 0, wrap_nid;
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = NULL;
int outlen = 0;
EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
ec = cms->d.envelopedData->encryptedContentInfo;
@@ -716,27 +748,33 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
goto err;
}
if (AES_set_decrypt_key(kekri->key, kekri->keylen << 3, &actx)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT,
CMS_R_ERROR_SETTING_KEY);
cipher = cms_get_key_wrap_cipher(kekri->keylen);
if (cipher == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_INVALID_KEY_LENGTH);
goto err;
}
ukey = OPENSSL_malloc(kekri->encryptedKey->length - 8);
if (ukey == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
ukeylen = AES_unwrap_key(&actx, NULL, ukey,
kekri->encryptedKey->data,
kekri->encryptedKey->length);
ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
if (ctx == NULL) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
goto err;
}
if (ukeylen <= 0) {
if (!EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, cipher, NULL, kekri->key, NULL)
|| !EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, ukey, &ukeylen,
kekri->encryptedKey->data,
kekri->encryptedKey->length)
|| !EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, ukey + ukeylen, &outlen)) {
CMSerr(CMS_F_CMS_RECIPIENTINFO_KEKRI_DECRYPT, CMS_R_UNWRAP_ERROR);
goto err;
}
ukeylen += outlen;
ec->key = ukey;
ec->keylen = ukeylen;
@@ -744,10 +782,9 @@ static int cms_RecipientInfo_kekri_decrypt(CMS_ContentInfo *cms,
r = 1;
err:
if (!r)
OPENSSL_free(ukey);
OPENSSL_cleanse(&actx, sizeof(actx));
EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return r;
crypto/cms/cms_io.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ int i2d_CMS_bio(BIO *bp, CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
return ASN1_item_i2d_bio(ASN1_ITEM_rptr(CMS_ContentInfo), bp, cms);
}
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw_const(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo, PEM_STRING_CMS, CMS_ContentInfo)
IMPLEMENT_PEM_rw(CMS, CMS_ContentInfo, PEM_STRING_CMS, CMS_ContentInfo)
BIO *BIO_new_CMS(BIO *out, CMS_ContentInfo *cms)
{
crypto/conf/conf_def.c
+67 -19
View File
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static BIO *get_next_file(const char *path, OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **dirctx);
static CONF *def_create(CONF_METHOD *meth);
static int def_init_default(CONF *conf);
#if !OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf);
#endif
static int def_destroy(CONF *conf);
@@ -83,7 +83,7 @@ CONF_METHOD *NCONF_default(void)
return &default_method;
}
#if ! OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
static CONF_METHOD WIN32_method = {
"WIN32",
def_create,
@@ -121,22 +121,22 @@ static int def_init_default(CONF *conf)
if (conf == NULL)
return 0;
memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
conf->meth = &default_method;
conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_default;
conf->data = NULL;
return 1;
}
#if ! OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
static int def_init_WIN32(CONF *conf)
{
if (conf == NULL)
return 0;
memset(conf, 0, sizeof(*conf));
conf->meth = &WIN32_method;
conf->meth_data = (void *)CONF_type_win32;
conf->data = NULL;
return 1;
}
@@ -354,7 +354,49 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
psection = section;
}
p = eat_ws(conf, end);
if (strncmp(pname, ".include", 8) == 0
if (strncmp(pname, ".pragma", 7) == 0
&& (p != pname + 7 || *p == '=')) {
char *pval;
if (*p == '=') {
p++;
p = eat_ws(conf, p);
}
trim_ws(conf, p);
/* Pragma values take the form keyword:value */
pval = strchr(p, ':');
if (pval == NULL || pval == p || pval[1] == '\0') {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_INVALID_PRAGMA);
goto err;
}
*pval++ = '\0';
trim_ws(conf, p);
pval = eat_ws(conf, pval);
/*
* Known pragmas:
*
* dollarid takes "on", "true or "off", "false"
*/
if (strcmp(p, "dollarid") == 0) {
if (strcmp(pval, "on") == 0
|| strcmp(pval, "true") == 0) {
conf->flag_dollarid = 1;
} else if (strcmp(pval, "off") == 0
|| strcmp(pval, "false") == 0) {
conf->flag_dollarid = 0;
} else {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_INVALID_PRAGMA);
goto err;
}
}
/*
* We *ignore* any unknown pragma.
*/
continue;
} else if (strncmp(pname, ".include", 8) == 0
&& (p != pname + 8 || *p == '=')) {
char *include = NULL;
BIO *next;
@@ -414,6 +456,7 @@ static int def_load_bio(CONF *conf, BIO *in, long *line)
continue;
} else if (*p != '=') {
CONFerr(CONF_F_DEF_LOAD_BIO, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN);
ERR_add_error_data(2, "HERE-->", p);
goto err;
}
*end = '\0';
@@ -590,7 +633,10 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
buf->data[to++] = v;
} else if (IS_EOF(conf, *from))
break;
else if (*from == '$') {
else if (*from == '$'
&& (!conf->flag_dollarid
|| from[1] == '{'
|| from[1] == '(')) {
size_t newsize;
/* try to expand it */
@@ -607,7 +653,8 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
s++;
cp = section;
e = np = s;
while (IS_ALNUM(conf, *e))
while (IS_ALNUM(conf, *e)
|| (conf->flag_dollarid && IS_DOLLAR(conf, *e)))
e++;
if ((e[0] == ':') && (e[1] == ':')) {
cp = np;
@@ -616,7 +663,8 @@ static int str_copy(CONF *conf, char *section, char **pto, char *from)
*rrp = '\0';
e += 2;
np = e;
while (IS_ALNUM(conf, *e))
while (IS_ALNUM(conf, *e)
|| (conf->flag_dollarid && IS_DOLLAR(conf, *e)))
e++;
}
r = *e;
@@ -729,7 +777,9 @@ static BIO *process_include(char *include, OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **dirctx,
static BIO *get_next_file(const char *path, OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **dirctx)
{
const char *filename;
size_t pathlen;
pathlen = strlen(path);
while ((filename = OPENSSL_DIR_read(dirctx, path)) != NULL) {
size_t namelen;
@@ -742,7 +792,7 @@ static BIO *get_next_file(const char *path, OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **dirctx)
char *newpath;
BIO *bio;
newlen = strlen(path) + namelen + 2;
newlen = pathlen + namelen + 2;
newpath = OPENSSL_zalloc(newlen);
if (newpath == NULL) {
CONFerr(CONF_F_GET_NEXT_FILE, ERR_R_MALLOC_FAILURE);
@@ -753,14 +803,11 @@ static BIO *get_next_file(const char *path, OPENSSL_DIR_CTX **dirctx)
* If the given path isn't clear VMS syntax,
* we treat it as on Unix.
*/
{
size_t pathlen = strlen(path);
if (path[pathlen - 1] == ']' || path[pathlen - 1] == '>'
|| path[pathlen - 1] == ':') {
/* Clear VMS directory syntax, just copy as is */
OPENSSL_strlcpy(newpath, path, newlen);
}
if (path[pathlen - 1] == ']'
|| path[pathlen - 1] == '>'
|| path[pathlen - 1] == ':') {
/* Clear VMS directory syntax, just copy as is */
OPENSSL_strlcpy(newpath, path, newlen);
}
#endif
if (newpath[0] == '\0') {
@@ -833,7 +880,8 @@ static char *eat_alpha_numeric(CONF *conf, char *p)
p = scan_esc(conf, p);
continue;
}
if (!IS_ALNUM_PUNCT(conf, *p))
if (!(IS_ALNUM_PUNCT(conf, *p)
|| (conf->flag_dollarid && IS_DOLLAR(conf, *p))))
return p;
p++;
}
crypto/conf/conf_def.h
+6 -4
View File
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
* WARNING: do not edit!
* Generated by crypto/conf/keysets.pl
*
* Copyright 1995-2019 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Copyright 1995-2020 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
* Licensed under the Apache License 2.0 (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@
#define CONF_DQUOTE 1024
#define CONF_COMMENT 128
#define CONF_FCOMMENT 2048
#define CONF_DOLLAR 4096
#define CONF_EOF 8
#define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
#define CONF_ALNUM (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
@@ -36,13 +37,14 @@
#define IS_ALNUM_PUNCT(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_ALNUM_PUNCT)
#define IS_QUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_QUOTE)
#define IS_DQUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_DQUOTE)
#define IS_DOLLAR(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_DOLLAR)
static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[128] = {
0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0080, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0040,
0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0040, 0x0080, 0x1000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0040,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200,
0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001,
0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200,
@@ -56,13 +58,13 @@ static const unsigned short CONF_type_default[128] = {
0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0004, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0000,
};
#if ! OPENSSL_API_3
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0
static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[128] = {
0x0008, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0010, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000,
0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0400, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0000,
0x0010, 0x0200, 0x0400, 0x0000, 0x1000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0000,
0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200, 0x0200,
0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0001,
0x0001, 0x0001, 0x0000, 0x0A00, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0000, 0x0200,
crypto/conf/conf_err.c
+3
View File
@@ -15,8 +15,11 @@
static const ERR_STRING_DATA CONF_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_ERROR_LOADING_DSO), "error loading dso"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_INVALID_PRAGMA), "invalid pragma"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_LIST_CANNOT_BE_NULL),
"list cannot be null"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_MANDATORY_BRACES_IN_VARIABLE_EXPANSION),
"mandatory braces in variable expansion"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_MISSING_CLOSE_SQUARE_BRACKET),
"missing close square bracket"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CONF, 0, CONF_R_MISSING_EQUAL_SIGN),
crypto/conf/conf_sap.c
+1 -1
View File
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
static int openssl_configured = 0;
#if !OPENSSL_API_1_1_0
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_1_1_0
void OPENSSL_config(const char *appname)
{
OPENSSL_INIT_SETTINGS settings;
crypto/conf/keysets.pl
+8 -4
View File
@@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ my $QUOTE = 0x0040;
my $DQUOTE = 0x0400;
my $COMMENT = 0x0080;
my $FCOMMENT = 0x0800;
my $DOLLAR = 0x1000;
my $EOF = 0x0008;
my @V_def;
my @V_w32;
@@ -38,6 +39,7 @@ foreach (0 .. 127) {
$v |= $ESC if $c =~ /\\/;
$v |= $QUOTE if $c =~ /['`"]/; # for emacs: "`'
$v |= $COMMENT if $c =~ /\#/;
$v |= $DOLLAR if $c eq '$';
$v |= $EOF if $c =~ /\0/;
push(@V_def, $v);
@@ -50,13 +52,13 @@ foreach (0 .. 127) {
$v |= $WS if $c =~ /[ \t\r\n]/;
$v |= $DQUOTE if $c =~ /["]/; # for emacs: "
$v |= $FCOMMENT if $c =~ /;/;
$v |= $DOLLAR if $c eq '$';
$v |= $EOF if $c =~ /\0/;
push(@V_w32, $v);
}
# Output year depends on the year of the script.
my $YEAR = [localtime([stat($0)]->[9])]->[5] + 1900;
# The year the output file is generated.
my $YEAR = [localtime()]->[5] + 1900;
print <<"EOF";
/*
* WARNING: do not edit!
@@ -80,6 +82,7 @@ print <<"EOF";
#define CONF_DQUOTE $DQUOTE
#define CONF_COMMENT $COMMENT
#define CONF_FCOMMENT $FCOMMENT
#define CONF_DOLLAR $DOLLAR
#define CONF_EOF $EOF
#define CONF_ALPHA (CONF_UPPER|CONF_LOWER)
#define CONF_ALNUM (CONF_ALPHA|CONF_NUMBER|CONF_UNDER)
@@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ print <<"EOF";
#define IS_ALNUM_PUNCT(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_ALNUM_PUNCT)
#define IS_QUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_QUOTE)
#define IS_DQUOTE(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_DQUOTE)
#define IS_DOLLAR(conf,c) is_keytype(conf, c, CONF_DOLLAR)
EOF
@@ -108,7 +112,7 @@ for ($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) {
}
print "\n};\n\n";
print "#if ! OPENSSL_API_3\n";
print "#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_DEPRECATED_3_0\n";
print "static const unsigned short CONF_type_win32[128] = {";
for ($i = 0; $i < 128; $i++) {
print "\n " if ($i % 8) == 0;
crypto/core_fetch.c
+2 -3
View File
@@ -31,9 +31,8 @@ static void ossl_method_construct_this(OSSL_PROVIDER *provider,
struct construct_data_st *data = cbdata;
void *method = NULL;
if ((method = data->mcm->construct(algo->algorithm_names,
algo->implementation, provider,
data->mcm_data)) == NULL)
if ((method = data->mcm->construct(algo, provider, data->mcm_data))
== NULL)
return;
/*
crypto/core_namemap.c
+183 -34
View File
@@ -72,9 +72,11 @@ static void stored_namemap_free(void *vnamemap)
{
OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap = vnamemap;
/* Pretend it isn't stored, or ossl_namemap_free() will do nothing */
namemap->stored = 0;
ossl_namemap_free(namemap);
if (namemap != NULL) {
/* Pretend it isn't stored, or ossl_namemap_free() will do nothing */
namemap->stored = 0;
ossl_namemap_free(namemap);
}
}
static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD stored_namemap_method = {
@@ -87,36 +89,16 @@ static const OPENSSL_CTX_METHOD stored_namemap_method = {
* =============
*/
OSSL_NAMEMAP *ossl_namemap_stored(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
int ossl_namemap_empty(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap)
{
return openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_NAMEMAP_INDEX,
&stored_namemap_method);
}
int rv = 0;
OSSL_NAMEMAP *ossl_namemap_new(void)
{
OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap;
CRYPTO_THREAD_read_lock(namemap->lock);
if (namemap->max_number == 0)
rv = 1;
CRYPTO_THREAD_unlock(namemap->lock);
if ((namemap = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*namemap))) != NULL
&& (namemap->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) != NULL
&& (namemap->namenum =
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_new(namenum_hash, namenum_cmp)) != NULL)
return namemap;
ossl_namemap_free(namemap);
return NULL;
}
void ossl_namemap_free(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap)
{
if (namemap == NULL || namemap->stored)
return;
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_doall(namemap->namenum, namenum_free);
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_free(namemap->namenum);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(namemap->lock);
OPENSSL_free(namemap);
return rv;
}
typedef struct doall_names_data_st {
@@ -210,8 +192,8 @@ const char *ossl_namemap_num2name(const OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number,
return data.name;
}
int ossl_namemap_add_n(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number,
const char *name, size_t name_len)
int ossl_namemap_add_name_n(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number,
const char *name, size_t name_len)
{
NAMENUM_ENTRY *namenum = NULL;
int tmp_number;
@@ -251,10 +233,177 @@ int ossl_namemap_add_n(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number,
return 0;
}
int ossl_namemap_add(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number, const char *name)
int ossl_namemap_add_name(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number, const char *name)
{
if (name == NULL)
return 0;
return ossl_namemap_add_n(namemap, number, name, strlen(name));
return ossl_namemap_add_name_n(namemap, number, name, strlen(name));
}
int ossl_namemap_add_names(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap, int number,
const char *names, const char separator)
{
const char *p, *q;
size_t l;
/* Check that we have a namemap */
if (!ossl_assert(namemap != NULL)) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_PASSED_NULL_PARAMETER);
return 0;
}
/*
* Check that no name is an empty string, and that all names have at
* most one numeric identity together.
*/
for (p = names; *p != '\0'; p = (q == NULL ? p + l : q + 1)) {
int this_number;
if ((q = strchr(p, separator)) == NULL)
l = strlen(p); /* offset to \0 */
else
l = q - p; /* offset to the next separator */
this_number = ossl_namemap_name2num_n(namemap, p, l);
if (*p == '\0' || *p == separator) {
ERR_raise(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_BAD_ALGORITHM_NAME);
return 0;
}
if (number == 0) {
number = this_number;
} else if (this_number != 0 && this_number != number) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, CRYPTO_R_CONFLICTING_NAMES,
"\"%.*s\" has an existing different identity %d (from \"%s\")",
l, p, this_number, names);
return 0;
}
}
/* Now that we have checked, register all names */
for (p = names; *p != '\0'; p = (q == NULL ? p + l : q + 1)) {
int this_number;
if ((q = strchr(p, separator)) == NULL)
l = strlen(p); /* offset to \0 */
else
l = q - p; /* offset to the next separator */
this_number = ossl_namemap_add_name_n(namemap, number, p, l);
if (number == 0) {
number = this_number;
} else if (this_number != number) {
ERR_raise_data(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, ERR_R_INTERNAL_ERROR,
"Got number %d when expecting %d",
this_number, number);
return 0;
}
}
return number;
}
/*-
* Pre-population
* ==============
*/
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
#include <openssl/evp.h>
/* Creates an initial namemap with names found in the legacy method db */
static void get_legacy_evp_names(const char *main_name, const char *alias,
void *arg)
{
int main_id = ossl_namemap_add_name(arg, 0, main_name);
/*
* We could check that the returned value is the same as main_id,
* but since this is a void function, there's no sane way to report
* the error. The best we can do is trust ourselve to keep the legacy
* method database conflict free.
*
* This registers any alias with the same number as the main name.
* Should it be that the current |on| *has* the main name, this is
* simply a no-op.
*/
if (alias != NULL) {
(void)ossl_namemap_add_name(arg, main_id, alias);
}
}
static void get_legacy_cipher_names(const OBJ_NAME *on, void *arg)
{
const EVP_CIPHER *cipher = (void *)OBJ_NAME_get(on->name, on->type);
get_legacy_evp_names(EVP_CIPHER_name(cipher), on->name, arg);
}
static void get_legacy_md_names(const OBJ_NAME *on, void *arg)
{
const EVP_MD *md = (void *)OBJ_NAME_get(on->name, on->type);
/* We don't want the pkey_type names, so we need some extra care */
int snid, lnid;
snid = OBJ_sn2nid(on->name);
lnid = OBJ_ln2nid(on->name);
if (snid != EVP_MD_pkey_type(md) && lnid != EVP_MD_pkey_type(md))
get_legacy_evp_names(EVP_MD_name(md), on->name, arg);
else
get_legacy_evp_names(EVP_MD_name(md), NULL, arg);
}
#endif
/*-
* Constructors / destructors
* ==========================
*/
OSSL_NAMEMAP *ossl_namemap_stored(OPENSSL_CTX *libctx)
{
OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap =
openssl_ctx_get_data(libctx, OPENSSL_CTX_NAMEMAP_INDEX,
&stored_namemap_method);
#ifndef FIPS_MODE
if (namemap != NULL && ossl_namemap_empty(namemap)) {
/* Before pilfering, we make sure the legacy database is populated */
OPENSSL_init_crypto(OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_CIPHERS
| OPENSSL_INIT_ADD_ALL_DIGESTS, NULL);
OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_CIPHER_METH,
get_legacy_cipher_names, namemap);
OBJ_NAME_do_all(OBJ_NAME_TYPE_MD_METH,
get_legacy_md_names, namemap);
}
#endif
return namemap;
}
OSSL_NAMEMAP *ossl_namemap_new(void)
{
OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap;
if ((namemap = OPENSSL_zalloc(sizeof(*namemap))) != NULL
&& (namemap->lock = CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_new()) != NULL
&& (namemap->namenum =
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_new(namenum_hash, namenum_cmp)) != NULL)
return namemap;
ossl_namemap_free(namemap);
return NULL;
}
void ossl_namemap_free(OSSL_NAMEMAP *namemap)
{
if (namemap == NULL || namemap->stored)
return;
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_doall(namemap->namenum, namenum_free);
lh_NAMENUM_ENTRY_free(namemap->namenum);
CRYPTO_THREAD_lock_free(namemap->lock);
OPENSSL_free(namemap);
}
crypto/cpt_err.c
+4
View File
@@ -14,6 +14,10 @@
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_ERR
static const ERR_STRING_DATA CRYPTO_str_reasons[] = {
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_BAD_ALGORITHM_NAME),
"bad algorithm name"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_CONFLICTING_NAMES),
"conflicting names"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_FIPS_MODE_NOT_SUPPORTED),
"fips mode not supported"},
{ERR_PACK(ERR_LIB_CRYPTO, 0, CRYPTO_R_ILLEGAL_HEX_DIGIT),
crypto/crmf/crmf_asn.c
+1 -2
View File
@@ -235,6 +235,5 @@ IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS) =
ASN1_EX_TEMPLATE_TYPE(ASN1_TFLG_SEQUENCE_OF, 0,
OSSL_CRMF_MSGS, OSSL_CRMF_MSG)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
ASN1_ITEM_TEMPLATE_END(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(OSSL_CRMF_MSGS)
crypto/crmf/crmf_lib.c
+9 -10
View File
@@ -97,10 +97,10 @@ static int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_push0_regCtrl(OSSL_CRMF_MSG *crm,
return 0;
}
/* id-regCtrl-regToken Control (section 6.1) */
/* id-regCtrl-regToken Control (section 6.1) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(regToken, ASN1_STRING, regCtrl)
/* id-regCtrl-authenticator Control (section 6.2) */
/* id-regCtrl-authenticator Control (section 6.2) */
#define ASN1_UTF8STRING_dup ASN1_STRING_dup
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(authenticator, ASN1_UTF8STRING, regCtrl)
@@ -153,11 +153,11 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_MSG_set_PKIPublicationInfo_action(
return ASN1_INTEGER_set(pi->action, action);
}
/* id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo Control (section 6.3) */
/* id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo Control (section 6.3) */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(pkiPublicationInfo, OSSL_CRMF_PKIPUBLICATIONINFO,
regCtrl)
/* id-regCtrl-oldCertID Control (section 6.5) from the given */
/* id-regCtrl-oldCertID Control (section 6.5) from the given */
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(oldCertID, OSSL_CRMF_CERTID, regCtrl)
OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(const X509_NAME *issuer,
@@ -188,10 +188,9 @@ OSSL_CRMF_CERTID *OSSL_CRMF_CERTID_gen(const X509_NAME *issuer,
return NULL;
}
/*
* id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey Control (section 6.6)
*
*/
/*
* id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey Control (section 6.6)
*/
IMPLEMENT_CRMF_CTRL_FUNC(protocolEncrKey, X509_PUBKEY, regCtrl)
/*-
@@ -567,7 +566,7 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_verify_popo(const OSSL_CRMF_MSGS *reqs,
* return 1 if the type of req->popo->value.keyEncipherment
* is OSSL_CRMF_POPOPRIVKEY_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE and
* its value.subsequentMessage == OSSL_CRMF_SUBSEQUENTMESSAGE_ENCRCERT
*/
*/
case OSSL_CRMF_POPO_KEYAGREE:
default:
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_MSGS_VERIFY_POPO,
@@ -702,7 +701,7 @@ X509 *OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_get1_encCert(OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE *ecert,
if ((iv = OPENSSL_malloc(EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))) == NULL)
goto end;
if (ASN1_TYPE_get_octetstring(ecert->symmAlg->parameter, iv,
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))
EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher))
!= EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher)) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_ENCRYPTEDVALUE_GET1_ENCCERT,
CRMF_R_MALFORMED_IV);
crypto/crmf/crmf_local.h
+2 -2
View File
@@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ struct ossl_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
ASN1_INTEGER *iterationCount;
X509_ALGOR *mac;
} /* OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER */;
#define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
# define OSSL_CRMF_PBM_MAX_ITERATION_COUNT 100000 /* if too large allows DoS */
/*-
* POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
@@ -232,7 +232,7 @@ struct ossl_crmf_pbmparameter_st {
* -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
* publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo -- from CertTemplate
* }
*/
*/
typedef struct ossl_crmf_poposigningkeyinput_authinfo_st {
int type;
union {
crypto/crmf/crmf_pbm.c
+6 -8
View File
@@ -133,8 +133,7 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,
int ok = 0;
EVP_MAC *mac = NULL;
EVP_MAC_CTX *mctx = NULL;
OSSL_PARAM macparams[3] =
{ OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END };
OSSL_PARAM macparams[3] = {OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END, OSSL_PARAM_END};
if (out == NULL || pbmp == NULL || pbmp->mac == NULL
|| pbmp->mac->algorithm == NULL || msg == NULL || sec == NULL) {
@@ -193,16 +192,15 @@ int OSSL_CRMF_pbm_new(const OSSL_CRMF_PBMPARAMETER *pbmp,
mac_nid = OBJ_obj2nid(pbmp->mac->algorithm);
if (!EVP_PBE_find(EVP_PBE_TYPE_PRF, mac_nid, NULL, &hmac_md_nid, NULL)
|| ((mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(hmac_md_nid)) == NULL)) {
|| (mdname = OBJ_nid2sn(hmac_md_nid)) == NULL) {
CRMFerr(CRMF_F_OSSL_CRMF_PBM_NEW, CRMF_R_UNSUPPORTED_ALGORITHM);
goto err;
}
macparams[0] =
OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
(char *)mdname, 0);
macparams[1] =
OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY, basekey, bklen);
macparams[0] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_DIGEST,
(char *)mdname, 0);
macparams[1] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string(OSSL_MAC_PARAM_KEY,
basekey, bklen);
if ((mac = EVP_MAC_fetch(NULL, "HMAC", NULL)) == NULL
|| (mctx = EVP_MAC_CTX_new(mac)) == NULL
|| !EVP_MAC_CTX_set_params(mctx, macparams)

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